September 22nd, 1993

[amtrak_russ]

Let us all take a minute to remember the 47 souls that lost their lives on Big Bayou Canot in Alabama 15 years ago!!!

 

[Green Maned Lion]

Also, lets curse the Sons of the *****, whomever or whatever that might have been.

 

[SUNSETLIMITED01]

Another thing that is missing is the train itself. After this wreck in 1993 the Sunset Limited had bad luck all the way until late 2007. I'm going to think for a minute for now.

 

[caravanman]

(Comment withdrawn in light of information recieved!)

Ed B)

 

[sky12065]

(Post removed - see quote's author's original post)
Ed B)

OMG, I can't believe it's been 15 years since that happened! I still imagine Alligators whenever I think of that day; if I were asleep it would definitely be a nightmare!

(Post removed) -_-

EDIT: To follow up on previous post and my comment based on it!

 

[PRR 60]

Also, lets curse the Sons of the *****, whomever or whatever that might have been.

That was a different incident. Big Bayou Canot was the barge-strike and bridge failure in Alabama. The "Sons of the *****" incident was the sabotage wreck in Arizona in 1995.

 

[Crescent ATN & TCL]

Also, lets curse the Sons of the *****, whomever or whatever that might have been.

That was a different incident. Big Bayou Canot was the barge-strike and bridge failure in Alabama. The "Sons of the *****" incident was the sabotage wreck in Arizona in 1995.

Lets curse CSX for not welding a a movable bridge span closed after river traffic was discontinued. If there was more than the track itself holding the bridge together the accident might have never happened.

 

[amtrakwolverine]

Also, lets curse the Sons of the *****, whomever or whatever that might have been.

That was a different incident. Big Bayou Canot was the barge-strike and bridge failure in Alabama. The "Sons of the *****" incident was the sabotage wreck in Arizona in 1995.

Lets curse CSX for not welding a a movable bridge span closed after river traffic was discontinued. If there was more than the track itself holding the bridge together the accident might have never happened.

lets curse the broken toilet. if it was not broken the train would have crossed the bridge before the barge hit it instead of waiting in the station for repairs.

 

[NativeSon5859]

I remember that the engineer of the Sunset on that fateful day graduated from the high school I was attending at the time. They had a small memorial for him. Also, the one thing I clearly remember is the wreath that was placed on the track which the train departed from NOL that day. It remained there for quite a while from what I can remember.

 

[Guest_George Harris_*]

Lets curse CSX for not welding a a movable bridge span closed after river traffic was discontinued. If there was more than the track itself holding the bridge together the accident might have never happened.

This 'bridge not welded" is absolutely a red herring. Even if designed and built as a fixed bridge, the force applied by a barge tow would still have moved it.

 

[Green Maned Lion]

But, if the bridge was fixed or welded, is it not reasonable to think that the loss of life and damage would be lower?

 

[George Harris]

But, if the bridge was fixed or welded, is it not reasonable to think that the loss of life and damage would be lower?

"The force applied by the barge would still be sufficient to have moved it." Once the bridge was knocked out of line sufficiently for the train to have hit it, the rest would have occured about as it did.

 

[amtrakwolverine]

if the tracks had broken the signal would have shown red making the engineer stop or put the train into emergency if the last signal before red was green.

 

[gswager]

if the tracks had broken the signal would have shown red making the engineer stop or put the train into emergency if the last signal before red was green.

As long as the track is severed (broken contact). In Arizona where the Sunset Limited accident occurred decade ago, the sabotager is very clever to put a copper wire to link between the link of intentionally broken track, thus the signal is still green.

 

[Joel N. Weber II]

if the tracks had broken the signal would have shown red making the engineer stop or put the train into emergency if the last signal before red was green.

Which may argue that jointed rail could have been a good thing.

 

[Green Maned Lion]

But, if the bridge was fixed or welded, is it not reasonable to think that the loss of life and damage would be lower?

"The force applied by the barge would still be sufficient to have moved it." Once the bridge was knocked out of line sufficiently for the train to have hit it, the rest would have occured about as it did.

