NY Times: Anderson out, William Flynn in

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Regarding deleting the agents, it reminded me of what transit system boards of directors do when they panic. They'll make up a rule, say "no trip should operate that carries less than seven passengers", and staff will roll their eyes and turn reverse peak trips into deadheads that may or may not make real savings. The excuse is that till this century transit systems had limited information. Amtrak should have been able to cut agents based on revenue inbound and outbound for each station, not on boardings.

Regarding the PPC, dining car capacity on the CS has been an issue since the beginning, when dinners were wrapping up at 10:30 p.m. When Amtrak developed a staff in LA, they discovered that they had Santa Fe cafe cars sitting around. They had been used on secondary transcons. They were inserted between the coaches and the diners and coach passengers loved their plain, but good, menus. So I started to write up a commendation, until I was told that Washington, DC was not in the decision-making process and would kill the improvement if they learned of it before it was well-established. If a second server had been added in the CS Superliner lounge, for example, the end of the PPC might have been less harsh.
 
Not quite. The whole deal with BNSF wanting nothing to do with maintaining the line was resolved long before Anderson took over. IIRC, a three-way agreement was reached between Amtrak, BNSF, and the State of Colorado that dealt with the line. At the time, Amtrak basically had a deadline to either come to an agreement to maintain the track or reroute the Chief over the transcon, which would have run the train through north Texas instead. I want to say it was around 2015/16 or so that the issue got resolved, and Amtrak agreed to pitch in some money to maintain the track.
In fact it was like the movie "Z" (1969), in which a coup plot is inadvertently exposed by an unrelated investigation. The tri-state and community efforts culminating in the successful agreement accidentally exposed the plot to segment the SWC.

Other factors were Amtrak's finding that rerouting the SWC would require costly station improvements and BNSF's realization that putting the SWC on their priority freight route had some disadvantages. (This was similar to their experiences when the EB was routed on the cut-off between Fargo and Minot due to flooding and track problems on the line through Grand Forks).
 
One issue that is not considered by casual proposals to do in the LD trains is that with all of the discontinuances over the years the routes that remain include many segments that are not paralleled by the Interstate Highway system. Example: the SWC bus bridge included US350, two lanes and barely any shoulders, and low priority for snow removal. If the segmented trains were held at Albuquerque or Dodge City for the bus, their neo-corridor role would have been undercut.

I've followed the intercity bus industry over the years. Their customers demand to be routed via the Interstates or tollways. Check the history of Pacific Trailways (PDX<>SLC via US20 and US26) vs. Greyhound (PDX<>SLC via I-84). Routing long-distance Amtrak passengers on secondary highways would have limited appeal.

At Oregon DOT we found that there was a handy rule of thumb regarding the public's willingness to ride an intercity bus for a given number of hours. Dodge City <> Albuquerque would interest about 10% of the public. Given this and the condition of the needed highways, it was only possible to assume that the segmentation proposal was either evil or incompetent.
 
Is it possible that it may not be "hatred of LD trains" but undisclosed love of "profit from airline stock". Maybe he thought that, if the LD trains were killed off, airline stock would go even higher - at least the stock he may own.

Just a thought .... don't know if he owns any stock - but, many of the decisions he made for Amtrak seem to be dumber than a person with his track record should have made.
 
It might well be mere stupidity rather than malice, but either way the Anderson record is just dismal. All of the overnight trains in the east have been so degraded that even an inveterate train rider like me would rather stay home or find some alternative to riding them. Ridership on these trains is falling, even as it rises on the system overall, and this situation will get worse as more people in the trains' large pool of occasional riders discover how truly awful the service has become. Read Mail4MrTed's review of the Crescent above. Every day more riders are having their "never again" Amtrak experience. The Lake Shore now has the shortest consist of any in the nearly 45 years of its operation by Amtrak.

Yes, there was a congressional mandate on food-service costs, but under Anderson there seems to have been little if any effort to figure out how to navigate or comply with this in a way that might be palatable to the company's most loyal and high-revenue customers. And in their public comments, Anderson and his team repeatedly spread the false narrative that long-distance trains were somehow standing in the way of developing and expanding corridor operations, when in fact the existence of the national network has been crucial to the development of short-haul corridors in the Midwest, California and the Northwest over the past four decades.

And then there was the crazy bus-bridge proposal for the Southwest Chief. To conceive of such a farce, and to actually implement "contemporary" non-dining in the way that Amtrak has, reflects an utter cluelessness on Anderson's part about the organization he was leading, its mission and its customers. I fear it will take a long time to undo the damage of his tenure, if it is even possible to do so.
 
