URPA Newsletter

[AlanB]

Mr. Boardman's trains, totaling 18 departures a day (nine roundtrips), solely serve residents of New York State. These trains offer coach and business class service, and some trains have cafe/food service, too. Most of the departures are clustered around morning and evening rush hour in and out of New York City, and cover much of the same stations as Metro North commuter trains. For FY 2008, Empire Service trains had an average failing load factor of 35%, carried just 105 passengers per mile, and had an average length of trip of 124 miles per passenger. Empire Service trains carried 994,300 passengers, each paying an average of 33 cents per revenue passenger mile for total revenue of $41,058,400.

I would really love to know where and how he comes up with these numbers, as I can't get close at all, other than to agree that the total passenger count is correct and the total revenue.

But when I try to calculate the passengers per mile, I get 150, not 105. And that's not really correct either, since there are only 18 trains per weekday, there are less on a weekend, which inflates my number. Additionally since this really is geared as a commuter service, one should be making the calculation based upon weekday ridership and then weekend ridership.

I wouldn't argue that NY State should be paying for this service, but that still doesn't change the fact that I believe the numbers are wrong.

 

[Hamhock]

I keep waiting for him to snap, and just put out an issue consisting of "NO ONE LISTENS TO ME! WHY WON'T ANYONE LISTEN TO ME?"

 

[haolerider]

I keep waiting for him to snap, and just put out an issue consisting of "NO ONE LISTENS TO ME! WHY WON'T ANYONE LISTEN TO ME?"

And you don't think he has already snapped???

He mentions that no outside group - other than URPA and the Reform Council - have scrutinized Amtrak; however I think he must be forgetting Congress, FRA, IG, etc. who are scrutinizing Amtrak every day. This is not to mention the rail fan groups that scrutinize from a distance - sometimes with more emotion than fact!

 

[jis]

I keep waiting for him to snap, and just put out an issue consisting of "NO ONE LISTENS TO ME! WHY WON'T ANYONE LISTEN TO ME?"

And you don't think he has already snapped???

He mentions that no outside group - other than URPA and the Reform Council - have scrutinized Amtrak; however I think he must be forgetting Congress, FRA, IG, etc. who are scrutinizing Amtrak every day. This is not to mention the rail fan groups that scrutinize from a distance - sometimes with more emotion than fact!

Ah! But if they don't agree with *them* clearly they need to keep scrutinizing more until they see the light of the day and do get around to agreeing with him. Until then they don't count Incidentally, among the so called rail advocates they are not alone in this attitude towards life either.

I have to hand it to them though.... they are masters of rhetoric and one liners. And sometimes they are even correct on a point or two.

 

[frj1983]

Like everybody else,

he gets a good jab in once in awhile. But his/their sense of self-importance is herculean!!! :lol:

 

[EB_OBS]

There are legitimate reports and corporate information available to anyone who can read from the Internet there are profitable passenger train services in Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, and elsewhere. If passenger trains can be profitable there, why not here?

Anyone know where to possibly find these so-called legitimate reports and information? It's been my understanding, since joining AMTRAK three years ago, that there isn't a profitable passenger railroad anywhere in the world. Have I been mislead?

 

[saxman]

There are legitimate reports and corporate information available to anyone who can read from the Internet there are profitable passenger train services in Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, and elsewhere. If passenger trains can be profitable there, why not here?

Anyone know where to possibly find these so-called legitimate reports and information? It's been my understanding, since joining AMTRAK three years ago, that there isn't a profitable passenger railroad anywhere in the world. Have I been mislead?

I have seen somewhere that the TGV line from Paris to Lyon makes an operating profit only. I'm sure it doesn't cover capital costs and expansion. That could be this guys definition of profit. I mean the Auto Train makes an operating profit and other routes come close to it. The numbers Amtrak gives even says the NEC makes a profit, but I know thats not really true, given how many of its allocated costs are given to other trains.

I'm willing to bet if proper capitol investments are made, I bet some LD trains could at least break even, operationally. The Empire Builder's farebox recovery is 76%. I'm willing to bet with the addition of the new cars on this train, it would be much higher.

 

[jis]

I have seen somewhere that the TGV line from Paris to Lyon makes an operating profit only. I'm sure it doesn't cover capital costs and expansion. That could be this guys definition of profit. I mean the Auto Train makes an operating profit and other routes come close to it. The numbers Amtrak gives even says the NEC makes a profit, but I know thats not really true, given how many of its allocated costs are given to other trains.

According to http://www.trainweb.org/tgvpages/map.html#pse, LGV PSE (Paris - Lyons) in 1991 made a profit of almost $400 million net of Maintenance, Operations and Depreciation, which would indicate that it was profitable taking into account depreciation of capital investment. That is way more profitable than Amtrak has ever claimed for the NEC or the Autotrain or anything else. I believe the LGV PSE and LGV Atlantique have been profitable net of capital for many years and at least the LGV PSE has actually paid dow the entire capital and interest on it and then some.

That is not to say that all LGV's are that profitable. Many of the newer ones would not have been built if the departments (districts) through which they passed had not agreed to chip in capital to construct them.

 

[MrFSS]

This Week at Amtrak; June 25, 2009

​

​

A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from

​

​

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

​

America's foremost passenger rail policy institute

​

​

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

​

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail

[email protected] • http://www.unitedrail.org​

​

​

Volume 6, Number 18

​

Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) Here at home in an adjoining county to the south is St. Augustine, which bills itself as the Ancient City. St. Augustine, Florida has been around as a point of civilization since 1565, and was pretty much a sleepy, colonial town, even after Florida statehood in 1845. It wasn't until the notorious Henry Flagler, business partner of John D. Rockefeller (Some historians say Flagler was the smarter of the two ruthless business partners.) came vacationing in Northeast Florida in the 1878 that he noticed sleepy St. Augustine.

Mr. Flagler came to Jacksonville for the temperate climate. (A century ago, oranges were still a cash crop in Northeast Florida.) He crossed the might St. Johns River (The only major river in North America which flows north.) and traveled by passenger train to St. Augustine in 1883. There, he found a slumbering city of Spanish descent which afforded cooling ocean breezes, a pleasant bayfront view, and a rural county seat.

Mr. Flagler took a liking to St. Augustine, and starting building hotels and the Florida East Coast Railway. His first hotel, the Ponce de Leon – begun in 1885 and which today is the home of Flagler College – became an overnight success as a playground for the Gilded Age rich and famous. More hotels followed, with Mr. Flagler becoming St. Augustine's most prominent part-time denizen.

Not content to stop at St. Augustine, Mr. Flagler pushed his new railroad and string of hotels and resorts southward, creating such famous Florida hot spots as Ormond Beach/Daytona Beach, Cocoa Beach, Melbourne, Stuart, Palm Beach (Where Mr. Flagler eventually built his permanent home and today's world famous The Breakers hotel and resort, the only remaining asset of the original Flagler System.), Ft. Lauderdale, and, in partnership with Julia Tuttle and her family, Miami and Miami Beach. Mr. Flagler's railroad entrepreneurship didn't end in Miami; he gazed further southward and saw Key West, the southernmost point of the United States, and promptly in 1905 began building the Florida Overseas Railroad, one island at a time from South Florida to Key West, completing the huge project in 1912.

Depending on your favorite Florida historian, there is debate as to whether or not Henry Flagler or Henry B. Plant, who owned a freight shipping company and small railroads, and in 1879 combined his holdings into the Plant System (Later, the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad.), building to the west coast of Florida via Orlando, invented modern Florida by the strength of their iron horses.

Of course, it was the common use of residential air conditioning in the late 1950s which created the most modern version of Florida, and allowed inland cities and towns away from cooling ocean and Gulf of Mexico breezes to grow and prosper. The coming of the Space Age at Cape Canaveral on the Florida East Coast Railway really put Florida on the international map.

But, no matter who your preferred railroad robber baron was prior to the Florida Land Boom of the 1920s, it was the railroad which created Florida, and especially St. Augustine.

St. Augustine was the home of a violent and deadly railroad strike in 1963; FEC non-operating employees went out on strike over several issues. The FEC continued to run trains with management personnel, but the strike turned violent with numerous bombings of bridges and trains, resulting in deaths, permanent injuries, and general mayhem.

By the time of the strike, Florida was served by the Seaboard Air Line Railroad, the Atlantic Coast Line, the FEC, and, into the northeast corner of Florida, the Southern Railway.

While the Seaboard's Silver Meteor, Silver Star, Palmland, Sunland, and a host of local trains traveled down the middle of the state on SAL's mainline through Ocala, the Coast Line trains, the East Coast Champion, the Everglades, and the trains it operated in conjunction with the FEC, such as the famed Winter-only Florida Special, the Havana Special, and the trains from the Midwest, including the Royal Palm, Dixieland, South Wind, Seminole, and City of Miami all stormed through St. Augustine on their way to and from Miami.

The 1963 strike ended all of that. The FEC's named trains simply disappeared, annulled because of the strike and the continuing violence and threats of violence. The trains handled by the Coast Line moved inland westward, from the FEC to soon-to-be merger partner's SAL lines down the middle of the state.

By court order, train service briefly returned to the FEC from 1965 to 1968, with a lone locomotive and two trailing cars – offering coach seating and parlor car seating, but no food service – running up and down from North Miami to Jacksonville's union terminal. (The main FEC station in downtown Miami had been torn down by 1965 as part of urban renewal in downtown Miami.)

Even FEC retirees who chose to come to Jacksonville from Miami when traveling by train, went via the Seaboard or Coast Line because it was safer, had more frequency offerings, and full train service.

In the late 1990s, in the George Warrington era of Amtrak, there was a brief flurry of activity in St. Augustine because discussions and negotiations were underway to return passenger train service to the FEC, courtesy of Amtrak and a ton of money (Now allocated elsewhere.) from the State of Florida.

Plans were laid, station sites were identified (The FEC, like so many other railroads which exited the passenger business had executives at the time who wanted to make sure those pesky passengers stayed away, so all but one or two FEC passengers stations were either demolished, sold, or had their tracks ripped up.), and cities and towns along the east coast competed to see whether or not they could snag one of the limited number of station stops planned for the new service.

St. Augustine, once the railroad king of Florida and still the corporate home of the FEC until 2008, decided to build a new station on the FEC main line directly across the street from St. Augustine's general aviation airport, claiming it was creating an "intermodal" center of transportation. No one ever quite explained what the attraction would be for private pilots to fly into the St. Augustine airport, tie their planes down, and then board a passenger train, but that was the plan.

All of those plans came to a screeching halt when Mr. Warrington's Acela bubble burst, and the Northeast Corridor Service which was supposed to save the entire company ended up having the company coming close to being liquidated.

Now, in the third century of trains through St. Augustine, once again there is talk of passenger trains calling at St. Augustine. Several local government groups along the FEC are petitioning popular Florida Governor Charlie Crist to apply for free federal monies to pay for restoring service between Jacksonville and Miami via St. Augustine, Daytona Beach, Cocoa Beach, Melbourne, Fort Pierce, Jupiter, and into West Palm Beach where a new connection would be built for the trains to join the former SAL main line (Now Tri-Rail commuter line and present Amtrak line.) to take the train into Amtrak's Miami/Hialeah southern terminal.

The scary part of this is the news media is reporting these funds are being asked for to use for high speed rail, not conventional rail. While the FEC is a very good piece of railroad with excellent infrastructure, no one would ever confuse it with high speed rail. Some of the logic goes the incremental approach should be taken, first restoring service, and then eventually upgrading the service to high speed over a specified period of time.

What is interesting about this is the current ownership of the FEC, RailAmerica, Inc., which in turn is owned by Fortress Investment Group. RailAmerica, in addition to owning the FEC, owns nearly four dozen other short line and regional railroads in the U.S. and Canada.

RailAmerica is a solid company, with good financial performance. Fortress Investment Group is a giant fund which controls many companies, all on a private basis. This means there are no individual stockholders or Wall Street money managers demanding RailAmerica do this or that to shore up stock prices, and no public reporting of financial results. In other words, the managers are free to carry out any prudent business decisions they see fit (Within the framework of the law and overall regulations.), including striking a deal with Amtrak to run trains on their property.

If it makes money and doesn't interfere with RailAmerica's other mission of supplying outstanding freight service, then there is an interest.

If the State of Florida does strike a deal for stimulus money for this route, there isn't much standing in the way of restored passenger service between Jacksonville and Miami via the FEC, with the exception of creating a new equipment pool.

Initial plans were to move the Silver Meteor from Orlando to the FEC, which is a very, very bad idea. Why would anyone want to take service away from one of the world's busiest vacation destinations in Central Florida to serve the towns of Florida's east coast?

A better solution is to find additional equipment, or, perhaps split a train in Jacksonville (Which Amtrak did from its very beginning until the horror of the common consist in the 1990s, and the closing of the Tampa crew and maintenance bases.), with half of the train traveling via Orlando and half of the train traveling via St. Augustine. Other options are to extend other trains from the Midwest or Northeast south to Miami via the FEC, such as the Capitol Limited or City of New Orleans via Mobile, Alabama. Extending an existing Superliner train would require less equipment than starting a complete new route.

As usual, it's all going to come down to politics. Which state (Other than Illinois.) has the most juice in Washington? Which state has the best planning? Which state can move the quickest?

St. Augustine may or may not have train service again, 125 years after Henry Flagler became serious about hauling passengers into Florida to fill up his elegant hotels and resorts. If it does, yet another of the dozens and dozens of gaps in America's passenger rail system will be rightly filled.

2) Inquiring minds want to know: With all of the money being thrown around Washington, and every city, town, village, hamlet, and their dog making plans to snap up as much money as possible to expand everything from local trolley systems (A good idea.) to major commuter rail systems to sprucing up stations, where are Amtrak's plans for the future? What about fleet expansion, Rail Passenger Association of California President Paul Dyson wants to know? The single-level sleeping car order for the east coast trains doesn't do anything to expand capacity; it just keeps enough new equipment floating into a maintenance-weary fleet to delay total breakdown.

What about new routes? We know three restart routes are being studied (The Sunset Limited east of New Orleans, the Pioneer, and the North Coast Limited/Hiawatha.), but, what about bold, new plans to fill in so many of the other gaps in the country outside of the Northeast Corridor?

And, the easiest thing of all, what about all of the other dozens and dozens of pieces of equipment sitting around in the weeds on wreck line tracks, waiting to be re-loved and repaired? When will Amtrak ask for money to fix this stuff, too?

A dose of reality for True Believers is Amtrak is lagging behind everyone else in vision, if not outright bold management. Yes, Amtrak Interim President and CEO Joseph Boardman seems to be nudging things in the right direction – only marginally and slightly so – but, when is he or the Board of Directors going to give things a major shove in the right direction?

Wise gray head Gil Carmichael has called for at least 150 new trainsets to ready Amtrak for his brilliant Interstate II strategy. While to some that may seem a big number, it's only a starting point.

Remember, Amtrak today has considerably less than 2,000 cars on its total roster, including active cars and cars sitting in the weeds on the wreck line. In the mid 1960s, just before the invention of Amtrak, there were over 5,000 passenger cars in the combined national fleet of America's passenger carriers, and that was a depleted number from the halcyon post-World War II days of rebuilding the worn out war time fleet of cars.

Now is not the time for timidity and reliance on the graciousness of others for survival. Now is the time for bold plans, bold action, and an understanding of how easy it is to bring America's passenger rail system from an asterisk on the charts of transportation output to a real figure representing growth and prosperity.

3) While we're on the subject of history, News From 1930 blog on the Internet came up with this fascinating gem, reporting what was written in The Wall Street Journal from June 16th through the 21st in 1930:

[begin quote]

Pullman Company [Operator of the nation's sleeping car business over the majority of passenger railroads.] purchases in the last year: 1,165,000 towels, 444,000 pillow slips, 387,000 sheets, 63,000 porter's jackets, 5,786,000 paper bags for women's hats. Launders 278 million items annually.

[End quote]

That's a lot of items, especially for the first year of the Great Depression. At one point early in the 20th Century, it was said the Pullman Company made up more beds every night than the largest hotel chain in the country.

4) Now, what? Amtrak's highly respected Inspector General, Fred E. Weiderhold, Jr. suddenly retired from Amtrak after 35 years, including being the watchdog who kept the contractors honest when the NEC was electrified north of New Haven, Connecticut.

This happened practically overnight, and was unexpected by most. The Boston Globe wondered in its news columns what brought on this sudden urge to retire, but no one is talking. It should be noted in the same several day period Mr. Weiderhold retired, at least three other government IGs were forced out of their jobs by the Obama Administration without reasonable explanation.

[begin quote]

National Railroad Passenger Corporation

60 Massachusetts Avenue NE

Washington, DC 20002

www.amtrak.com

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

ATK-09-047

Contact: Media Relations (202) 906-3860

June 18, 2009

Amtrak Inspector General to Retire

Fred E. Weiderhold, Jr. Served Amtrak for 35 Years

WASHINGTON – Amtrak Inspector General Fred E. Weiderhold, Jr. today informed the Chairman of the Amtrak Board of Directors that he is retiring after 35 years of loyal service to the railroad.

"As Amtrak's first and only Inspector General, Fred has made important contributions in helping the Board of Directors understand key issues facing the railroad and made useful recommendations to improve how we do business," Amtrak Chairman Thomas Carper stated. "We thank him for his dedicated service to Amtrak and wish him well in his retirement."

Carper added that under the federal Inspector General Act, the Amtrak Inspector General is appointed by the Chairman of the Board of Directors. Carper said he takes this responsibility seriously and will soon undertake a search for a replacement that can continue to maintain the integrity, independence and objectivity required of the position.

In addition, Carper said that he has confidence in the Inspector General staff and expects them to carry on their important work during this interim period, including providing effective oversight of how Amtrak is handling the stimulus funds it received from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.

Mr. Weiderhold has been the only person to serve as the Amtrak Inspector General since former Amtrak Chairman W. Graham Claytor, Jr, asked him to establish the Amtrak Office of Inspector General (OIG) in 1989. Previously, he was Amtrak's first Special Assistant to the Chairman for Employee Relations, conducting special investigations and acting as the company's first employee ombudsman. He has been one of the longer serving Inspectors General within the OIG community.

About Amtrak

Amtrak has posted six consecutive years of growth in ridership and revenue, carrying more than 28.7 million passengers in the last fiscal year. Amtrak provides intercity passenger rail service to more than 500 destinations in 46 states on a 21,000-mile route system. For schedules, fares and information, passengers may call 800-USA-RAIL or visit Amtrak.com.

[End quote]

5) The Holland, Michigan Sentinel on Monday, June 22, 2009 reported ridership on Amtrak's Pere Marquette is down 12.7% this May compared to a year ago, and a state senate committee which funds the service is looking to slash funding for the train.

Only 8,500 people boarded the route in May of 2009, or an average of 137 passengers per departure. All of the usual reasons were given for low ridership, including low gas prices and the slowed economy.

Here's the problem no one seems to want to understand: As long as government funding as the primary source of revenue for these short, perpetually money-losing routes is necessary, politicians are going to always be looking for ways to cut budgets, and low return on investment programs are usually the first to go.

Too much of Amtrak relies on this very type of funding. There are unceasing stories from New England about those states wanting to cut funding for local trains (This, of course, does not include Amtrak Interim President and CEO Joseph Boardman's home State of New York where he previously served as head of the state department of transportation. New York only funds one Amtrak train, the Adirondack, even though the entire Empire Service trains, with only an average load factor of 35%, gets a free ride with an all-federal subsidy.). Oklahoma pays big bucks for the tiny Heartland Flyer with even worse transportation output performance.

What will it take to make Amtrak and its True Believers understand a healthy and robust long distance system throws off enough excess cash (profits) these short distance trains can be mostly internally subsidized? Why perpetually fight these annual political battles when the simple answer is vision and expansion, even if it's just making the existing skeletal long distance system train consists longer?

Why is this such a difficult concept to understand? Why do so many ill-informed people think it's perpetually okay to support failure when success is within easy grasp?

