Mysterious disappearance of AF 447

Amtrak Unlimited Discussion Forum

Help Support Amtrak Unlimited Discussion Forum:

This site may earn a commission from merchant affiliate links, including eBay, Amazon, and others.
I think that a lot of it depends on what they find. If there's an obvious smoking gun like one of the pilots saying "Holy crap, we just got struck by lightning and everything quit working", then it'll be a lot sooner than if the data is all mangled up and needs work.

I would think that weeks into months is about the right time scale, but I'll defer to those with more knowledge. I just hope that there's enough data there to give us a good feeling about what went wrong, and if there are any changes that can be made to help prevent it from happening again.
 
Normally it takes anywhere between 6 months to a couple of years. My hunch is that this is a complicated one and will take a while. The outcome may be as drastic as significant change in procedures for going past tropical storm lines etc. that may have significant impact on some schedules and routes even.

I get the impression that thunderstorms over Indian Ocean specially during Monsoon, are the worst, and much worse than typical ones in the Atlantic. The phenomenon of "Black Rain" is peculiar to that part of the world. So trans Indian Ocean flights may be the ones more affected than the trans-equatorial Atlantic and Pacific flights.
 
Discussion on airliners.net suggests now that initial data from CVR and FDR should be available within four weeks. Of course the complete analysis etc. will take much longer.

There are some interesting undercurrents about the credibility of the French investigative authority, which is accused by some of having tampered with data recorders in the past before handing them over to investigators. This allegation has been made specifically in connection with a Airbus 320 crash. So they are probably going to be extra cautious to make sure that no apparent impropriety or even appearance thereof happens this time.
 
The third interim report is now out from BEA, and it give an event by event description of what happened with a complete time-line, and frankly it is scary reading. Seems like there were a series of individually recoverable events that cascaded together to lead to disaster with possibly inadequate pilot training and cockpit management playing a significant part.

The report can be found at: http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/note29juillet2011.en.pdf

Safety Recommendations at: http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/reco29juillet2011.en.pdf

The passengers never knew anything was amiss since no announcements were made.
 
There weren't any announcements, but I would guess that falling at 10,000 feet per minute that they knew that something wasn't right.

Absolutely terrifying - of course it's easy to think rationally about it while sitting at a comfortable desk.
 
There weren't any announcements, but I would guess that falling at 10,000 feet per minute that they knew that something wasn't right.

Absolutely terrifying - of course it's easy to think rationally about it while sitting at a comfortable desk.
I wonder how much the passengers felt, other than a feeling of falling into an air pocket. Afterall even the pilots did not quite understand it, even with the altimeter whizzing away in front of them.
 
Early indications seem to be that the pitot tubes failed, possibly with ice. Pitot probes are always heated, so I'm sure we'll see something about that. Now the question is if the pilot flying responded correctly. The first thing a pilot learns is stall recovery, and the one thing they have to do is lower the nose, and add full power. The engines were operating normal. Several times the pilot flying raised the nose which upset the situation. It remains to be seen if he knew if they were in a stall. Obviously his airspeed information was not accurate.

Hopefully it's not the same as the Colgan crash in Buffalo. That was totally the pilots' fault.
 
Early indications seem to be that the pitot tubes failed, possibly with ice. Pitot probes are always heated, so I'm sure we'll see something about that. Now the question is if the pilot flying responded correctly. The first thing a pilot learns is stall recovery, and the one thing they have to do is lower the nose, and add full power. The engines were operating normal. Several times the pilot flying raised the nose which upset the situation. It remains to be seen if he knew if they were in a stall. Obviously his airspeed information was not accurate.

Hopefully it's not the same as the Colgan crash in Buffalo. That was totally the pilots' fault.
The Thales Pitot Tubes were known to have this problem, and at least 10 other flights had experienced similar problem (and even in bad weather) (both Airbus and Boeing aircrafts) and recovered. That particular type of Pitot Tube is not used by any responsible airline any more. Air France was in the process of replacing them when this event occurred and even the very aircraft involved was supposed to get the replacement Pitot Tubes before its next flight! Some sections of the press have alleged that they and the French in general dragged their feet for a while since after all Thales is an upstanding French company. Just allegedly mind you. No matter which way you look at it, two and a half French companies are in a bit of a soup it would seem.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
How Statisticians Found Air France Flight 447 Two Years After It Crashed Into Atlantic
After more than a year of unsuccessful searching, authorities called in an elite group of statisticians. Working on their recommendations, the next search found the wreckage just a week later.

Lawrence Stone and colleagues from Metron Scientific Solutions in Reston, Virginia,... are statisticians who were brought in to re-examine the evidence after four intensive searches had failed to find the aircraft. What’s interesting about this story is that their analysis pointed to a location not far from the last known position, in an area that had almost certainly been searched soon after the disaster. The wreckage was found almost exactly where they predicted at a depth of 14,000 feet after only one week’s additional search.
Today, Stone and co explain how they did it. Their approach was to use a technique known as Bayesian inference which takes into account all the prior information known about the crash location as well as the evidence from the unsuccessful search efforts. The result is a probability distribution for the location of the wreckage.
 
https://www.france24.com/en/france/...rial-in-paris-over-fatal-2009-rio-paris-crash
After more than 10 years of proceedings and a reversal of the court's decision to dismiss the case, Air France and Airbus will be tried on charges of "involuntary manslaughter". From Monday, the two aeronautical giants will appear before the Paris criminal court. They will face the families of the 228 passengers and crew members who died onboard flight AF447 from Rio de Janeiro to Paris when it crashed on June 1, 2009.

Civil parties, who have been caught up for a decade in a judicial labyrinth of expertise and counter-expertise reports requested by Airbus, have been long awaiting this extraordinary trial.
 
This is what to do unless a pilot has visual reference to the horizon. Whenever unusual indications of airspeed & or altitude place the airplane attitude horizon level wings and on the zero pitch. airplanes usuall have 3 independent attitude indicators. Set engine power to whatever setting needed for last known cruise altitude or slightly less if that attitude would cause too much airspeed.. Then check wings for ice and look at windshiel wiper shaft connection for ice Usually for most airplanes first location to ice.

At lower altitudes set attitude for whatever pitch will hold altitude and airspeed. If known ground hazards set attitude recommended and engines to max continous power.

Then tell ATC you have a problem. All the above will only take 10 - 15 seconds. Now why Air Chance experienced pilots did not do this ????
 
Back
Top