I have just arrived home from a New Orleans to New York trip on the Crescent (Anderson's "end points"). This is my first experience with "contemporary" dining. The food was tasty enough though on a long haul trip of 29 plus hours it got old. We bought sandwiches from the cafe for lunch since we really didn't want another "bowl (so much for being free)." The first wine was NOT free for the second of our two dinners which was not made clear. I paid a whopping $2,700 for two fares plus a bedroom. The bedroom on the way North was worn out and rattled and had doors that didn't close and lights that didn't work. The sleeping car attendant was usually missing in action somewhere. We had to wander around the train to find her to put the beds down. The Lead Service Attendant in the dining car was not a happy person and "self service" was not working well, especially for the older folks. There were no Millennials in site in the diner probably because they didn't know what a sleeper was and couldn't afford one if they did. So whether they were willing to sit with others was moot. The little signs inviting people to sit together were a joke. I truly missed intermingling with the coach folks as did everyone else. And I think coach people on a long trip should be able to purchase dinners though I am sure Amtrak would over charge.

On the way back the sleeper attendant was far more personable and the dining attendant made an effort at table service, her choice, though on a previous trip she was "scolded" by some official for making the extra effort! The train was 2 and half hours late into New York and 3 into New Orleans, which I am told was the earliest arrival time in NOLA all that week! The time keeping issue is not entirely Anderson's fault and must be corrected,somehow, since people can't rely on the time keeping. Other than that, my experience tells me Anderson's administration is a disaster and the company doesn't care that much. Good riddance. Now let's see if another airline guy can do any better. As far as food and service goes, they can save money and still offer a good product - they can and should do far better, especially for that kind of money.

The crescents OTP has been terrible for quite some time. I’m surprised it’s ridership seems to hold stable year after year. I guess it just shows the strength of that New York to Atlanta corridor and the ticket prices must be competitive with flying. If the Crescents OTP was fixed it would need more equipment.
 
But it seems the theory/belief is that he actively hated the LD trains, that he knew the right noises to make to Congress -- carrying the charade to the extent of asking Congress for more money for the national network than the NEC -- but then after getting that funding actively sabotaged the LD trains.

Does anyone realize how bonkers that sounds? Where would such active malice come from? Neglect or lack of enthusiasm makes some sense given that Anderson came to Amtrak from another industry altogether, but that same lack of experience leans against him knowing enough about LD trains to either hate or love them.

It's particularly odd in light of the national-network-heavy budget request. Half the infrastructure money and three-quarters of the equipment and station money is IMHO a hell of a lot more than you'd ask for if you hated LD trains but needed to ask for enough funding to hide it. Plus once Congress expects you to run the LD trains, what's to be gained from deliberately sabotaging them? Some of the old railroads sabotaged passenger service because they were fishing for ICC train-off authorizations, but Amtrak is more like a government bureaucracy where you connive to add to your bailiwick, not to be rid of a good chunk of it. :confused:

I think you're attempting to simplify the situation by turning it into a "love/hate" situation. I have read his remarks, heard his remarks and seen proposals and the message is quite clear. It is not about love or hate. It is about costs and it has been said time and time again the long-distance trains are cost eaters that have run their length.

Since certain think tanks and groups have been pushing for changes to the LD network, it was assumed it would be easy to "make the right noises to Congress." If you look at fleet plans and strategy, there is constant talk of reimaging of the LD network. They even made casual mention in the latest fleet proposal:

Several key elements which will drive our long-distance refleeting initiative remain
outstanding and will become clearer over the next 12-18 months. These include:

• Changes to our planned route network following reauthorization. Some long-distance
routes today may be better-served by daylight services which can use corridor trainsets;
the Palmetto is already a candidate for conversion to Amfleet I replacement trainsets.
The upcoming reauthorization will provide guidance to Amtrak from Congress
regarding the future National Network, and thus the route network which the new
long-distance fleet must support.


If you read the budget request, it was based upon the desire of Congress to operate the system as is.

While some may believe that he attempted to "sabotage" the long-distance system, I don't believe he did anything to "sell" or "grow" the system. Consists were cuts, trains were routinely canceled while tired rhetoric like using end to end ridership numbers as a basis for saying the service isn't what people want.

Once Congress started pushing back and people started realizing that asking for BILLIONS for the NEC while balking at funding 1 train for a few senators that you may need in your corner wasn't working out too well, the rhetoric was turned down.

Of course, none of this has anything to do with the new CEO, who hasn't uttered a peep and we have 105 posts in his thread. o_O
 
Some long-distance
routes today may be better-served by daylight services which can use corridor trainsets;

Yes, I'm sure New York-to-Chicago travelers would be better served by spending the night in Buffalo or Pittsburgh en route. Talk about clueless.

On the plus side, at least we could get a real dinner and breakfast while we were stopped overnight between trains.
 
The crescents OTP has been terrible for quite some time. I’m surprised it’s ridership seems to hold stable year after year. I guess it just shows the strength of that New York to Atlanta corridor and the ticket prices must be competitive with flying. If the Crescents OTP was fixed it would need more equipment.
FWIW: OTP arrival in Atlanta from NY has been reasonably reliable (by Amtrak's current standards)--most of the delays have been south of Atlanta.
 
Is it possible that it may not be "hatred of LD trains" but undisclosed love of "profit from airline stock". Maybe he thought that, if the LD trains were killed off, airline stock would go even higher - at least the stock he may own.
Actually, killing LD trains will have negligible effect on airline stock. I don't think any airline executive or stockholder really worries about Amtrak as an effective competitor in the LD market at all. The numbers tell the story pretty clearly. Amtrak's LD ridership falls in the noise territory in the statistics.