Well, certainly it would have still moved, but is it reasonable to think that it might have moved less, such that the train might have not hit the bridge, but derailed going over it and ended up mostly on the other side instead of in the bayou?

 

[George Harris]

Rather than continue this conversation, take a look at the accident report. While it is not available on the NITSB web site, it is available on the ICC Historical Accidents web site. Go to railroad accidents, then 1993, then Amtrak.

The report is somewhat longwinded. The conclusions:

Abstract: On September 22, 1993, barges, being pushed by the towboat MAUVILLA in dense fog, struck and displaced the Big Bayou Canot railroad bridge near Mobile, Alabama. Shortly after, the Amtrak Sunset Limited struck the displaced bridge and derailed. Forty-two passengers and 5 train crewmembers were killed, 103 passengers were injured. The towboat crew was uninjured.
The major safety issues discussed in this report include towboat operator training and evaluation, bridge risk assessment, bridge identification, emergency response and evacuation procedures, and event recorder crashworthiness.

As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board issued safety recommendations to the U.S. Department of Transportation, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Coast Guard, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, The American Waterways Operators, Inc., the Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company, the Association of American Railroads, and the American Short Line Railroad Association.

. . . . . . . . . . . .

CONCLUSIONS

Findings

1. The traincrew's qualifications and the condition of the track, signals, and train equipment did not contribute to this accident.

2. The Sunset Limited, traveling about 72 mph, derailed after striking a girder that had been displaced about 38 inches when the towboat MAUVILLA, pushing six barges, struck the Big Bayou Canot railroad bridge.

3. Had the pilot used the radar as visibility deteriorated, he could have observed the intersection formed by the Mobile River and the Big Bayou Canot and could have avoided turning his tow and barges into the wrong waterway.

4. The pilot exercised poor decisionmaking under the prevailing conditions by continuing to navigate when he could not find a tree to which to tie up, by continuing his approach to an unidentified object, and by not summoning help from other crewmembers.

5. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company did not provide adequate radar navigation training to the pilot, nor did it provide him with a compass.

6. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company's written evaluation form did not fully identify and assess those skills critical to vessel operation, limiting its value as a management tool for ensuring safe vessel operations.

7. The American Waterway Operators, Inc., should encourage member companies to incorporate into towboat operator evaluations a practical method of assessing proficiency in navigation, including the use of radar.

8. Coast Guard standards for inland towing vessel operator licensing are inadequate because they do not address the radar skills that are necessary for safe operation of vessels in restricted visibility.

9. All uninspected towing vessels should be required to carry appropriate navigational devices, including charts, in the wheelhouse, and all such vessels, except those operating in very limited areas, should be required to have a radar installed.

10. Delays in obtaining samples from vessel crewmembers, which prevented conclusive determination of whether alcohol was a factor in this accident, could continue to be a factor in marine accidents because Coast Guard regulations applicable to postaccident alcohol testing do not specify the time limits within which such testing must be conducted.

11. As evidenced by information provided by his employer and a statement from his doctor, the pilot had been able to control his diabetic condition satisfactorily since 1982 and the disease most likely did not preclude him from operating the MAUVILLA safely.

12. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company should establish procedures that encourage towboat operators to inform management when they are taking medication, determine whether such medication may affect their performance of duties, and arrange for a qualified relief, if necessary.

13. The transportation industry needs to disseminate information and educational materials that stress the relationship between use of medications (over-the-counter and prescription) and an employee's fitness for duty.

14. Damage to the bridge discussed in repair plans issued on November 1, 1979, was probably due to a barge strike that may have occurred as a result of high water and winds generated during Hurricane Frederic.

15. Currently available data pertaining to bridge-vessel collisions are insufficient to allow the U.S. Department of Transportation to develop a bridge risk assessment methodology or to allow the railroads to systematically identify vulnerable bridges and take action to increase protection for them.

16. Development of a national risk assessment program for railroad bridges requires the full cooperation and support of the railroad industry.

