Derailment of Cascades #501, DuPont WA, 2017-12-18

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Several posts back, someone said that in Europe, or possibly it was Japan, engineers were required to point at the signals and say out loud what the signal said. Isn't this a rule for Amtrak? I have been told that's a requirement for engineers on some of the host railroads.
 
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Several posts back, someone said that in Europe, or possibly it was Japan, engineers were required to point at the signals and say out loud what the signal said. Isn't this a rule for Amtrak? I have been told that's a requirement for engineers on some of the host railroads.
Yes, but oversimplifying it...it signal says go, go slow, or stop. It does not display the speed limit.
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In most of the US the signaling system does not say anything about speed limits. People from the Northeast used to NORAC mistakenly think NORAC and its speed signals apply everywhere.

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Several posts back, someone said that in Europe, or possibly it was Japan, engineers were required to point at the signals and say out loud what the signal said. Isn't this a rule for Amtrak? I have been told that's a requirement for engineers on some of the host railroads.
Growing up in Japan, I've seen this used in practice in varying degrees. I've seen some drivers barely lift a finger on the busiest lines, to one driver on a very rural line practically shouting every action he was taking to the bemusement of passengers. In all cases, these were heavily ATC'd corridors.

I've made the argument since Chatsworth that there should be an operations conductor in the cab in addition to the payload conductor for passenger operations. Every class 1 freight had two in the cab (working, not observing). When you add a major function such as passenger manifests, ticket management, crew supervision, etc, that should require another head.

The problem with Chatsworth - and the same goes with every commuter operation - it's that the conductor repeats the signal call of the driver without being physically capable of actually seeing the aspect.
 
and problem with extra eyes in cab is freight trains crash all time , with extra eyes and at lower speeds , so were is the benefit??
We should get rid of co-pilots, then? Poor argument.
There were two people in the cab in the Cascades crash, so that didn't help anything.
They were observing or training, not a part of a resource management oriented crew.
 
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and problem with extra eyes in cab is freight trains crash all time , with extra eyes and at lower speeds , so were is the benefit??
We should get rid of co-pilots, then? Poor argument.
Actually no. Apples and Oranges.
The copilot is justified because if something happens to the pilot the plane cannot be brought to a safe state in the absence of the copilot. A train can be through simple devices like allerters, dead man’s handle/pedal and of course more sophisticated systems like PTC or Any flavor of ATC. In the latter situation the additional person is more of a distraction than help.

The other thing is there are Cockpit Resource Management protocols used these days to minimize distractions. Nothing of the sort exists on railroads. So even what could be done to operate more safely with two crew members is not practiced on railroads.
 
The copilot is justified because if something happens to the pilot the plane cannot be brought to a safe state in the absence of the copilot. A train can be through simple devices like allerters, dead man’s handle/pedal and of course more sophisticated systems like PTC or Any flavor of ATC. In the latter situation the additional person is more of a distraction than help.
Yes, because the deadmen have worked out so well at Spuyten Duyvil. Let's not forget how helpful the alertor was for the two crew members in the




Oh...so I guess railroad crew resource management instructions have been lifted?
 
They just don’t appear to work as effectively as the air ones given observed accident rates. [emoji6]

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I wouldn't know since I'm not an airline employee but I would say that train may have a lot more distractions to deal with than an airliner. I can't remember the last time I've heard of someone hanging a dog from a bridge juuust high enough to hit the windshield of a plane as it taxis down the runway. I'm not sure how many signals planes have to look for while in the air. I'd be willing to bet they aren't looking for one every two miles while also blowing a horn, looking at for signs, speed restrictions, trespassers, things in their flight path.

I can't remember the last time a plane had to even be concerned about something like this:



I suppose it was that Concorde that hit the debris in the runway and crashed. But, as I said...I'm not an airline employee.

Perhaps you can credit the crew resource management rules for there being less incidents than there are?
 
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There is no cockpit resource management that was going to prevent the Concorde crash at CDG. That was a goofup at multiple places, cockpit not being one of them. It was more akin to a piece of metal getting lodged in a point frog derailing a train. Now a CRM related incident for example would be the Tanenerife crash of the two 747s, or even the weird incident in SFO involving an Air Canda flight trying to land on a taxiway, in which case eventually a phenomenal potential disaster was averted - pretty much by chance.

But as I said in the first place, comparing planes and trains is not terribly useful when trying to decide what number of crew is appropriate, which at least you appear to agree with at great length.

I do agree with your point that it is likely that crew resource management does reduce the number of incidents some, but my point was - and quite possibly incorrectly - that the incidents still are way more frequent than is comfortable to an outside observer.
 
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An airline crew taking off in a crowded airspace like LaGuardia for example, does have to be on high alert......just ask Captain "Sully".....
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Reporting from aboard CS train 11. All trains have been rerouted back to the old route and using the old Tacoma station. Amfleet equipment are in PDX and are now operating the segment from Portland to Eugene. The one I saw had the Noethwest Regional branding on the side.
 
Okay, we're into the second year of this investigation.

Have the NTSB completed their interview with the crew of the 501 ?

Have any crew interviews been accomplished ? ?
 
seems everything in this investigation is secret, compare this to Amtrak #188 or MN at Spuyten Duyvil ??

in those investigations names , and everything including color of their Jockey shorts was public in 24 hours .

What is NTSB/FRA trying to hide ?
 
Okay, we're into the second year of this investigation.

Have the NTSB completed their interview with the crew of the 501 ?

Have any crew interviews been accomplished ? ?
Really? Second year? You make it sound like they’ve been investigating this for over a year. It’s only been 3 weeks.

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seems everything in this investigation is secret, compare this to Amtrak #188 or MN at Spuyten Duyvil ??

in those investigations names , and everything including color of their Jockey shorts was public in 24 hours .

What is NTSB/FRA trying to hide ?
I hope they learned their lesson and don’t release names. In order to protect the innocent (until proven guilty).

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