6) Here's some heartburn for those who believe the passenger business can never be profitable: Carnival plc, which owns Carnival Cruise Lines, Princess Cruises, Holland America Line, Cunard Line, and The Yachts of Seabourn in North America; Costa Cruises in Europe; P&O Cruises, Cunard Line, and Ocean Village in the Untied Kingdom; AIDA Cruises in Germany; Ibero Cruises in Spain and Brazil; and P&O Cruises Australia in Australia and New Zealand, operates 88 cruise ships with a passenger capacity of approximately 169,040 souls. Carnival also marketed and operated 16 hotels or lodges with approximately 3,500 guest rooms; approximately 560 motor coaches used for sightseeing and charters, 24 domes rail cars, which run on the Alaska Railroad between Anchorage and Fairbanks, Whittier and Denali, and Whittier and Talkeetna; 2 luxury dayboats; and sightseeing packages.

Carnival plc, headquartered in London, when tracing its heritage back through P&O Princess Cruises, was founded in 1850. Television fans may remember the real Princess Cruises happily loaned its ship, the real Pacific Princess, to Aaron Spelling and ABC to create the wildly popular television hit, The Love Boat, which spurred the modern cruise line renaissance.

All of this, by the way, is somehow accomplished without any government subsidies and is effected through private capital and entrepreneurship.

7) William Lindley of Scottsdale, Arizona has some thoughts on state passenger rail organizations. Mr. Lindley, a longtime professional associate of URPA, is a past president and treasurer of the Arizona Rail Passenger Association, and currently serves as a writer and editor for the group's newsletter.

[begin quote]

What does a rail passenger association really need to do? A recent report illustrates how what looks like failure to uphold principles may have helped doom a major city's plans for modern passenger train service.

In Atlanta, Georgia, a proposed green space called the "Decatur Beltline" would remove track connections which permitted trains to connect in all directions from Atlanta's downtown yards and stations. According to the National Association of Railroad Passengers Newsletter of May 2009, this "pitted local environmentalists against passenger train advocates (Georgia ARP remained officially neutral to minimize bad blood among erstwhile allies.)"

Say, what? Since when would a responsible passenger advocacy group roll over and play dead when the future of any kind of sensible passenger train operations is threatened? When I saw that I had to do some digging.

According to a November 30, 2005 Associated Press report, Ed McMahon of the Urban Land Institute called for using Atlanta's "unused" railway tracks for a linked system of parks, paths and transit. Now, while this is certainly an admirable goal, according to AP, "A panel of transportation experts raised concerns when it found isolated parts of the loop would not have riders to support trains, trolleys or whatever transit options are proposed." In other words, here we go again with removing a vital railway link – which can't be relocated – in favor of some green space which can be placed anywhere.

This conflicts with the goals of a long-proposed and eagerly anticipated downtown intermodal terminal at approximately the site of the original Atlanta Union Station, and with an immediate connection to mass transit MARTA's hub, the Five Points subway station, from which trains radiate north, south, east, and west.

Atlanta's other former main station, Terminal Station, on the Southern Railway, had south-facing stub-end platforms and was on Southern's mainline just west of Union Station. Although the Richard B. Russell Federal Building replaced Terminal Station in the 1970s, a single through-track connection to the Union Station area still exists ... but neither Terminal Station nor the current Peachtree station used by Amtrak can reasonably be expanded for the demands of an expanded modern passenger operation.

The Five Points site is within walking distance to Georgia State University buildings, the popular Underground Atlanta shopping and nightlife district, and the downtown sports arenas. Furthermore, there is potential at a downtown terminal for a building with visual and interpretive ties to Atlanta's historic train stations and its growth as the key city to the "New South" – building on the idea of the station as gateway to the city.

The City of Atlanta, according to an Atlanta Journal-Constitution newspaper article of March 5, 2009, said that the State Department of Transportation's "vision of high-speed rail would discourage future residential development." Amazingly, the city seems thereby to value a few new apartments over connecting the entire metro area with its downtown transit center.

With the Georgia DOT's March 2009 removal of its objection to the park project, trains will only be able to reach downtown via the west side connection. Amtrak's Crescent and commuter trains from the north and east would have a two-mile backup move to reach a new downtown station.

Now, without the eastern loop connection, Amtrak would likely have to stop at a new station with a MARTA connection – a new stop miles further northeast from downtown than even the existing Peachtree Station. This would mean requiring longer trips for most users, and a

change of subway trains for many. This site, like Peachtree, has little potential for filling the perceptual role of a Gateway.

So, now, let's return to that quote again:

"... pitted local environmentalists against passenger train advocates (Georgia ARP remained officially neutral to minimize bad blood among erstwhile allies.)" – NARP Newsletter, May 2009.

I wasn't privy to the discussions but this certainly sounds like a failure to uphold the principles which should govern a passenger rail association. Rail passenger associations are neither historic preservation groups (the National Railway Historical Society fulfills that goal) nor are they railfan groups. Our associations are not yes-men to Amtrak, the railroads, local transit operators, real estate interests, sports teams, or environmental groups.

Indeed, the whole point of such a rail passenger association, as a non-profit institution, is a fiduciary (meaning: a relationship of confidence and trust) and a moral obligation to guide the progress toward modern and expanded passenger rail service. This is a charitable goal because passenger trains improve our quality of life, offer transportation options to everyone, improve our economy, and improve our environment ... everyone wins with better public transit.

So was Georgia ARP's failure to object to the removal of a vital transportation link a breach of trust for the objective of advocacy? Again, I wasn't there so I can't say, but if NARP's account is correct, placing "not upsetting so-called environmentalists" above "fulfilling the confidence placed in your organization to preserve and enhance passenger train service" seems

highly suspect.

Because detailed coverage has proven difficult to find in newspapers or on-line, I dearly hope one of our Gentle Readers more familiar with the subject can soothe my fears.

[End quote]

8) Six months from today is Christmas Day!

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J. Bruce Richardson

President

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

[email protected]

http://www.unitedrail.org

 

[MrFSS]

This Week at Amtrak; June 27, 2009

​

A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from

​

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

​

America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute

​

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

​

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail

[email protected] • http://www.unitedrail.org​

Volume 6, Number 19

​

Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) Things are getting interesting regarding the sudden departure by retirement of Amtrak’s well-respected Inspector General, Fred Weiderhold.

No one seems to know where this is going, but, fortunately for Amtrak and the American taxpayers, Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa has taken a strong interest in this situation.

It’s important to note throughout Amtrak’s decades-long corporate life, Amtrak has often been remiss in following normal rules and procedures and courtesies (Not to mention settled law.) in Washington.

Back in the late 1980s, this was the identical case with VIA Rail Canada, run by our cousins in the cold north. Since the Canadian federal government is a parliamentary system of government, things can happen more quickly and dramatically there versus what happens in the United States. The bottom line for VIA at the end of the 1980s was the government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney felts it was constantly being submarined by the board of directors and management of VIA, and, in a meeting of just a handful of members of the Prime Minister’s cabinet, suddenly, half of VIA Rail Canada disappeared due to a tremendous slash in VIA’s government funding.

That one cut cost the original Canadian on Canadian Pacific Railway lines to be gone, and the lesser route of the Super Continental on Canadian National Railroad lines to become the premier train of the system (With the “Canadian” moniker.), but to this day only operating a tepid tri-weekly service between Toronto, Ontario and Vancouver, British Columbia via Edmonton and Jasper, Alberta. Also soon gone was the Atlantic, which operated between Montreal, Quebec and Halifax, Nova Scotia via St. John, New Brunswick.

The tourist service VIA Rail Rocky Mountaineer survived, but was transferred to private ownership where it has flourished and grown by being freed of the oppression of government ownership.

Several other routes, such as service to Sudbury, Ontario, also disappeared.

Amtrak for decades has played – like VIA Rail Canada – fast and loose with federal law, mostly often obeying federal statutes and mandates when convenient and otherwise doing as it pleased, often ignoring propriety.

Understand, it really didn’t matter who was on the Amtrak Board of Directors at the time or who was running the White House at the time, these games have continued unabated for decades.

Perhaps, a century from now, when a true and deep history of Amtrak is compiled and written by a neutral historian, there will be an understanding of why so many directors of Amtrak chose to either look the other way or did what they did for the sake of expediency.

Maybe, some of what was done was done to get around the vagaries of attempting to run a business in a cesspool like Washington.

But, for whatever reasons things have happened in the past, it looks like a day is dawning when business as usual at Amtrak may have to be radically changed. We saw the many great efforts of departed Chairman of the Board David Laney to put Amtrak on a more transparent and businesslike track. We saw a reduced board after his departure struggle to get through the wrong hiring of Alex Kummant and his subsequent merciful departure. And, we now see a continuing reduced board with buckets of free federal money and lots of extraneous infrastructure projects going on, but without a clear vision of what Amtrak will be later this year or next year.

Here’s hoping Senator Grassley will continue to work to bring the light what is really going on at Amtrak.

Amtrak Interim President and CEO Joseph Boardman, a creature of government and not accustomed to working within or for private sector boundaries needs to take the lead with Senator Grassley and reveal what his management team is doing to solve any problems being identified as holding Amtrak back from greatness.

2) This is a press release, published in full, from Senator Grassley’s office. Keep in mind this is a press release from a politician, not a news story.

[begin quote]

For Immediate Release

June 25, 2009

Grassley asks Amtrak to respond to report describing interference with IG work

WASHINGTON --- Senator Chuck Grassley has asked Amtrak about the circumstances of the Inspector General's unexpected retirement seven days ago and invited Amtrak to provide information about the interference by Amtrak in the work of the Inspector General described in a report prepared at the request of the retired watchdog.

Grassley said the report indicates that Amtrak's policies and procedures have systematically violated the letter and spirit of the Inspector General Act.

"As I continue my investigation into whether the independence of the Inspector General was undermined by Amtrak officials, I want to make sure I have any and all information Amtrak wants to provide," Grassley said. "The allegations are serious, including third parties being told to first send documents under subpoena by the Inspector General to Amtrak for review, and the Inspector General being chastised for communicating directly with congressional appropriations and authorizing committees,"

Grassley asked the Office of the Inspector General last week for a copy of the report, which was prepared by the law firm of Willkie Farr & Gallagher. Grassley said his office had been in communication with former Inspector General Fred Weiderhold about the issues before Weiderhold's retirement on June 18, 2009.

Also this month, Grassley has been investigating the President's decision to fire the AmeriCorps Inspector General, after the Inspector General issued two reports of mismanagement and abusive spending by AmeriCorps grantees. Grassley also has asked the International Trade Commission to account for its termination of its Inspector General who had been repeatedly hired for six-month increments and been given outstanding performance reviews. In both cases, Grassley said the administration failed to comply with a law enacted last year requiring Congress to be notified 30 days in advance of the dismissal of an Inspector General and given the reasons for the firing. Then-Senator Barack Obama co-sponsored the legislation along with Grassley.

"Inspectors general are watchdogs over the federal bureaucracy, and the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 is supposed to better safeguard their independence so they can do their jobs for taxpayers and program stakeholders," Grassley said. "The President has said he wants more accountable government, and keeping good watchdogs on the job is fundamental to that goal. Inspectors general need to be strengthened, not undermined."

Last week, Grassley asked the Treasury Secretary to put an end to documented resistance from the Treasury Department to requests for information from the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Assets Relief Program. Senator Grassley was an advocate for creating a Special IG for TARP to try to hold the program accountable and co-sponsored legislation to strengthen the ability of the Special IG to conduct oversight after the TARP program changed its original mission. Earlier this year, Senator Grassley also battled the White House after it tried to subject requests of the Special IG to the red tape of the Paperwork Reduction Act. Grassley subsequently introduced legislation to exempt the Special IG from the Paperwork Reduction Act.

Grassley has long worked to empower inspectors general to conduct effective oversight of the federal bureaucracy and he has held inspectors general themselves accountable for meeting the requirements of the jobs.

The text of Grassley's letter to Amtrak is below, along with his letter of last week to the Amtrak Office of the Inspector General, which sought a copy of the report. The attachment to today's letter, including the "Report on Matters Impairing the Effectiveness and Independence of the Office of Inspector General," are posted here.

June 25, 2009

The Honorable Thomas C. Carper

Chairman of the Board

Amtrak

National Railroad Passenger Corporation

10 G Street, NE

Washington, DC 20525

The Honorable Lorraine A. Green

Interim Inspector General

Amtrak

Office of Inspector General

National Railroad Passenger Corporation

10 G Street, NE

Washington, DC 20525

Dear Chairman Carper and Interim Inspector General Green:

Thank you for your response dated June 23, 2009. My staff is currently in the process of reviewing information from various sources concerning the Amtrak Office of Inspector General (OIG). I am interested in the facts regarding former Inspector General Fred Weiderhold's (IG) retirement. Interestingly, he retired on the same date that the law firm of Willkie Farr & Gallagher, LLP completed a "Report on Matters Impairing the Effectiveness and Independence of the Office of Inspector General" ("Report"). I understand that there was a meeting with Mr. Weiderhold and the Board of Directors on that same date as well, and that his decision to retire was made during that meeting. Accordingly, please:

1) provide a description of the circumstances surrounding former IG Weiderhold's unexpected retirement, specifically the relationship between the timing of his retirement and the Report;

2) produce any and all internal as well as personal materials relating to: (a) the former IG's departure; and (b) the Report; and

3) produce any and all materials cited in footnote 7 of the Report.

For definitions related to this request and all future requests, please refer to Attachment 1.

The Report prepared by Willkie Farr & Gallagher, LLP and Attachment 2 suggests a long-term and unrelenting interference with the activities and operation of the OIG. The Report seems to indicate that Amtrak's policies and procedures have systematically violated the letter and the spirit of the Inspector General Act, as amended. However, in order to ensure that Amtrak has an opportunity to respond, please identify any factual representations with which you disagree, or about which you wish to provide additional information. Please be sure to provide documentation in support of your position(s).

I also want to thank you both for offering to "maintain an open line of communication" with my office, and look forward to my staff receiving a briefing from you. In addition, I would appreciate your making the following individuals immediately available for interviews:

1) D. Hamilton Peterson, Deputy Counsel to the Inspector General;

2) Edward Puccerella, Director of Congressional & External Affairs;

3) Colin C. Carriere, Counsel to the Inspector General; and

4) E. Bret Coulson, Deputy Inspector General.

It was also reported to my staff that some OIG staff members may be fearful of retaliation if they were to discuss the matters set forth in this letter with anyone, including Congress. As you may be aware, 18 U.S.C. § 1505 prohibits obstruction of Congressional inquiries. Denying or interfering with employees' rights to furnish information to Congress in any way will be considered an obstruction of our inquiry. Amtrak and Amtrak OIG employees should be free from fear of retaliation or reprisal, and authorized to freely answer questions from Congress without representatives from Amtrak present, if they so desire. Accordingly, I would appreciate your advising the OIG and all full-time, part-time and contractor employees at Amtrak of the fact that they are free to contact Congress without advising Amtrak management or their respective supervisors.

Thank you again for your continued cooperation and assistance in this matter. As you know, in cooperating with the Committee's review, no documents, records, data or information related to these matters shall be destroyed, modified, removed or otherwise made inaccessible to the Committee.

Sincerely,

Charles E. Grassley

Ranking Member

Attachment

June 18, 2009

E. Bret Coulson

Deputy Inspector General Management & Policy

Office of Inspector General

Amtrak

National Railroad Passenger Corporation

10 G Street, NE

Washington, DC 20525

Dear Mr. Coulson:

As a senior member of the United States Senate and as the Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Finance (Committee), it is my duty under the Constitution to ensure that Inspectors General, which were created by Congress, are permitted to operate without political pressure or interference from their respective agencies. Inspectors General were designed for the express purpose of combating waste, fraud, and abuse and to be independent watchdogs ensuring that federal agencies were held accountable for their actions. I understand that Inspector General Fred Weiderhold, Jr. has retired today.

Based on contacts that my staff had with Mr. Weiderhold on two recent occasions (April 2, 2009 and June 4, 2009), I understand that the OIG has suffered from repeated and continuous interference from the agency. After the most recent discussion, it was agreed that the OIG would provide, among other things, a White Paper and specific examples of agency interference with OIG audits and/or investigations. To date, the OIG has not yet provided any documents. As you know, any interference such as that was described in these previous discussions is a direct violation of the Inspector General Act of 1978.

In light of Mr. Weiderhold's unexpected retirement, please provide the previously requested documentation immediately. I am deeply troubled that these aforementioned meetings with my staff and discussions of the OIG's independence concerns predicated this personnel action with IG Weiderhold. Furthermore, I am even more concerned that there is a lack of accountability, based on the OIG's reported lack of independence, for the $1.3 billion in stimulus funds that Amtrak has received from American taxpayers.

Due to these recent events, I specifically request all materials at the IG's office be preserved immediately.

In addition to providing the requested documentation, please provide an immediate briefing to my staff on the level of proper oversight the OIG has over of the $1.3 billion dollars of American taxpayer money, and what role the previously discussed independence issues with the agency played in the elimination of former IG Weiderhold.

Thank you in advance for your assistance and I would appreciate a response to this inquiry by June 19, 2009.

Sincerely,

Charles E. Grassley

Ranking Member of the

Committee on Finance

cc: The Honorable Thomas C. Carper

Chairman

Amtrak

National Railroad Passenger Corporation

Joseph H. Boardman

President and Chief Executive Officer

Amtrak

National Railroad Passenger Corporation

[End quote]

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J. Bruce Richardson

President

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

[email protected]

http://www.unitedrail.org

 

[MrFSS]

This Week at Amtrak; June 29, 2009

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A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from

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United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

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America's foremost passenger rail policy institute

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1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

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Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail

[email protected] • http://www.unitedrail.org​

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Volume 6, Number 20

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Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) There has been so much going on these past couple of weeks that needs to go on the record, we're producing a third This Week at Amtrak in less than a week. We have read about the sudden departure of Amtrak former Inspector General Fred Weiderhold, Jr. and the follow-up to that departure by Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa. Also making a buzz in the past 10 days was the presentation of a report by the United States General Accountability Office entitled "High Speed Passenger Rail: Effectively Using Recovery Act Funds for High Speed Rail Projects." Reading all the way through it could prove to be a snoozer for some, but this report by the GAO's director of physical infrastructure issues raises some important points about the need for clarity and focus in government, particularly relating to the subject of passenger rail. That report is presented at the end of today's TWA.

2) First, some good news from here in Florida. We've been following the saga of Tri-Rail, South Florida's commuter rail system which operates in three counties, Palm Beach, Broward (Ft. Lauderdale), and Miami-Dade. (Note, if you're like this writer and wondered how Dade County suddenly got to be Miami-Dade County in recent years, you are not alone. It seems the county fathers decided since Miami pretty much completely dominates Dade County, the county should officially be renamed Miami-Dade County. Which, if you're a map printer, created some headaches for you. One interesting note: further north, in Central Florida is Seminole County, which is adjacent to Orange County the home of Orlando and partially to Walt Disney World. Originally, Seminole County was named Mosquito County, and the name was changed sometime prior to the Florida Land Boom. It would be tough to draw tourists to a location named Mosquito County.)

Tri-Rail has been publicly struggling with its upcoming annual budget since once again, no permanent funding source was declared for the commuter system by the gutless, do-nothing Florida legislature this year. Tri-Rail officials have been publicly wringing their hands, hoping for a government miracle to save having to slash all weekend and holiday service, and cut huge amounts out of daily service, effectively creating a revised system which would meet very few needs of its total ridership, and drive passengers away. Add to all of that the feds telling Tri-Rail if it didn't run a full complement of service, the United States Government would demand all sorts of money be repaid in full for infrastructure improvements made (Double tracking the system, and more.) with signed contracts saying Tri-Rail would operate a certain size schedule, no matter what.

Suddenly, it was a miracle. Well, no, not really. What it was amounted to was transit officials accustomed to lots and lots of funding from other sources (Mainly, the county governments.) and never having to say you're sorry for anything "finding" some money for operations.