17. The U.S. Department of Transportation's development of a national risk assessment program for determining bridge vulnerability to vessel collision is needed.

18. To carry out a national risk assessment program for highway and railroad bridges, the transportation regulatory agencies need a standard methodology so that they can determine the vulnerability of the Nation's highway and railroad bridges to collisions from marine vessels, formulate a ranking system for identifying those bridges at greatest risk, and provide guidance on the effectiveness and appropriateness of protective measures.

19. Bridges vulnerable to impact from commercial marine traffic should bear unique, readily visible markings so that waterway and bridge users are better able to identify bridges involved in accidents when reporting such mishaps to emergency responders, a list of bridge identification markings should be published periodically in a national register of bridges.

20. Considering the remoteness of the accident site, the weather conditions, and the limited modes of transportation available, the emergency response was well-coordinated and effective.

21. Amtrak did not have an effective system of apprising passengers of safety features, and some passengers were unaware of safety information.

22. Because Amtrak did not equip its passenger cars with portable lighting, passengers were at a disadvantage in evacuating the train.

23. Emergency responders were at a disadvantage because they were unable to obtain an adequate passenger and crew list from Amtrak until the next day.

24. If the Mobile County Emergency Management Agency had held drills to simulate a train accident, the incident commander may have known about Amtrak's procedures for accounting for passengers, and CSXT may have had the correct telephone number for the Coast Guard.

Size of barges:

Today, the standard hopper barge is 195 feet long, 35 feet wide, 11 to 12 feet deep, and has a capacity of 1,400 to 1,500 tons of cargo (about 4 to 5 times the weight of the barge).

Take six of these plus the towboat. Approximately 10,000 tons. Far in excess of the weight of the bridge and any load it was built to carry.

 

[Joel N. Weber II]

Take six of these plus the towboat. Approximately 10,000 tons. Far in excess of the weight of the bridge and any load it was built to carry.

On the other hand, isn't 10,000 tons somewhat less than the total weight of a typical modern freight train (at over 100 cars, and over 100 tons per car)? (But the typical railroad bridge is much shorter than a typical long haul freight train.)

And then there's the issue that bridges are engineered to deal with the weight on top of them, but possibly not the same weight hitting them from the side.

 

[George Harris]

Take six of these plus the towboat. Approximately 10,000 tons. Far in excess of the weight of the bridge and any load it was built to carry.

On the other hand, isn't 10,000 tons somewhat less than the total weight of a typical modern freight train (at over 100 cars, and over 100 tons per car)? (But the typical railroad bridge is much shorter than a typical long haul freight train.)

And then there's the issue that bridges are engineered to deal with the weight on top of them, but possibly not the same weight hitting them from the side.

The 10,000 ton train is usually somewhere around 4,000 feet long or more. Goes back to the thought that a woman in high heel shoes puts more pressure on the spot where she is standing than a elephant. However, look at the elephant foot. It is spread over a much larger area. So, just becasue your floor can support a 120 pound woman wearing stiletto heels does not mean it will hold up the elephant.

For design purposes, a train is assumed to be spread out at a rate of 8,000 pounds per foot of track. The reality is normally less. That is the simplified version. There are a series of concentrated loads that combine to give a higher weight per unit length used to represent engines and an even higher set of four concentrated loads for use in the design of short spans. Then there are impact factors, safety factors, wind loads, ice loads, etc. etc.

 

[Green Maned Lion]

Rather than continue this conversation, take a look at the accident report. While it is not available on the NITSB web site, it is available on the ICC Historical Accidents web site. Go to railroad accidents, then 1993, then Amtrak.
The report is somewhat longwinded. The conclusions:

Abstract: On September 22, 1993, barges, being pushed by the towboat MAUVILLA in dense fog, struck and displaced the Big Bayou Canot railroad bridge near Mobile, Alabama. Shortly after, the Amtrak Sunset Limited struck the displaced bridge and derailed. Forty-two passengers and 5 train crewmembers were killed, 103 passengers were injured. The towboat crew was uninjured.
The major safety issues discussed in this report include towboat operator training and evaluation, bridge risk assessment, bridge identification, emergency response and evacuation procedures, and event recorder crashworthiness.

