Years ago I worked a couple of contract inspection jobs on natural gas pipeline construction. After that I had a lot more respect for the safety of pipelines. It was very simple: 100% of everything done will be 100% inspected by someone who knows how to do the work being inspected., and that person will sign off on everything he looks at. But of course this was work doen by and for companies that were not government agencies.
Well, this is topic drift away from graft into "best practices" for complex projects, but I think pipeline safety is a good example of how we have left the straight and narrow, as I once worked on the governmental end of it. I agree, that qualified persons who work on natural gas pipelines are blue-collar royalty. A natural gas pipeline welder is formally qualified to make every weld he uses in the field. He makes the weld in front of an instructor and the weld is x-rayed. If the X-ray is good, he qualifies for the next kind of weld he uses. He only uses the exact kind of rosin rod appropriate for the exact kind of weld that he is using. When he is done, he documents the weld he used, the techniques that he used to make the weld, and the company stores the information permanently. All the while, cathodic protection is maintained and monitored for every foot of the pipeline. When I mentioned to the inspectors that these seemed like exacting standards, they shrugged and said it was only common industry practice in the late 1960's when the rules of part 192 were adopted. The concept of "Blue collar royalty" doesn't correspond with modern business management practices. The attitude now is "cheapest labor that can get the job right 90% of the time"
In practice what did we see? leaking natural gas pipeline patched with bicycle innertube and hose clamps. Thankfully that company sold their natural gas operations, but they still operate one of the largest nuclear power-plants in the US. Their successor did a pressurization test so ineptly (they didn't monitor pressure continuously, so they didn't know when their 18" main had blown out) that they nearly caused a 9/11 type conflagration in a major American city.
By the time I left the field, the Office of Pipeline Safety had abandoned formal regulation for something they called "risk management" which entailed letting the pipeline companies do what they thought best. That lasted for about four or five years until a family of six camping near an interstate pipeline in Southern New Mexico was horribly burned to death when the pipeline blew. Seems the company thought that cathodic protection and a yearly leak survey were unnecessary expenses.....
When it comes to Railroad,the FRA is one of the worst of the bad agencies. For many years their inspectors would keep their seniority with the railroads they were now inspecting. Railroads would be able to call bosses and cancel inspections. Hazmat write-ups would simply be thrown away. I'm sure its a little better now, but not much.
Its not a politically popular now, but there is a place for aggressive government regulation. When I was a kid corporate types were in mortal fear of the SEC. A small, but highly competent and hugely aggressive operation. They weren't loved, but the public had confidence in the markets and we attracted capital from all over the world because of it.
As Alice points out, its should be a seamless consideration. Good management practices maximizes good results and minimizes graft. An environment is maintained where the ethical operators can thrive. But you still need to be able to lower the boom on the bad apples, and fast.
P.S. I'd never heard of Parsons Brinckerhoff until now, let alone seen Parsons Brinckerhoff in my jurisdiction. If that's not a backhanded testament to your company's ethicality, I don't know what is.