So, what happened? Gosh, golly, gee, wow, it turns out the money for next year's full operations was there all of the time, just sitting unused and unloved in another account. Yes, you guessed it, Tri-Rail bosses figured out money could be borrowed from accounts to improve parking and some other equipment upgrades to keep the system operating while a final solution is found for a permanent source of funding.

The transit-riding public, and all of the businesses in the Tri-Rail area which support the system with paid subsidies for employees and other programs read account after account in the news media saying Tri-Rail was in crisis. Yes, it was – a crisis of its own making. It would have been wonderful if the gutless, do-nothing Florida legislature had done something this year about solving the funding problem for Tri-Rail on a permanent basis. But, keeping true to form, they punted and said it was someone else's problem.

What the various denizens of Florida's legislative branch of government fail to recognize in a huge state such as Florida (Fourth in the nation for population.) is what brings prosperity to one corner of the state brings prosperity to all of the state. Transit is not a regional issue for Florida; it is a state issue. It's a given in state government highways and other infrastructure will be built and maintained; why isn't it a given commuter rail should be built and maintained, too, as long as it's a viable system like Tri-Rail?

3) The plight of Tri-Rail is similar to the plight of Amtrak. There was a belief at Tri-Rail someone else would bail them out and keep the system running, while the real answer to the immediate problem was just sitting in a Tri-Rail bank account.

Much the same is true at Amtrak. As long as it's business plan – a favorite of the fans of failure – continues to emphasize money from outside sources instead of first finding every possible way to generate revenues by full use of the company's various assets, Amtrak will lurch from crisis to crisis.

Amtrak probably thinks the failed experiment of the heartstrings-pulling Heartland Flyer, funded by the State of Oklahoma for seven figures a year, is a good train. Harrumph. The Heartland Flyer is a waste of good Superliners and locomotives which could be producing far more revenue elsewhere, and could be replaced by a bus or two for the average of a total of 111 passengers per day the train hauls over its 206 mile, two-state route. Amtrak nationally only captures one tenth of one percent of domestic transportation output; the taxpayers of Oklahoma are taking a huge bath with the Heartland Flyer as on a statewide basis it falls far below Amtrak's national average.

Rational people hope this more than decade-long operating junior train will one day grow into a real, productive, adult train if the consortium of states working together right now figures out a way to correctly stretch this route north of Oklahoma City and connect it with the route of the Southwest Chief in Kansas. When you consider the tiny consist of the Heartland Flyer still has only a 43% load factor, one has to wonder if anything at all is being done to bolster this train. While it does serve as a feeder to the Texas Eagle in Fort Worth, Texas, (And, the Eagle itself only has a 53% load factor, well below what it should be.) the Heartland Flyer is an example critics can point to and say, "Look at the millions of dollars Oklahoma has fed into this train, and the impact on the mobility of Oklahomans is near zero in the overall picture of state transportation output." While a tiny, vocal, misinformed minority group of supporters of this train can boast and say Oklahoma has Amtrak service, the real question is, "at what price?"

Amtrak's critics constantly point to the high cost of low return on many routes, and the Heartland Flyer is a prime example of when a real, gut-wrenching decision has to be made whether or not to provide a transportation alternative at an exorbitant price, or use those assets elsewhere. Having a train for the sole sake of having a train helps no one except those who like to stand by the side of the track and watch the train go by.

From the standpoint of Amtrak's business plan, it doesn't care where government money comes from, as long as it comes. The only states which have a viable train that can be pointed to by other states as a success story are North Carolina and the Carolinian, with a load factor of 77.9%, Pennsylvania's Pennsylvanian with a load factor of 74.3%, and Michigan's Pere marquette, with a load factor of 67.3% (But, as reported earlier this month in TWA, even the State of Michigan is looking cross-wise at continued funding for this train as ridership has slipped this fiscal year.). If North Carolina's model can be followed, it would be easier for other states to justify the cost of state-funded passenger rail service.

While starter projects are important, the 11-year run of the Heartland Flyer has proven nothing more than a half of a blip on the transportation radar in Oklahoma, and realistic people have to seriously look at this train and how the assets to operate this train could create a better return on investment elsewhere. It's notable North Carolina's other state funded train, the Piedmont, with a load factor of 44.6%, operates solely with equipment owned and maintained by the State of North Carolina.

So, in summary, Tri-Rail found fiscal religion in its own bank account, and will live to fight another day for better state funding, perhaps in the form its has advocated for years, a small, local sales tax on rental cars only in the three tourist-laden counties Tri-Rail serves. Oklahoma has shelled out millions of dollars for a junior train (If there were any Rail Diesel Cars still available for intercity service, this train as it is today would be a good candidate for those.), and, unless a solution is found to extend the train to its logical endpoint further north in Kansas, will have to make some serious decisions about the worth of the Heartland Flyer.

Amtrak, as our national passenger rail provider, still lacking a long term vision, has got to make some decisions, too, before someone else makes them for it. Amtrak has to decide whether it is happy to drain money out of state bank accounts or develop its own plan for as much self-sufficiency as possible. As long as there are annual fights over money being paid to Amtrak to run these small routes, there will be anxiety and wonder every budget year. As one president of a state passenger rail association so eloquently said, "it's not a matter of making 55% return at the farebox, it's a matter of straining every muscle and ounce of energy and squeezing out every dime of assets to get to 56% that's important." Amtrak and its various fans of failure have been too happy for too long to never worry about reaching that extra point of self-reliant liberty.

4) Something fun from half-way around the world: Fox News reported in mid-June many Japanese women choose to commute in female-only passenger rail coaches during rush hour to avoid being groped by men, and now men are requesting men-only coaches for fear of being accused of groping.

You can't make this stuff up. Ten representatives of male commuters petitioned the commuter train operator for men-only coaches, noting there have many cases of groping, as well as false charges of groping, so, since the female-only coaches have been successful, in the spirit of gender-equality, men-only coaches should also be available.

No word on whether married couples would be allowed to ride in the same car.

5) Here is the GAO report mentioned above.

[begin quote]

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate

HIGH SPEED PASSENGER RAIL

Effectively Using Recovery Act Funds for High Speed Rail Projects

Statement of Susan A. Fleming, Director Physical Infrastructure Issues

For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT, Tuesday, June 23, 2009

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thune, and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the implementation of high speed intercity passenger rail projects in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the Recovery Act). The $8 billion provided by the Recovery Act for high speed and other intercity passenger rail projects has focused more attention on and generated a great deal of anticipation about the possibility of developing high speed rail systems in the United States. These projects are seen by some as serving an important transportation role, by moving people quickly and safely, reducing highway and airport congestion, and being environmentally friendly. My statement today focuses on (1) the factors that we have identified that affect the economic viability of high speed rail projects and (2) how the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) recent strategic plan incorporates those factors. 1 My testimony is based on our recent report on high speed rail, our review of FRA's strategic plan, and discussions with FRA and selected transportation experts. 2

In summary, we found that while the potential benefits of high speed rail projects are many, these projects—both here and abroad—are costly, take years to develop and build, and require substantial up-front public investment, as well as potentially long-term operating subsidies. Determining which, if any, high speed rail projects may eventually be economically viable will rest on factors such as ridership potential, costs, and public benefits. FRA largely agrees with our March report. FRA's strategic plan for high speed rail outlines, in very general terms, how the federal government may invest the $8 billion in Recovery Act funds for high speed rail development. However, this plan does not establish clear goals for the federal government in high speed rail—other than establishing a "longer term goal of developing a national high speed intercity passenger rail network of corridors"—and does not define a clear federal role for involvement in high speed rail projects other than providing Recovery Act funds. As such, in our view, it is more a vision than a strategic plan. As part of a discussion to prepare for this hearing, FRA told us that it sees its strategic plan as a first step and that it intends to seek structured input from stakeholders and the public to help develop strategies to implement its vision.

Factors That Affect the Economic Viability of High Speed Rail Projects

The factors affecting the economic viability of high speed rail projects include the level of expected ridership, costs, and public benefits (i.e., the benefits to non-riders and the nation as a whole from such things as reduced congestion), which depend on a project's corridor and service characteristics. High speed rail is more likely to attract riders in densely and highly populated corridors, especially where there is congestion on existing transportation modes (such as highways or airports). Characteristics of the proposed service are also a key consideration because high speed rail is more likely to attract riders where it compares favorably to travel alternatives in terms of trip times, frequency of service, reliability, and safety. Costs largely hinge on the availability of rail right-of-way, and a corridor's terrain. To stay within financial or other constraints, project sponsors typically make trade-offs between cost and service characteristics.

Once projects are deemed economically viable, project sponsors face the challenging tasks of securing the significant up-front investment for construction costs and of sustaining public and political support and stakeholder consensus. We found that in other countries (France, Japan, and Spain) with high speed intercity passenger rail systems, the central government generally funded the majority of the up-front costs of high speed rail lines. 3 The $8 billion in Recovery Act funds for high speed rail (and other intercity passenger rail) lines represents a significant increase in federal funds available to develop new or enhanced intercity passenger rail service. This amount, however, represents only a small fraction of the estimated costs for starting or enhancing service on the 11 federally authorized high speed rail corridors. For example, the San Francisco-Los Angeles portion of the California high speed rail corridor alone, which already has about $9 billion in state bonding authority, is estimated to cost about $33 billion dollars. 4 Furthermore, federal funds for high speed rail in the past (as with the Recovery Act) have been derived from general revenues, not trust funds or other dedicated funding sources. This makes ongoing capital support for high speed rail projects challenging, as they compete for funding with other national priorities such as health care, national defense, and support for ailing industries. In addition, the challenge of sustaining public-sector support and stakeholder consensus is compounded by long project lead times, the diverse interests of numerous stakeholders, and the absence of an established institutional framework for coordination and decision making.

FRA's Strategic Plan Is a First Step

FRA's strategic plan attempts to address the absence of an institutional framework for investments in high speed intercity passenger rail service. In our recent report and in 2005, 5 we discussed the need for:

1. Clear federal objectives and clear roles for all stakeholders (federal, regional, state, and local governments and freight, commuter, and passenger railroads).

2. Clear identification of outcomes expected.

3. Ensuring the reliability of ridership and other forecasts to determine the viability of high speed rail projects.

4. Including high speed rail with a reexamination of other federal surface transportation programs to clarify federal goals and roles, link funding to needs and performance, and reduce modal stovepipes that hinder financing transportation improvements that will lead to the greatest

improvements in mobility.

FRA's plan, which the Recovery Act required the FRA to issue 60 days after the act was signed, outlines in very general terms how the FRA will allocate the Recovery Act high speed rail funds. It does not define goals for investing in high speed rail, how these investments will achieve them, how the federal government will determine which corridors it could invest in, or how high speed rail investments could be evaluated against possible alternative modes in those corridors. In our opinion—and as FRA recognizes—this strategic plan is a first step in planning federal involvement. FRA has emphasized that its approach is to involve the ultimate "owners" of high speed rail—the states and communities in which they will reside—to help flesh out the approach to developing high-speed rail that are under its control. FRA officials also told us that it plans to spend Recovery Act funds in ways that show success to help keep longterm political support for these projects at the local level.

Overall, FRA generally agrees with the issues that we raised in our March report, with the report's recommendations, and with the observations that we are making today. Last week, FRA took its next step by issuing interim guidance for applying for Recovery Act funds. 6 The guidance lays out the evaluation criteria for grant funding, the weights to be applied to the criteria, and the selection criteria.

In conclusion, the infusion of up to $8 billion in Recovery Act funds is only a first step in developing potentially viable high speed passenger rail projects. The host of seemingly intractable issues that have hampered development of these projects remain as challenges, and these issues will need to be resolved to effectively spend Recovery Act funds. Surmounting these challenges will require federal, state, and other stakeholder leadership to champion the development of economically viable high speed corridors and the political will to carry them out. It will also require clear, specific policies and delineations of expected outcomes, and objective, realistic analysis of ridership, costs, and other factors to determine the viability of projects and their transportation impact.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be pleased to answer any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have.

1 By economically viable, we mean that a project's total social benefits offset or justify the project's total social costs.

2 See GAO, High Speed Passenger Rail: Future Development Will Depend on Addressing Financial and Other Challenges and Establishing a Clear Federal Role, GAO-09-317 (Washington D.C.: Mar. 19, 2009); and Federal Railroad Administration, Vision for High- Speed Rail in America (Washington D.C.: April 2009). We conducted this performance audit from May 2009 to June 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

3 GAO-09-317.

4 The corridor would extend from Sacramento and San Francisco through Los Angeles to San Diego.

5 GAO-09-317 and GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington D.C.: February 2005).

Please contact Susan Fleming at (202) 512-2834 or [email protected] about this statement. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Relations can be found on the last page of this statement. Greg Hanna and James Ratzenberger made key contributions to this statement.

[End quote]

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URPA leadership members are available for speaking engagements.

J. Bruce Richardson

President

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

[email protected]

http://www.unitedrail.org

 

[VentureForth]

Initial plans were to move the Silver Meteor from Orlando to the FEC, which is a very, very bad idea. Why would anyone want to take service away from one of the world's busiest vacation destinations in Central Florida to serve the towns of Florida's east coast? 

A better solution is to find additional equipment, or, perhaps split a train in Jacksonville (Which Amtrak did from its very beginning until the horror of the common consist in the 1990s, and the closing of the Tampa crew and maintenance bases.), with half of the train traveling via Orlando and half of the train traveling via St. Augustine. Other options are to extend other trains from the Midwest or Northeast south to Miami via the FEC, such as the Capitol Limited or City of New Orleans via Mobile, Alabama. Extending an existing Superliner train would require less equipment than starting a complete new route.

 

As usual, it's all going to come down to politics. Which state (Other than Illinois.) has the most juice in Washington? Which state has the best planning? Which state can move the quickest?

 

St. Augustine may or may not have train service again, 125 years after Henry Flagler became serious about hauling passengers into Florida to fill up his elegant hotels and resorts. If it does, yet another of the dozens and dozens of gaps in America's passenger rail system will be rightly filled.

Though I typically like Bruce's fiscally conservative approach towards the way Amtrak should be managed, I have to disagree with this point. This is what I sent him back:

With regards to your commentary in the 6/25 issue of TWA, I find it interesting that you would consider the re-routing of the Silver Meteor to the FEC would be detrimental. Though it isn't traditional routing, does it have to be?
The current Meteor is the "prime mover" of the Silver service. It runs an extra sleeper (and extra coach?) vs the Star and it makes for a much quicker ride between Miami and NYP. If the Meteor is relocated to the FEC, it would become even more of a premier service, cutting the time (with appropriate rail upgrades, of course) to NYP by hours.

No station/city would be left without service - just without twice daily in each direction service.

I strongly advocate that Amtrak needs more trains on existing services. There is no doubt about that at all. I hope that line of thought continues. But even more so is the importance of adding cities to the network. This must happen NOW while the going is good. Let's not forget that all of this was APPROVED back in 2001 and then turned off when the source of funding couldn't be found.

South of Savannah, the two trains are running only two hours apart from each other, and by Miami, the schedules are almost on top of each other. Rerouting the Meteor would perhaps increase demand on the Star, requiring another sleeper and perhaps another coach. But that's less equipment than an all-new train. Demand on the Meteor would increase with it's faster service and now possibly opposite-time-of-day schedule.

We can get people to Disney World on one train - this could even encourage the Sun Rail to move forward to increase intrastate passenger rail capacity.

 

[VentureForth]

There are legitimate reports and corporate information available to anyone who can read from the Internet there are profitable passenger train services in Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, and elsewhere. If passenger trains can be profitable there, why not here?

Anyone know where to possibly find these so-called legitimate reports and information? It's been my understanding, since joining AMTRAK three years ago, that there isn't a profitable passenger railroad anywhere in the world. Have I been mislead?

I have seen somewhere that the TGV line from Paris to Lyon makes an operating profit only. I'm sure it doesn't cover capital costs and expansion. That could be this guys definition of profit. I mean the Auto Train makes an operating profit and other routes come close to it. The numbers Amtrak gives even says the NEC makes a profit, but I know thats not really true, given how many of its allocated costs are given to other trains.

I'm willing to bet if proper capitol investments are made, I bet some LD trains could at least break even, operationally. The Empire Builder's farebox recovery is 76%. I'm willing to bet with the addition of the new cars on this train, it would be much higher.

JR East, Co, Japan's primary people mover in Tokyo. And they are private, operating without a government subsidy, and infact RETIRING debt from it's previous life under government control.

 

[MrFSS]

This Week at Amtrak; July 6, 2009

​

​

A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from

​

​

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

​

America's foremost passenger rail policy institute

​

​

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

​

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail

[email protected] • http://www.unitedrail.org​

​

​

Volume 6, Number 21

​

Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) Amtrak woke up this Monday morning for the first time in decades without the prospect of having the many services, decades of experience, and wisdom of Victor Francis at its disposal. Mr. Francis retired from Amtrak on Saturday; the Fourth of July was his declared day of personal freedom, too.

Mr. Francis is a young man; he just turned 60 a few days ago. But, with his combined age and over 30 years of experience and the rules of Railroad Retirement, he was able to go out the door and start the next useful phase of his life. Don't be fooled at that number 60; Mr. Francis could/has/will run rings around lesser folks half his age.

He began his Amtrak career when both he and Amtrak were young in the 1970s, beginning as a trainee in the kitchen of an Amtrak dining care that still used coke logs for fire and heat in stoves. His worthy teachers were salty chefs and cooks first trained by familiar names in the best traditions of passenger railroading such as Santa Fe, Union Pacific, and Southern Pacific, all working out of the Los Angeles, California crew base, where Mr. Francis called home his entire Amtrak career.

His experience under fire taught him the tricks of the trade, and how to turn out a superb meal in a hot, cramped space, often having to improvise to provide the best presentation for passengers.

After the kitchen, Mr. Francis moved into other areas, including a long stint as Chief of Onboard Services for the Coast Starlight and Sunset Limited. After that, other supervisory roles called in the Los Angeles crew base and Los Angeles yard areas, including his last assignment of making sure the Coast Starlight and Sunset Limited were road-worthy and ready to be backed into Los Angeles Union Passenger Terminal to being their multi-state runs. It was under Mr. Francis' watchful eye those consists were released for service after making sure everything was well-stocked and in as much working order as possible.

Mr. Francis is a totally passenger-focused manager; he understands service recovery and also what it takes for passengers to have an enjoyable train experience from the moment they step on the train. Graciousness has always been a part of his demeanor – unless, of course, behind the scenes something is awry and a stronger approach was necessary – and he was always an advocate for those working for him. Be sure, Mr. Francis was never shy about speaking his mind, but his purpose was positive and for improvement, not negative.

So, today, Victor Francis will be missed by his many friends at Amtrak, and all of us who had the privilege of working with him at various times on special projects. Under the direction of former Gulf Coast Business Group General Manager Deborah Wetter, Mr. Francis was one of the group of four of us who invented the successful 24-hour dining car experiments on the Sunset Limited. It was great fun working with him creating menus, figuring out labor requirements, and understanding storage limits in a Superliner dining car. He knows union rules inside and out, and he knows railroad safety rules even more. He took all of this experience and put it to use where it was most important, for his passengers.

There are many like Victor Francis in Amtrak's national system; people who go to work everyday determined to make a difference for their passengers. These fine people often have to pick up the slack for co-workers who don't share this creed, but they do it because they understand the passenger – not government subsidy – is what makes Amtrak possible.

Victor Francis will be missed at Amtrak. In the end, he knows he goes into the next positive phase of his life with the knowledge of a job well done.

2) The fans of failure often incorrectly point to Amtrak's host freight railroads as the primary reason Amtrak can't expand, citing track congestion and an unwillingness for freight railroad managers to deal with passenger trains.

Norfolk Southern Corp., owner of Norfolk Southern Railroad (along with Burlington Northern Sante Fe Railroad) has always taken a more business-like approach to passenger rail. While other railroads have often expressed a knee-jerk negative reaction when the subject of passenger rail is even brought up, the folks at NS have taken their cue from the top.

