Does NS have fewer, more, or the same number of detectors than when it was Conrail ?
Freight Derailment disrupts Capitol Limited 2/3/23
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Our buses have Tire Pressure Monitors that measure both air pressure and temperature, that can give early warning of dragging brakes or overheated wheel bearings…
Yes there is a technical solution, both on how to detect and communicate any issues. Going to need a government mandate to get all railroads and railcars owners to do this. I just don’t see them proactively do anything. A Cost vs Benefit thing.
Railroads will amp up there lobbying, both to stop, delay, transfer the cost to the government.
It can be done. If we want to.
Pretty sure the railroads do not remove anything from the railway if it is still working, or not falling down. So many overhead catenary post still standing.
I do believe that there a FRA requirement for detectors. If there is not there should be.
Basically admitting the rules for classification were too weak to begin with.
Also I’m not reading anywhere that ECP brakes would have prevented the accident; instead would have been more effective in stopping the train and thus mitigated the damage.
There some very special trailers designed to circumvent reporting requirements for Hazmats in the trucking industry. The chemical industry works very hard to restrict regulatory oversight.
ECP brakes have a shorter stopping distance over the standard Westinghouse brakes in these longer trains. That should of prevent a few railcars from joining the pile. Less things in the pile, less things to catch on fire.
Again this was a mixed train, so all railcars need ECP brakes. Which is unlikely to be cost effective. Therefore a government regulation will be need.
There some politicians that are visiting the area, just not enough to get anything done, yet.
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rookzie
Train Attendant
This incident at East Palestine hase given me much more resolve in my decision taken as a car foreman for Norfolk Southern in 1985.
Approaching the end of second trick (work shift) that Friday night, the yardmaster at Portlock Yard (Chesapeake, Va., Norfolk Terminal) relayed to me a message from one of the dispatchers and bridge tenders, of sparks seen somewhere mid-train of an empty coal-hopper consist headed from the transloading piers back to the WV mines.
I walked to the westbound main, and all traffic on the eastbound had been suspended for my protection. Despite what I had sensed as a disappointment and possible annoyance from the operating department and train crew, I awaited for the slowed down passage of the train on the westbound main. I radioed the engineer and the yardmaster that the car in question had to be set out. The hand brake hadn't been released, and a wheel was sliding. With the car being empty, there was little chance of that axle breaking loose into free rotation over time, so it was a good catch by the observing bridge tender (Bridge 5).
I stood by until the train was split and the car was switched into the yard shop for as bad-ordered. I caught a bit of flack for that decision, but it was one which all along and to this very day almost 40 years later I felt was one of the best unilateral decisions I ever will have made. Had I determined that the train could proceed even with the hand brake released, the intensity of the rotating wheel flat-spot sound, a false flange possible already could have been in the making. It was not a "normal" rotating bang.
Now I can sleep nights.
Approaching the end of second trick (work shift) that Friday night, the yardmaster at Portlock Yard (Chesapeake, Va., Norfolk Terminal) relayed to me a message from one of the dispatchers and bridge tenders, of sparks seen somewhere mid-train of an empty coal-hopper consist headed from the transloading piers back to the WV mines.
I walked to the westbound main, and all traffic on the eastbound had been suspended for my protection. Despite what I had sensed as a disappointment and possible annoyance from the operating department and train crew, I awaited for the slowed down passage of the train on the westbound main. I radioed the engineer and the yardmaster that the car in question had to be set out. The hand brake hadn't been released, and a wheel was sliding. With the car being empty, there was little chance of that axle breaking loose into free rotation over time, so it was a good catch by the observing bridge tender (Bridge 5).
I stood by until the train was split and the car was switched into the yard shop for as bad-ordered. I caught a bit of flack for that decision, but it was one which all along and to this very day almost 40 years later I felt was one of the best unilateral decisions I ever will have made. Had I determined that the train could proceed even with the hand brake released, the intensity of the rotating wheel flat-spot sound, a false flange possible already could have been in the making. It was not a "normal" rotating bang.
Now I can sleep nights.
Will the NTSB analysis look at "what if" scenarios - if the train were shorter, if there were more frequent hot box detectors, if there were electronic braking - what would occur with all those permutations of circumstances?