As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board issued safety recommendations to the U.S. Department of Transportation, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Coast Guard, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, The American Waterways Operators, Inc., the Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company, the Association of American Railroads, and the American Short Line Railroad Association.

. . . . . . . . . . . .

CONCLUSIONS

Findings

1. The traincrew's qualifications and the condition of the track, signals, and train equipment did not contribute to this accident.

2. The Sunset Limited, traveling about 72 mph, derailed after striking a girder that had been displaced about 38 inches when the towboat MAUVILLA, pushing six barges, struck the Big Bayou Canot railroad bridge.

3. Had the pilot used the radar as visibility deteriorated, he could have observed the intersection formed by the Mobile River and the Big Bayou Canot and could have avoided turning his tow and barges into the wrong waterway.

4. The pilot exercised poor decisionmaking under the prevailing conditions by continuing to navigate when he could not find a tree to which to tie up, by continuing his approach to an unidentified object, and by not summoning help from other crewmembers.

5. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company did not provide adequate radar navigation training to the pilot, nor did it provide him with a compass.

6. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company's written evaluation form did not fully identify and assess those skills critical to vessel operation, limiting its value as a management tool for ensuring safe vessel operations.

7. The American Waterway Operators, Inc., should encourage member companies to incorporate into towboat operator evaluations a practical method of assessing proficiency in navigation, including the use of radar.

8. Coast Guard standards for inland towing vessel operator licensing are inadequate because they do not address the radar skills that are necessary for safe operation of vessels in restricted visibility.

9. All uninspected towing vessels should be required to carry appropriate navigational devices, including charts, in the wheelhouse, and all such vessels, except those operating in very limited areas, should be required to have a radar installed.

10. Delays in obtaining samples from vessel crewmembers, which prevented conclusive determination of whether alcohol was a factor in this accident, could continue to be a factor in marine accidents because Coast Guard regulations applicable to postaccident alcohol testing do not specify the time limits within which such testing must be conducted.

11. As evidenced by information provided by his employer and a statement from his doctor, the pilot had been able to control his diabetic condition satisfactorily since 1982 and the disease most likely did not preclude him from operating the MAUVILLA safely.

12. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company should establish procedures that encourage towboat operators to inform management when they are taking medication, determine whether such medication may affect their performance of duties, and arrange for a qualified relief, if necessary.

13. The transportation industry needs to disseminate information and educational materials that stress the relationship between use of medications (over-the-counter and prescription) and an employee's fitness for duty.

14. Damage to the bridge discussed in repair plans issued on November 1, 1979, was probably due to a barge strike that may have occurred as a result of high water and winds generated during Hurricane Frederic.

15. Currently available data pertaining to bridge-vessel collisions are insufficient to allow the U.S. Department of Transportation to develop a bridge risk assessment methodology or to allow the railroads to systematically identify vulnerable bridges and take action to increase protection for them.

16. Development of a national risk assessment program for railroad bridges requires the full cooperation and support of the railroad industry.

17. The U.S. Department of Transportation's development of a national risk assessment program for determining bridge vulnerability to vessel collision is needed.

18. To carry out a national risk assessment program for highway and railroad bridges, the transportation regulatory agencies need a standard methodology so that they can determine the vulnerability of the Nation's highway and railroad bridges to collisions from marine vessels, formulate a ranking system for identifying those bridges at greatest risk, and provide guidance on the effectiveness and appropriateness of protective measures.

19. Bridges vulnerable to impact from commercial marine traffic should bear unique, readily visible markings so that waterway and bridge users are better able to identify bridges involved in accidents when reporting such mishaps to emergency responders, a list of bridge identification markings should be published periodically in a national register of bridges.

20. Considering the remoteness of the accident site, the weather conditions, and the limited modes of transportation available, the emergency response was well-coordinated and effective.