Wick Moorman, the CEO of Norfolk Southern, recently spoke to business leaders in the NS hometown of Norfolk, Virginia. Mr. Moorman in June told members of the Greater Norfolk Corp. civic development group his thoughts were his own, and not necessarily those of his company, but, please, when the CEO expresses an opinion which is made public for the press, that opinion always carries some extra weight.

When speaking on the subject of the need for high speed passenger rail to come to the Hampton Roads area of Tidewater Virginia, the Virginian-Pilot, Norfolk's daily newspaper quoted Mr. Moorman as saying "... (H)e signaled in an interview that his company is open to becoming an active partner. 'If we think it makes sense for us financially to take some role in the ongoing operation, we'd be willing to at least consider that,' he said. 'We certainly are more than willing to be engaged in the dialogue.'"

The Virginian-Pilot went on to say "Moorman's comments represent a sea change in Norfolk Southern's attitudes. The company historically has had understandable heartburn about trying to coordinate fast-moving passenger trains and slower freight cars. But Moorman and other executives are proud residents of Hampton Roads, and they understand the economic consequences if a network of high- and higher-speed passenger rail along the Eat Coast bypasses the region.

"They also understand their own business model is changing. Moorman told business leaders that cargo traffic has dropped by about 45 percent for automobiles, 40 percent for steel and 25 percent for coal compared to last year's figures. Although Moorman sees signs of improvement he believes recovery will be slow. While the recession has been painful, it's also encouraged Moorman and his colleagues to consider new opportunities, including passenger rail.

"Moorman said 16 states have contacted his company eager to engage Norfolk Southern in passenger rail projects. He's met with officials in Virginia, and his expertise is already helping to level barriers impeding the project.

"For example, he said in an interview that the state's $475 million price tag for a southern route [From the Norfolk area to other parts of the East Coast in the Carolinas and elsewhere.] exceeds his company's own estimates for necessary upgrades. Norfolk Southern boasts a rail network perfectly capable of handling passenger trains with additional side tracks for passing and improved road crossings."

"While Moorman is willing to work with Virginia on passenger rail, issues of capacity, liability and financing must be resolved. 'The trick is the money,' he said."

Well. So, to the surprise of many socialists and others of their ilk, basic business and the desire to make money for corporate shareholders does trump the perceived distaste for passenger rail that came from generations past of railroad executives, not necessarily those of today who are responsible for corporate growth and prosperity.

The time has come to discard the old, outdated thought patterns. People tend to forget railroads are a business charged with producing the highest possible return on investment for shareholders. If part of that process includes the reintroduction of passenger rail on much of America's railroad infrastructure, there is a higher chance that is going to happen than there was 25 years ago. Stop thinking in the past and embrace the future, or you may just miss the train.

3) Okay, so we're seeing an overt willingness by at least two of the four largest railroads in the United States to talk about passenger rail. Most likely, the others will fall in line when they realize what it can do for the bottom line. So, what about Amtrak? Is there a willingness on Amtrak's part to embrace this new culture of expansion?

It really doesn't look that way. While everybody and their dog in the country has created a vision for the future based on stimulus money and all sorts of other goodies as the recession wanes, Amtrak has been steadfast in its silence.

Amtrak Interim President and CEO Joseph Boardman publishes a column two weeks ago in the Richmond (Virginia) Times-Dispatch heralding the virtues of high speed rail and how Amtrak is poised and ready to assist states grab free federal monies (Something Amtrak is very adept at doing.) to start high speed passenger services.

But, the column was totally devoid of any mention of Amtrak as we know it – America's passenger railroad – and the future of Amtrak as a provider of conventional rail.

More and more people with the ability to look at Amtrak with their eyes wide open – as opposed to those True Believers who believe Amtrak can do no wrong – are questioning Amtrak's ability to move forward in a meaningful way. No one is seeing any vision, and no one is seeing any plan for the future. In reality, we're not even seeing a holding pattern, just the continued decline in national operations.

Since Mr. Boardman's one year contract expires in less than five months, and he was the product of the previous White House administration, what will happen today and tomorrow? Will the current White House want to put its own imprint on Amtrak, complete with a new CEO? Will the current White House fill the five vacant seat on the Amtrak Board of Directors so the company can move forward in a legal manner?

Will Amtrak ultimately have the management team it deserves; a team committed to expansion, not retrenchment?

Amtrak's current enablers always want us to believe to tired old canard of "just give Amtrak the money it needs, and everything will be fine." Please, that line of thinking has got to stop. Amtrak, because of its lack of vision, doesn't make full use of the money it receives now, but instead, chooses to plow money into the least productive and most socialistic lines of business, short distance trains.

4) Since Mr. Boardman has offered a helping hand to states wanting to get into the high speed rail biz, is he willing to do that to states looking to improve their state funded trains, too?

Michigan is going through some serious heartburn at the moment, with a sure cut coming in its funding of its state trains, including the Pere Marquette and Blue Water services. Michigan state senators have passed a budget resolution which will cut the annual Pere Marquette and Blue Water subsidy from the current $7.3 million to about $3.7 million next year. The governor and house, from a different political party than the majority of the senate, want to cut the Amtrak subsidy to about $5.7 million, still a 22% cut. Either way you look at it, there is going to be a cut in state funding in Michigan. These numbers are just preliminary, final budget resolutions haven't been proposed or voted on by both chambers of the Michigan legislature.

As said before, this is the inherent problem of relying on state monies for routes, because not only will Michigan take a hit, but so will service in and out of Chicago. Both of these routes traverse Indiana to get to and from the Chicago terminal, but neither route makes a stop in Indiana. This is a vivid demonstration of how everything is connected, even when it's paid for separately.

And, even though Michigan pays for these trains, what is Amtrak doing to promote the trains outside of listing them in its printed and virtual timetables? Does Amtrak have any responsibility to make these trains successful? Yes, it does. These state paid-for trains still carry the Amtrak logo and are part of the Amtrak system. The states are Amtrak's clients, so Amtrak has a duty to make these trains as successful as possible, beyond just taking a monthly check from the states for operations. Amtrak will try and tell you promotion is the problem of the states, not Amtrak. While California and North Carolina take this to heart and heavily promote their trains to try and hold down their Amtrak subsidies, that is not often the case elsewhere.

5) Good news came in the past couple of days from Canada. The Canadian federal government has decided to wave its scandalous daily fee of $1,500 for border crossing services for a second daily train from Seattle, Washington to Vancouver, British Columbia. This train is designed to be a boost for the upcoming Olympic games in Vancouver, and much nail-biting has been going on over the Canadian's refusal to provide border crossing checkpoint services at the same level it charges for other trains and forms of conveyance.

Finally, someone in Ottawa came to their senses and waved the fee so service on this train can begin. The new service will begin in August in time for the Olympic winter games in February 2010. There is desperate need for much more cross-border traffic between the United State and Canada beyond this new train in the Pacific Northwest. Can anyone say Boston-Montreal for starters?

6) Remember those Rohr Turboliners that caused so much controversy a decade ago in New York State? The trains, originally owned by Amtrak were being upgraded at great expense to the State of New York for runs on the Empire Service route between Albany and New York City. The Turboliners travel at a high rate of speed, but the tracks were never upgraded to handle the service.

Even though $65 million was spent to bring the Turboliners up to modern specifications, they ended up being stored at Amtrak's facility in Bear, Delaware instead of being put on the road. Amtrak said since the tracks were never upgraded in New York State, these trains were too expensive to run in regular service, and chose to store them, instead.

New York took exception to this, and did all sorts of huffing and puffing, but Amtrak won the day and the trainsets remained in storage.

Now, you, too, can own your very own Turboliner. They have been put up for sale to the highest bidder. Be the first on your block to own a trainset; moving expenses must be handled by the buyer. Just think of that $65 million investment by the State of New York as a decade-old jobs stimulus program.

7) We've talked about this before recently in this space; here's the formal press release of the good news.

[begin quote]

COLUMBUS, Ohio, July 1 /PRNewswire/ – Private investors affiliated with Value Recovery Group, Inc. (VRG) of Columbus, OH, have acquired the Colorado Railcar DMU and will resume manufacturing this modern domestically produced passenger train in a new manufacturing facility to be established later this year pending state/local incentives and final round investments. Assets acquired by US Railcar include the former Colorado Railcar DMU proprietary rights and information, manufacturing documentation, inventory, and other equipment necessary for production.

According to VRG Chairman & CEO Barry H. Fromm, "US Railcar intends to reestablish passenger train production in the United States." Currently, passenger trains purchased in the U.S. today are produced by European and Asian suppliers typically importing 40 of content from overseas. "We want to keep American jobs and U.S. public investment at home," said Fromm. "There is a major commitment by the Obama Administration and the Congress to make investments in intercity and high-speed rail to promote economic growth and mobility, create jobs, conserve energy and address climate change. This opens a new era for passenger trains and railcar manufacturing in the United States."

US Railcar, LLC will be led by Michael P. Pracht, its President & CEO, a rail industry veteran with extensive past experience at two of the world's leading rail transportation companies, Siemens and Ansaldo. US Railcar will manufacture both single- and bi-level Diesel Multiple Units (DMUs) which are self-propelled railcars eliminating the need for more costly locomotive-hauled push/pull trains in lower density corridors. Both platforms are fully compliant with existing Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) safety standards for crashworthiness as established by Department of Transportation and approved for immediate use on the national rail system.

Unlike European & Asian DMUs, the US Railcar DMU can operate in all mixed-mode freight corridors throughout the country without waivers and/or temporal separation agreements currently required for non-compliant foreign platforms. "There are extraordinary growth opportunities for passenger rail development," said US Railcar CEO Mike Pracht. "The US Railcar DMU will enable new cost-effective passenger rail service across a range of corridors and routes, all with a proven, existing equipment platform already in service."

The US Railcar DMU was prototyped through a demonstration project in 2002 and is currently the only FRA-compliant DMU operating in revenue service in North America. Available in both regional and intercity configurations, the US Railcar DMU is uniquely suited for incremental corridor development at speeds from 79-to-90 mph. Platform enhancements currently anticipated include a diesel-electric upgrade, increasing speeds to 125 mph, making this American-made DMU the ideal solution for both mature and emerging passenger rail agencies around the country.

VRG is an asset recovery and management firm that specializes in asset management, advisory and asset recovery services for state and local governments, commercial banks, private investors and several federal agencies, including the FDIC. VRG also manages a brownfield remediation and redevelopment partnership and serves as consultant to advanced energy programs for state and federal agencies. More information about Value Recovery Group can be found at www.valuerecovery.com. US Railcar's website www.usrailcar.com is currently under development.

[End quote]

8) We get lots of mail here at This Week at Amtrak. Here's a sampling from the mailbag after the last issue.

[begin quote]

There are so many comments, suggestions, solutions, etc, on how the federal government will invest/spend the billions of dollars in stimulus funds (wisely). In my opinion, as long as politics are involved (Congress), the money isn't going to be spent wisely nor will such a passenger rail network be effectively planned and structured.

Recently, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) commented that the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) strategic plan for high-speed rail is less of a plan and more of a vision. Additional comments are that the plan does not establish clear high-speed rail goals for the federal government, other than a longer-term goal of developing a national intercity passenger rail network, and doesn't define a clear federal-role for high-speed rail involvement other than providing recovery act dollars. Source: Progressive Railroading Daily News 6/25/2009 (www.progressiverailroading.com)

It's a tremendous challenge to create a coordinated, reliable, passenger rail network after so many years of neglect. Would it be a consideration to offer the private railroad sector the opportunity to structure/restructure our passenger rail network? Could there be an incentive that would ignite an interest in the private sector to create an efficient, long-lasting, passenger rail system? It might even be less costly and more reliable.

Again, my personal opinion, but presently an excessive amount of emphasis is being placed on the NEC and on "high-speed rail". Equal emphasis should be placed on an integrated, nationwide network for passenger rail service.

One issue that concerns me is, what organization is most influential, or respected, in contributing to the improvement of passenger rail service? My observation is that NARP obtains the most publicity. However, I've seen no dramatic, or noticeable improvement in our current passenger rail system over the years from their advice, judgment, or speculation.

J. C. Tietgens

Fargo, North Dakota

[End quote]

And, a second offering.

[begin quote]

Greetings,

I'm a fairly regular reader of This Week at Amtrak, a mechanical engineer who lately lives in the Portland area and I admit I get curious about the Dr. Herzog's matrix operations theory and other technical aspects from time to time, and anyway the thought of the proposed revivals that have been much-mooted in certain circles gave me some pause for consideration.

I know there has been mandated studies for the revival of the Pioneer and the North Coast Limited. Now the question is – why should the Pioneer continue all the way to Chicago? Seattle has perfectly good maintenance facilities and so does Portland, and it doesn't seem to make very much sense to run it to Chicago especially if the North Coast Limited were to be revived (the main issue with reviving the North Coast Limited to be would see that an ideal trip would require the re-commissioning of Homestake Pass, though I know this wasn't necessary before, but it would make a more direct journey and serve Lewiston then, if I'm correct about the route of the old NP main). Anyway it seems the ideal trip matrix would be to have the Pioneer leave Seattle - Portland in separate sections (one going over Stampede pass) to combine in eastern Oregon in Pendleton, in the late evening/early night (around 10:30 PM departures at the latest, anything else would be an inconvenience). The goal would be to allow a morning arrival in Boise and then proceed by day to Salt Lake City. At that point I'm not sure if it would make more sense to try the Union Pacific main through Wyoming or just keep on the existing route – probably the later unless there's strong demand from Wyoming's congressional delegation, seeing how politicized it is these days.

Anyway, the basic thought is that once the train gets to Denver, why should it go to Chicago? It would seem more worthwhile to run to Trinidad Colorado (and worth establishing a station at least in Colorado Springs) and then mirror the route of the Southwest Chief as far as Albuquerque ... And then head south to El Paso. This would allow mid-route connections with all three of the Chicago-California routes of Amtrak and feed those connections into the Pacific Northwest. Is there something about the route that would make it unfeasable, or is this just another case of a lack of imagination at Amtrak?

As another question, for all that the Superliner equipment is better for the western routes, because Amtrak doesn't run the trains at nearly full capacity for the ability of head end power to provide hotel power to the train, wouldn't a fair bit of savings be achieved via economies of scale if the build order for single-level long distance equipment which is now going through was simply massively increased and the transition sleepers used to combine the two equipment types as necessary? It may be un-ideal, but with Amtrak's chronic refusal to spend money on infrastructure (perhaps America's chronic refusal is a better thing to say, sadly) it might make sense for now to try and squeeze as many cars as possible out of as little money as possible by just expanding the build orders for single-level equipment and starting to use it on western routes again.

If the cost of restarting production of the Superliners and having two separate production lines going at the same time is prohibitive it makes much more sense to just run 12-car single level trains in the future instead of the current trains which at most are eight Superliner cars, anyway – two deck equipment only truly makes sense when you have sold out trains of the maximum operating length with single-deck equipment, which is manifestly not the case with modern Amtrak. It does also offer the advantage of universal system interoperability in addition to the economies of scale from a single large order that I'd mentioned before.

Sincerely,

Marina Collette

[End quote]

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J. Bruce Richardson

President

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

[email protected]

http://www.unitedrail.org

 

[MrFSS]

This Week at Amtrak; July 13, 2009

​

​

A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from

​

​

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

​

America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute

​

​

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

​

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail

[email protected] • http://www.unitedrail.org​

​

​

Volume 6, Number 22

​

​

Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) It’s 10:30 A.M. on any morning of the year, and Amtrak train number 97, the southbound Silver Meteor, is racing southward through Northeast Florida on its way to the barn in Miami, due in the Hialeah/Miami suburb station more than eight hours later. Once the flagship train – complete with the trademark Pullman Sun Lounge – of Seaboard Air Line Railroad’s Silver Fleet, the Meteor is traveling over SAL’s once arch rival’s Atlantic Coast Line main line south of Jacksonville. Today, the Meteor is hosted by SAL/ACL successor CSX.

The Silver Meteor has a baggage car, sleeping cars, full diner, lounge, and coaches. It’s the coach passengers who have that look of quiet desperation, just waiting for their station stop to come so they can get off the train. Orlando, home of Walt Disney World and other Central Florida world-famous attractions is still two and a half hours away. Many of the train’s passengers will detrain at the Orlando station, with visions of Mickey Mouse dancing in their heads. A surprising number of passengers will also board in Orlando, headed south into Florida’s cattle and orange grove country, on the way to South Florida’s Gold Coast and the solid metropolitan area from north of West Palm Beach all the way to Miami and beyond.

The diner has been closed after breakfast for more than an hour, and the lounge car has its typical denizens, some working on their first – or second or third – morning eye-opener. Everywhere you look, passengers and crew look weary. The train and engine crew are fresh, having boarded in Jacksonville for the trip to Miami after a good night’s sleep. The onboard services crew is on the last eight hours of their shift which began several days before at the Miami crew base for their northbound trip to New York City, and the turn to come home on the southbound Silver Meteor. By union contract in these modern times, each of these employees which are designated as safety employees, are entitled to four hours of sleep the previous night. Some get more, some of the sleeping car attendants get less if they have entraining or detraining passengers along the route during their designated sleep periods.

You can look at the coach passengers and easily say to yourself, this group of people needs a bath. The passengers who boarded in New York City at Penn Station have been on the train for more than 19 consecutive hours, the Washington, D.C. passengers 15 hours, and the Richmond, Virginia passengers 13 hours. If the coach was full, these people were trying to sleep with 53 of their new best friends, some sitting next to total strangers, crying or restless children, or fidgeting smokers on a non-smoking train. No one got a good night’s sleep, and this morning, the coach itself looks like it’s been hosting people for the 1,000 miles its traveled. The floors are messy, the trash bins are getting full, and the restrooms could use some attention.

For coach passengers, there are no showers, and the tiny restroom offers some opportunity to clean up a bit, but only if you’re not a large person.

Are we there yet? is written on everyone’s face.

The Silver Meteor’s sleeping car passengers are faring somewhat better. They each had a bed with real linens and blankets and soft pillows for the night, and most passengers took advantage of the gentle rocking motion of the car, pretending they were back in an infant’s cradle. Each sleeping car has a community shower for the roomette passengers, those traveling in full bedrooms have their own individual shower. There is plenty of hot water for bathing and cleaning up, and fresh clothes come out of the suitcases. Upon awakening, coffee or orange juice along with a newspaper was available from the sleeping car attendant to help brace for the day before the full breakfast in the dining car which was included in the price of the sleeping accommodation.

Sleeping car passengers, too, look a bit road-weary, but they can comfortably nap in their private accommodation without worry of someone waking them up, other than for the call to luncheon.

Detraining coach passengers gather their belongings and step off the train relieved to be at their destination. Sleeping car passengers tip the car attendant and gather their bags on the platform and go in search of their local transportation, ready to face the day at their destination.

Does this sound like class warfare? Nah, it’s just the very real difference between traveling on Amtrak in coach or in a sleeping car.

Coach travel is fine for daylight travel if you really like being in a long, silver tub with dozens of other strangers and travelers, just like on an airplane or in a bus.

But, for overnight travel, it’s tough to beat the comforts and conveniences of sleeping cars.

The difference in fares is dramatic. New York City to Orlando on the Silver Meteor for two people in coach, one-way costs a total of $308.00. In a full bedroom, the same two travelers taking the same trip would pay $973.00. Both of these fares are based on summer season travel in August.

There is a huge difference of $665 for the same 21+ hour trip. For the extra cost dinner and breakfast is included, and lunch, too, if you eat quickly enough to finish before the train arrives in Orlando at the scheduled time of 12:55 P.M. You get two beds, a shower, toilet, sink, towels, and all of the other usual comforts of a rolling hotel room, including most importantly the ability to close the door, turn off the light, and go to sleep in a bed with pillows, fresh sheets, and blankets.

Too rich for your blood? Yes, it’s pricey, but Amtrak regularly fills the sleeping cars on the Silver Meteor and its sister train, the Silver Star. In fact, sleeping car business does well on all Amtrak long distance trains, with the full, more expensive bedrooms usually selling out before the smaller roomettes designed for one regular size person or two very small people.