Also, one dose of a carcinogen is probably not going to give a person cancer. Occasionally smoking cigarettes and then quitting give one a much lower chance of getting lung cancer than having a 2 pack a day habit. Now if they routinely have hazmat train crashes with explosions and fires on a regular basis in the area, then one might have good reason to start looking for cancer clusters.
This derailment was catastrophic and IMO will have a severe health, and environmental impact for years to come. I am surprised that it happened and that the problem was not discovered way before the derailment. Along all of that line NS line there are "hotbox detectors" and video cameras that should have alerted the engineer and conductor of problems. My question is; what happened? I also wonder about NS preventative maintenance program.
Hopefully the NTSB report will answer these questions.
"But the temperature readings never reached the critical threshold that would have tripped an alarm and required the crew to stop the train — until moments before the derailment, when train 32N passed the detector at milepost 49.81 in East Palestine."
https://www.trains.com/trn/news-rev...norfolk-southern-train-that-derailed-in-ohio/
jis
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One wonders if the way the dynamic brakes were applied had an effect on the way the derailment happend ...
No, but I am sure the NTSB will look into the force that occurred during the derailment.
My big issues is the non-smart track side defect detector. Seem to me there are not determining the outside temperature and alarm at a certain temperature above ambient. Just activated when it’s a critical high temperature.
What video cameras are you talking about? I don't think railroad infrastructure is equipped with cameras that would pick the fire up.
Also, Alan Fisher uploaded a video about it.
No federal standards for placement of defect detectors (DD) or alarm set points (Temperature).
NS safety setting for a DD is 170 degrees. Wonder what the other railroads have for that set point.
Also the railcar that failed was 23 cars back. Sure would like (from the Union) to know how many railcars that they think should be the maximum number pulled by one train. (For maximum safety.)
I think that this 3 person crew is going to need to hire a attorney. I do recall NS like to hold there crews accountable in a civil court.
NS safety setting for a DD is 170 degrees. Wonder what the other railroads have for that set point.
Also the railcar that failed was 23 cars back. Sure would like (from the Union) to know how many railcars that they think should be the maximum number pulled by one train. (For maximum safety.)
I think that this 3 person crew is going to need to hire a attorney. I do recall NS like to hold there crews accountable in a civil court.
west point
Engineer
If a defect detector had been installed at ~ MP59 would it have detected the problem? Certainly a question that jurys will ask!
And if it would have detected the problem, would it have considered it to be a problem? Or at least a problem that warrants a stop?
Seem this is a political thing now.
The EPA has now stopping transfer of waste. I guess they will now be paying for the clean up as there preventing and or add cost to the clean up.
Do you really thing it was the freight railroads solo decision to empty and burn the hazmat in a ditch?
I am sorry this is out of control.
The EPA has now stopping transfer of waste. I guess they will now be paying for the clean up as there preventing and or add cost to the clean up.
Do you really thing it was the freight railroads solo decision to empty and burn the hazmat in a ditch?
I am sorry this is out of control.
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crescent-zephyr
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If the detectors notice a rising temperature on a particular axle, the train crew should stop and inspect that axle. The fact that isn’t standard operating procedure is very concerning.
Obviously, if you wait until it’s 170+ - it may very well be too late, as was proven in this very situation.
Obviously, if you wait until it’s 170+ - it may very well be too late, as was proven in this very situation.
west point
Engineer
It is not the detectors that note the rise. It is the back office computer is supposed to tell the desk train # A has the rise and the desk has to call the train to examine the noted axel. Now the detector will send a stop the train message directly if temp, dragging equipment, or other dangerous problem as well as to the desk. Sort of a double back up?
jis
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I thought the detectors called out defects on the road channel. Has that changed? In addition to it might do additional actions with the back office.
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crescent-zephyr
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The engine crew should be able to monitor and react to data given from the Hot Box Detectors. If that's called out on the radio like it used to be, great. If it's transmitted to a computer on board the train, ok that works too.
The idea that the information needs to go to a computer in Atlanta and then someone decides if they should or shouldn't alert the train crew is very dangerous.
The train crew should be responsible for their train.