21. Amtrak did not have an effective system of apprising passengers of safety features, and some passengers were unaware of safety information.

22. Because Amtrak did not equip its passenger cars with portable lighting, passengers were at a disadvantage in evacuating the train.

23. Emergency responders were at a disadvantage because they were unable to obtain an adequate passenger and crew list from Amtrak until the next day.

24. If the Mobile County Emergency Management Agency had held drills to simulate a train accident, the incident commander may have known about Amtrak's procedures for accounting for passengers, and CSXT may have had the correct telephone number for the Coast Guard.

Size of barges:

Today, the standard hopper barge is 195 feet long, 35 feet wide, 11 to 12 feet deep, and has a capacity of 1,400 to 1,500 tons of cargo (about 4 to 5 times the weight of the barge).

Take six of these plus the towboat. Approximately 10,000 tons. Far in excess of the weight of the bridge and any load it was built to carry.

Interesting, but it fails to rebut my point. If it had moved 20 inches, rather than 38, lives might have been saved. I'm not saying the derailment could have been prevented, but it could have been less lethal, perhaps.

 

[PRR 60]

One cannot just weld a former movable bridge closed without some thought and analysis. To do so could turn what is, in structural engineering terms, a "simple span structure" into an "indeterminate span structure". What that means in English is the the stress and expansion characteristics of the structure could significantly change as a result of taking two sections of the bridge and making them act like one. That change may not for the better. Add to that the fact that the force imposed by a moving barge hitting a bridge from the side is far higher than virtually any bridge can withstand, and my conclusion is that welding that bridge shut would not necessarily have been a wise action structurally and likely would not have prevented the tragic outcome.

 

[had8ley]

One cannot just weld a former movable bridge closed without some thought and analysis. To do so could turn what is, in structural engineering terms, a "simple span structure" into an "indeterminate span structure". What that means in English is the the stress and expansion characteristics of the structure could significantly change as a result of taking two sections of the bridge and making them act like one. That change may not for the better. Add to that the fact that the force imposed by a moving barge hitting a bridge from the side is far higher than virtually any bridge can withstand, and my conclusion is that welding that bridge shut would not necessarily have been a wise action structurally and likely would not have prevented the tragic outcome.

One thing that I never read in the NTSB report (I probably overlooked it) but how far back from the bridge was the last signal? Apparently, it was clear as the train was making track speed but IF a non-welded bridge did not break the circuit and throw up a red block what's to say that a welded, at both ends, bridge would do any different or worse yet~ hold the block green.

 

[George Harris]

Take six of these (1500 ton barges) plus the towboat. Approximately 10,000 tons. Far in excess of the weight of the bridge and any load it was built to carry.

Interesting, but it fails to rebut my point. If it had moved 20 inches, rather than 38, lives might have been saved. I'm not saying the derailment could have been prevented, but it could have been less lethal, perhaps.

See also what PRR60 said:

One cannot just weld a former movable bridge closed without some thought and analysis. To do so could turn what is, in structural engineering terms, a "simple span structure" into an "indeterminate span structure". What that means in English is the the stress and expansion characteristics of the structure could significantly change as a result of taking two sections of the bridge and making them act like one. That change may not for the better. Add to that the fact that the force imposed by a moving barge hitting a bridge from the side is far higher than virtually any bridge can withstand, and my conclusion is that welding that bridge shut would not necessarily have been a wise action structurally and likely would not have prevented the tragic outcome.

And also had8ley's comment about the signal. It is also entirely possible that even if jointed rail the bars would not have pulled apart so continuity and a green signal would have remained.

The train could have derailed if the offset had been 12 inches or even 6 inches. We really do not know. Would cars have gone into the water with a lesser offset? We do not know that either.

As someone once said, major transportation disasters usually consist of several improbably thnigs coming together at one time and place.

Give it up. I am quitting on this subject with this. Have you ever heard the expression, "beating a dead horse?"

 

[Green Maned Lion]

It's my favourite pastime. I got the original Mr. Ed as my whipping boy.