Amtrak, always feeling like it must be proletariat, seldom has placed much emphasis on its sleeping car business, and has always focused on the much less desirable, and lower revenue generating coaches. When calling an Amtrak reservations center, often only coach seats are offered; passengers have to ask about sleeping cars.

VIA Rail Canada, Amtrak’s cold country cousin to the north, however, has always placed a high emphasis on its sleeping car business and offers a variety of sleeping car accommodations choices, ranging from the very old Pullman Company-style open berths to elegant drawing rooms, designed with two lower berths and one upper berth. On VIA, it’s the drawing rooms which sell out first.

Amtrak, as it’s ordering new single-level Viewliner sleeping cars and hopefully planning to order new Superliner sleeping cars, needs to revisit the wonders and many advantages of drawing rooms.

Looking at the demographics of Amtrak’s sleeping car passengers, much of the business comes from middle-aged and older traveling couples, people who want two lower berths in their sleeping accommodation, not one upper and one lower. To make this happen, wealthier passengers often pay for two full bedrooms which open en suite to offer a single space with two lower berths.

Amtrak doesn’t care if two people buy space designed for four people, because the cost to feed four people has been factored into the fare (Money Amtrak keeps without complaining when it only has to feed two people.), and the high revenue from selling two bedrooms instead of one looks pretty good.

Well, actually, it’s not so good, because if that same space had been sold to four passengers instead of two passengers, an additional $234 in rail fare (Amtrak charges sleeping car passengers the lowest bucket rail fares in addition to the accommodations charges for each passenger.) would have been collected. If a new design was hatched for sleeping cars which reshuffled priorities to maximize revenue and passenger satisfaction, each sleeping car would have at least four bedrooms, one drawing room, and perhaps seven or eight roomettes.

When the Viewliners were designed, three basic mistakes were made in this experimental car. First, no public restroom was included in the design. When the toilet facilities in any given room are non-functioning, and all accommodations are sold, passengers either have to impose on the facilities of the car attendant (not a good idea) or go to a restroom in another car. All in all, very inconvenient and unprofessional in the design. Second, instead of the former six full bedrooms which were found in the predecessor Heritage 10 roomette, six bedroom cars, only three full bedroom were included, one being a handicapped room. Third, no drawing rooms with three berths were included.

When the original 10/6 sleeping cars were designed during the World War II era, roomettes for one passenger were primarily designed for traveling businessmen. If a passenger was a midnight sailor and had to make use of the toilet, he had to get out of bed, open the door to the room, and back into the hallway inside of a closed curtain to raise the bed which folded down over the toilet, and then repeat the process to go back to bed. In the Viewliners, smaller beds are used and allegedly passengers can access the micro-size toilet which is not covered by the bed when the beds are in use. This, however, does require a certain knowledge of gymnastics to accomplish that feat.

In the process of all of this, Viewliners have fewer full bedrooms, and more roomettes, which contain two beds instead of one bed as found in the 10/6 roomettes. However, since the overall floor space remains about the same as the old roomettes, trying to squeeze two normal sized adults into this space leaves much to the imagination and to be desired, not to mention you have two people using non-private toilet facilities, which harkens back to some Pullman accommodations on western trains prior to World War II. In the Heritage fleet, as in the fleets of all of the pre-Amtrak passenger railroads, a number of all-bedroom cars were found, offering a choice of bedrooms, drawing rooms, and compartments, but no roomettes.

When Amtrak ordered the Viewliners, only 50 were purchased, replacing nearly double that number of Heritage sleepers, allegedly, again, because Viewliners held more passengers so fewer cars were needed. In reality, Amtrak made a conscious decision to restrict the number of sleepers in its fleet, and have less accommodations for sale overall, thereby restricting sleeping car revenues.

Prior to the arrival of the Viewliners in the mid-90s, it was common for the Florida long distance trains and the Crescent between New York and New Orleans to have five or more sleeping cars per train. Today, five cars have been replaced by two or three sleeping cars per train, with dramatically fewer bedrooms for sale, and fewer roomettes, too.

Let’s stop for a moment and do a quick comparison. Amtrak and its many True Believers, egalitarian to the core and non-believers that those who wish to pay for better accommodations should suffer along with the rest, for years made the claim the company makes more money from coach passengers than from sleeping car passengers. Oh, really? Well, no, it doesn’t.

Let us stick to our same trip model, from New York City’s Penn Station or Orlando, Florida. Just for comparison purposes, using fares quoted today for travel in about a month’s time in August, weigh the income from a full coach with 54 passengers to a full Viewliner sleeping car with all accommodations sold. The fully sold out coach brings in ticket revenue of $8,316. The fully sold out sleeping car brings in ticket and accommodations revenue of $10,433, more than $2,000 more in revenue.

And, yes, each of those sleeping car passengers will consume food in the dining car that’s included in the cost of the accommodation. However, it’s doubtful even the most ravenous group of sleeping car passengers, eating full dinners and breakfasts, will consume $2,000 worth of food.

And, yes, many of those coach passengers will also find their way into the dining car, adding extra revenues. Even if every coach passenger spent a total of $25 on dinner and breakfast in the dining car, they would only spend an additional $1,350, still not adding up to the additional revenue from the sleeping car.

Remember, those sleeping car passengers will have other opportunities (Although limited by Amtrak.) to spend money on the train in for form of alcohol sales in the dining car and alcohol and snacks sales in the lounge car. Plus, travelers in sleeping cars are also more likely to have a higher amount of disposable income to spend on the train in the diner and lounge than coach passengers.

Overall, if Amtrak took a page from the VIA Rail Canada book and understood the high value of sleeping and dining car business, it would be eager to operate more sleeping cars, instead of scoffing at sleepers as something that are somehow unpatriotic to operate because of egalitarian concerns.

2) The ideal train – whether long distance or short distance – has a variety of accommodations. Back in the days prior to Amtrak of the Pennsylvania Railroad’s Congressional Service (The Pennsy was the builder and original owner of what is today Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor.) between New York City’s Pennsylvania Railroad Station and Washington, D.C., passengers had a choice of coach seats, parlour car seating, or private accommodations in sleeping cars set up for day use. The Pennsylvania recognized not one size fits all for travel accommodations, and a good number of passengers were willing and able to pay additional fares for larger seats in less crowded cars, or completely private accommodations with private plumbing in each accommodation. This wasn’t class warfare, this was a recognition of the marketplace and the proper exploitation of the marketplace for (Gasp!) profit.

Congressional Service trains also had a combination of full dining cars, parlour bar lounges, coffee shop taverns, and grill cars. Depending on the size of the train, time of day operated, or level of service advertised, there were drinking and dining choices appropriate for the service.

Amtrak’s Metroliners had first class seating which was three across: one seat, an aisle, and then two larger than normal coach seats. The Metroliners, which were also originally designed by the Pennsylvania Railroad, intentionally recognized the different tastes of travelers, and how accommodations charges could be both profitable and fun.

There is little reason why today’s Amtrak long distance trains cannot have some innovation in coach seating with a few modifications to existing equipment to create a first class/parlour car service with accompanying accommodations charge.

The installation of showers in first class coaches would be a great improvement, and a shower service could either be included in the accommodation price or sold separately onboard by the car attendant when providing towels and bathing articles.

Changing seating from four across to three across is another simple innovation for part of the cars; adding special areas for family travel where five or six seats are clustered together for large groups or families is also an inviting concept.

Adding a self-service food service area, offering 24-hour coffee, cold drinks, and light snacks and perhaps newspapers enhances the experience without dramatically taking away from lounge car sales. Including dining car meals in the price of a first class coach seat adds instant, guaranteed revenue for the dining car and an excellent perk for passengers.

Working on the same principle as for sleeping cars which produce higher revenue for every car carried, first class coach, with fewer coach seats per car, but higher fares for additional parlour car/first class coach seating would serve two excellent purposes: First, those not wishing to spend the costs of full sleeping car accommodations would have a good second choice for travel comfort, and second, fewer passengers in an upscale environment make for a much more pleasant trip overall then being jammed in a long distance coach with 53 of your closest, new best friends.

Coach class could remain for those taking shorter trips or those seeking truly budget accommodations.

3) The idea is to create a broader market for passenger train travel, higher revenues for Amtrak, and a better travel environment.

No one will dispute the annoyance and discomfort of air travel. What was once glamorous has become more than annoying and almost punitive. Today’s air travel is today’s agony. It’s not uncommon for someone to wonder if flying is really “worth it” for all of the hassles one has to go through, from the removal of shoes before you can be allowed to board the aircraft to a total restriction of what you can carry with you on the airplane. Speed does not always trump every other consideration.

Amtrak has a golden opportunity to become the carrier of comfort and convenience, and the carrier of value.

As said before in this space, Europeans are often shocked at the low cost of Amtrak coach travel; if Amtrak chooses to upgrade its service and accommodations offerings, based on how well sleeping car accommodations are sold today, Amtrak has a grand opportunity to become a carrier of first choice instead of a carrier of last choice – or even worse, the forgotten carrier. Amtrak remains America’s best kept secret. Imagine the demand if even a third of Americans knew passenger rail service was available to them.

4) >From Amtrak This Week, that OTHER publication, not to be confused with This Week at Amtrak. Amtrak This Week is the company’s employee news and information publication.

[begin quote]

July 13, 2009

First Stimulus-Funded Car Returning to Service

Today, President and CEO Joe Boardman, U.S. Senator Tom Carper (D-Del.) and other elected officials were in Wilmington, Del., as the first car refurbished with funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act departs Bear Car Shops on its way back to the active fleet.

“The real story today is about people – the Amtrak passengers who will ride in these rehabilitated cars and the workers who are doing a great job bringing them back to life,” said Boardman, noting that the additional seating capacity on its trains will help connect families, further business relationships, and position Amtrak for expected future growth in ridership.

The car, Amfleet II Coach 25103, was built in 1982 but has been out of service since April 2005, when it was damaged in a rail yard accident in Florida. It is the first of 60 Amfleet cars that will be returned to service by early 2011. The Amfleet I and II cars in the project are either being converted, rehabilitated from wreck status or undergoing a Level 3 overhaul. The cost per unit ranges from $615,000 to $1.4 million depending on the level of work being done.

Two additional ARRA-funded projects will put 15 diesel locomotives and 21 long-distance cars back in the fleet over the same time period. The combined cost of the three projects is $91 million.

“An expanded fleet is a critical part of our ability to grow,” said Vice President of Policy and Development Stephen Gardner. “We need these cars as we pursue new service in partnership with states and also to increase capacity along existing routes where demand exceeds what we can currently offer.”

To meet the labor needs of refurbishing and overhauling nearly 100 cars in under two years, the Mechanical department has expanded its force by adding 160 new positions between facilities in Wilmington and Beech Grove, Ind. Competition was extremely high, as the company received 3,200 applications and conducted more than 400interviews to fill the 160 positions.

[End quote]

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[MrFSS]

This Week at Amtrak; July 20, 2009

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A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from

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United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

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America's foremost passenger rail policy institute

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1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

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Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail

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Volume 6, Number 23

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1) The Amtrak Board of Directors should be furious about this document. Amtrak Interim President and CEO Joseph Boardman, since this document was issued during his stewardship, should be fired immediately. The Amtrak planning department should be outright ashamed of themselves and simply die of embarrassment they took a paycheck for producing such an untoward piece of drivel and written chicanery.

We can only be discussing the July 16, 2009 issuance of Amtrak's P.R.I.I.A. Section 226 Gulf Coast Service Plan Report, mandated last year by the Amtrak reauthorization. Congresswoman Corrine Brown, who placed a million dollars into Amtrak's free federal money handout last year deserves a refund for her efforts. At 77 pages long, plus the cover, $12,820.51 for each page will long be noted by government watchdogs as one of the greatest misuses of money in the modern history of the United States government. Certainly, when Congresswoman Brown threw Amtrak this generous bone she most likely never dreamed Amtrak would come back with such an insulting document to her, her constituents, and American taxpayers.

The report is an outright disgrace and complete misrepresentation of facts to restore service east of New Orleans to Orlando, Florida after the Sunset Limited was "temporarily" discontinued in August of 2005 because of the onslaught of Hurricane Katrina. Four years later, Amtrak's planning department and Joe Boardman expect us to believe their fantasy document provides any credence whatsoever as to what it will take to restore service over the Sunset Limited route along the Gulf Coast.

2) Here's a summary of the document by one interested observer who has contributed accurate reporting to this space in the past. Then, we'll take a close look at the nuts and bolts of this written travesty that one other commentator who exposed his complete lack of knowledge of the railroad world incorrectly called "a realistic assessment of existing difficulties."

First, the correct summary.

[begin quote]

After reading the Amtrak report I basically held my thoughts and comments until I had a chance to see the input from people within the group who are much more knowledgeable about running a rail passenger system than am I. I believe I can say without exception none of the reports I've read are optimistic or approving of Amtrak's report which is precisely my opinion from the minute I finished reading it.

With the single exception of the report indicating that regardless of which option was selected it would include sleepers between New Orleans and Orlando this was a disheartening report. This inclusion of sleepers was not intimated in the oral reports given to this point concerning the "new train" (Option 3).

Option 1 (tri-weekly Sunset Limited) seemed to be the least desirable based on oral comments simply because of the odd arrangement of having a daily "stub" train arriving in New Orleans (this stub train was made to sound like all but a certainty), but continuing to Orlando only with a tri-weekly schedule. This naturally meant playing havoc with anyone trying to travel through New Orleans to points East. Yet the written report makes Option 1 appear as the best option based on several points. Option 2 (City of New Orleans) appeared to possibly be the best option based on early reports, but the written report makes it sound undesirable on several points.

It's obvious to even the most casual reader that the primary recurring theme from Amtrak is that they don't want to reinstate any service between New Orleans and Orlando. They do not say that specifically, but by any interpretation of the facts they've done everything they can to make the return of the route as difficult as possible from inflated costs to inflated time frames and convoluted passenger counts and miles. I would love to know the real reason Amtrak absolutely is not interested in running a New Orleans-Orlando train. Might be interesting.

There is little doubt that there has been for years strong opponents of Amtrak (with the Sunset being the punching bag). However, many of those voices of dissent have been silenced or at least muffled to a large extent. We have a president and Congress professing strong support for passenger rail, and actually providing funding. It would seem if ever there was a good time to push expansion and improvement of Amtrak it would be now.

Yet Amtrak seems to still be on the wrong track as usual. I've never seen a company run only for the benefit of the management and employees instead of the customers as is Amtrak. This is what comes from a government-funded company I guess. Their goal seems to be to get more and more government money, but they don't seem to know what to do with it. Amtrak management does not seem to have a plan. They can't even decide whether they want to have long-distance trains. They can't decide the best way to manage the Northeast Corridor. They can't decide how to manage dining car concepts. They can't decide what kinds of cars to order. They can't decide what routes to operate. They can't decide whether to have High Speed Rail or even what HSR is.

If Amtrak were a private company they would have gone bankrupt a long time ago. However, American management can't seem to operate auto companies, banks or insurance companies either. Maybe we shouldn't expect them to be able to operate a rail-passenger corporation. Possibly we should replace the entire Amtrak management team with Japanese rail executives. They seem to have no trouble running passenger rail. I cannot possibly see how it couldn't help but be an improvement.

I for one am fed up with Amtrak's lack of leadership, vision, planning, and just general inability to function effectively. If I remember correctly we paid $1 million for this "informative" report which basically tells us all the reasons Amtrak doesn't want to reinstate service to Orlando. We already knew that. I'm tired of seeing my tax money being wasted by an incompetent company.

If they had just reinstated the train when CSX opened the route all of this could have been avoided. Instead of telling us why they can't reinstate it now we'd be talking about how best to improve service on the route. You don't have to be a rail expert to know this is a snow job which is the one thing Amtrak has perfected during their existence. I've waited four years to catch a train in Pensacola, and now the best they can tell me is that it likely will be four more years if ever. Enough is enough. What a crock. I've no more patience with this nonsense.

Our only hope is if Congress puts their collective foot up Amtrak's posterior, and tells them to make things happen or they'll find people who can. Without that it's going to be business (or no business) as usual for years to come.

[End quote]

3) Amtrak says the dog ate its homework, so it can only do so much to restore service between New Orleans and Orlando. It lists three options, two of which are pretty reasonable.

The first option is to restore the service as it was before, re-extending the Sunset Limited (or it's named replacement service) from New Orleans to Orlando on a tri-weekly basis, using the same maintenance facility at Sanford, Florida, a suburb of Orlando, as it previously successfully used for a decade.

The second option is to extend the City of New Orleans, operating from Chicago to New Orleans via Memphis, Tennessee, to Orlando, an option long sought by United Rail Passenger Alliance. This option would – for the first time since 1979 – provide single train service between Chicago and Florida, with a schedule which feeds all of the western transcontinental trains eastbound into Chicago to cross-platform travelers to the City and to Florida.

The third option is to recreate the old Seaboard Air Line/Louisville & Nashville joint train, the Gulf Wind, as a stand-alone train between New Orleans and Jacksonville, Florida, and extend it down to Orlando. The Gulf Wind was discontinued on Amtrak Day in 1971, and the service was eventually replaced by the Sunset Limited's tri-weekly schedule in 1993 until Hurricane Katrina hit in 2005.

4) Amtrak's report has such blatantly false numbers as a basis for the document, and the assumptions use such discredited junk science in the transportation industry, that it's tough to zero in on a starting point. So, the most understandable thing to do is to go through the report as presented and point out the numerous inaccuracies – and, frankly, outright lies – as stated.

Here's the first laugh: "The service remains suspended today because of the cost and challenges associated with restoring service to this route." Really? CSX, the primary host railroad of the route, which suffered considerable damage from Hurricane Katrina, had the track up and running and available to Amtrak on April 1, 2006. The CSX efforts included replacing huge stretches of track, bridges, signaling, switches, and every type of railroad infrastructure in the wake of Katrina. Amtrak's relatively small challenges of rehabbing stations (many of which are municipally owned) pale in comparison to what CSX (and Norfolk Southern on its Crescent line into New Orleans just to the north of the CSX line along the Gulf Coast) had to accomplish, and was able to accomplish in seven months. Of course, the difference is CSX is a private, for-profit company, and every hour the railroad was out of service was an hour of revenue lost. In the case of Amtrak, it could blow off the service and still turn to Congress for more money with yet another, ongoing sob story. When there is no accountability, there is no progress.

The report notes a $10.7 million cost for restoring stations along the route, including $3.2 million for the demolition and reconstruction of the Sanford, Florida station, which was damaged from other hurricane preceding Katrina.

Whoops! The Sanford station is also on the route of the Silver Meteor and Silver Star. The reasons Amtrak gave for closing the station initially had absolutely nothing to do with the Sunset Limited, but rather because Amtrak said there were enough other stations in the area (DeLand, Winter Park, Orlando, and Kissimmee), and Sanford served no useful purpose, plus eliminating the Sanford station stop sped up train schedules.

Also, on an adjoining piece of property to the old Atlantic Coast Line Sanford station and division office building, Amtrak is using stimulus money to build a brand new Auto Train station and terminal.

Now, Amtrak is telling us it wants another $3.2 million – charged directly to the restoration of the Sunset Limited route – to build another new Sanford station that will also serve the Silver Meteor and Silver Star? If this station is built for the restored service, will the Meteor and Star also use it? If this station is important enough to the overall financial health of this route, why wait for this service to be restored; why isn't the station in some other vision plan for the future? And, better yet, why wasn't the Auto Train's new terminal planned and constructed so it could serve both the mainline trains and the Auto Train, too?

The other $7.5 million will be used to upgrade a relatively new station in Pensacola, Florida, and the old Seaboard Air Line station in Tallahassee, which was well out of the way of Katrina. Amtrak said in the report this money would be used to add American With Disabilities Act requirements to the stations, which, most when built or reconfigured for service in 1993 met most of those requirements.