Just a very very rough back of the envelope scribbling suggests that Amtrak LD ridership is around 4.5 million per year, give or take (based on PTJ ridership figures for 2019). Airline domestic ridership is about 800 million give or take (based on FDOT Bureau of Transportation supplied statistics for 2018). Even if only 75% are main line that is still 600 million. Very generously if we say LD trains enable 6 million riders to not ride on planes, that is still just 1% of mainline air ridership. And I doubt that all of them or even 2/3rds of them would start flying if LD trains got segmented or disappeared.
 
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Of course, none of this has anything to do with the new CEO, who hasn't uttered a peep and we have 105 posts in his thread. o_O
Well considering that he does not become the CEO until April 15, and the he has a bit of a learning curve to traverse, it would be unfair to expect any "peep"s from him, specially ones that are substantially based on knowledge of the business and facts.

But I agree, AU as usual is ahead of the times :D
 
From the 1st of the year. Actually the arrivals of #19 in ATL are not that good. Just 8 OT arrivals

Average Ar delay: 50 minutes late
Median Ar delay: 31 minutes late

Now arrivals of #19 in CLT average just 15 minutes with 29 OT arrivals - departures

Average Ar delay: 15 minutes late
Median Ar delay: 9 minutes late

So Crescent loosing average of 35 minutes on each train clt - atl
 
From the 1st of the year. Actually the arrivals of #19 in ATL are not that good. Just 8 OT arrivals

Average Ar delay: 50 minutes late
Median Ar delay: 31 minutes late

Now arrivals of #19 in CLT average just 15 minutes with 29 OT arrivals - departures

Average Ar delay: 15 minutes late
Median Ar delay: 9 minutes late

So Crescent loosing average of 35 minutes on each train clt - atl

I stand corrected. Haven't been on this train in a while, and for several years the major delays were south of Atlanta.
 
Yes, I'm sure New York-to-Chicago travelers would be better served by spending the night in Buffalo or Pittsburgh en route. Talk about clueless.

On the plus side, at least we could get a real dinner and breakfast while we were stopped overnight between trains.

You seem to have missed the first word of the bit you quoted.
 
The problem with the “just following orders to reduce food costs” excuse is there were other tests that some claim were successful that were cut. The at your seat coach meals for example.
 
Something “selling” doesn’t mean it’s covering its costs or satisfying a mandate. The problem is that the mandate effectively required eliminating losses on food service, not just reducing them. Food service on Amtrak starts with a relatively high cost base (staff, equipment, catering logistics), and has a limited overall revenue potential (limited by the the more restrictive of the amount of storage space on board, the number of passengers on the train, and the price those passengers are willing to pay; essentially a supply-and-demand problem). So even if a certain practice was overall financially positive vs. the previously existing model, it may not have been enough to eliminate all of the losses for food service. It’s possible the best they could hope for under that model still only gets them part way towards their goal.
 
Something “selling” doesn’t mean it’s covering its costs or satisfying a mandate. The problem is that the mandate effectively required eliminating losses on food service, not just reducing them. Food service on Amtrak starts with a relatively high cost base (staff, equipment, catering logistics), and has a limited overall revenue potential (limited by the the more restrictive of the amount of storage space on board, the number of passengers on the train, and the price those passengers are willing to pay; essentially a supply-and-demand problem). So even if a certain practice was overall financially positive vs. the previously existing model, it may not have been enough to eliminate all of the losses for food service. It’s possible the best they could hope for under that model still only gets them part way towards their goal.

Again, with respect to the f&b mandate, the discussion of accounting for revenue is missing.

The very high sleeper price includes the meals but no indication as to the portion of the ticket price which is allocated to f&b.

It is likely that a shift in the allocation would cure any “apparent” loss.
 
Maybe that is why they discontinued allowing coach passengers on the Silvers from eating in the dining car - it made it too easy to set a price on each meal. If they wanted to declare a higher or lower portion of the sleepers for food - that is hard to do when menu prices show what is being charged.

Eliminate meals for coach - you eliminate published prices for the meals.
 
Actually, killing LD trains will have negligible effect on airline stock. I don't think any airline executive or stockholder really worries about Amtrak as an effective competitor in the LD market at all. The numbers tell the story pretty clearly. Amtrak's LD ridership falls in the noise territory in the statistics.

Just a very very rough back of the envelope scribbling suggests that Amtrak LD ridership is around 4.5 million per year, give or take (based on PTJ ridership figures for 2019). Airline domestic ridership is about 800 million give or take (based on FDOT Bureau of Transportation supplied statistics for 2018). Even if only 75% are main line that is still 600 million. Very generously if we say LD trains enable 6 million riders to not ride on planes, that is still just 1% of mainline air ridership. And I doubt that all of them or even 2/3rds of them would start flying if LD trains got segmented or disappeared.
I agree. Amtrak is not a factor, and no air executive views it as a threat. In the same way that Walmart and Target locate near each other, the more people travel is just good for business.
 
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