The one major station project to be undertaken is a completely new station in Mobile, Alabama. That building was severely damaged by Katrina to the point CSX sold the damaged building to a real estate developer since it was in such bad shape. A completely new facility will have to be created in Mobile. However, as anyone who has ever traveled around the country on Amtrak knows, there have been many stations in large cities and small hamlets which have functioned well using an Amshack trailer for a building, and later permanent construction considered. St. Louis Union Trailers is perhaps the most famous of these stations, with new construction coming after decades of "temporary" shelter. A single station in Mobile should not be enough to hold up this project; most of the passenger platforms in Mobile are still in place and serviceable.

The report states a cost of $600,000 for improvements at Amtrak's Sanford maintenance facility. Well, prior to Katrina, the Sunset's equipment base was in Sanford, and the maintenance crews there did an exemplary job of maintaining the train. Why, now, more than half a million dollars for upgrades? Is it just because as long as Amtrak is making a wish list or a discouragement list, this $600,000 of Other Peoples Money is necessary?

Amtrak's report makes an assumption $20 million will be necessary to install Positive Train Control (PTC), as required by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 by 2015 on portions of the route solely because of restoration of passenger service. This is an issue we will delve into in a very soon future issue of This Week at Amtrak. CSX had indicated some of the current route may be downgraded because it can route some of its hazmat and other trains requiring the use of PTC on a similar route via Montgomery, Alabama.

5) One of the biggest ticket items in the report is alleged additional passenger rolling stock which would be required to operate either an extended City of New Orleans (two train sets) or a new overnight Gulf Wind (the same number of new cars). Amtrak estimates the need of between six and 14 new passenger cars, at a cost of $24 million to $63 million.

This is perhaps one of the most incredible and ludicrous parts of the report. Amtrak says it could take up to four years (yes, you read that right) to get either of these trains running because that is the time to design, plan, order, and build new passenger cars specifically for this route. Such hogwash.

A review of Amtrak's current System Fleet Pan for Fiscal Year 2009 indicates after the few Superliners which will be taken out of the wreck line and restored with stimulus funds monies, 32 Superliners of every description, including coaches, diners, lounges, and sleepers will still be available to be taken out of storage and rebuilt for service. Even if Amtrak needs the maximum number of 14 cars it says it does, that still leave another 18 Superliners to be restored for other uses. New cars, designed and built specifically for this service? Why? Amtrak already owns all of the cars it needs; it's a question of using existing assets through rebuilds and rehabilitation instead of the lengthy and expensive process of creating a new fleet of cars. In the report, Amtrak says it could cost up to $63 million to buy these new cars. If every car to be rebuilt cost as much as $1.5 million to rebuild (that follows what Amtrak is spending in stimulus funds currently for rebuilding Superliner cars), that a tab of only $21 million, not up to $63 million. It must be wonderful to plan and spend Other Peoples Money with great abandon when you have no accountability.

But, wait! you implore. Some of those Superliners are slated to be used IF the Pioneer is restored or IF the North Coast Limited is restored. Yes, that may be so. First come, first served. If the restoration of the Sunset's route can fill that crucial gap before the gaps of the Pioneer and the North Coast Limited are ready to be filled, get in line, folks.

6) When we start delving into the financial aspects of this report, things become more complicated. Amtrak makes several wrong assumptions.

The report says ridership was a primary consideration in selecting the three preferred route options. Amtrak says if option one is used, and a tri-weekly Sunset Limited is restored, ridership will be 53,300 a year. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, an average of 45% of the Sunset's ridership and revenues came from east of New Orleans. In FY 08, the Sunset, operating only west of New Orleans, had ridership of 71,700 passengers. A projection of 53,300 (171 passengers per trip) is probably the closest thing to a legitimate number in the entire report, although that figure could probably be altered up by 25% and still be a legitimate figure.

Everyone knows in the real, non-Amtrak world, business plan forecasts always figure revenue low and expenses high. Amtrak, of course, being Amtrak, has taken this to heart and grossly distorted its numbers for ridership, revenue, and expenses.

Option two, the extension of the City of New Orleans, creating a single train route from Chicago to Orlando, has the greatest chance of success, and Amtrak terribly underestimates its potential. Today's City of New Orleans has ridership of 197,400 per year (FY 08), and Amtrak says an extended version of that will only bring in an additional 96,100 passengers on the haul to Orlando.

They are saying the system's only Chicago-Florida train, with the Empire Builder, California Zephyr, Southwest Chief, Lake Shore Limited, and all of the Chicago regional trains feeding into the City would only generate additional business to Florida, projected to be less than half of what the City carries today between Chicago and New Orleans via Memphis. One has to wonder exactly what Amtrak's planning department is smoking on their lunch breaks. It's unlikely enough equipment could be found on this train to make it 18 cars which would serve as a replacement for the long, lost Floridian, gone since 1979.

Option three, a reconstituted and stretched Gulf Wind, running as a stand-alone train between New Orleans and Orlando on an overnight schedule is, according to Amtrak, the most expensive to operate and not very productive, with a predicted ridership of 79,900, because, as Amtrak says, the train would have to have connecting passengers from the eastbound Sunset Limited successor, and the southbound City of New Orleans. Amtrak uses old and discredited junk science to say passengers will not want to detrain at New Orleans Union Passenger Terminal, spend a few hours in the Crescent City, and entrain for a late afternoon departure and midday arrival in Orlando.

Uh, lessee, well, airlines create their entire route systems around hubs, and passengers hub for bus travel, too. Amtrak expects all of its passengers north of New York City to hub in Washington for Florida trains and the Crescent, after arriving there on Northeast Corridor trains. Lots and lots and lots of passengers hub every day in Chicago for destinations all over the country, and Los Angeles is a big hub, too, not to mention Seattle and Portland, Oregon, and a half a dozen other hubs in the Amtrak system.

So, why is there a dire prediction about hubbing in New Orleans? Is this just another use of discredited junk science to make the report read badly so no service will be restored east of New Orleans? What is the prejudice the Amtrak planners have about those of us living in Florida or along the Gulf Coast? Is there some sort of genetic trait we have that makes us unworthy of passenger train travel? Do these people think all we do is marry our cousins and drink beer and never want to travel?

Here's something else to put a smile on your face. Amtrak's planners say the route between New Orleans and Orlando is adversely impacted by the circuitry of the rail route, a passenger train having to travel 769 miles versus 639 miles by automobile, and what it calls slow speeds which result in a trip time of 18.5 hours versus 9.6 by automobile.

Well. If that's the case, why doesn't Amtrak just turn out the lights and go home? It's also much faster to travel from Jacksonville, Florida to Richmond, Virginia by automobile (less than 10 hours) than by Amtrak (12 and a half hours). But, that doesn't mean everyone wants – or is able – to drive. It's also much, much quicker to take a jet airplane, but that's not always comfortable or easy or desirable for everyone, either.

The point of travel by train is just that – travel by train. Every individual train in Amtrak's system to connected to every other train in the system through the matrix theory. Everything connects with everything (although, sometimes inconveniently), and every train feeds other trains.

Amtrak's rather boorish presumption a new Gulf wind will only haul local business, and only haul those who want to avoid driving is hogwash. Amtrak provides a viable travel choice. Most likely, the Amtrak planning department denizens would be shocked to know someone from Washington State or Oregon may have an interest in riding a new Gulf Wind between New Orleans and Tallahassee or Jacksonville, or Palatka or DeLand or Orlando. That's the beauty of the matrix theory. To presume little or no traffic from connecting trains, especially strong feeders like the City of New Orleans and a daily Sunset Limited (or replacement of that named train) west of New Orleans is like saying a gas station on an Interstate highway exit will only sell gas to local residents, and no travelers from other areas will ever stop at the station.

7) Let's use the existing City of New Orleans as a model for this route. The City's route is similar in length, 926 miles versus the projected length of 769 miles. The City begins in Chicago and ends in New Orleans, and has only one other major city on its route – Memphis, Tennessee. It has a number of smaller cities and state capitals along its route, such as Jackson, Mississippi. Much of the route of the City is rural, such as the route between New Orleans and Jacksonville, Florida. Since the southern terminal for the proposed Gulf Wind is Orlando, one of the world's largest vacation destinations, the travel data for that city equals – if not exceeds – that of Chicago.

Let's look at the characteristics of the City of New Orleans for FY 2008.

Total Revenue – $14,864,600

Passenger Miles – 93,433,000

Ridership – 197,400

Average Length of Trip – 473.3 miles

Train Miles – 666,000

Passengers per Train Mile – 140.3

Revenue per Passenger Mile – 15.91 cents

Load Factor – 63.8%

Available Seat Miles – 146,375,952

Here's what Amtrak estimates for the three options east of New Orleans to Orlando.

Option One, Tri-Weekly extension of the Sunset Limited (or named replacement service)

Ridership – 53,300

Option Two, Extension of the City of New Orleans from New Orleans to Orlando

Ridership – 96,100

Option Three, Creation of a new stand-alone, connecting train, labeled the Gulf Wind by Amtrak

Ridership – 79,900

Amtrak says it used its normal methods to determine ridership, including "Ridership and revenue impacts for each alternative were estimated utilizing models and data Amtrak has developed to measure the impact of now or changed services. The inputs included surveys of Amtrak's long distance passengers; socio-economic data; and forecasts of population and income in the areas served by each station." Amtrak goes on correctly to say it includes data between Jacksonville and Orlando where a third frequency would increase travel opportunities for the Silver Meteor and Silver Star, and therefore, that ridership would grow, too.

What Amtrak did not bother to measure is overall passenger traffic along the line. Using Amtrak's data, it is all based on population, and only the desire of the local population to travel. It does not account for incoming traffic from other routes or other parts of the country, and it does not account for Amtrak's typical one tenth of one percent of the domestic transportation output Amtrak commands.

When using real data, we discover Interstate 10 parallels the route between New Orleans and Jacksonville, Florida, and on any given day at any given intermediate rural point (outside of local traffic using the Interstate in such places as Jacksonville, Tallahassee, Pensacola, etc.), an average of 36,000 to 70,000 passenger vehicles (excluding trucks hauling freight) pass a measuring point on the Interstate. What Amtrak is projecting a year for ridership, the Interstate hosts in a day, and we are unable to measure how many occupants are in each vehicle.

The same holds true for air transportation. When culling city pair information from the government's Bureau of Transportation Statistics, we learn travelers between Chicago and Orlando are measured in six and seven figure numbers, not counting other intermediate city pairs along this route.

As previously stated, Amtrak also eschews any real cross-platform business in New Orleans to bolster its numbers. It presumes people will not intentionally schedule connections from one train route to another. Apparently, Amtrak's planning department, located in Washington, never bothers to stroll through Washington Union Station to see the millions of annual riders who make train connections there, or the millions who connect through Chicago or other points.

Therefore, Amtrak's numbers for ridership, expenses, and every other category beyond basic diesel fuel are not credible.

Looking at the ridership and revenue passenger mile figures for the present City of New Orleans we see numbers which are double what Amtrak projects for east of New Orleans. These numbers are a more accurate barometer than Amtrak's report numbers.

8) One final point. Amtrak's report says the company wants an incredible 20 months or more to recruit and train operating personnel for this route.

Why?

Back in 1993 (before HD television), it took Amtrak substantially less than a year to – from scratch – create this service on a tri-weekly basis east of New Orleans. Apparently, the "can do" people who were running Amtrak at that time must be long gone, replaced by a group comfortable in their government-subsidized paychecks with no worries in the world, and no hurry to fulfill Amtrak's national mission of providing passenger service to the lower 48 states.

Twenty months? Even if it has been four years since the Sunset last operated east of New Orleans, many of the train and engine crew members are still employees of Amtrak, just working other routes

9) There is much more ground to cover, but you get the idea. Amtrak fraudulently wasted $1 million of taxpayer money creating a worthless document with false data, incorrect assumptions, and incomplete conclusions.

This type of fiasco has been going on for far too long at Amtrak. Interim President and CEO Joseph Boardman has been in office for nine months now, and this was created under his stewardship. He is ultimately responsible. He needs to be gone, at the earliest moment.

It's worth noting a phrase from the last edition of TWA, taken from the Amtrak This Week employee publication story about the first restored passenger car coming out of the shops.

[begin quote]

"An expanded fleet is a critical part of our ability to grow," said Vice President of Policy and Development Stephen Gardner. "We need these cars as we pursue new service in partnership with states and also to increase capacity along existing routes where demand exceeds what we can currently offer."

[End quote]

Still no future vision, still no business plan better than gouging individual states for money for short distance trains. If Mr. Gardner's statement holds true, then Amtrak truly isn't interested in expanding the long distance system and the entire $1 million exercise was just done to appease a Member of Congress.

So, at this point, is Amtrak worth saving? Or, is it time for a complete make over with an entire new leadership team which will have the ability to unleash the power and potential of Amtrak and allow many of the good managers and executives there to do their jobs properly and with some enthusiasm?

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J. Bruce Richardson

President

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

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Telephone 904-636-7739

[email protected]

http://www.unitedrail.org

 

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This Week at Amtrak; July 20, 2009

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A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from

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United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

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America's foremost passenger rail policy institute

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1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

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Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail

[email protected] • http://www.unitedrail.org​

Volume 6, Number 23

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Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

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1) The Amtrak Board of Directors should be furious about this document. Amtrak Interim President and CEO Joseph Boardman, since this document was issued during his stewardship, should be fired immediately. The Amtrak planning department should be outright ashamed of themselves and simply die of embarrassment they took a paycheck for producing such an untoward piece of drivel and written chicanery.

We can only be discussing the July 16, 2009 issuance of Amtrak's P.R.I.I.A. Section 226 Gulf Coast Service Plan Report, mandated last year by the Amtrak reauthorization. Congresswoman Corrine Brown, who placed a million dollars into Amtrak's free federal money handout last year deserves a refund for her efforts. At 77 pages long, plus the cover, $12,820.51 for each page will long be noted by government watchdogs as one of the greatest misuses of money in the modern history of the United States government. Certainly, when Congresswoman Brown threw Amtrak this generous bone she most likely never dreamed Amtrak would come back with such an insulting document to her, her constituents, and American taxpayers.

The report is an outright disgrace and complete misrepresentation of facts to restore service east of New Orleans to Orlando, Florida after the Sunset Limited was "temporarily" discontinued in August of 2005 because of the onslaught of Hurricane Katrina. Four years later, Amtrak's planning department and Joe Boardman expect us to believe their fantasy document provides any credence whatsoever as to what it will take to restore service over the Sunset Limited route along the Gulf Coast.

2) Here's a summary of the document by one interested observer who has contributed accurate reporting to this space in the past. Then, we'll take a close look at the nuts and bolts of this written travesty that one other commentator who exposed his complete lack of knowledge of the railroad world incorrectly called "a realistic assessment of existing difficulties."

First, the correct summary.

[begin quote]

After reading the Amtrak report I basically held my thoughts and comments until I had a chance to see the input from people within the group who are much more knowledgeable about running a rail passenger system than am I. I believe I can say without exception none of the reports I've read are optimistic or approving of Amtrak's report which is precisely my opinion from the minute I finished reading it.

With the single exception of the report indicating that regardless of which option was selected it would include sleepers between New Orleans and Orlando this was a disheartening report. This inclusion of sleepers was not intimated in the oral reports given to this point concerning the "new train" (Option 3).

Option 1 (tri-weekly Sunset Limited) seemed to be the least desirable based on oral comments simply because of the odd arrangement of having a daily "stub" train arriving in New Orleans (this stub train was made to sound like all but a certainty), but continuing to Orlando only with a tri-weekly schedule. This naturally meant playing havoc with anyone trying to travel through New Orleans to points East. Yet the written report makes Option 1 appear as the best option based on several points. Option 2 (City of New Orleans) appeared to possibly be the best option based on early reports, but the written report makes it sound undesirable on several points.

It's obvious to even the most casual reader that the primary recurring theme from Amtrak is that they don't want to reinstate any service between New Orleans and Orlando. They do not say that specifically, but by any interpretation of the facts they've done everything they can to make the return of the route as difficult as possible from inflated costs to inflated time frames and convoluted passenger counts and miles. I would love to know the real reason Amtrak absolutely is not interested in running a New Orleans-Orlando train. Might be interesting.

There is little doubt that there has been for years strong opponents of Amtrak (with the Sunset being the punching bag). However, many of those voices of dissent have been silenced or at least muffled to a large extent. We have a president and Congress professing strong support for passenger rail, and actually providing funding. It would seem if ever there was a good time to push expansion and improvement of Amtrak it would be now.

Yet Amtrak seems to still be on the wrong track as usual. I've never seen a company run only for the benefit of the management and employees instead of the customers as is Amtrak. This is what comes from a government-funded company I guess. Their goal seems to be to get more and more government money, but they don't seem to know what to do with it. Amtrak management does not seem to have a plan. They can't even decide whether they want to have long-distance trains. They can't decide the best way to manage the Northeast Corridor. They can't decide how to manage dining car concepts. They can't decide what kinds of cars to order. They can't decide what routes to operate. They can't decide whether to have High Speed Rail or even what HSR is.

If Amtrak were a private company they would have gone bankrupt a long time ago. However, American management can't seem to operate auto companies, banks or insurance companies either. Maybe we shouldn't expect them to be able to operate a rail-passenger corporation. Possibly we should replace the entire Amtrak management team with Japanese rail executives. They seem to have no trouble running passenger rail. I cannot possibly see how it couldn't help but be an improvement.

I for one am fed up with Amtrak's lack of leadership, vision, planning, and just general inability to function effectively. If I remember correctly we paid $1 million for this "informative" report which basically tells us all the reasons Amtrak doesn't want to reinstate service to Orlando. We already knew that. I'm tired of seeing my tax money being wasted by an incompetent company.

If they had just reinstated the train when CSX opened the route all of this could have been avoided. Instead of telling us why they can't reinstate it now we'd be talking about how best to improve service on the route. You don't have to be a rail expert to know this is a snow job which is the one thing Amtrak has perfected during their existence. I've waited four years to catch a train in Pensacola, and now the best they can tell me is that it likely will be four more years if ever. Enough is enough. What a crock. I've no more patience with this nonsense.

Our only hope is if Congress puts their collective foot up Amtrak's posterior, and tells them to make things happen or they'll find people who can. Without that it's going to be business (or no business) as usual for years to come.

[End quote]

3) Amtrak says the dog ate its homework, so it can only do so much to restore service between New Orleans and Orlando. It lists three options, two of which are pretty reasonable.

The first option is to restore the service as it was before, re-extending the Sunset Limited (or it's named replacement service) from New Orleans to Orlando on a tri-weekly basis, using the same maintenance facility at Sanford, Florida, a suburb of Orlando, as it previously successfully used for a decade.

The second option is to extend the City of New Orleans, operating from Chicago to New Orleans via Memphis, Tennessee, to Orlando, an option long sought by United Rail Passenger Alliance. This option would – for the first time since 1979 – provide single train service between Chicago and Florida, with a schedule which feeds all of the western transcontinental trains eastbound into Chicago to cross-platform travelers to the City and to Florida.

The third option is to recreate the old Seaboard Air Line/Louisville & Nashville joint train, the Gulf Wind, as a stand-alone train between New Orleans and Jacksonville, Florida, and extend it down to Orlando. The Gulf Wind was discontinued on Amtrak Day in 1971, and the service was eventually replaced by the Sunset Limited's tri-weekly schedule in 1993 until Hurricane Katrina hit in 2005.

4) Amtrak's report has such blatantly false numbers as a basis for the document, and the assumptions use such discredited junk science in the transportation industry, that it's tough to zero in on a starting point. So, the most understandable thing to do is to go through the report as presented and point out the numerous inaccuracies – and, frankly, outright lies – as stated.

Here's the first laugh: "The service remains suspended today because of the cost and challenges associated with restoring service to this route." Really? CSX, the primary host railroad of the route, which suffered considerable damage from Hurricane Katrina, had the track up and running and available to Amtrak on April 1, 2006. The CSX efforts included replacing huge stretches of track, bridges, signaling, switches, and every type of railroad infrastructure in the wake of Katrina. Amtrak's relatively small challenges of rehabbing stations (many of which are municipally owned) pale in comparison to what CSX (and Norfolk Southern on its Crescent line into New Orleans just to the north of the CSX line along the Gulf Coast) had to accomplish, and was able to accomplish in seven months. Of course, the difference is CSX is a private, for-profit company, and every hour the railroad was out of service was an hour of revenue lost. In the case of Amtrak, it could blow off the service and still turn to Congress for more money with yet another, ongoing sob story. When there is no accountability, there is no progress.

The report notes a $10.7 million cost for restoring stations along the route, including $3.2 million for the demolition and reconstruction of the Sanford, Florida station, which was damaged from other hurricane preceding Katrina.

Whoops! The Sanford station is also on the route of the Silver Meteor and Silver Star. The reasons Amtrak gave for closing the station initially had absolutely nothing to do with the Sunset Limited, but rather because Amtrak said there were enough other stations in the area (DeLand, Winter Park, Orlando, and Kissimmee), and Sanford served no useful purpose, plus eliminating the Sanford station stop sped up train schedules.

Also, on an adjoining piece of property to the old Atlantic Coast Line Sanford station and division office building, Amtrak is using stimulus money to build a brand new Auto Train station and terminal.

Now, Amtrak is telling us it wants another $3.2 million – charged directly to the restoration of the Sunset Limited route – to build another new Sanford station that will also serve the Silver Meteor and Silver Star? If this station is built for the restored service, will the Meteor and Star also use it? If this station is important enough to the overall financial health of this route, why wait for this service to be restored; why isn't the station in some other vision plan for the future? And, better yet, why wasn't the Auto Train's new terminal planned and constructed so it could serve both the mainline trains and the Auto Train, too?

The other $7.5 million will be used to upgrade a relatively new station in Pensacola, Florida, and the old Seaboard Air Line station in Tallahassee, which was well out of the way of Katrina. Amtrak said in the report this money would be used to add American With Disabilities Act requirements to the stations, which, most when built or reconfigured for service in 1993 met most of those requirements.

The one major station project to be undertaken is a completely new station in Mobile, Alabama. That building was severely damaged by Katrina to the point CSX sold the damaged building to a real estate developer since it was in such bad shape. A completely new facility will have to be created in Mobile. However, as anyone who has ever traveled around the country on Amtrak knows, there have been many stations in large cities and small hamlets which have functioned well using an Amshack trailer for a building, and later permanent construction considered. St. Louis Union Trailers is perhaps the most famous of these stations, with new construction coming after decades of "temporary" shelter. A single station in Mobile should not be enough to hold up this project; most of the passenger platforms in Mobile are still in place and serviceable.

The report states a cost of $600,000 for improvements at Amtrak's Sanford maintenance facility. Well, prior to Katrina, the Sunset's equipment base was in Sanford, and the maintenance crews there did an exemplary job of maintaining the train. Why, now, more than half a million dollars for upgrades? Is it just because as long as Amtrak is making a wish list or a discouragement list, this $600,000 of Other Peoples Money is necessary?

Amtrak's report makes an assumption $20 million will be necessary to install Positive Train Control (PTC), as required by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 by 2015 on portions of the route solely because of restoration of passenger service. This is an issue we will delve into in a very soon future issue of This Week at Amtrak. CSX had indicated some of the current route may be downgraded because it can route some of its hazmat and other trains requiring the use of PTC on a similar route via Montgomery, Alabama.

5) One of the biggest ticket items in the report is alleged additional passenger rolling stock which would be required to operate either an extended City of New Orleans (two train sets) or a new overnight Gulf Wind (the same number of new cars). Amtrak estimates the need of between six and 14 new passenger cars, at a cost of $24 million to $63 million.

This is perhaps one of the most incredible and ludicrous parts of the report. Amtrak says it could take up to four years (yes, you read that right) to get either of these trains running because that is the time to design, plan, order, and build new passenger cars specifically for this route. Such hogwash.

A review of Amtrak's current System Fleet Pan for Fiscal Year 2009 indicates after the few Superliners which will be taken out of the wreck line and restored with stimulus funds monies, 32 Superliners of every description, including coaches, diners, lounges, and sleepers will still be available to be taken out of storage and rebuilt for service. Even if Amtrak needs the maximum number of 14 cars it says it does, that still leave another 18 Superliners to be restored for other uses. New cars, designed and built specifically for this service? Why? Amtrak already owns all of the cars it needs; it's a question of using existing assets through rebuilds and rehabilitation instead of the lengthy and expensive process of creating a new fleet of cars. In the report, Amtrak says it could cost up to $63 million to buy these new cars. If every car to be rebuilt cost as much as $1.5 million to rebuild (that follows what Amtrak is spending in stimulus funds currently for rebuilding Superliner cars), that a tab of only $21 million, not up to $63 million. It must be wonderful to plan and spend Other Peoples Money with great abandon when you have no accountability.

But, wait! you implore. Some of those Superliners are slated to be used IF the Pioneer is restored or IF the North Coast Limited is restored. Yes, that may be so. First come, first served. If the restoration of the Sunset's route can fill that crucial gap before the gaps of the Pioneer and the North Coast Limited are ready to be filled, get in line, folks.

6) When we start delving into the financial aspects of this report, things become more complicated. Amtrak makes several wrong assumptions.

The report says ridership was a primary consideration in selecting the three preferred route options. Amtrak says if option one is used, and a tri-weekly Sunset Limited is restored, ridership will be 53,300 a year. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, an average of 45% of the Sunset's ridership and revenues came from east of New Orleans. In FY 08, the Sunset, operating only west of New Orleans, had ridership of 71,700 passengers. A projection of 53,300 (171 passengers per trip) is probably the closest thing to a legitimate number in the entire report, although that figure could probably be altered up by 25% and still be a legitimate figure.

Everyone knows in the real, non-Amtrak world, business plan forecasts always figure revenue low and expenses high. Amtrak, of course, being Amtrak, has taken this to heart and grossly distorted its numbers for ridership, revenue, and expenses.

Option two, the extension of the City of New Orleans, creating a single train route from Chicago to Orlando, has the greatest chance of success, and Amtrak terribly underestimates its potential. Today's City of New Orleans has ridership of 197,400 per year (FY 08), and Amtrak says an extended version of that will only bring in an additional 96,100 passengers on the haul to Orlando.

They are saying the system's only Chicago-Florida train, with the Empire Builder, California Zephyr, Southwest Chief, Lake Shore Limited, and all of the Chicago regional trains feeding into the City would only generate additional business to Florida, projected to be less than half of what the City carries today between Chicago and New Orleans via Memphis. One has to wonder exactly what Amtrak's planning department is smoking on their lunch breaks. It's unlikely enough equipment could be found on this train to make it 18 cars which would serve as a replacement for the long, lost Floridian, gone since 1979.

Option three, a reconstituted and stretched Gulf Wind, running as a stand-alone train between New Orleans and Orlando on an overnight schedule is, according to Amtrak, the most expensive to operate and not very productive, with a predicted ridership of 79,900, because, as Amtrak says, the train would have to have connecting passengers from the eastbound Sunset Limited successor, and the southbound City of New Orleans. Amtrak uses old and discredited junk science to say passengers will not want to detrain at New Orleans Union Passenger Terminal, spend a few hours in the Crescent City, and entrain for a late afternoon departure and midday arrival in Orlando.

Uh, lessee, well, airlines create their entire route systems around hubs, and passengers hub for bus travel, too. Amtrak expects all of its passengers north of New York City to hub in Washington for Florida trains and the Crescent, after arriving there on Northeast Corridor trains. Lots and lots and lots of passengers hub every day in Chicago for destinations all over the country, and Los Angeles is a big hub, too, not to mention Seattle and Portland, Oregon, and a half a dozen other hubs in the Amtrak system.

So, why is there a dire prediction about hubbing in New Orleans? Is this just another use of discredited junk science to make the report read badly so no service will be restored east of New Orleans? What is the prejudice the Amtrak planners have about those of us living in Florida or along the Gulf Coast? Is there some sort of genetic trait we have that makes us unworthy of passenger train travel? Do these people think all we do is marry our cousins and drink beer and never want to travel?

Here's something else to put a smile on your face. Amtrak's planners say the route between New Orleans and Orlando is adversely impacted by the circuitry of the rail route, a passenger train having to travel 769 miles versus 639 miles by automobile, and what it calls slow speeds which result in a trip time of 18.5 hours versus 9.6 by automobile.

Well. If that's the case, why doesn't Amtrak just turn out the lights and go home? It's also much faster to travel from Jacksonville, Florida to Richmond, Virginia by automobile (less than 10 hours) than by Amtrak (12 and a half hours). But, that doesn't mean everyone wants – or is able – to drive. It's also much, much quicker to take a jet airplane, but that's not always comfortable or easy or desirable for everyone, either.

The point of travel by train is just that – travel by train. Every individual train in Amtrak's system to connected to every other train in the system through the matrix theory. Everything connects with everything (although, sometimes inconveniently), and every train feeds other trains.

Amtrak's rather boorish presumption a new Gulf wind will only haul local business, and only haul those who want to avoid driving is hogwash. Amtrak provides a viable travel choice. Most likely, the Amtrak planning department denizens would be shocked to know someone from Washington State or Oregon may have an interest in riding a new Gulf Wind between New Orleans and Tallahassee or Jacksonville, or Palatka or DeLand or Orlando. That's the beauty of the matrix theory. To presume little or no traffic from connecting trains, especially strong feeders like the City of New Orleans and a daily Sunset Limited (or replacement of that named train) west of New Orleans is like saying a gas station on an Interstate highway exit will only sell gas to local residents, and no travelers from other areas will ever stop at the station.

7) Let's use the existing City of New Orleans as a model for this route. The City's route is similar in length, 926 miles versus the projected length of 769 miles. The City begins in Chicago and ends in New Orleans, and has only one other major city on its route – Memphis, Tennessee. It has a number of smaller cities and state capitals along its route, such as Jackson, Mississippi. Much of the route of the City is rural, such as the route between New Orleans and Jacksonville, Florida. Since the southern terminal for the proposed Gulf Wind is Orlando, one of the world's largest vacation destinations, the travel data for that city equals – if not exceeds – that of Chicago.

Let's look at the characteristics of the City of New Orleans for FY 2008.

Total Revenue – $14,864,600

Passenger Miles – 93,433,000

Ridership – 197,400

Average Length of Trip – 473.3 miles

Train Miles – 666,000

Passengers per Train Mile – 140.3

Revenue per Passenger Mile – 15.91 cents

Load Factor – 63.8%

Available Seat Miles – 146,375,952

Here's what Amtrak estimates for the three options east of New Orleans to Orlando.

Option One, Tri-Weekly extension of the Sunset Limited (or named replacement service)

Ridership – 53,300

Option Two, Extension of the City of New Orleans from New Orleans to Orlando

Ridership – 96,100

Option Three, Creation of a new stand-alone, connecting train, labeled the Gulf Wind by Amtrak

Ridership – 79,900

Amtrak says it used its normal methods to determine ridership, including "Ridership and revenue impacts for each alternative were estimated utilizing models and data Amtrak has developed to measure the impact of now or changed services. The inputs included surveys of Amtrak's long distance passengers; socio-economic data; and forecasts of population and income in the areas served by each station." Amtrak goes on correctly to say it includes data between Jacksonville and Orlando where a third frequency would increase travel opportunities for the Silver Meteor and Silver Star, and therefore, that ridership would grow, too.

What Amtrak did not bother to measure is overall passenger traffic along the line. Using Amtrak's data, it is all based on population, and only the desire of the local population to travel. It does not account for incoming traffic from other routes or other parts of the country, and it does not account for Amtrak's typical one tenth of one percent of the domestic transportation output Amtrak commands.

When using real data, we discover Interstate 10 parallels the route between New Orleans and Jacksonville, Florida, and on any given day at any given intermediate rural point (outside of local traffic using the Interstate in such places as Jacksonville, Tallahassee, Pensacola, etc.), an average of 36,000 to 70,000 passenger vehicles (excluding trucks hauling freight) pass a measuring point on the Interstate. What Amtrak is projecting a year for ridership, the Interstate hosts in a day, and we are unable to measure how many occupants are in each vehicle.

The same holds true for air transportation. When culling city pair information from the government's Bureau of Transportation Statistics, we learn travelers between Chicago and Orlando are measured in six and seven figure numbers, not counting other intermediate city pairs along this route.

As previously stated, Amtrak also eschews any real cross-platform business in New Orleans to bolster its numbers. It presumes people will not intentionally schedule connections from one train route to another. Apparently, Amtrak's planning department, located in Washington, never bothers to stroll through Washington Union Station to see the millions of annual riders who make train connections there, or the millions who connect through Chicago or other points.

Therefore, Amtrak's numbers for ridership, expenses, and every other category beyond basic diesel fuel are not credible.

Looking at the ridership and revenue passenger mile figures for the present City of New Orleans we see numbers which are double what Amtrak projects for east of New Orleans. These numbers are a more accurate barometer than Amtrak's report numbers.

8) One final point. Amtrak's report says the company wants an incredible 20 months or more to recruit and train operating personnel for this route.

Why?

Back in 1993 (before HD television), it took Amtrak substantially less than a year to – from scratch – create this service on a tri-weekly basis east of New Orleans. Apparently, the "can do" people who were running Amtrak at that time must be long gone, replaced by a group comfortable in their government-subsidized paychecks with no worries in the world, and no hurry to fulfill Amtrak's national mission of providing passenger service to the lower 48 states.

Twenty months? Even if it has been four years since the Sunset last operated east of New Orleans, many of the train and engine crew members are still employees of Amtrak, just working other routes

9) There is much more ground to cover, but you get the idea. Amtrak fraudulently wasted $1 million of taxpayer money creating a worthless document with false data, incorrect assumptions, and incomplete conclusions.

This type of fiasco has been going on for far too long at Amtrak. Interim President and CEO Joseph Boardman has been in office for nine months now, and this was created under his stewardship. He is ultimately responsible. He needs to be gone, at the earliest moment.

It's worth noting a phrase from the last edition of TWA, taken from the Amtrak This Week employee publication story about the first restored passenger car coming out of the shops.

[begin quote]

"An expanded fleet is a critical part of our ability to grow," said Vice President of Policy and Development Stephen Gardner. "We need these cars as we pursue new service in partnership with states and also to increase capacity along existing routes where demand exceeds what we can currently offer."

[End quote]

Still no future vision, still no business plan better than gouging individual states for money for short distance trains. If Mr. Gardner's statement holds true, then Amtrak truly isn't interested in expanding the long distance system and the entire $1 million exercise was just done to appease a Member of Congress.

So, at this point, is Amtrak worth saving? Or, is it time for a complete make over with an entire new leadership team which will have the ability to unleash the power and potential of Amtrak and allow many of the good managers and executives there to do their jobs properly and with some enthusiasm?

If you are reading someone else's copy of This Week at Amtrak, you can receive your own free copy each edition by sending your e-mail address to

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You MUST include your name, preferred e-mail address, and city and state where you live. If you have filters or firewalls placed on your Internet connection, set your e-mail to receive incoming mail from [email protected]; we are unable to go through any approvals processes for individuals. This mailing list is kept strictly confidential and is not shared or used for any purposes other than distribution of This Week at Amtrak or related URPA materials.

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URPA leadership members are available for speaking engagements.

J. Bruce Richardson

President

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

[email protected]

http://www.unitedrail.org

I don't know where he gets the idea that this report cost $1M. If anyone is mis-stating the facts I think it would be Mr. Bruce.! We can either agree or disagree, but there is no way $1M was spent on this report.

 

[Larry H.]

For what ever good it will do I sent Senator Durbin a copy of your report and my thoughts and questions on exactly where the Amtrak Management intended to take this country as far as first rate nation wide rail service as promised. I mentioned to him the obvious that as Illinois is his home state and Chicago being the terminus for the City of New Orleans he should be strongly in support of the service to florida for his constituents and others.

 

[bretton88]

I would say Mr. Bruce sounds mad because his pet may not be done first. The fact is, not all rail routes are feasible to do. Consultants rarely just pull numbers out of thin air, so I would be more trusting of the report. Its more inflammatory rhetoric from Mr. Bruce.

 

[henryj]

I would say Mr. Bruce sounds mad because his pet may not be done first. The fact is, not all rail routes are feasible to do. Consultants rarely just pull numbers out of thin air, so I would be more trusting of the report. Its more inflammatory rhetoric from Mr. Bruce.

The report is full of mis-information and inaccuracies and obsolete information. Why would you trust it? I think Mr. Bruce was more into pointing this out and the fact that Amtrak was paid over a million dollars for this stupid report.

 

[VentureForth]

I would say Mr. Bruce sounds mad because his pet may not be done first. The fact is, not all rail routes are feasible to do. Consultants rarely just pull numbers out of thin air, so I would be more trusting of the report. Its more inflammatory rhetoric from Mr. Bruce.

That's not necessarily true. If they extend the CONO to ORL, then it will fulfil his greatest desire - to get another Jax - ORL route. AND it would free up the Meteor to go straight from JAX to MIA without going through ORL, which Bruce doesn't like, but I think is a HUGE winner for East Coast travellers. In fact, it would increase demand on BOTH the Silvers from the NE by a) providing faster service to Miami from points N of JAX and b) merging more Disney-goers onto the already slower and less used Star. It would probably increase demand on the Star to the point where they'd need to go ahead and run the same consist on both Silvers (Meteor has at least one more sleeper and I think and additional coach than the Star).

 

[MrFSS]

This Week at Amtrak; July 25, 2009

​

A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from

​

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

​

America's foremost passenger rail policy institute

​

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

​

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail

[email protected] • http://www.unitedrail.org​

Volume 6, Number 24

​

Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) Response to the last This Week at Amtrak published Monday came fast and furious. The overwhelming sentiment was negative against Amtrak and the P.R.I.I.A. Section 226 Gulf Coast Service Plan Report as discussed in the last issue.

Here are some samples from the TWA mailbag. Every new paragraph represents a new quote by another individual writer.

[begin quotes]

"Those crooks are so lost in extorting money they have absolutely forgotten their purpose is to operate a 'national network of rail passenger services'."

"I have in my possession a published SCL passenger timetable from December 1970. Could I just mail that to Mr. Boardman and say 'here, can't you replicate this service?'."

"I am totally incensed by Amtrak's total incompetence from Mr. Boardman down the line to middle management. 20 months to train onboard staff is absurd! What can the average person do to correct the culture of mediocrity?"

"Yeah, I read the report. In typical Am-logic, they establish a conclusion first, and then

'manufacture' facts and data to justify it! A new station at Sanford? Why? Good point. ... Yeah, you're right – [Congresswoman] Corrine Brown should request a refund and Boardman should resign. What a disgrace!"

"I was comforted that it wasn't only me that was . . . well . . . flabbergasted . . . at the audacity Amtrak had to issue such a publication. It's filled not only with numerous untruths, but it actually documents their 'hidden' agenda, which obviously is to impede and hinder hooking up east of New Orleans. Does this go unseen by those who SHOULD care? Now, if there are so many obstacles over the New Orleans to Florida issue, will Amtrak raise similar objections for restoring the Pioneer and/or the North Coast Limited? To my knowledge, I've not been made aware of Amtrak's viewpoint on this matter. The restoration of The Sunset Limited issues began previous to the Pioneer or NCL proposals; correct me if I'm mistaken."

"Put two stakes in the ground with yellow tape between them and call it a station until one is built. Not running a train because of one station on the route is nonsense. And 20 months required to train the crews to do what? I worked at an airline and it took way less time to train our crews on the various aircraft they had to fly. Why is Amtrak dragging its feet on this route? It doesn't make sense. I hope they do extend the City of New Orleans ... then I can get on the train in Memphis and make the whole trip to Disney World! You think that Amtrak might try to market that? ... Nah."

"I don't understand this nonsense about tri-weakly service either (misspelling intended). Then again, the Rio Grande Zephyr was a huge success, in spite of tri-weekly service. Yes, I know the Rockies aren't the Florida panhandle, plus the D&RGW folks ran a first class operation and had a huge amount of pride in their train. Always good to get your weekly newsletter and analysis."

"Amtrak New Orleans-Orlando passenger service. Designed to fail. Amtrak's record of plans and implementation have been a failure, except for maintaining an inept bureaucracy. America's skeletal passenger train network is a carryover from decades ago, yet, Amtrak's board continues to perpetuate this as their primary purpose. The present Amtrak board has outlived their usefulness in today's world of American transportation. No disrespect to you and any of the advocates, but I cannot even suggest any choice when the inmates are running the asylum. I suggest you review the 'be careful what you wish for' quote, and listen to what your subconscious tells you."

2) And, so the comments went. There was one comment from someone living on the Gulf Coast this space has a lot of respect for, and there were two other major comments, too.

"Amtrak is accomplishing precisely what they hoped to accomplish with their inaccurate, error-prone, agenda-driven, biased report – turn people against restoration of service. Anyone who doesn't understand the importance of the route to the national system, and also understand that Amtrak has intentionally put the worst possible spin on projected ridership will question whether return of Florida service is a wise decision. Amtrak should be ashamed and embarrassed, but they're not. Goal accomplished and business as usual inside Amtrak – protect the money machine, and not waste precious resources on anything as mundane as service to the passenger. Isn't it odd that spending money to run a train between New Orleans and Orlando simply scares them to death, but paying an Amtrak crew to lay around the pool at a New Orleans hotel for three days while the equipment sets idle [waiting for the return trip] seems likes a logical decision. Only at Amtrak would buffoonic moves such as these be made."

[End quote]

3) For the major comments, first, United Rail Passenger Alliance Vice President of Law and Policy, and President of the Minnesota Association of Railroad Passengers, Andrew Selden of Minneapolis.

[begin quote]

By Andrew Selden

TWA's discussion of the intellectual failures of Amtrak's projections of usage of the various service alternatives across the New Orleans-Florida gap missed one of the most compelling bits of evidence: Amtrak's own experience with actual patterns of usage of this service when it existed.

One of the most striking passenger behaviors that evolved almost immediately upon extension of the Sunset Limited to Florida in 1993 was the spontaneous discovery by passengers and travel agents one could change trains in Jacksonville between the Sunset and trains to and from points NORTH of Jacksonville.

This is not a surprising result to anyone who understands networks in transportation systems. Matrix theory in mathematics predicts when a node (or a "hub") is created, traffic will flow through that hub in all possible directions, and the volume is approximately proportional to the square of the potential number of origin-destination pairs in the matrix.

So it didn't matter the one train – the Sunset – turned south at Jacksonville. Amtrak, of course, if they thought about it at all (no evidence exists that they did, before or after service was started), assumed customers would only go where the train went, to points south.

But passengers could read the timetable, and saw if they got off at Jacksonville, lo and behold, before too long a train would come through headed north into the Carolinas and Virginia, and even all the way to the Northeast. So people bought tickets and constructed their own connections, sometimes enduring unreasonably long waits for the connecting train. But through they went, generating "ridership" – and more importantly revenues – and much longer trips (output, measured in revenue passenger miles). United Rail Passenger Alliance founder Austin Coates documented this phenomenon by going into the Jacksonville station, and talking to passengers and ticket agents. They all understood what was happening, but Amtrak didn't: their systems only saw the local tickets to and from Jacksonville, not the fact it was the same folks passing through Jacksonville.

Amtrak's blindness to inter-route through traffic is further exacerbated by its bias – Amtrak sees itself mostly as operating a high-cost transit service in the Northeast Corridor and other short corridors. Many short trains, running discontiguous short routes, accommodating time-insensitive customers, who won't use the service (Amtrak assumes) if they have to change vehicles to reach their own destination.

It is an old shibboleth of urban transit planners that a connection for a journey will cut potential patronage ("ridership") by 50% or more as compared to operating a through train and/or bus or trolley. That notion is false, of course, but Amtrak's planners didn't get the memo. So to them, potential passengers are not likely to use a long distance service which requires a change of trains, and so only a few riders are to be expected to want to change trains at a place like Jacksonville. In Amtrak's projection, little or no allowance is made for the potential usage or resulting revenue of someone who might choose to use rail to get from Houston to Raleigh, North Carolina or Mobile, Alabama to Boston via Jacksonville, even if that means a short layover at Jacksonville.

But, people are willing to do that. We know that not because of a theory or a forecast, but because of actual historical patterns of usage, of which Amtrak is either ignorant or which it is willing to try to hide, when it really doesn't want to do the work of running the train in the first place.

Our casual analysis suggested the comparatively few passengers who hubbed at Jacksonville between points west and points north of there were generating enough revenue (from their entire trip's fare, not just the fare for the segment taken on the Sunset) to pay all or most of the direct, above-the-rail, cost to operate the Sunset east of New Orleans. Everyone else was gravy. And, of course, all that occurred spontaneously, without benefit of any advertising or promotional support, fare promotions, or any other marketing.

And – at the time – the phenomenon was sharply limited by the lack of capacity on the Silver Star and Silver Meteor, especially in sleepers, to handle any serious growth in traffic. We believe if additional capacity had been available on the Silver trains, especially in first class, there would have been MUCH more connecting traffic at Jacksonville than there was. There is no way to estimate how much revenue Amtrak lost for lack of understanding. And, when the Sunset was discontinued east of New Orleans and the connection lost, ridership and revenue of the Silver trains to and from Florida was diminished accordingly.

Thus, Amtrak's craven failure this year to account properly for inter-route connecting revenue and ridership is really no surprise, either as a methodological failure, or a political scam. But, it is both disappointing and dishonest, and reflects a very serious lost opportunity to serve the public and to make money.

[End quote

Noted rail historian Daniel Carleton of Dunnellon, Florida had this to add, thinking along the lines of last weekend's 40th anniversary of American man on the moon.

[begin quote]

Mission Control … What is our mission?

By Daniel Carleton

As a nation we look back with pride to that day 40 years ago when humankind, humankind of American citizenry, set foot on Earth's first and foremost satellite. It was the pinnacle of our civilization and became the benchmark for all technological leaps… or lack thereof; "We can land a man on the moon but we can't …"

During these intervening four decades we have seen substantial changes in the size and scope of human enterprise. Due to the evident realities concerning what resources are actually available we have readjusted our views concerning our endeavors. Man has not been back to the moon since 1972. Commercial supersonic flight ended in 2002. And on the ground, intercity rail transportation became the ward of the National Rail Passenger Corporation, or Amtrak, in 1971. In Amtrak's 38 years we have seen it expand and contract, rise and fall, lauded and condemned. With all the talk these days of "High Speed Rail" one may conclude the future mission of passenger rail is, in NASA parlance, "ago."

So it was with great dismay that on July 16th of this year Amtrak released its "Gulf Coast Service Plan Report;" ironically on the same day of the states' deadline for Pre-Applications for High-Speed Passenger Rail Funding. Although appearing comprehensive, the inaccuracy of detail leads one to believe it was conceived by one either not familiar with the area of proposed service or counting on those reading it would not be familiar.

The Report calls for "$10.7 million" for restoration of stations including "$3.2 million for the demolition and reconstruction of the Sanford, Florida station." This should not be confused with the southern terminus of the Auto Train. The regular passenger station in Sanford is between the active stations in Winter Park and DeLand, and is passed daily by the current pair of New York to Miami trains. However, unlike other now vacant stations in Florida, Sanford was abandoned years ago due to very low passenger loadings. Why should the restoration of Gulf Coast service shoulder the cost of rebuilding a station with low boardings?

Also cited is "$600,000 for improvements at Amtrak's Sanford maintenance facility where equipment would be maintained." When the Sunset Limited was running prior to 2005 it was adequately maintained at the Auto-Train terminal in Sanford. Sanford is already in line for $2 million in maintenance area funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act; this does not include the $10 million new Auto Train passenger station. Why should the restoration of Gulf Coast service shoulder the cost of unnecessary improvements?

The least expensive option for restoration of service is the reestablishment of the tri-weekly Sunset Limited. However, the "major issue associated with this option is the route length. The route length (2,763 miles) presented significant operational challenges for the pre-Hurricane Katrina Sunset Limited with respect to equipment servicing, operational performance, crew scheduling and other issues." This is a curious statement as Amtrak is planning to operate a daily Texas Eagle from Chicago to Los Angeles (2728 miles) as noted in the August 2009 issue of Trains magazine. Does 35 miles make that much of a difference? Or does Amtrak intend to discontinue this train when it is deemed convenient?

As of this early date at least two "advocates" listed in the Report as having been contacted have denied any such correspondence.

This action, or more accurately inaction, on the part of Amtrak is an insult to the people of the State of Florida, the Gulf Coast, and adds insult to injury to those left in New Orleans. What is Amtrak's mission? Are they or are they not our national passenger railroad? If not, so be it; let us find another medium for rail transportation. If so, then where is our train? At a time when we should be working toward a stable and responsible means of ground transportation we are handed a 78-page report which says, in essence, "no, we can't." Remember this point, if New Orleans and the Gulf Coast had been mercifully spared the wrath of Katrina in 2005, would not the Sunset Limited still be running today?

[End quote]

4) Reports like the Gulf Coast Report make it difficult to snuggle up close to Amtrak and make nice. The report showed everyone – politicians, railroaders, passengers, American taxpayers – the worst and most arrogant side of Amtrak. We've seen a company with no solid or permanent leadership, no vision for the future, no regard for its basic mission for existence.

Then, we come to the following two press releases. Read them carefully.

[begin quote]

Veolia Transportation Names Former Amtrak CEO As Chairman of its Rail Division

CHICAGO – June 17, 2009 – Veolia Transportation Inc. announced that Tom Downs has joined the company as chairman of its rail division. Downs will work with Rail Executive Vice President Ron Hartman to continue Veolia Transportation's growth as the largest private provider of contracted passenger rail services in the U.S.

As chairman, Downs will help guide the company's strategic planning efforts as well as its expanding roster of public private partnerships, and catalyze the development of its high-speed rail business. He will further develop the company's relationships and alliances with key organizations in the public and private sectors, including the Federal Railway Administration, Federal Transit Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, as well as transit authorities and city governments. Downs also will provide assistance with operations, continuing to enhance performance in safety, maintenance, customer service, technology and maintenance of way.

In his distinguished career in transportation, Downs has held several executive roles. As CEO of AMTRAK, Downs was credited with leading the national passenger rail system from insolvency to a $2 billion capital investment fund in 1998. He also has served as commissioner of transportation in New Jersey and as president of the Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority. As city administrator of the District of Columbia in the 1980s, Downs oversaw the restoration of Union Station.

From 2003 to 2008, Downs was CEO of the Eno Transportation Foundation, a forum for the discussion of emerging issues and policies in all fields of transportation. Prior to that, he directed the National Center for Smart Growth Education and Research at the University of Maryland.

"Tom brings a powerful combination of strategic depth, integrity and a proven record of successful leadership in rail to Veolia Transportation," said Mark Joseph, CEO of Veolia Transportation. "The experience he has gained in leading several of the most respected entities in the rail industry will be a tremendous asset to our rapidly growing rail business and to our clients."

"I am very pleased to be joining Veolia Transportation as I believe they have the competence, capacity for innovation and values that will assure their continued leadership in the industry," said Downs. "As the company continues to grow over the next 10 years, we will bring groundbreaking advances in commuter and high-speed rail service to cities and transit authorities in North America. Veolia Transportation is committed to setting the standard in safe and sustainable mobility solutions through genuine partnerships with clients and superb execution, and I share these commitments."

About Veolia Transportation

Veolia Transportation is the largest private-sector operator of multiple modes of transit in North America, including bus, rail, paratransit, shuttle, sedan and taxi services. The company has over 17,000 employees and operates some 150 contracts in multiple modes of transit for cities in North America. The company operates several major commuter rail networks in the U.S., including Boston, San Diego, Austin, Los Angeles and Miami and is an integrated manager and operator, providing a range of rail services to clients.

Veolia Transportation is part of Veolia Transport, the world's largest private operator of multiple modes of public transit, including bus, rail, paratransit, shuttle, ferry and taxi services. Veolia Transport operates contracts for 5,000 city transit authorities in 27 countries, and transports 2.5 billion passengers per year. The Company operates some of the most sophisticated rail systems in the world in Australia, Germany, The Netherlands, and the UK.

For more information, visit www.veoliatransportation.com

[End quote]

[begin quote]

Veolia Transportation Names COO of Its Rail Division

CHICAGO – July 20, 2009 – Veolia Transportation announced today that Donald Saunders has been named chief operating officer of the company's Rail Division. Saunders, who joins Veolia Transportation from Amtrak, will report to Executive Vice President – Rail Ron Hartman and work with the rail management team to advance Veolia Transportation as the largest provider of contracted rail services in the United States.

Saunders joins a management team committed to setting the standard for passenger rail operations in North America. As COO, he will focus on day-to-day operations and operational execution to ensure that Veolia Transportation is continually exceeding the expectations of passengers and clients. He will also participate in the company's strategic planning efforts.

"Don has extensive experience in many parts of the passenger rail industry and an excellent track record," said Hartman. While working at Amtrak in the Central Region, Don dramatically improved the operational performance of the trains he managed, including the operation of 60 daily intercity trains and dispatching of 300 Chicago commuter trains.

"Veolia Transportation has a global reputation for being an innovative company that cares about the safety and well-being of customers and employees," said Saunders. "I look forward to helping them achieve their mission of being best in class through strong partnerships and commitments to clients and employees."

Prior to joining Veolia Transportation, Saunders had a long career in various executive positions at Amtrak. Most recently, he was assistant vice president of the west region for policy and development. His key responsibilities in this role included business development, including developing and implementing plans for stimulus-related projects, and for new future service possibilities. He successfully negotiated contracts with the Departments of Transportation in three western states.

About Veolia Transportation

Veolia Transportation is the largest private sector operator of multiple modes of transit in North America, including bus, rail, paratransit, shuttle, sedan and taxi services. The company has a workforce of over 20,000 people and operates over 200 transportation contracts in 22 states and two Canadian Provinces. The company manages and operates transportation services in leading U.S. cities, including Las Vegas, San Diego, Phoenix, Denver, Baltimore, Atlanta, San Francisco and Los Angeles, as well as several major rail networks, including Boston, San Diego, Los Angeles, Miami and Austin. (www.veolia-transport.com/en)

Veolia Transportation is part of Veolia Transport, the world's largest private operator of multiple modes of transit, including bus, rail, paratransit, shuttle, ferry and taxi services. Veolia Transport operates contracts for 5,000 city transit authorities in 28 countries, and completes 2.63 billion passenger trips per year. (www.veolia-transport.com/en/)

[End quote]

Ron Hartman, Veolia's Executive Vice President here in North America has been putting together a blockbuster team of transit and passenger railroaders. Adding Tom Downs is a plum for Veolia (After all, transit is what Mr. Downs does best; not intercity passenger rail.) when dealing with various state governors and city mayors, plus an assortment of other politicians.

Good railroaders like Don Saunders add huge strength to the company.

Ron Hartman is a well-respected former Amtrak executive, with excellent private experience, too. He is earnest and hard working, and he is not someone to be taken lightly; he knows his business.

Now, go back and reread the last two paragraphs of both press releases. French company Veolia is a huge, powerful worldwide player in every field it enters, including transit and passenger rail. This is a company with a lot of clout, a boatload of money, huge political muscle, and an executive cadre not to be messed with. If you don't believe everything you read in those last two paragraphs of the press releases, visit the company's web site. You'll be convinced these people are important – and highly relevant.

Look to the future. Here's Veolia with all of this money, all of this talent, all of this experience. What if someone wanted to start a regional rail operation ... who better than Veolia to run it? As a private, for-profit company, Veolia is automatically much leaner and more focused than Amtrak, and has a work ethic far, far different from Amtrak, especially after what we have seen in last week's Gulf Coast Report. What if Veolia had produced that report? Do you think the conclusions would have been the same? No, they would have been radically different, with a dozen different ways to make that service work, instead of three examples and all of the reasons why the service can't work. (Ron Hartman alone would have made sure of that, even without the other new guys.)

Every city, town, and hamlet in America is clamoring for high speed rail. A puny $8 billion to be distributed this year goes against so far over $100 billion in requests by states. Everything is up for grabs. Even Amtrak? Well, possibly so.

What if Veolia gets in the operations door for high speed rail? There is no mandate for Amtrak to have those contracts automatically. (Indeed, the Gulf Coast Report makes a huge argument for Amtrak to be pushed as far away as possible from those contracts.)

So, think outside the box, because that's what everyone but Amtrak is trying to do today. Let's say Veolia (or one of its competitors other than Amtrak) gets one or two high speed routes to operate. Well, to make the contract complete, how about putting some of the existing connecting long distance or regional or short distance Amtrak routes into that contract, to make a nice, efficient, connected bundle? A couple of votes from Congress and that could happen. Amtrak may currently have a monopoly on passenger rail in this country, but it does not have a monopoly on political clout.

Imagine for a moment you're a planning executive at one of the major freight railroads. We just saw earlier this month Norfolk Southern's CEO is willing to talk about passenger rail. If one is talking about it, mostly likely others at competing railroads are, too. Suppose you see an opportunity in passenger rail, but your passenger department has been long gone for nearly four decades. Where do you go to find and populate a new passenger department?

Why go anywhere further than Veolia? Don't hire individual passenger department employees, just sign a contract with Veolia to handle the whole thing for you. No muss, no fuss, and you've got instant professionals handling things to your specifications. If things don't work out, well, don't renew the contract, and don't worry about having to get rid of a huge pool of employees. They all belong to Veolia, not you.

Ron Hartman's Veolia has become the 800 pound gorilla in the room when it comes to transit and regional passenger rail. The desire is there, the financial muscle is there, the deep bench of talent is there, the vision (Amtrak, are you paying attention?) is there. Veolia through its normal lines of business wants to grow and expand, not contract or merely maintain, as Amtrak is, because it is always depending on someone else's good graces or funding and does not have the will to accept normal growth.

If you were Amtrak and you had a lick of sense, would you be looking over your corporate shoulder?

5) Oh, and look at the date. Five months from today is Christmas Day!

If you are reading someone else's copy of This Week at Amtrak, you can receive your own free copy each edition by sending your e-mail address to

[email protected]

You MUST include your name, preferred e-mail address, and city and state where you live. If you have filters or firewalls placed on your Internet connection, set your e-mail to receive incoming mail from [email protected]; we are unable to go through any approvals processes for individuals. This mailing list is kept strictly confidential and is not shared or used for any purposes other than distribution of This Week at Amtrak or related URPA materials.

All other correspondence, including requests to unsubscribe should be addressed to

[email protected]

Copies of This Week at Amtrak are archived on URPA's web site, www.unitedrail.org and also on www.todaywithjb.blogspot.com where other rail-related writings of Bruce Richardson may also be found.

URPA leadership members are available for speaking engagements.

J. Bruce Richardson

President

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

[email protected]

http://www.unitedrail.org

 

[bretton88]

The problem with Veolia, is that they're aren't in our good graces right now. They had the contract for Metrolink, and the crash happened. (Not quite blaming Veolia, train accidents can happen to any company) The COASTER of San Diego is run by Veolia and the transit agency isn't happy with them either. Veolia is also known as Connex down under, and I don't know any Australian that is happy with them. Maybe a better example is UP and BNSF running METRA under contract in Chicago, look domestically.

 

[stntylr]

Veolia is also a year late in opening the CapMetro commuter train in Austin. They haven't annouced a new start date for that yet.

CapMetro has had a long history of safety violations including two new ones that were just found this month.

 

[Bob Dylan]

:angry:

Veolia is also a year late in opening the CapMetro commuter train in Austin. They haven't annouced a new start date for that yet.CapMetro has had a long history of safety violations including two new ones that were just found this month.

yeah we here in Austin figure we might get it going by 2012!!What a joke CAPMETRO is,hope that Veolia doesnt

get fed up and cancel and leave these clowns! :lol: