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This Week at Amtrak; January 13, 2009




A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from




United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.




America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute




1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA




Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail [email protected]

http://www.unitedrail.org



Volume 6, Number 2



Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute that focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, and New York. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) Gil Carmichael, former Chairman of the Amtrak Reform Council, former Administrator of the Federal Railway Administration from 1989 to 1993, and the Founding Chairman, Intermodal Transportation Institute at the University of Denver, is a man who anyone involved in railroads and transportation should sit at his knee and learn all sorts of useful things. Mr. Carmichael is one of a handful of visionaries in the United States who look at the state of our railroad world – both passenger and freight – and dares to dream and enunciate a rational plan for the future.

At the end of last year, This Week at Amtrak was privileged to print Mr. Carmichael’s latest major speech to the 15th World Congress on Intelligent Transportation Systems held in New York City last November. Part of Mr. Carmichael’s vision spoke of his concept for high speed rail:

"Our success in freight intermodal transportation points the way to what I believe is the most promising strategy for North American transportation improvements, for freight and passenger, in the coming years. I call that strategy ‘Interstate II’. In the last century we built 43,000 miles of grade-separated four-lane highways – the U.S. Interstate I. On the other hand, Interstate II is a vision of truly high-speed intercity/port travel that is based upon steel wheel on a steel rail, not pavement. It partners the superior safety and efficiency of rail transportation with the strengths of the intermodal system. Interstate II can be built on rights-of-way that already exist because there is ample room. I believe that we must build or upgrade about 30,000 miles of double and triple track corridors capable of running freight trains at speeds in excess of 90 miles an hour. That network would be augmented by as much as another 10,000 miles of high-quality conventional routings. This network would be the basis of Interstate II, a high-efficiency network of steel stretching from coast to coast and from Mexico City to Montreal. With GPS and the new PTC technology we should be able to very safely include passenger trains at speed up to 125 MPH. Such trains can be competitive in city pairs up to 500 miles."

Okay, Mr. Carmichael is famous for making people think in a Socratic method way. In other words, his leadership starts people having discussions and expanding thinking and learning.

The various professional associates of United Rail Passenger Alliance took Mr. Carmichael’s thoughts to heart, and spawned the following discussion on URPA’s Intranet.

[begin quote]

... [A]sking this group for opinions is like hauling coals to Newcastle, but, let's do this, anyway.

Gil Carmichael said in his speech to the Rail Congress in New York in November his vision of a high speed train is passenger trains regularly traveling at 100 MPH or more. We know this was possible in the past, and when [several of us] rode the first eastbound run of the Sunset when the CSX road master was on the train crossing the panhandle of Florida, [the late Doctor] Adrian [Herzog] was clocking mileposts and calculated we were doing in excess of 100 MPH. We were in the lounge at the time, and the CSX road master just kind of grinned; and more or less indicated he was seeing what would happen on his newly refurbished roadbed.

... I remember riding the [union Pacific’s] City of Los Angeles across some pretty deserted desert country [in the 1960s], and there was speculation the train was going in excess of 90 MPH.

So, my question to each and every one of you is ... :

– We know the best way to speed up route schedules is to strengthen track around terminals and use other methods to relieve terminal congestion and roundabout terminal routings like in San Antonio, which adds an hour to each trip of the Texas Eagle in and out of the station just because a quarter-mile piece of track is missing. Is 79 MPH running sufficient? If terminal congestion and terminal slow track were eliminated, would 79 MPH running be enough?

– With Positive Train Control coming, should 79 MPH running be bumped up higher, such as 90 MPH or even Mr. Carmichael's suggested 100 MPH or more?

– Anyone who has traveled on the NEC knows 100 MPH running or more makes scenery a blur right next to the train, but faraway scenery is fine. Does this make a difference in the passenger train experience?

– If time sensitivity is an issue, would the traveling public care how fast the train is running, as long as the trip time is the goal? In this case, would terminal congestion elimination do the trick?

– Overall, does the majority of the public care how long it takes a train to arrive at a destination as long as it's reasonably priced, on time, not unreasonably longer than if an automobile trip were substituted, and there are sufficient onboard creature comforts such as food, beverage, and some sort of distraction beyond looking out the window or reading a book?

– Does the current upcoming generation of under age 35 passenger train riders care about cost, length of trip, amenities, or just about getting from Point A to Point B?

– Plans like the current Midwest High Speed Rail proposal want speeds to be even higher than 100 MPH at some points because they believe the public wants faster speeds, and there is also a belief that since the rest of the world has high speed trains, we've got to have them too, or we won't be keeping up with the Jonses. Does it really matter what the Jonses do when it comes to American passenger rail travel?

The responses were:

New York: As a start to this exercise, one needs to look at the FRA classes of track. Class 4 is a maximum speed of 60 for freight and 80 for passenger. Class 5 is a maximum speed of 80 for freight and 90 for passenger. Class 6 is 110 for passenger (no maximum shown for freight, but one assumes that is still 80 MPH).

Considering no matter what is done to improve track speeds, the tracks are going to be shared by passenger and freight trains, it seems like you get the most bang for the buck by going to Class 5 as a top speed. There is no advantage to going to 100 as opposed to 90. If you go to 110 (Class 6), you will probably have more passenger/freight conflicts.

That said, I don't think anyone cares what the top speed is as long as the trip time is competitive. To do that means doing things like straightening curves, eliminating grade crossings, rebuilding bridges, putting in more passing sidings, etc.

I think a lot more is gained by improving average speed as opposed making a major increase in top speed. Over the long term the maintenance costs will be less on a Class 5 railroad than a Class 6 railroad.

If you could just average 70 MPH, you could run New York-Chicago in 13 hours and 40 minutes, which is much faster than the 20th Century ever ran. Number 3 [Amtrak’s Southwest Chief] could run Chicago to Los Angeles in 32 1/4 hours. Chicago-Detroit would be four hours.

The problem we face is convincing politicians who think 110 or higher is sexy that a lot more bang for the buck could be gotten for an average speed of 70 MPH.

When Metro-North raised the speeds on the Hudson Line from 79 MPH to 90 MPH a number of years ago, it saved ... about 30 seconds time between New York and Poughkeepsie.

California/North: - With Positive Train Control coming, should 79 MPH running be bumped up higher, such as 90 MPH or even Mr. Carmichael's suggested 100 MPH?

YES. And with PTC coming, it COULD be.

– Anyone who has traveled on the NEC knows 100 MPH running or more makes scenery a blur right next to the train, but faraway scenery is fine. Does this make a difference in the passenger train experience?

No. In 1974 I rode the San Francisco Zephyr on UP across Wyoming. Stopwatch on the mileposts said 103MPH, mile after mile. I cannot say I saw any less than from the Pioneer, 23 years later in its last days, at 79 MPH.

The "scenic routes" such as the current Zephyr's across the Colorado Rockies, and the Empire Builder across Marias Pass, would not be subject to 100 MPH speeds anyway.

– If time sensitivity is an issue, would the traveling public care how fast the train is running, as long as the trip time is the goal? In this case, would terminal congestion elimination do the trick?

Yes.

– Overall, does the majority of the public care how long it takes a train to arrive at a destination as long as it's reasonably priced, on time, not unreasonably longer than if an automobile trip were substituted, and there are sufficient onboard creature comforts such as food, beverage, and some sort of distraction beyond looking out the window or reading a book?

No, especially not in the long distance markets.

– Does the current upcoming generation of under age 35 passenger train riders care about cost, length of trip, amenities, or just about getting from Point A to Point B?

Cost is always primary and amenities are somewhere in the consciousness. Length of trip is generally not ... 1/10 the speed of air makes it much less of an issue.

– Plans like the current Midwest High Speed Rail proposal want speeds to be even higher than 100 MPH at some points because they believe the public wants faster speeds, and there is also a belief that since the rest of the world has high speed trains, we've got to have them too, or we won't be keeping up with the Jonses. Does it really matter what the Jonses do when it comes to American passenger rail travel?

It doesn't matter until the powers that be, Amtrak or otherwise, TELL them it matters.

Minnesota I: Look at the Empire Builder (in North Dakota and eastern Montana) and Acela over 400 mile distances. The Empire Builder has comparable trip times and sell-out traffic, so empirically a reliable 79 running speed with minimal slow stuff is an eminently salable product. Capital cost of that for the Empire Builder: zero. For regional high speed rail: infinite, because its billions up front and mega-millions annually thereafter. That's why by Acela standards, the Empire Builder – is – "high speed rail."

Arizona I: I'll look at this from the passenger perspective.

The new Phoenix streetcars (err, light rail trains) have been favorably received, even though actual travel times remain slightly poky so far (as speed limits are gradually increased and various other lingering issues are resolved).

In observing and listening to people on our new trains, the factors in attracting ridership seem to be:

– The trains look modern

– Trains and stations are clean and comfortable

– The train "feels" fast (good acceleration)

– The next train is just a few minutes away (low headways)

Actual travel time is a lower priority than comfort, convenience, and frequency.

The longer the distance, of course, the more travel time becomes an issue – but I submit that "true high speed" trains appeal only to the train geeks and a few frantic businessmen.

If we define "high speed" as 110mph, then with PTC there is little reason much of the Class I railroad company network can't support "high speed" trains – but it's the look and feel of the trains and stations, the frequency, and consistency (keeping to schedule) that will attract passengers.

Illinois: Makes sense, but first we should define High Speed Rail. Joe Vranich (... someone who does know a lot about high speed rail) used to state that the proper definition of HSR was consistent speeds of 180 MPH or above. I've also heard "Conventional speed" rail defined as speeds up to 79 MPH, and "medium speed" rail as speeds from 80 to 179. I don't know if any railroad organization – like the Association of American Railroads – has come up with any "official" speed designations, but if anyone knows, please pass it on.

It seems to me that, for passenger trains to be successful, they need to be comfortable, convenient and operate at speeds reasonable for the situation. I know, that's painting with a broad brush, but, especially on the long distance routes, my point is that speeding up the California Zephyr might be counter-productive if – by doing so – you ended up with a Denver arrival of 3:00 AM. I think each long distance route would have to be studied and areas targeted where increased speed makes sense. Increased speed [the Southwest Chief] between Chicago and Kansas City would make sense.

California/South: Define it how you like. [illinois]’s second paragraph is on the nail. Example, the northbound Coast Starlight now arrives Sacramento about midnight, no use to anybody. An earlier arrival in the Bay Area and Sacramento would be a commercial benefit. But with other trains speeding them up gives poor arrivals, unless you can leave later.

For long distance trains, key is, go slow less often, rather than worry about top speed.

I can't imagine the fuel consumption of a train of high level cars at 100 MPH. You've got to have a real commercial justification for that, I'd think.

All things equal, I'd want to put my money on reducing the 20 MPH or less sections (station approaches, etc.) rather than worry about top speed.

Virginia: I concur. I make no claim to operational or track geometry expertise, but it is my understanding that, in shared track situations, there is an unavoidable trade-off between track standards (FRA class and geometry on curves etc.) for freight and passenger. This also drives part of the economics: higher speed track (and trains) become rapidly more expensive as speed increases – not just to modify or install, but to maintain as well.

The "commercial justification" angle boils down to having a trip time/average speed that meets the passengers' needs without breaking the bank. It is far less about what speed is physically attainable than about the average speed that is economically viable. So getting rid of low-speed choke points, reducing delays with passing sidings, etc. can all contribute to higher average speed and shorter trip times – far less expensively than true "high speed rail." This doesn't mean that high speed rail doesn't have a place in the US – just that the locations where its cost can be justified are probably quite few. In contrast, there are more numerous locations where relatively low-cost improvements can make a big difference in the average speed and ride quality that help attract and keep passengers.

Minnesota I: When the United States Railway Administration was planning the first Northeast Corridor Improvement Project, they generated graphs that plotted end-point journey time against train velocity, and demonstrated that end point times are reduced far more and far faster by speeding up slow spots and eliminating stops than by increasing top end running speed.

Picture a graph with a descending parabolic curve. The fast drop on the left-hand side of the curve represents avoided time with increases in average velocity between zero and 40 or so mph.

The far right of the curve where the plot goes nearly flat shows that increased velocity (on the horizontal axis) decreases end point travel time (the vertical axis) very little, and less and less so with increased speed.

Then, figure the capital and maintenance cost to straighten curves, clean up interlockings, add the odd flyover and improve command and control technology as against the capital and maintenance cost of building (new?) Class 8 or whatever track, and the Illinois/Michigan/New York approach begins to make far more sense than the MHRA approach.

Distance matters, too. Going like a bat out of Hell for 15 or 50 miles doesn't save much time at all. Doing so for 300 miles could reduce times noticeably. In the NEC today, cutting Acela back to 125 over its entire route might add as much as 5 minutes to a Washington-New York City trip, and one or two to a New York city-Boston trip, which is well within the operational margin of error (in the US) and well below passengers' thresholds of awareness.

Washington, D.C.: Faster trips through congested interlocking and terminals are not as attention-grabbing as zippy top speeds, but it's the low-hanging fruit. One extreme example is the Cardinal's trip through Chicago.

Virginia: True. A friend who (unlike me) has actually had operating experience, claims that the vertical infrastructure cost curve inflicted by the Acela only vastly increases Amtrak's (uncompensated) NEC overhead for what is ultimately a marginal trip time advantage. He argued that dropping the NEC to a lower FRA track class standard (sans the current PHSR – pseudo high speed rail) would not only save huge bucks in day to day operations, but in long term maintenance costs as well. Right now, as we all know, the Acela achieves "high speed rail" velocity for only a few minutes of each trip.

Texas/East: Arizona I writes:

– The trains look modern

– Trains and stations are clean and comfortable

– The train "feels" fast (good acceleration)

– The next train is just a few minutes away (low headways)

Actual travel time is a lower priority than comfort, convenience, and frequency.

I agree with Arizona I, and have listened for many years to my wife who concurs that the key word for her is "clean."

I like Arizona I’s "feels fast" above, as perception is many times more important than fact. We traveled the Southwest Chief back when the Superliners were first introduced in the early 80's. And, I might add on each trip since then, the experience of being in the top bunk in an Economy bedroom while Amtrak descends from Flagstaff to Kingman at over 90 MPH on the BNSF was and is quite exciting and "feels fast." Very fast.

As to travel time, there are many spots in the system where this should be addressed. California/North said, "All things equal, I'd want to put my money on reducing the 20 MPH or less sections (station approaches, etc.) rather than worry about top speed." I would add, "for now."

Recently I was at Dallas Union Station when the southbound Texas Eagle arrived at 11:15, waited until its scheduled departure time of 12:20 for Ft. Worth where it arrived on time and had to wait for servicing for a 2:40 PM departure. The distance traveled: 31 miles. Were passengers upset about that? Not the ones detraining at Dallas, not the ones boarding at Ft. Worth. The through passengers? Don't know, but it was better than being 3-4 hours late at each spot.

Florida/North Central: Last year I heard Rick Harnish of the Midwest High Speed Rail Association tell the tale (twice) of having public meetings on his initiative. What were the two most frequent comments following his dissertation? "How do we get what we already have to run reliably" and "How do we keep the toilets clean." The great masses want predictability and civility from their public transit.

As for the prospects of higher speeds on the long distance routes, I cannot speak to the east-west fleet. However, I have long contended that a run time between Washington and Jacksonville should be no more than twelve hours. There are no technical obstacles to this initiative. The locomotives and rolling stock were designed for the necessary speeds. The right-of-ways in place are capable of upgrading. Even CSX recognized the potential of upgrading this 'corridor' as one of their long term goals. All that is missing is the will and the capital, both of which are in dwindling supply.

Getting back to the masses, the most frequent reason I've heard for not taking the train is "I can drive there faster than the Amtrak." I do not expect to hear this too often going forward due to route slashing and burning by NRPC and the winnowing use of the private automobile.

California/South II: The key ... is to define terms ... while we're building Class V railroad ... . High speed rail is a political, not an engineering term. If the long predicted San Diego Bullet Train were built according to the FRA safety standards and the politically necessary number of stops, this 165 mph "capable" wunderbahn would cut endpoint times by about 10 minutes, according to the study that [the late Doctor] Adrian [Herzog] and I did for Amtrak back in the day. This was and is less time savings than if the Surfliners were able to maintain reasonable timekeeping.

Track upgrading, grade separation, and a couple of holes punched in hills could have increased speed with conventional equipment by nearly 20%. We successfully killed off the taxpayer boondoggle of this and the Las Vegas Bullet Train, but were not successful in getting the much less expensive (and less sexy) improvements made because the train would "only" be capable of a 90 MPH average, making it perhaps a Cannonball, but not a Bullet.

If we define High Speed as reducing the travel time between point A and point B by xx% (got to be double digits), using sexy looking but off the shelf technology, and offer on board services that today's passenger wants (WiFi, 110 Volt outlets, Dish Network, decent – but reasonably priced and presented – food with personable service personnel), not what rail fans think the 20th Century offered, then we have a product that the public might actually use, instead of a public works project that would make the Big Dig look like a line in the sand.

Oh, and did I forget to mention that we maintained that service must be at least twice daily and connecting within reasonable times to other trains or modes? Then we can advertise "high speed" trains traveling between Los Angeles and Chicago in only 36 hours. High speed has to be redefined along these lines so that the politicos can claim High Speed Rail, and we can build realistic fast trains in the real world. We are never going to see the world of the Jetson's with flying cars and maglev trains short of the entire landscape being leveled, which leads to a couple of political and/or military considerations ...

Texas/West: If you intend to make intermediate stops (so you're actually a railroad instead of an airline wannabe), 100 is a good number for conventional trainsets. What you want to do is average over 70.

This is something all of us looked at many years ago.

New York: Like I said in an earlier post, when Metro-North increased the track speed from 79 MPH to 90 MPH, the time savings was 30 seconds. If the money was spent upping the 60 and 70 MPH curves to 79 MPH, I'm will to bet a lot more time would have been saved.

Texas/West: Exactly. That's why averaging 70 or a bit above is so important. The real problem out here in the West is slow running through terminals and urban areas where track speeds are sometimes unreasonably low.

Back during the Texas bullet train debacle (and this goes along with California/South II's observations on Calfornia, to which I was also privy back then) we computed a number of speed scenarios with a reasonable number of stops (if I recall, the west side of the triangle was San Antonio, New Braunfels, San Marcos, Austin, Round Rock/Georgetown, Temple/Belton, Waco, Hillsboro, South Fort Worth, Fort Worth, mid-cities/DFW airport, Dallas), where stops were generally about 15 miles apart (urban areas) and 30-40 miles apart on the spine everywhere else, and there was basically NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE between a 100 MPH (peak) bilevel and the 200+ MPH bullet.

That is because the bullet takes so much time and distance getting up to top speed and back that it never gains an advantage if you actually stop and pick up and drop off people. For you guys not familiar with the lay of the land here, what is laid out above is NOT a local or commute service. Sounds like a certain Wondertrain, doesn't it? This result was entirely consistent with what California/South II and Adrian came up with on Los Angeles-San Diego.

The way the other guys sell this concept is just to replicate the major airline schedule between endpoints, with little or nothing intermediate (Which, of course, is a generally captive market for rail, something our favorite carrier of last choice has never ever learned.), and then claim a great achievement in mobility improvement.

This is why Southwest Airlines opposed the Texas bullet so vehemently – it was transparently aimed right at them, and it didn't help that American Airlines (who has tried to kill Southwest throughout their history) jumped right on the bullet bandwagon as well, failing to recognize how they got their numbers (see below).

Meanwhile, Bubba in Waco still usually drives 100+ miles to the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport, Dallas or Austin to get his long distance flight because he doesn't want to pay premium price for the four weekday cramjet RJs on American Airlines from Waco Regional Airport to DFW or the 4 weekday cram-and-shake SAAB 340s from Waco Regional Airport to Houston on Continental, which rarely go at the right time anyway. Now Killeen-Fort Hood Regional Airport has more (and a few additional) destinations, but you still pay the inflated RJ/major carrier prices, and the airport is almost 30 miles west of the corridor (sort of the McGregor of air service if you're anywhere outside the Ft. Hood area and understand what train riders have to put up with down here).

Ironically, since Austin moved south to Bergstrom, Killeen-Fort Hood Regional Airport is now effectively closer and quicker, with traffic, to get to/from the northern Austin suburb area (Georgetown, Leander, etc.) than Austin is, a fact that Killeen markets with billboards and occasional print ads to the extent of their somewhat limited budget.

In the case of the Texas bullet bust, what they did to make the patronage projections look good (and when we caught them at it they were forced to admit it in a public meeting in Austin) was to assume 100% modal shift to rail for all airline flights operating in the triangle, even flights that were continuing segments of through services originating and ending outside, with a 60% load factor assumed for all flights.

At the time, well over half of the flights were interregional and fit this model, as Continental hubbed at Houston and Delta and American hubbed at DFW, and Southwest hubbed (even under the Wright Amendment and despite the fact that they emphatically deny that they hub – LOL!) at Dallas and Houston, so the presumption was that, for example, a passenger going Miami-DFW on a one stop through Houston was going to get off and take the train when he or she got to Houston, instead of staying on the plane. This is just an extension of the same single-segment endpoint mentality Amtrak has used since its inception.

This is the same line of bull(et) the HSR types use elsewhere, so you guys need to take a serious look at the numbers and market segments when they come calling.

As [the late] Byron [Nordberg], Adrian and I used to tell everyone, it's the captive onesies and twosies that make the service viable, not the airport/freeway crowd.

Minnesota I: Allow me to elaborate on this.

I agree with Arizona I's points, but the analysis also depends to some degree on the distances involved.

In under 400-500 mile markets, where rail competes with cars for the most part, and cars have a 98-99% market share, for rail to even be in the game, it has to overcome inherent technological handicaps.

Cars have virtually infinite schedules (it leaves exactly when you want to go), an infinite route matrix (it goes anywhere there is a road), and convenience (it goes door-to-door, more or less, and has privacy of a sort).

Speed seems to be an issue only to the extent that congestion that slows me down is an annoyance. So if a train goes to the same general area that I want to reach, whether it goes 60 or 90 or 180 doesn't seem to be that much of a factor. Frequency, reliability, lack of hassle, and accessibility (e.g., free parking, and good rail transit or rental cars at my destination) are probably the main drivers of modal preference. And subjective orientation: I know intelligent small business owners on the east coast who drive from points south of Newark to meetings in Rhode Island and Massachusetts and look at you a little strange if you ask whether they considered the train. Their issue seems to be the factors I listed: convenience and privacy trump whatever Amtrak has on offer.

And Acela isn't all that fast either. Look at the timetable to see how long it takes to get from Newark to New Haven or Providence. Most days, you really can get there faster on I-95, allowing for station access, fitting your journey into someone else's timetable, and getting from the destination station to your ultimate actual destination. Even at 150 (or its average of closer to 60), Acela doesn't cut it.

We all know that short sprints up to 150 or whatever can't compensate for miles run at 60, or long stops, or unreliable schedules, or surly help.

Amtrak's persistent NEC load factors in the 30-40% range (lower still if one were to discount PHL-NYP local traffic) tend to prove that rail isn't really competitive even in these markets.

But in longer markets, where share is beginning to shift to air, high speed rail doesn't seem to be that relevant either. Is some businessman going to skip American Airlines and its Advantage points to get from Chicago to New York because (for 30 billion dollars invested) Amtrak can now get him there in 13 hours instead of 20? Or to Denver in 12 hours instead of 17? San Francisco from LA in three hours might have legs, but that's only going to happen if they don't stop at Bakersfield and Fresno, which seems unlikely politically, and foolish commercially. We have ample empirical experience of what happens when Amtrak runs non-stop endpoint trains on either coast.

And we do need to define our terms carefully. If we compare the runs of the Southwest Chief or the Empire Builder over 400 mile distances in the prairies at 79 or 90 to the 400 mile run of any Acela between Boston and Washington, the elapsed end point trip times are very close, so what really is "high speed" rail? Cost should be a factor, too. Public capital cost of the former? Zero. Of the latter? Virtually infinite, because its billions in cash on the front end, and hundreds of millions a year in off-the-books subsidy forever after. (But to a politician looking to dole out bucks to favored constituents, that argument might be exactly backwards.)

My take is that speed only needs to be at an "in the game" average, based on what the bulk of the customers are looking to buy. Since the vast majority have their cars as the other choice for any given trip and the folks that are flying aren't going to come over to rail in any meaningful numbers no matter what rail does, average speeds in the range of 60 to 90 do the job to make rail competitive, and that goal is much more easily and cheaply accomplished at the low end than at the top of the running speed environment.

It's only where someone decides to indulge the conceit that rail can and should compete with air that genuine high speed rail really makes any commercial sense at all. That hasn't worked at 135 mph in a 221-mile market in one of our densest air lanes (I don't buy Amtrak's modal split argument, either, because I think they are comparing apples to pomegranates by not counting all six NY area airports for the air number, but including more than their own Washington to Newark/NYP passengers in the rail tally) and we have precious little research to suggest that cutting the rail trip to two hours is going to bump Delta and Continental out of the NEC shuttle business.

Arizona II: Good points all.

I believe the following two points are as important as speed:

– The perceived "seamlessness" of the journey

– The percentage of total travel time that can be either productive, relaxing, or entertaining

Use each mode for what it does best: Use the "infinite matrix" of the automobile at the origin and destination; use the train for covering the bulk of the mileage in ways that can be realistically productive or enjoyable for the traveler.

Hypothetical case study: Phoenix to Southern California

Currently, there are two viable options – each of which take between six and eight hours.

1. Drive. Of course many persons enjoy driving, if the traffic is not too bad, but it is still tiring, and one's time is consumed by being the operator of the vehicle. Time permitting, sightseeing is possible and, in a car pool, discussion and planning can take place.

2. Fly. If one is not an anxious flyer and the weather is decent, the actual "wheels up" time can be enjoyable – provided one doesn't mind being shoe-horned into a space that barely gives one enough room to sip a Coke or read a book – let alone do any meaningful work on a laptop. Plus, on a longer flight, one is at the mercy of the laptop's battery. Cell phones cannot be used. Most of the trip is unproductive and unpleasant – parking, checking the luggage, the TSA drill, getting to the gate, and so on – with most of this done in reverse at the destination.

On a train trip, there is ample time to do enjoyable or productive stuff – eat a meal, work on a laptop (or watch a video), or converse with fellow travelers where the ambient background noise is low enough to make talking to someone feasible. Cell phones can be used. Plus – at least on last summer's Empire Builder – the cars had electric outlets for plugging in computers so one was not held hostage to battery time.

Train travel could be made more seamless by having "rent-and-ride" stops at the periphery of major metropolitan areas where rental cars are available along with access to the area's freeway system – Minnesota I’s "infinite matrix."

Of course, one can still continue to downtown and use transit when feasible to do so. Rent-and-rides can also be park-and-rides for travelers originating at that location. Covered parking could be provided – rental cars could be electric and be charged up from solar cells on the roof of the garage. Rail fare options could include round trip train, parking at origin, and car rental or transit pass at destination.

Minnesota II: The consensus seems to be that speed isn't important. But here are some exceptions.

The Chicago to Minneapolis route was based on speed. And speed captured lots of business. There were far more people waiting to board at various stops than there is today by two to three times. Today it is 8-1/2 hours plus delays, it was 6-1/4 hours for the best time in the 1950's. Milwaukee Road was usually always on time, the CB&Q usually was late.

A complaint I hear over and over again is the slow transit time of the Empire Builder versus driving today from Minneapolis to Chicago but not westward from Minneapolis.

The Hiawatha's routinely cruised across Wisconsin and from Milwaukee to Chicago in excess of 100 MPH with 105 commonly reported. The speed limit was officially 90 mph. One locality posted "trains pass crossing at 100 MPH". (Local police put their radar on the trains.)

Illinois Central trains crossed Illinois at speeds over 100 mph with a dawn to dusk run from Chicago to New Orleans.

The 20th Century Limited was another long distance train where speed was a major selling point with overnight service between Chicago and New York. My trip in the 1960's was uneventful with arrival in Chicago 20 minutes early. This train is accurately depicted in the old movie North by Northwest. And, yes there was a red carpet at Grand Central.

Another fast route was from Chicago to Denver. Departure was around 5 PM and arrival the next morning around 9 AM.

All of these routes had excellent transit times.

100 MPH makes a good marketing tool, 90 doesn't, but transit time is most important This is what people see on the Internet first.

Illinois: ... I also like the idea that rail travel should be faster than the auto in the same market. Or, at least AS FAST, but with more comfort and convenience.

Washington, D.C.: Speed is a tool to lure customers, but not the only tool. And it should be deployed in selected areas where it makes sense. Too often advocates become too enamored with speed for speed's sake.

Illinois: Exactly, and getting speed up to 90 MPH or 100 in some markets would probably be a very effective marketing tool. Minnesota II’s example of Chicago/Minneapolis is a good one.

A local market here is Galesburg/Chicago. By rail it's 162 miles and Amtrak does it in about 2:40 (Westbound). Driving Galesburg to Chicago is 200 miles because the Interstate goes North to the Quad Cities before heading to Chicago. Anyhow, the drive to Chicago can easily take four hours, depending on traffic, so most folks around here take the train to Chicago for day trips or business. The State of Illinois was going to speed up much of the Galesburg/Chicago run to 90, but I don't think that has happened. Funding was available once, but maybe our soon-to-be-impeached Governor, Blagojevich, used it for something else!

[End quote]

You’ve just read a discussion held on URPA’s Intranet with the usual give-and-take. Among those discussing were two former Amtrak consultants, a professional civil engineer in the railroad industry along with another Ph.D., some professional railroaders both in operations and other areas, a couple of academics, some attorneys, and other professional interested parties.

The point of the exercise was to have a rational discussion of high speed rail, a constant topic of interest in today’s Washington environment where every fantasy project ever perceived is under consideration as part of a trillion dollar stimulus program about to be launched by the federal government.

One thing everyone can agree on in this country is "high speed rail" is a term which has many definitions. Perhaps everyone should attempt to agree on a single definition for high speed rail, and relegate everything else to enhanced conventional rail.

Whatever becomes of high speed rail, including the started project in California, it is incumbent on rational people to look at all of the considerations and detractions of high speed rail, and not only how it will be a short term benefit to the construction industry, but what long term benefit high speed rail will provide in the future. Will high speed rail become so expensive, it will not be practical to operate? Will high speed rail become a permanent, dependent child of government, always needing subsidy, but never providing enough social benefit to justify the subsidy? How long will the initial high speed rail infrastructure practically last, and how soon will that infrastructure become another Amtrak Northeast Corridor financial black hole, where countless billions of dollars will have to be poured into those potential black holes to keep a system running that has limited social and business benefit?

Before everyone gleefully jumps on the high speed rail bandwagon, many of these questions must be answered in a thoughtful and rational way. What may be today’s short term solution to other problems could easily turn into tomorrow’s long term nightmare that may stifle other better, and more useful incarnations of passenger rail.

There is one essential caveat to all of this discussion: Amtrak, as we know it today, has barely been capable of operating the Northeast Corridor in a useful way. While the public numbers Amtrak shows say the NEC is "profitable," and contributes financially to the overall company, we know that to be patently false. A true examination of Amtrak’s financial stewardship of the NEC shows many routine operating expenses are relegated to capital costs, creating a massive financial shell game that rivals the evils of Enron.

Gil Carmichael, as usual, with vision and clarity, has laid a path for us to follow. Steel wheels on steel rails is the answer to present and future transportation needs in North America, including increased velocity for freight trains and decreased trip times for passenger trains. The challenge will be for us to honor his vision by the proper implementation of his plan for the future where fiscal responsibility runs rampant, commercial success is unquestioned, and social benefit is obvious.

If you are reading someone else’s copy of This Week at Amtrak, you can receive your own free copy each week by sending your e-mail address to

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Telephone 904-636-7739

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1) "What we’ve got here is failure to communicate." is the famous line uttered by the late, great character actor Strother Martin to the even greater late Paul Newman in 1967's Cool Hand Luke movie. While Mr. Martin’s character, when addressing Mr. Newman’s character, was specifically talking about some perceived naughtiness by Mr. Newman’s character, we can use this famous line when referring to Amtrak, too.

When the House of Representatives version of the new Obama administration’s nearly $1 trillion stimulus plan was announced January 15th, Amtrak and passenger rail fans were agog at how little was included in the plan for the benefit of Amtrak. After all, Amtrak had recently requested over $7 billion in projects it felt were "shovel ready," and, certainly, the thinking of so many went, no organization could be more worthy than Amtrak for free federal largess to help the economy get back on a solid footing.

Whoops! Amtrak was only allotted $1.1 billion in the House version, with the Senate still unheard from. But, you can bet the Senate version won’t be markedly different from the House version; maybe – at best – an extra billion, but nowhere near what the alleged cognoscenti thought would be coming the way of Amtrak and passenger rail. So, what happened (besides reality striking)?

First, let’s visit the most recent column, Volume 20, No. 2, released by Ken Orski and Innovation NewsBriefs, an always informative source for transportation infrastructure topics. (www.innobriefs.com)

[begin quote]

January 18, 2009

The Stimulus Bill Leaves Most of the Transportation Community Dissatisfied

It looks like the economic stimulus proposal unveiled by the House Appropriations Committee on January 15 has left few in the transportation community satisfied. That’s a conclusion we have drawn from informal conversations at the just concluded annual meeting of the Transportation Research Board and from reviewing the National Journal’s Transportation Blog. (The stimulus program has been a focus of discussion on that blog during the past week. The blog can be found at www.transportation.nationaljournal.com). Voicing disappointment were members of the House transportation committee and a wide array of interest groups ranging from the highway users and the construction industry to transit and airport officials, labor unions and environmentalists. According to a January 15 Wall Street Journal story, some members of the House transportation committee protested at a congressional Democratic caucus session last Thursday against what they deemed a grossly inadequate level of funding for transportation projects. In a radio interview on "Marketplace" the same day, Highway and Transit Subcommittee Chairman Peter DeFazio (D-OR) made no attempt to hide his displeasure. He pointed out that the transportation sector has received a scant 7% of the proposed stimulus package despite the high potential of transportation funding to create jobs and revitalize the economy.

The House transportation leaders’ dissatisfaction was echoed by a wide variety of transportation stakeholders who voiced disappointment with what they felt was inadequate consideration of their particular needs. "Transportation infrastructure investment should be a core component of an economic stimulus plan," stated a Transportation Construction Coalition release, expressing the views of its leaders, the American Road & Transportation Builders Association (ARTBA) and the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC). Writing in the National Journal’s Transportation Blog, Terry O’Sullivan, President of the Laborers’ International Union (LIUNA) criticized the proposed level of infrastructure investment as falling "far short of needs and ... of the opportunity to invest in a way that can revive our economy and leave behind tangible assets and a positive legacy for generations to come." James C. May, President of the Air Transport Association thought the House missed a real opportunity to create new jobs by failing to invest more in the aviation sector.

Environmental spokesmen such as Deron Lovaas, Transportation Policy Director of the Natural Resources Defense Council and Geoff Anderson, Co-Chair of the liberal Transportation for America Campaign, were blunt in criticizing the House proposal, calling its allocation to mass transit and passenger rail as inadequate and disproportionately low compared to the highway allocation. Other environmental activists decried the House bill in even stronger terms, calling it "disastrous," a "capitulation" and completely lacking any emphasis on "fix-it-first," "green" transportation projects.

The House Appropriations Committee’s $825 billion draft bill (with $550 billion in spending initiatives and $275 billion in tax cuts) would dedicate $30 billion to highways, $9 billion to public transportation, $3 billion to airport runway projects and $1.1 billion to Amtrak and intercity passenger rail. An additional $7.75 billion would be spent on flood control, navigation and public lands infrastructure. The House proposal would require a certain percentage of each state allocation to be distributed to metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs), based on population. In selecting projects, the draft bill specifies that priority should be given to projects that are in an approved Transportation Improvement Program and can be contracted within 120 days. Grant recipients must certify that the projects contribute to job creation and are an appropriate use of taxpayer dollars. (The draft bill can be found at http://appropriations.house.gov/pdf/recove...rt01-15-09.pdf)

Short-term vs Long-term Benefits

What kind of projects deserve to be funded has been likewise a subject of debate. Opinion is roughly divided between those who view the short term economic impact and job creation as the primary (or sole) goals of the stimulus program, and those who view the stimulus as an opportunity to invest in the country’s infrastructure and achieve long-term benefits. "Unless we spend those dollars on the right things (which requires a plan) and efficiently (which requires non-political iron handed oversight) we will ... fail to create the infrastructure needed to support an economy vigorous enough to repay the dollars we are spending," wrote Robert Crandall, retired Chairman of American Airlines in the National Journal’s Transportation Blog. Steve Heminger, Executive Director of the San Francisco Bay Area’s Metropolitan Transportation Commission concurred, evoking the potential of the economic recovery program to launch major infrastructure projects such as those built during the New Deal, whose benefits, he pointed out, Bay Area residents enjoy to this very day.

Jeffrey Shane, former Deputy Secretary of Transportation, speculated that "a national ranking of the most productive transportation investments would look very different from the aggregation of a fifty-state wish list" but, he added, "let’s give our state authorities some credit for knowing what works." Bob Poole, Transportation Director at the Reason Foundation, observed that the process inherent in the stimulus bill "substitutes political priorities for economic priorities," and the use of existing allocation formulas spreads the money across the country rather than focusing funds on high-performing projects that offer maximum pay off. Polly Trottenberg, Executive Director of the Building America’s Future Coalition agreed, noting that "the political process may be producing a result which is at odds with what the public supports." She cited a Coalition-sponsored public opinion survey that stressed the importance of setting priorities and measuring outcomes.

As Steve Sandherr, AGC’s Chief Operating Officer pointed out, many of the details of the stimulus bill will inevitably change over the coming weeks. In fact, as one congressional source told us, the fight has only just begun. Over the next several weeks we shall see some of the most intense lobbying in recent history. The stakes are extremely high. State and municipal governments, the non-profit sector, businesses, and the construction industry are facing tremendous economic pressures and the stimulus bill offers for some of them a rare avenue of relief. The intensity of the lobbying is magnified by the promise of unprecedented sums of money dangled in front of the stakeholders. For example, the $39 billion stimulus allocation to surface transportation represents almost 80 percent of the entire FY 2008 appropriations for highways and transit ($49.9 billion)

Needed: A National Strategy for Infrastructure

Could the stimulus package influence the plans for a new surface transportation authorization later this year? One could argue that an injection of a substantial sum of stimulus money might lessen the need and the pressure for a prompt enactment of new surface transportation legislation. The longer it takes Congress to approve the stimulus bill, the easier it will be for lawmakers to put off consideration of a separate surface transportation bill. Faced with a crowded legislative agenda, congressional legislators might convince themselves that the immediate needs of the transportation program have been taken care of and can safely be postponed until 2010 or beyond. Of course, it can be argued that postponing the reauthorization by one year might not be such a bad thing after all. It would give Congress and the Obama Administration more breathing space to thoroughly reexamine the existing transportation policy and fundamentally restructure the federal program.

Contending that the economic recovery package is no substitute for a multi-year legislation will be House transportation leaders and an array of transportation interests. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman James Oberstar (D-MN) has already announced that he plans to introduce and pass "the largest transportation investment package since the creation of the Interstate Highway System" (as much as $500 billion over six years). Transportation interest groups such as ARTBA, AASHTO, APTA and AGC will be solidly aligned behind the Chairman. Another strong advocate of a multi-year strategy of infrastructure investment is Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell. Speaking at a January 12 Brookings symposium on Infrastructure, Rendell observed that investment in infrastructure will have to continue long after the stimulus program has expired. He called for a long-term vision to finance major capital investments through a dedicated federal capital budget and a National Infrastructure Bank. (Unconfirmed reports at the end of the week had the National Infrastructure Bank proposal in real danger of being killed by opposition in the Senate Finance Committee).

The current debate surrounding the infrastructure priorities in the stimulus bill offers a preview of the debate later this year (or in 2010) about the structure and priorities of the new surface transportation legislation. But unlike the stimulus bill, the reauthorization will not have the benefit of easy, deficit-financed money. It will require either raising new funds through a politically risky gas tax increase or coming up with some new untried financing mechanisms. The authors of the transportation authorization will face a far more difficult challenge than simply allocating seemingly "free" money.

[End quote]

Let’s add to what Mr. Orski had to say. He’s given a good, broad picture of what it will take for infrastructure improvements.

We can safely conclude, without hesitation, part of the lack of funding for Amtrak projects has very much to do with two simple concepts: First, Amtrak remains America’s best kept secret, and second, Amtrak still only accounts for 1% (yes, one percent) of America’s transportation output, or, about the same as motorcycles.

So, Amtrak has a failure to communicate. When not that many people know – and, as a result, care – about you, why should a flood of funding come your way? Amtrak has burned so many bridges through the years by abandoning routes and stations (Often, stations just recently completed with local or state monies.), annoying Members of Congress in uncountable ways on just about every subject, and by ignoring glaring business opportunities on every level, it was/almost is not relevant in a national stimulus package discussion.

Now, everyone who understands the business of passenger rail and the desirability of passenger rail as a legitimate part of our domestic transportation network knows this is a golden opportunity for passenger rail to waddle up to Washington’s golden trough of money and gobble up some free federal monies. The question is, will Amtrak be able to get its snout close enough to the trough to slurp up a few dollars?

2) Even before the Obama administration was inaugurated last Tuesday, the criticism began to flow after the announcement of the stimulus plan spending allocations. It only took seconds for Internet bloggers to reach a high pitched whine about the lack of support for Amtrak, especially since "Amtrak Joe," (that would be Vice President Joe Biden, dubbed Amtrak Joe by the news media) used to commute daily on Amtrak between his Wilmington, Delaware home and Washington when he was serving in the Senate. It seems more than one blogger made the incorrect assumption that since Amtrak Joe was now just a heartbeat away from the presidency, and his son is Vice Chairman of the Amtrak Board of Directors, Amtrak’s worries about federal funding were at an end.

Wrong, of course. All of these misguided, yet hopeful, Internet bloggers forgot to take into account how Washington works. No matter who Amtrak has as an abstract friend, it still has to prove it’s worthy of extra funding, especially when the federal budget is in a huge deficit mode.

What it’s going to take is honest hard work, backed up by real documentation – not Amtrak’s and it’s wholly owned lapdog organizations’ hyperbole – demonstrating money spent is money well spent.

Anything worth having is worth working for, and that includes free federal monies.

3) Paul Dyson, the take-no-prisoners president of the Rail Passenger Association of California has sent a letter to Amtrak Interim President and Chief Executive Office Joseph Boardman. Here’s is Mr. Dyson’s letter. We can only hope all other state association presidents are being this proactive and sending similar letters at the earliest possible moment.

[begin quote]

16th January, 2009

Mr. Joseph H. Boardman

President and Chief Executive Officer

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION

60 Massachusetts Avenue, NE

Washington, DC 20002

Via Fax to 202 906 2850 (2 Pages)

AMTRAK ROLLING STOCK INVESTMENT PLANS

Dear Mr. Boardman:

As you take up your new duties as President of Amtrak, albeit so far on temporary assignment, we’d like to draw your attention to some distressing tendencies in Amtrak policy over recent years. We refer in particular to the geographic imbalance of Amtrak investment, and the capital starvation of service west of the Mississippi. It has been the case for some years now that 95%, more or less, of Amtrak’s capital budget has gone to the NEC, and at the same time most of the long distance trains in the west have had almost no new equipment since the 1970s. If this trend is continued, and the current 5-year rolling stock plan indicates that it will be, then trains such as the Coast Starlight and the Empire Builder will cease to operate for want of serviceable cars in a few short years. Our Board believes that this will be both politically and economically disastrous for the future of passenger rail in the USA.

We believe that you should quickly review this policy and redress this imbalance as soon as possible. Consider these points:

• Even though Amtrak owns the NEC, it is the minority user as far as trains and passengers are concerned. The commuter agencies that share the route need to contribute more to bringing the route up to date and into good order. We do not advocate starving the NEC, or any other market, of appropriate capital resources, but it would be just as foolish to continue to starve productive western routes.

• We see no regulatory reason why Amtrak should expect the State of California or other western states to provide the rolling stock and other capital improvements for trains on the existing National network. San Diego to San Luis Obispo for example is part of this network and is every bit as deserving of its share of Amtrak’s capital investment as any other route in the country. Since most journeys, even in the shorter state corridors, are longer than most journeys in the NEC, we believe that the western routes are more productive in revenue and passenger miles, and can generate a better return on investment.

• Both the California corridors and the long distance trains need new cars. We believe that these cars can be built using a common hull and many standard components. Indeed the coach car can be common to all these services. We believe that Amtrak should immediately be placing an order for this type of equipment. A long term order with steady state production of say 2,000 cars will give the manufacturer and supplier the opportunity to reduce costs substantially.

We have started to take this message to the California congressional delegation. We are pointing out that California taxpayers are paying twice for Amtrak service, through federal and State taxes, and that this is not acceptable. While most of our elected officials support Amtrak funding as a concept, very few understand the funding mechanisms and the direction in which the money flows. This is changing.

Mr. Boardman, we wish you every success in your new position. We’d be delighted if you could attend our Spring combined members meeting (date to be announced) in Los Angeles. We’d like to discuss these issues with you and give you the opportunity to meet a core group of passenger rail supporters.

Yours faithfully,

SIGNED

Paul J. Dyson

President, Rail Passenger Association of California

[End quote]

4) From Steven Aftergood and the Federation of American Scientists (Amtrak, are you paying attention? It’s time to mend your ways.):

[begin quote/edited for relevancy]

Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2009

SECRECY NEWS

from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy

Volume 2009, Issue No. 7

January 22, 2009

Secrecy News Blog:

http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/

PRESIDENT OBAMA DECLARES "A NEW ERA OF OPENNESS"

In a breathtaking series of statements and executive actions, President Barack Obama yesterday announced "the beginning of a new era of openness in our country."

"For a long time now there's been too much secrecy in this city," he told reporters at a January 21 swearing-in ceremony.

"The old rules said that if there was a defensible argument for not disclosing something to the American people, then it should not be disclosed" (a paraphrase of the October 2001 policy statement of former Attorney General John Ashcroft). "That era is now over."

"Starting today, every agency and department should know that this administration stands on the side not of those who seek to withhold information, but those who seek to make it known," President Obama said.

Moreover, "I will also hold myself, as president, to a new standard of openness.... Information will not be withheld just because I say so. It will be withheld because a separate authority believes my request is well-grounded in the Constitution."

"Let me say it as simply as I can. Transparency and the rule of law will be the touchstones of this presidency."

Accordingly, the President issued several new policy statements. A new policy on Freedom of Information directed that "All agencies should adopt a presumption in favor of disclosure" and called for the Attorney General to develop new FOIA guidelines reflecting that principle. A broader statement on Transparency and Open Government directed agencies to "harness new technologies to put information about their operations and decisions online and readily available to the public," and ordered preparation of recommendations for an Open Government Directive. A new executive order rescinded an order issued by former President Bush that imposed increased restrictions on public access to presidential records.

The whole package gained immense force from the fact that it was presented on the President's first full day in office. (By comparison, the Clinton and Bush Administrations did not get around to addressing FOIA policy until October of their first year in office.) The actions closely tracked the recommendations of openness advocates, and they represented a personal commitment to openness and accountability that goes far beyond what any previous President has dared to offer.

Inevitably, several caveats are in order. A "presumption of disclosure" really only applies to records that are potentially subject to discretionary release, which is a finite subset of secret government information. Vast realms of information are sequestered behind classification barriers or statutory protections that remain unaffected by the new policy statements. "In the face of doubt, openness prevails," the President said. But throughout the government secrecy system, there is not a lot of doubt or soul-searching about the application of secrecy.

...

Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists.

The Secrecy News Blog is at:

http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/http://www...recy/index.html

Steven Aftergood

Project on Government Secrecy

Federation of American Scientists

web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html

email: [email protected]

voice: (202) 454-4691

[End quote]

Memo to Amtrak: At the earliest possible moment, many of us crave a better understanding of how you allocate expenses to all routes, especially the long distance routes. Also, please explain how the Northeast Corridor is considered profitable, even though not all of the expenses of ownership and operation are fully allocated, and many of the daily expenses of NEC operations are hidden in capital expenditure accounts, instead.

5) Amtrak has been unbelievably naughty this winter by constantly annulling trains in the Midwest and elsewhere (sometimes for days at a time) because of lack of working locomotives. These are not just issues related to cold weather, but issues related to outright neglect of the non-NEC locomotive fleet in order to not spend money on proper routine maintenance and repair of these valuable assets.

For the moment, the burning question is, why has William Crosbie, Amtrak vice president and chief operating officer, allowed this situation to deteriorate to such a degree as Amtrak is unable to fulfill its basic purpose of operating passenger trains on a routine basis? It’s impossible to blame this situation of a lack of funds; it’s a lack of management priorities. Mr. Boardman, what is being done about this deplorable situation?

More on this in the next issue of This Week at Amtrak.

6) An update on the last issue of TWA from Joe Vranich:

[begin quote]

Hello Bruce,

A Google alert showed that you are attributing a definition of High Speed Rail to me being one of 180 MPH or more. Please note that I've never used that figure. I have used 150 MPH or more. At one time that speed could have been considered the "official" HSR definition under U.S. law when the IRS code was modified to permit tax-exempt bonds to be used to help finance HSR systems – provided trains reached (if I remember the language correctly) "sustained" speeds of 150 MPH or more.

BTW, the fastest HSR train in the world today is in China, between Beijing and Tianjin, at 217 MPH.

Hope you are well,

Joe Vranich

[End quote]

If you are reading someone else’s copy of This Week at Amtrak, you can receive your own free copy each week by sending your e-mail address to

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This Week at Amtrak; January 29, 2009






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Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute that focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, and New York. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

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1) Inquiring minds have wanted to know for a long time why Amtrak never wants to report its metrics by standard measures used by all other types of common carriers, not to mention federal government reporting agencies such as the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.

The reason is, Amtrak has a dirty little secret it doesn’t want anyone to know or figure out: Statistically, Amtrak is completely irrelevant as a part of our domestic transportation network.

New figures have been released by BTS this month. The latest figures available from BTS are for 2006, but that doesn’t matter, because Amtrak’s figures are so very low, even if they were doubled Amtrak would still be statistically irrelevant.

BTS 2006 Statistics, Market Share by Mode

Air – 11.07%

Passenger cars – 49.82%

Other 2 axle vehicles (Such as SUVs, pickup trucks, etc;) – 35.38%

Busses – 2.78%

Motorcycles – 0.30%

Rail transit – 0.31%

Rail commuter – 0.19%

Amtrak – 0.10%

Other transit – 0.04%

Just in case you think you read that Amtrak figure incorrectly, it’s one tenth of one percent market share. Yes, far less than a single percentage point.

If you are doling out free federal monies in Washington, how high would that be on your priority list? Amtrak has certain members of Congress who will ALWAYS offer amendments to bills and other devices to defund Amtrak. When you look at Amtrak’s true numbers, you have to wonder why not more members of Congress don’t do the same thing? Just looking at raw numbers, Amtrak is not only a loser, but it’s a colossal loser, and screams government waste and boondoggle to rational people.

If you are a political commentator of any stripe and are accustomed to either flying everywhere or driving to any destination (especially if you live outside of the Northeast), you can see why Amtrak receives little or no support for a future as part of our domestic transportation network.

When someone cries "Close it! Sell it! Dismantle it!" they are doing so from a practical economic standpoint. Amtrak is, in the eyes of anyone doing cold, hard, analysis, unimportant. If Amtrak went away – even (gasp!) in the Northeast – there would be little, if any, impact on any roadway crowding. Even as heavy as traffic is on Northeast interstate highways, Amtrak’s daily passengers could still easily be absorbed onto busses, vans, and in automobiles.

Now, you see why Amtrak only wants to talk about warm bodies/passenger counts. Amtrak says it carries about 26 million passengers a year, for an average of 70,000 passengers a day on its over 300 trains (most of which are Northeast Corridor trains) a day (including the two tri-weekly trains, the Sunset Limited and the Cardinal).

What this tells us is a completely new approach is needed to "sell" passenger rail in North America. VIA Rail Canada isn’t much different from Amtrak in terms of percentage of population it serves; the only real difference is VIA has some social service routes which are critical to the inhabitants of remote parts of various provinces where no real roads exist. VIA and general aviation are still the only two forms of any type of transportation through or over some very desolate countryside.

Here’s the good news. It doesn’t take much to sell travelers on the potential of passenger train travel, especially Generation Y (people in their 20s) travelers. To many, train travel is a new and novel experience to be embraced and enjoyed.

If ever Amtrak gets away from insisting it must be the best kept secret in America, it will explode with riders.

Some otherwise well-respected authors are continuing the tedious and false drumbeat about Amtrak having to perpetually be a step-child of government, and how it can never come close to making money or even breaking even. Since this canard is constantly put before the public, more and more people blithely believe this drivel without bothering to check for themselves what the realities are about passenger rail in North America. Yes, as long as passenger rail commands one tenth of one percent of the traveling public’s market share, it will always have to be an unwanted child of government. It if ever gets just to one percent of market share, it will be a success both financially and socially, as long as the correct business plan is followed.

2) As rational individuals, we know body counts are worthless; revenue passenger miles are the defining figure of measurement.

Here are the same results for 2006, expressed in revenue passenger miles instead of percentages (in millions).

Air – 590,633

Passenger cars – 2,658,621

Other 2 axle vehicles (Such as SUVs, pickup trucks, etc;) – 1,887,997

Busses – 148,485

Motorcycles – 15,750

Rail transit – 16,587

Rail commuter – 10,361

Amtrak – 5,410

Other transit – 2,221

Amtrak still comes out on the bottom, no matter how you express the data.

If the presumption was made that every Amtrak passenger was unique every year (every passenger used Amtrak only one way for one trip a year), then Amtrak would be serving about 8.5% of the population of the United States. However, since the vast majority of Amtrak’s riders use the train as a round-trip service, and over half of Amtrak’s riders use NEC trains on a frequent basis, it’s safe to say Amtrak actually serves well under 3% of the population of the United States – again, making the service statistically irrelevant.

2) Let’s look at some other figures and trends, all courtesy of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.

Here’s a breakdown of U.S. passenger miles by mode over an extended period of time (figures in millions).

Air Passenger Miles

1960 – 33,399

1965 – 57,626

1970 – 117,542

1975 – 147,400

1980 – 219,068

1985 – 290,136

1990 – 358,873

1995 – 414,688

2000 – 531,329

2005 – 583,689

2006 – 590,633

Highway Passenger Miles (Combined passenger car, motorcycle, two-axle passenger vehicles)

1960 – 1,272,078

1965 – 1,555,237

1970 – 2,042,002

1975 – 2,404,954

1980 – 2,653,510

1985 – 3,012,953

1990 – 3,561,209

1995 – 3,868,070

2000 – 4,390,076

2005 – 4,887,945

2006 – 4,933,689

Transit Passenger Miles (Combined bus, light rail, heavy rail, trolley bus, commuter rail)

1960 – NA

1965 – NA

1970 – NA

1975 – NA

1980 – 39,854

1985 – 39,581

1990 – 41,143

1995 – 39,808

2000 – 47,666

2005 – 49,680

2006 – 52,154

Passenger rail/Intercity, Amtrak Passenger Miles

1960 – 17,064

1965 – 13,260

1970 – 6,179

1975 – 3,931

1980 – 4,503

1985 – 4,825

1990 – 6,057

1995 – 5,545

2000 – 5,498

2005 – 5,381

2006 – 5,410

Additional figures compiled by URPA from Amtrak data

2007 – 5,653

2008 – 6,159

Figures for prior to 1990 are only reported in five year increments. What’s interesting about the passenger rail figures is the huge drop – over 50% – from 1965 to 1970, a period still prior to Amtrak when most railroads were still running private passenger trains under government regulation.

The drop from 1970 to 1975 includes the introduction of Amtrak with its skeletal national system and the removal of most remaining passenger trains in the country. Since the directed mission from the United States Department of Transportation in the creation of Amtrak was to determine what formerly private railroad routes could be considered sustainable after the creation of Amtrak, it’s obvious just the very creation of Amtrak instituted a false capacity constraint on passenger rail.

The total figure of revenue passenger miles for 2008 – Amtrak’s best year ever – is still below that of 1970, the year before Amtrak started service and private railroads were still operating passenger trains under government mandate.

What does this tell us? From the very beginning, by government directive, Amtrak has placed a false restraint on passenger demand in the United States. Even as bad as the last years of private passenger trains were by some railroads hoping to scare away passengers and only operate the barest of services, the public still wanted to ride trains. Not everyone wants to fly, and not everyone wants to travel by private automobile, no matter how wonderful the Eisenhower Interstate Highway System may be.

What would have happened if Amtrak would not have falsely constrained demand? What would happen if Amtrak was not America’s best kept secret? What would happen if Amtrak’s senior management was actually interested in making the company a success rather than living off of the sour fruits of payments from state treasuries to run intrastate services at high prices while offering low value and bad service?

3) How did Amtrak falsely constrain demand? Let us count the ways, using higher math, of course, because simple arithmetic can’t handle the numbers.

Amtrak has consistently replaced its original fleet inherited from the private railroads with fewer and fewer cars. Here are the numbers.

Passenger Railroad Cars (Does not include locomotives)

1970 – 1,569

1980 – 2,128

1990 – 1,863

1994 – 1,852

1995 – 1,722

1996 – 1,730

1997 – 1,728

1998 – 1,962

1999 – 1,992

2000 – 1,894

2001 – 2,084

2002 – 2,896

2003 – 1,623

2004 – 1,211

2005 – 1,186

2006 – 1,191

2009 – 1,505 plus 140 state owned, but operated by Amtrak, for a total of 1,645

2009 – 1,345 active cars Amtrak lists as available for fleet status or undergoing routine maintenance

Passenger Railroad Car Purchases by Year as reported by BTS (Does not include locomotives)

1975 – 109

1980 – 109

1990 – 58

1994 – 64

1995 – 76

1996 – 92

1997 – 10

2000 – 26

(No figures available after 2000)

Today, Amtrak has 1,551 fewer cars than it did in 2002, mostly due to older equipment being sold for scrap by previous Amtrak stewards, and Amtrak allowing too many cars to go onto the wreck line for minor maintenance issues which Amtrak chooses not to pay for to restore the cars to service.

Again, Amtrak has intentionally created false passenger constraints by simply not providing enough equipment to haul passengers based on demand. While Amtrak’s Amen Corner choruses will incorrectly claim this is the fault of the federal government due to alleged under funding, the reality is Amtrak never requests funding for large equipment orders, nor does it explore viable options through bootstrapping equipment leasing schemes. Instead, Amtrak is content to annually ask for free federal monies to supplement its operations instead of searching for viable ways to support itself, perhaps, say, with the fabulous idea of hauling more passengers instead of seeking subsidies.

4) Most Amtrak supporters suffer from the unbecoming disease of modal envy, that scurrilous malady which forces people to think that just because some other mode of transportation has to have free federal monies to keep it solvent, so does passenger rail.

Here are the numbers – again, from BTS – published in Federal Subsidies to Passenger Transportation in December 2004

[begin quote]

Executive Summary

Recent work in the private sector and current policy debates have refocused attention on Federal subsidies to passenger transportation modes. To provide the Department of Transportation with an independent analysis of this issue, BTS developed data on federal transportation revenues, expenditures, and net subsidies, by mode. Subsidy, for the purpose of this analysis, represents a simple accounting calculation of the net flow of funds to or from the federal government for individual transportation modes. The excess of expenditures over revenues is the net subsidy. To show the amount of subsidy relative to the level of use of transportation infrastructure, we normalized the data by dividing the absolute net subsidy values by passenger-miles.

Highways

Users of the highway passenger transportation system paid significantly greater amounts of money to the federal government than their allocated costs in 1994-2000. This was a result of the increase in the deficit reduction motor fuel tax rates between October 1993 and September 1997, and the increase in Highway Trust Fund fuel tax rates starting in October 1997.

School and transit buses received positive net federal subsidies over the 1990-2002 period, but autos, motorcycles, pickups and vans, and intercity buses paid more than their allocated cost to the federal government.

On average, highway users paid $1.91 per thousand passenger-miles to the federal government over their highway allocated cost during 1990-2002.

Passenger Rail

The net federal subsidy to passenger railroads was the third largest, except for the years 1998-2000, when it was second. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 provided Amtrak with a tax credit in the amount of $2.18 billion in current dollars that caused the net federal subsidy to increase dramatically in 1998 and 1999.

Passenger rail received the largest subsidy per thousand passenger-miles, averaging $186.35 per thousand passenger-miles during 1990-2002.

Transit

Between 1990 and 2002, transit received the largest amount of net federal subsidy, increasing from $5.09 billion to $7.31 billion, an increase of 3% per year. Next to passenger rail, transit received the next highest net federal subsidy per thousand passenger-miles for the period, averaging $118.26 in year 2000 chained dollars.

Air

After transit, air transportation received the second largest net federal subsidy, except for the period from 1998 to 2000, when rail was second. Subsidies declined in 1998-2000 as a result of the increase in federal receipts from aviation users associated with the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, which increased existing aviation excise tax rates and introduced new taxes as of October 1, 1997.

Net federal subsidy per thousand passenger-miles for air increased between 1990 and 1996 and then declined from 1997 to 2000, before rising again in 2001 and 2002. The decline during 1997-2000 was caused by the increase in federal receipts from aviation users as a result of the increase in the existing excise tax rates and the introduction of new taxes in 1997, which preceded increases in expenditures.

[End quote]

So, for you in the back of the room sleeping, let’s have a quick review. Out of the 10 modes of transportation measured by the federal government, Amtrak is ranked ninth (9th) in market share, only above "Other Transit," which includes such modes as "demand response, ferryboat, and other transit not specified."

Being ninth in line – passenger automobiles, other passenger vehicles such as SUVs, and air being the top three modes – Amtrak in some recent years has received the second largest net federal subsidy, and often received the third largest net federal subsidy. To repeat part of the quote above: "Passenger rail received the largest subsidy per thousand passenger-miles, averaging $186.35 per thousand passenger-miles during 1990-2002."

Please, stop the modal envy. Amtrak is cleaning up when it comes to free federal monies. Every other mode should be jealous of Amtrak, not the other way around.

5) Where are we in the Winter of 2009? Amtrak is statistically irrelevant. But, even if it gains just one percent of the national transportation market share, it can be self-sustaining without annual federal funds. This doesn’t mean it has to go private (as appealing as that is to many people), but it does mean it doesn’t have to live and die by the will of reluctant lawmakers who constantly use Amtrak as a political pawn.

Prior to the introduction of the Boeing 707 jet aircraft and the building of the Eisenhower Interstate Highway System, passenger rail had the vast majority of market share in North America for moving passengers. Those days will never be repeated, mostly because there are too many good alternatives to passenger rail. But, passenger rail has tremendous growth potential to regain enough business to make it relevant.

Put all of the annoying tree-hugging arguments aside. Make a modern case for the business of passenger rail. Take visionary schemes like Gil Carmichael’s Interstate II and make them a reality, tugging passenger rail along for the ride.

Most people don’t ride a train for four main reasons: either they don’t know train service is available, today’s embarrassingly skeletal offerings are too inconvenient, no Amtrak service is available to them, or they have joined the thousands of legions of "never again" passengers Amtrak has mistreated in one way or another over the past nearly four decades.

The next time you hear a politician or political commentator griping about Amtrak, just be grateful they even know enough about passenger rail to complain about it. Statistically, Amtrak should never even be a topic of conversation, it’s so insignificant.

As soon as Amtrak management embraces a true growth strategy which includes good passenger service, then Amtrak will become more and more relevant. As long as Amtrak chooses to remain a ghost of America’s past transportation glory, it will be unimportant to almost everyone except Amtrak’s Amen Corner choruses, who are often Amtrak’s worst enemies in disguise because of the enabling they provide for poor management and bad business decisions.

6) We promised last week more in this issue about Amtrak’s winter naughtiness and the appalling lack of functioning locomotives outside of the Northeast Corridor. We promise – really – to address this topic in the next issue of TWA. We’re still gathering information, and had hoped to have more by this point in time.

If you are reading someone else’s copy of This Week at Amtrak, you can receive your own free copy each week by sending your e-mail address to

[email protected]

You MUST include your name, preferred e-mail address, and city and state where you live. If you have filters or firewalls placed on your Internet connection, set your e-mail to receive incoming mail from [email protected]; we are unable to go through any individual approvals processes for individuals. This mailing list is kept strictly confidential and is not shared or used for any purposes other than the distribution of This Week at Amtrak or related URPA materials.

All other correspondence, including requests to unsubscribe, should be addressed to

[email protected]

URPA leadership members are available for speaking engagements.

J. Bruce Richardson

President

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

[email protected]

http://www.unitedrail.org

TWA mailing list

[email protected]

http://lists.unitedrail.org/mailman/listinfo/twa
 
This Week at Amtrak; January 29, 2009






A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from



United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.




America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute



1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA




Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail

[email protected]http://www.unitedrail.org


 

Volume 6, Number 4





I

 

 

Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute that focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, and New York. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) Inquiring minds have wanted to know for a long time why Amtrak never wants to report its metrics by standard measures used by all other types of common carriers, not to mention federal government reporting agencies such as the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.

The reason is, Amtrak has a dirty little secret it doesn’t want anyone to know or figure out: Statistically, Amtrak is completely irrelevant as a part of our domestic transportation network.

New figures have been released by BTS this month. The latest figures available from BTS are for 2006, but that doesn’t matter, because Amtrak’s figures are so very low, even if they were doubled Amtrak would still be statistically irrelevant.

BTS 2006 Statistics, Market Share by Mode

Air – 11.07%

Passenger cars – 49.82%

Other 2 axle vehicles (Such as SUVs, pickup trucks, etc;) – 35.38%

Busses – 2.78%

Motorcycles – 0.30%

Rail transit – 0.31%

Rail commuter – 0.19%

Amtrak – 0.10%

Other transit – 0.04%

Just in case you think you read that Amtrak figure incorrectly, it’s one tenth of one percent market share. Yes, far less than a single percentage point.

If you are doling out free federal monies in Washington, how high would that be on your priority list? Amtrak has certain members of Congress who will ALWAYS offer amendments to bills and other devices to defund Amtrak. When you look at Amtrak’s true numbers, you have to wonder why not more members of Congress don’t do the same thing? Just looking at raw numbers, Amtrak is not only a loser, but it’s a colossal loser, and screams government waste and boondoggle to rational people.

If you are a political commentator of any stripe and are accustomed to either flying everywhere or driving to any destination (especially if you live outside of the Northeast), you can see why Amtrak receives little or no support for a future as part of our domestic transportation network.

When someone cries "Close it! Sell it! Dismantle it!" they are doing so from a practical economic standpoint. Amtrak is, in the eyes of anyone doing cold, hard, analysis, unimportant. If Amtrak went away – even (gasp!) in the Northeast – there would be little, if any, impact on any roadway crowding. Even as heavy as traffic is on Northeast interstate highways, Amtrak’s daily passengers could still easily be absorbed onto busses, vans, and in automobiles.

Now, you see why Amtrak only wants to talk about warm bodies/passenger counts. Amtrak says it carries about 26 million passengers a year, for an average of 70,000 passengers a day on its over 300 trains (most of which are Northeast Corridor trains) a day (including the two tri-weekly trains, the Sunset Limited and the Cardinal).

What this tells us is a completely new approach is needed to "sell" passenger rail in North America. VIA Rail Canada isn’t much different from Amtrak in terms of percentage of population it serves; the only real difference is VIA has some social service routes which are critical to the inhabitants of remote parts of various provinces where no real roads exist. VIA and general aviation are still the only two forms of any type of transportation through or over some very desolate countryside.

Here’s the good news. It doesn’t take much to sell travelers on the potential of passenger train travel, especially Generation Y (people in their 20s) travelers. To many, train travel is a new and novel experience to be embraced and enjoyed.

If ever Amtrak gets away from insisting it must be the best kept secret in America, it will explode with riders.

Some otherwise well-respected authors are continuing the tedious and false drumbeat about Amtrak having to perpetually be a step-child of government, and how it can never come close to making money or even breaking even. Since this canard is constantly put before the public, more and more people blithely believe this drivel without bothering to check for themselves what the realities are about passenger rail in North America. Yes, as long as passenger rail commands one tenth of one percent of the traveling public’s market share, it will always have to be an unwanted child of government. It if ever gets just to one percent of market share, it will be a success both financially and socially, as long as the correct business plan is followed.

2) As rational individuals, we know body counts are worthless; revenue passenger miles are the defining figure of measurement.

Here are the same results for 2006, expressed in revenue passenger miles instead of percentages (in millions).

Air – 590,633

Passenger cars – 2,658,621

Other 2 axle vehicles (Such as SUVs, pickup trucks, etc;) – 1,887,997

Busses – 148,485

Motorcycles – 15,750

Rail transit – 16,587

Rail commuter – 10,361

Amtrak – 5,410

Other transit – 2,221

Amtrak still comes out on the bottom, no matter how you express the data.

If the presumption was made that every Amtrak passenger was unique every year (every passenger used Amtrak only one way for one trip a year), then Amtrak would be serving about 8.5% of the population of the United States. However, since the vast majority of Amtrak’s riders use the train as a round-trip service, and over half of Amtrak’s riders use NEC trains on a frequent basis, it’s safe to say Amtrak actually serves well under 3% of the population of the United States – again, making the service statistically irrelevant.

2) Let’s look at some other figures and trends, all courtesy of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.

Here’s a breakdown of U.S. passenger miles by mode over an extended period of time (figures in millions).

Air Passenger Miles

1960 – 33,399

1965 – 57,626

1970 – 117,542

1975 – 147,400

1980 – 219,068

1985 – 290,136

1990 – 358,873

1995 – 414,688

2000 – 531,329

2005 – 583,689

2006 – 590,633

Highway Passenger Miles (Combined passenger car, motorcycle, two-axle passenger vehicles)

1960 – 1,272,078

1965 – 1,555,237

1970 – 2,042,002

1975 – 2,404,954

1980 – 2,653,510

1985 – 3,012,953

1990 – 3,561,209

1995 – 3,868,070

2000 – 4,390,076

2005 – 4,887,945

2006 – 4,933,689

Transit Passenger Miles (Combined bus, light rail, heavy rail, trolley bus, commuter rail)

1960 – NA

1965 – NA

1970 – NA

1975 – NA

1980 – 39,854

1985 – 39,581

1990 – 41,143

1995 – 39,808

2000 – 47,666

2005 – 49,680

2006 – 52,154

Passenger rail/Intercity, Amtrak Passenger Miles

1960 – 17,064

1965 – 13,260

1970 – 6,179

1975 – 3,931

1980 – 4,503

1985 – 4,825

1990 – 6,057

1995 – 5,545

2000 – 5,498

2005 – 5,381

2006 – 5,410

Additional figures compiled by URPA from Amtrak data

2007 – 5,653

2008 – 6,159

Figures for prior to 1990 are only reported in five year increments. What’s interesting about the passenger rail figures is the huge drop – over 50% – from 1965 to 1970, a period still prior to Amtrak when most railroads were still running private passenger trains under government regulation.

The drop from 1970 to 1975 includes the introduction of Amtrak with its skeletal national system and the removal of most remaining passenger trains in the country. Since the directed mission from the United States Department of Transportation in the creation of Amtrak was to determine what formerly private railroad routes could be considered sustainable after the creation of Amtrak, it’s obvious just the very creation of Amtrak instituted a false capacity constraint on passenger rail.

The total figure of revenue passenger miles for 2008 – Amtrak’s best year ever – is still below that of 1970, the year before Amtrak started service and private railroads were still operating passenger trains under government mandate.

What does this tell us? From the very beginning, by government directive, Amtrak has placed a false restraint on passenger demand in the United States. Even as bad as the last years of private passenger trains were by some railroads hoping to scare away passengers and only operate the barest of services, the public still wanted to ride trains. Not everyone wants to fly, and not everyone wants to travel by private automobile, no matter how wonderful the Eisenhower Interstate Highway System may be.

What would have happened if Amtrak would not have falsely constrained demand? What would happen if Amtrak was not America’s best kept secret? What would happen if Amtrak’s senior management was actually interested in making the company a success rather than living off of the sour fruits of payments from state treasuries to run intrastate services at high prices while offering low value and bad service?

3) How did Amtrak falsely constrain demand? Let us count the ways, using higher math, of course, because simple arithmetic can’t handle the numbers.

Amtrak has consistently replaced its original fleet inherited from the private railroads with fewer and fewer cars. Here are the numbers.

Passenger Railroad Cars (Does not include locomotives)

1970 – 1,569

1980 – 2,128

1990 – 1,863

1994 – 1,852

1995 – 1,722

1996 – 1,730

1997 – 1,728

1998 – 1,962

1999 – 1,992

2000 – 1,894

2001 – 2,084

2002 – 2,896

2003 – 1,623

2004 – 1,211

2005 – 1,186

2006 – 1,191

2009 – 1,505 plus 140 state owned, but operated by Amtrak, for a total of 1,645

2009 – 1,345 active cars Amtrak lists as available for fleet status or undergoing routine maintenance

Passenger Railroad Car Purchases by Year as reported by BTS (Does not include locomotives)

1975 – 109

1980 – 109

1990 – 58

1994 – 64

1995 – 76

1996 – 92

1997 – 10

2000 – 26

(No figures available after 2000)

Today, Amtrak has 1,551 fewer cars than it did in 2002, mostly due to older equipment being sold for scrap by previous Amtrak stewards, and Amtrak allowing too many cars to go onto the wreck line for minor maintenance issues which Amtrak chooses not to pay for to restore the cars to service.

Again, Amtrak has intentionally created false passenger constraints by simply not providing enough equipment to haul passengers based on demand. While Amtrak’s Amen Corner choruses will incorrectly claim this is the fault of the federal government due to alleged under funding, the reality is Amtrak never requests funding for large equipment orders, nor does it explore viable options through bootstrapping equipment leasing schemes. Instead, Amtrak is content to annually ask for free federal monies to supplement its operations instead of searching for viable ways to support itself, perhaps, say, with the fabulous idea of hauling more passengers instead of seeking subsidies.

4) Most Amtrak supporters suffer from the unbecoming disease of modal envy, that scurrilous malady which forces people to think that just because some other mode of transportation has to have free federal monies to keep it solvent, so does passenger rail.

Here are the numbers – again, from BTS – published in Federal Subsidies to Passenger Transportation in December 2004

[begin quote]

Executive Summary

Recent work in the private sector and current policy debates have refocused attention on Federal subsidies to passenger transportation modes. To provide the Department of Transportation with an independent analysis of this issue, BTS developed data on federal transportation revenues, expenditures, and net subsidies, by mode. Subsidy, for the purpose of this analysis, represents a simple accounting calculation of the net flow of funds to or from the federal government for individual transportation modes. The excess of expenditures over revenues is the net subsidy. To show the amount of subsidy relative to the level of use of transportation infrastructure, we normalized the data by dividing the absolute net subsidy values by passenger-miles.

Highways

Users of the highway passenger transportation system paid significantly greater amounts of money to the federal government than their allocated costs in 1994-2000. This was a result of the increase in the deficit reduction motor fuel tax rates between October 1993 and September 1997, and the increase in Highway Trust Fund fuel tax rates starting in October 1997.

School and transit buses received positive net federal subsidies over the 1990-2002 period, but autos, motorcycles, pickups and vans, and intercity buses paid more than their allocated cost to the federal government.

On average, highway users paid $1.91 per thousand passenger-miles to the federal government over their highway allocated cost during 1990-2002.

Passenger Rail

The net federal subsidy to passenger railroads was the third largest, except for the years 1998-2000, when it was second. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 provided Amtrak with a tax credit in the amount of $2.18 billion in current dollars that caused the net federal subsidy to increase dramatically in 1998 and 1999.

Passenger rail received the largest subsidy per thousand passenger-miles, averaging $186.35 per thousand passenger-miles during 1990-2002.

Transit

Between 1990 and 2002, transit received the largest amount of net federal subsidy, increasing from $5.09 billion to $7.31 billion, an increase of 3% per year. Next to passenger rail, transit received the next highest net federal subsidy per thousand passenger-miles for the period, averaging $118.26 in year 2000 chained dollars.

Air

After transit, air transportation received the second largest net federal subsidy, except for the period from 1998 to 2000, when rail was second. Subsidies declined in 1998-2000 as a result of the increase in federal receipts from aviation users associated with the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, which increased existing aviation excise tax rates and introduced new taxes as of October 1, 1997.

Net federal subsidy per thousand passenger-miles for air increased between 1990 and 1996 and then declined from 1997 to 2000, before rising again in 2001 and 2002. The decline during 1997-2000 was caused by the increase in federal receipts from aviation users as a result of the increase in the existing excise tax rates and the introduction of new taxes in 1997, which preceded increases in expenditures.

[End quote]

So, for you in the back of the room sleeping, let’s have a quick review. Out of the 10 modes of transportation measured by the federal government, Amtrak is ranked ninth (9th) in market share, only above "Other Transit," which includes such modes as "demand response, ferryboat, and other transit not specified."

Being ninth in line – passenger automobiles, other passenger vehicles such as SUVs, and air being the top three modes – Amtrak in some recent years has received the second largest net federal subsidy, and often received the third largest net federal subsidy. To repeat part of the quote above: "Passenger rail received the largest subsidy per thousand passenger-miles, averaging $186.35 per thousand passenger-miles during 1990-2002."

Please, stop the modal envy. Amtrak is cleaning up when it comes to free federal monies. Every other mode should be jealous of Amtrak, not the other way around.

5) Where are we in the Winter of 2009? Amtrak is statistically irrelevant. But, even if it gains just one percent of the national transportation market share, it can be self-sustaining without annual federal funds. This doesn’t mean it has to go private (as appealing as that is to many people), but it does mean it doesn’t have to live and die by the will of reluctant lawmakers who constantly use Amtrak as a political pawn.

Prior to the introduction of the Boeing 707 jet aircraft and the building of the Eisenhower Interstate Highway System, passenger rail had the vast majority of market share in North America for moving passengers. Those days will never be repeated, mostly because there are too many good alternatives to passenger rail. But, passenger rail has tremendous growth potential to regain enough business to make it relevant.

Put all of the annoying tree-hugging arguments aside. Make a modern case for the business of passenger rail. Take visionary schemes like Gil Carmichael’s Interstate II and make them a reality, tugging passenger rail along for the ride.

Most people don’t ride a train for four main reasons: either they don’t know train service is available, today’s embarrassingly skeletal offerings are too inconvenient, no Amtrak service is available to them, or they have joined the thousands of legions of "never again" passengers Amtrak has mistreated in one way or another over the past nearly four decades.

The next time you hear a politician or political commentator griping about Amtrak, just be grateful they even know enough about passenger rail to complain about it. Statistically, Amtrak should never even be a topic of conversation, it’s so insignificant.

As soon as Amtrak management embraces a true growth strategy which includes good passenger service, then Amtrak will become more and more relevant. As long as Amtrak chooses to remain a ghost of America’s past transportation glory, it will be unimportant to almost everyone except Amtrak’s Amen Corner choruses, who are often Amtrak’s worst enemies in disguise because of the enabling they provide for poor management and bad business decisions.

6) We promised last week more in this issue about Amtrak’s winter naughtiness and the appalling lack of functioning locomotives outside of the Northeast Corridor. We promise – really – to address this topic in the next issue of TWA. We’re still gathering information, and had hoped to have more by this point in time.

If you are reading someone else’s copy of This Week at Amtrak, you can receive your own free copy each week by sending your e-mail address to

[email protected]

You MUST include your name, preferred e-mail address, and city and state where you live. If you have filters or firewalls placed on your Internet connection, set your e-mail to receive incoming mail from [email protected]; we are unable to go through any individual approvals processes for individuals. This mailing list is kept strictly confidential and is not shared or used for any purposes other than the distribution of This Week at Amtrak or related URPA materials.

All other correspondence, including requests to unsubscribe, should be addressed to

[email protected]

URPA leadership members are available for speaking engagements.

J. Bruce Richardson

President

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

[email protected]

http://www.unitedrail.org

TWA mailing list

[email protected]

http://lists.unitedrail.org/mailman/listinfo/twa
I gues, if Amtrak is so irrelevant, then Bruce seems to be spending a great deal of time on something that is not all that important. Perhaps he can re-focus his energies on something important like education, medical care reform or world peace!
 
Last edited by a moderator:
This Week at Amtrak; February 6, 2009




A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from



United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.




America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute



1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA




Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail

[email protected]http://www.unitedrail.org


 

Volume 6, Number 5



Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute that focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, and New York. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) Amtrak has a new hero, and his name is Daryl Pesce. Mr. Pesce is the General Superintendent in Chicago, for Amtrak’s Central Division. This guy should get a medal.

Mr. Pesce’s domain is one of Amtrak’s most difficult; Chicago is the main passenger rail hub of the Midwest, and trains converge into and out of Chicago from and to every direction to every part of the country. Eastern long hauls come in from New York and New England, as well as Philadelphia and Washington. Three of Amtrak’s premier transcontinental trains have terminals in Chicago, and it is directly served from New Orleans by the City of New Orleans. Chicago also has its share of corridor and short haul trains which include Michigan’s Pere Marquette, the Detroit service, as well as the Illinois services and others, such as the Hiawathas.

Together, this makes for interesting passenger railroading, because in addition to all of this, Amtrak has to work around Chicago’s vast commuter network.

As Amtrak’s General Superintendent in Chicago, Mr. Pesce is Lord of the Manor. However, along with the glory comes the responsibility over an Amtrak division that every year seems genuinely surprised when winter arrives immediately after the fall. For years, Chicago has been one of Amtrak’s biggest headaches when it comes to equipment maintenance and just about every other facet of operations. It’s almost been as if Amtrak’s employees in Chicago have been doing the equivalent of the inmates running the asylum. Employee comfort and convenience has in almost every instance beat out passenger service or a desire to operate a passenger railroad in an efficient manner.

For years, reports have dribbled into URPA and TWA about the naughtiness of Chicago maintenance employees, especially in winter. This has been on top of numerous firings for things like full-time Amtrak union employees also collecting a paycheck from a second employer while they were supposed to be working for Amtrak.

In short, accountability has been so far out of the window in Chicago, that accountability hasn’t been recognized by anyone recently as a current concept.

Daryl Pesce seems determined to change that. He’s asking questions, and, when the right answers don’t come, is demanding more. He’s not content with "business as usual," and wants things to improve. Not only is he demanding more of his top managers, but he’s rightly demanding more of the frontline employees, too. When a conductor or engineer on a far-flung train hours away from Chicago (but still in the division) makes a passenger-unfriendly decision, Mr. Pesce demands to know why that conductor or engineer was allowed to do that, and what’s being done to fix it in the future.

This is so refreshing, it’s hard to describe the euphoria it generates among those who believe adult supervision should always be prevalent in every part of passenger railroading.

Mr. Pesce is having to answer to the State of Michigan for December’s problems with the Pere Marquette, and Michigan’s Department of Transportation is being rowdy about the whole situation, and demanding performance for the money its spending. Other cities and towns along the way are jumping on Michigan’s bandwagon, and demanding accountability from Mr. Pesce’s division. This is all good; Mr. Pesce seems to be just the man to correct those situations and put new orders in place so problems won’t happen a second time.

In the past, there have been so many good managers, such as current Amtrak Vice President Richard Phelps, that have had to work in less than ideal circumstances because of an ingrained Amtrak culture of non-accountability. Here’s hoping Mr. Pesce, along with the higher-ups like Mr. Phelps, will continue to whack away at that unacceptable culture and create an Amtrak everyone can be proud to work for and to ride as a passenger.

2) Here’s what we have learned about Amtrak’s massive failure to have a serviceable locomotive fleet in the national system.

Several incorrect things have happened, along with some experimentation by an outside consultant who allegedly claims Amtrak can save big bucks by not performing routine maintenance on locomotives, but, instead, just replace crucial locomotive components at timed intervals.

One of the reasons so many trains were recently cancelled in and out of Chicago due to a lack of locomotives also falls on Washington, because eight locomotives were pulled out of the regular service pool to haul President-Elect Obama’s now-famous special train from Philadelphia to Washington on the Saturday prior to the inauguration.

The Secret Service has – correctly – very strict rules about presidential trains which have been in place for decades. The rules make a lot of sense, especially in today’s terrorist environment.

Under normal circumstances, Mr. Obama’s train would have been pulled by electric locomotives, since it operated exclusively on the Northeast Corridor. However, the Secret Service said no to that; diesel locomotives had to be used instead. This meant the presidential train was not at the mercy of overhead catenary, but, rather was always operating under its own power. That makes perfect sense. Also, the train – short as it was – had two locomotives instead of one, in case of engine failure. Another logical move.

What many people don’t know is a presidential train is always preceded by an advance train, which essentially makes sure the rails are clear, and if anyone has placed anything on the tracks, the advance train will deal with it, not the presidential train. Again, a train with two locomotives, bringing the total to four.

Behind the presidential train was a third train, offering protection from the rear. Again, two locomotives, for a total of six.

Two other locomotives were held in reserve, in case anything went wrong with the other six locomotives, brining the total to eight.

By the time Amtrak pulled these units out of regular service, spiffed them up mechanically and both inside and out for presidential service, and later returned them to service, they were gone from the pool roster for a long number of days.

Considering Amtrak was already short of locomotives before this special event, losing eight locos put a huge hole in Amtrak’s operating plan. As a result, regular train service on several routes in and out of Chicago was cancelled on various days for lack of motive power, sometimes for several days in a row.

If you were Amtrak, what decision would you have made? It’s impossible to turn down a presidential request, especially such a high profile request. Secret Service demands are high – thank goodness – and perfection is demanded. Lacking perfection, backup plans must be in place and everything must go off without a hitch. There is no room for error; too much is at stake on every level.

Amtrak did the right thing handling the presidential train, but, in reality, there should have been more than enough locomotives to handle a relatively small request of eight locomotives out of the entire fleet of 199 which serves intercity trains outside of the NEC (but does not include West Coast trains).

Intercity has a requirement of 150 locomotives on a typical day, out of 187 active units. (Keep in mind these locomotives include all of the East Coast units; New Orleans, New England, and anywhere else outside of the NEC and West Coast that needs power, so not all 187 active units have a home base of Chicago.)

It’s not unusual for 15% or more of those units to be out of service for maintenance; that’s 28 locomotives on average. Oops! Suddenly you’re almost out of locomotives. Take another eight units out of service for presidential service, and you’re in real trouble. (You think 15% of the locomotives down for maintenance is high? Think, again. On the NEC, it’s not unusual to have 24% of the locomotives out of service. The NEC has 96 units on its active roster, with a daily requirement of 65; sometimes 23 can be out of service.)

But, the question remains, why is Amtrak always short of locomotives, when it has enough motors on the books to handle all of its needs?

Because, Amtrak has been practicing – as a corporate policy – far too much deferred maintenance to save money, and also, when something breaks, Amtrak just sends a broken locomotive to sit idle in the weeds instead of repairing it.

There are also some silly policies about rotating spare parts stock that make little sense to the rational mind, and these policies often have Amtrak selling/getting rid of spare parts instead of using them to repair out of service locomotives.

3) Let’s get down home about this. If something like this became an issue in a political campaign, any good candidate would be having a field day with Amtrak’s locomotive problems.

Here’s how it would be portrayed for maximum impact: Amtrak, a semi-government corporation, which exists on annual subsidies of taxpayer monies on both the federal and state levels of well into billions of dollars, takes monies specifically to be used for equipment maintenance which allows Amtrak to fulfill its mandate of operating passenger trains for the benefit of the traveling public, yet does not spend that money on basic necessities like locomotive maintenance.

Instead of spending the money on required maintenance on equipment which costs more than $1 million per locomotive, Amtrak just parks this expensive equipment on a weeded side track instead of keeping it in revenue service. Because that locomotive is not in revenue service, and therefore, generating fares from passengers who may wish to travel on a train, Amtrak exacerbates the problem by keeping a valuable, revenue-generating asset idle, therefore, needing more government subsidy to make up for the lost income not generated by a working locomotive.

A good political candidate would be demanding reform, demanding relevant law enforcement agencies be looking into misuse of public funds, and demanding to know why all members of management directly associated with these decisions are still employed by Amtrak.

Legal minds will tell you – in theory – this is the kind of thing management is supposed to be accountable for to a normal board of directors, who are then accountable to stockholders on every level.

However, since this is Amtrak, the board rarely bestirs itself to take an active role in this level of management. In terms of outside remedies beyond the board, there may be the possibility of a citizen "qui tam" suit. This is a suit in which any citizen/plaintiff has standing to sue because the federal government is involved.

From a law enforcement standpoint, it would depend on how much gumption a federal prosecutor has and the time/inclination to start looking into such a rat’s nest of complex financial dealings and questionable bookkeeping practices which Amtrak has used for years.

Which means unless something extraordinary happens, Amtrak will probably get away with these hijinks, and continue to be unaccountable to anyone. Here’s wishing Daryl Pesce well in his pursuit of accountability in Chicago; perhaps he can persuade the powers that be that if he is going to be successful in rehabilitating Chicago into a normally-functioning division of Amtrak, he’s got to have available working locomotives to pull his trains.

4) Amtrak has a new Chairman of the Board, and, to no one’s surprise, he’s from Illinois. For some very odd reason, the Republican Chairman of the Board, Donna McLean, felt it appropriate to step aside from her duly appointed position, and install Thomas Carper, former Mayor of Macomb, Illinois as Amtrak’s new chairman. The former vice chairman, Hunter Biden, son of Vice President Joe Biden, left his position so Ms. McLean could become vice chairman.

Got that? Ms. McLean, who was chairman is now vice chairman, and Mr. Carper who was a board member is now chairman of the board, and Mr. Biden, who was vice chairman is now a board member. Nancy Naples remains on the board.

In April, Joe Boardman, the Interim President and CEO of Amtrak will become a full voting member of Amtrak board, as directed by the Amtrak authorizing legislation signed by former President Bush last October. There are still four board vacancies to be filled, as the board will be expanded from seven to nine members. The entire tenure of the Bush Administration never saw a fully-populated Amtrak board of directors.

Here’s the official press release from Amtrak, dated January 30, 2009.

[begin quote]

AMTRAK BOARD NAMES THOMAS CARPER OF ILLINOIS AS CHAIRMAN

Former Chairman Donna McLean becomes Vice Chairman

WASHINGTON – At its regularly scheduled meeting yesterday, Amtrak’s Board of Directors unanimously agreed to name Thomas Carper of Illinois as Chairman of the Board. Carper, who has served in various Illinois state and local government positions, including Mayor of the City of Macomb, has been a director on the Amtrak board since March 2008. At the same meeting former Chairman Donna McLean was named Vice Chairman, replacing Hunter Biden, who remains as a board member.

Carper said, "Everything we have done as a board, we’ve done as a unified body, and this change in our hierarchy is no exception. That this was a unanimous and non-contentious decision is testimony to that fact. I look forward to tackling the exciting challenges and opportunities that lie ahead. Amtrak is ready to play a growing role in strengthening our transportation system and our economy."

The five-member board consists of four voting members, two Democrats, Carper and Biden, and two Republicans, McLean and Nancy Naples. Amtrak President and CEO Joseph Boardman is a non-voting member of the board.

Former Chairman McLean, who was named Vice Chairman, said, "With the change in administration, its best for the company to have Tom as Chairman. I am pleased to be able to work with Tom and the rest of the board as we face the exciting and challenging years ahead."

As part of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, the Board of Directors of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) is expected in 2009 to expand to nine members from its current allotment of seven positions, five of which are currently occupied. The President nominates and the U.S. Senate confirms Amtrak Board members.

About Amtrak

Amtrak has posted six consecutive years of growth in ridership and revenue, carrying more than 28.7 million passengers in the last fiscal year. Amtrak provides intercity passenger rail service to more than 500 destinations in 46 states on a 21,000-mile route system. For schedules, fares and information, passengers may call 800-USA-RAIL or visit Amtrak.com.

[End quote]

Here in the real world, it’s amusing the Amtrak board felt this step necessary. There is no evidence Ms. McLean would not have been able to continue functioning as Amtrak’s chairman, but, since she’s a Republican, turned over the reins to a Democrat.

This illustrates the folly of Amtrak being such a child of government; if it were strong enough to stand on its own without billions in federal subsidies every budget year, it wouldn’t matter if a Republican or Democrat was chairman of the board. All that would matter would be if the corporation was being run in a proper way.

Maybe, one day, that will be the case. In the interim, we’ve got a new chairman of the board with Illinois credentials.

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This Week at Amtrak; February 27, 2009

A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail [email protected]http://www.unitedrail.org

Volume 6, Number 6

1) No! No! No! The answer is No! What’s the question? The question is, have Americans been told the truth about profitable passenger rail systems in the world, and the answer is No! It’s been the constant Big Lie that’s been told over and over again by Amtrak, it’s wholly owned lapdog organizations, authoritative people who should know better, supposedly prestigious magazines, and a host of innocents who haven’t bothered to do their own research.

The truth is, a number of passenger rail systems in highly developed Western countries all have profitable passenger rail systems which are efficiently run, provide excellent service for passengers, and hold the esteem of bankers and various financial people. In short, just the opposite of what Amtrak, and it’s Amen Corner echo, the National Association of Railroad Passengers, and various others, including members of government want you to believe, because constantly telling the Big Lie provides an excuse for the dismal performance of Amtrak.

It’s not nice to lie.

2) Here’s how it started: Railway Age Online, on Tuesday, February 24, 2009 published the following excerpt from International Railway Journal.

[begin quote]

International News

Another good year for Netherlands Railways

Netherlands Railways (NS) says the introduction of an ambitious new timetable and the opening of new stations helped it to maintain its healthy financial performance last year, although net profit fell by 281 million euros ($357 million) to 56 million euros ($71 million). NS warned that its success in 2008 is unlikely to be repeated this year as the global financial crisis is expected to slow the growth in passenger numbers. NS says it is looking at ways of reducing costs and could sell off non-core areas of its business.

For more on this story, visit:

IRJ Breaking News

[End quote]

So, it seemed those wily Dutch were doing something allegedly no one else was doing, and the International Railway Journal was using normally verboten words in the United States like "profit" when referring to a national passenger rail system.

This required some digging, and the article and subject matter was tossed out to United Rail Passenger Alliance’s discussion and study group for comment. Here is what ensued.

[begin quote]

CONTRIBUTOR ONE: The Europeans have culturally accepted rail as a primary form of transportation. It's profitable simply due to active use and streamlined operation.

In the US people would rather fly or drive, still.

CONTRIBUTOR TWO: ... Remember that movie "Field of Dreams"? It was okay. But, remember how the neighbors of guy that built the ballpark tried to put him out of business because he was going to go broke? They saw a nutcase who was going to go broke so they tried to do him in. It would be the same with passenger service. You will not get much aid and comfort for trying, but you will get lots of folks willing to help you fail!

CONTRIBUTOR THREE: And, lots of state subsidy I expect, just calling it something else, to wit: Britain's "profitable" private train operators who are on the government dole, paying a fraction of costs of their physical plant. Here, we would call that "corporate welfare."

CONTRIBUTOR FOUR: Here, we call that "Acela" and "NJ Transit".

CONTRIBUTOR SIX: Take a look at the Deutsche Bahn 2007 Annual Report [Germany] (on their website). At least at the EBIT [Earnings Before Interest and Tax] level, they say they made money on all of their passenger services (and freight as well). What any given service would look like after interest and taxes, they don't say.

Two caveats: 1) figures don't lie, but liars figure; 2) their positive EBITs in the passenger areas are at least partly based on results after subsidies from the Federal and State (Laender) governments. But, the holding company made money after interest and taxes. I don't think their ROI [Return on Investment] was startling, or even adequate, but that is not an unfamiliar story in railroading ...

CONTRIBUTOR SEVEN: Yes, but the true focus here - and what Contributor One is saying, too – is the system is robust enough to actually promote a profit. If there is enough activity – trains, rational frequencies, passengers, momentum – the system can throw off a profit. It's only those who want to believe that passenger rail MUST be a creature of government that don't want to believe this could happen. Remember, every "credible" source in the country always says there are NO passenger systems in the world which make money.

CONTRIBUTOR SIX: Yes, there is that allegation. BUT, it is actually untrue on two grounds.

1. The three Japanese railways (East, West and Central Japan) make money, period. It is true that there is a question whether the value at which they received their assets in the privatization was too low. Maybe, but you can read their Annual Reports on the web – they are listed on the NYSE (poor guys) – and the numbers are out in the open. One can argue that the SNCF [France] makes money on the TGV, at least Paris to Lyons, but the bookkeeping is not public.

2. There are a number of competed franchises in the UK, Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany that make money on passenger services, as do some of the concessions in Buenos Aires and Rio. In these cases, Government is asking for minimum subsidy, and they get pretty efficient service. I will be happy to debate the UK experience at length if anyone wants (see the highly informative website www.tgaassoc.com for this and other studies).

With this said, most passenger operators are unprofitable in the financial sense; their revenues from customers do not cover their costs. Governments make up the difference for social, economic, environmental, or political reasons, or a mix of all of them. Sometimes the governments do the right thing, sometimes they don't.

There is also a caveat about the Netherlands numbers – what is the railroad paying for access charges to use the infrastructure? The Dutch only wanted their operator to pay marginal cost access charges: in their case, this was only about 12 percent of the total cost of infrastructure. The Government paid the rest directly to the infrastructure manager. By comparison, the DB [Germany] operators are supposed to pay the entire cost of infrastructure from their access charges. See the most recent update of EU access charges on the website I mentioned above.

CONTRIBUTOR EIGHT: I think you're on thin ice here. If the infrastructure is subsidized, is the operation profitable? Within the parameters set, perhaps. In the real world, perhaps not. Are airlines profitable if they don't take provision of airport facilities, air traffic control, etc., into account? Truckers too, for that matter.

CONTRIBUTOR NINE: All of these are legitimate – and preferably quantifiable – facets of "profitability," however defined. What one needs to remember is that, in what passes for US policy debate about Amtrak, the mantra of "no passenger service makes money" is almost never a quantified or verified observation about the economics of rail passenger service, but an all-purpose propaganda excuse for Amtrak failures and a bogus premise for complete shutdown of further inquiry, lest any new examples of Amtrak's incompetence and duplicity emerge.

CONTRIBUTOR TEN: Gentlemen, as the inimitable Brother Dave Gardner ("The earth is a southern planet – have a moon pie and an RC") used to say, "it's all in how you look at it and study it."

And, unfortunately, there is no accepted common basis for looking at it and studying it, particularly with regard to our favorite carrier of last resort, who has made a masterwork of consistently pulling newer and more innovative figures and formulas out of an increasingly vast number of heretofore undiscovered ... openings.

The "bottom line" shell game has produced a crop of apples and oranges so extensive that it would cripple the Pacific Fruit Growers’ Express fleet.

That's the payment for politicizing a business. And it's all legal; just don't you try it.

This is why the best stuff has always come from people who dig through and distill the figures.

CONTRIBUTOR EIGHT: Don't get me wrong. The need for subsidy in some instances is no excuse for inefficiency, for failure to make the best use of assets. If your fare box recovery is 55% you should still be straining every sinew to make it 56% or better, because you owe that responsibility to the "owners," in this case the taxpayer. I attend public meetings and frequently ask the question "Is that the best you can do with my money?". I'm not always the most popular person in the room!

CONTRIBUTOR ELEVEN: The question as I see it is, "Can we draw a line, to the left of which is Infrastructure, and to the right of which is Operations; and draw that line so that Operations is profitable?"

The traditional view of Amtrak is that such a line cannot even be drawn.

The fact that an actual passenger railroad has drawn such a line, and made a profit, proves that such a line CAN be drawn.

CONTRIBUTOR SIX: Yes, a line can be drawn. The EU has demanded that a line be drawn and, with great reluctance, the EU railways have gone along. The famous American railroad belief that the EU model has failed has missed this point entirely. With infrastructure separated from all operators, then you can draw a line around infrastructure and tell whether the infrastructure is stable or not. You can also evaluate the performance of the operators as well and, if you want, you can privatize some operators while keeping others public.

The problem comes when they try to set up access charges. The Commission recommends the access charges be set at marginal cost (hard to define, but most people believe it is about 15% to 20% of total costs) with the government making up the remainder. But, the Commission also permits the infra manager to charge more than marginal cost if the government sets a financial target that includes more cost recovery above marginal costs. The result is that some governments set the marginal cost target and make up the rest directly to the infra manager, other governments set varying degrees of full financial cost recovery as a target.

When the target is above marginal cost, then the "markups" become critical, and they are fraught with difficulties that no one really has a perfect answer for. The most recent report on this issue (www.tgaassoc.com) covers the issue as well as it can be covered.

In fact, when Amtrak pays access fees to the freights, the line has been drawn (we don't know how the freights calculate their charges, and Amtrak and the freights refuse to reveal what the access charges are – a guess at about $3.00/train mile is about right). And Amtrak is happy to charge the freights full costs plus a considerable markup for the use of the Northeast Corridor while, in principle, they are charging the commuters marginal cost. Again, though, there is no information or backup about the charges.

With Amtrak, watch what they do, not what they say ...

CONTRIBUTOR NINE: Well stated. In the case of Amtrak, the drawing of the line has been done by that ever trustworthy draftsman, the Congress. For off-NEC situations, the Surface Transportation Board — contrary to popular belief — is not held absolutely to incremental costs when forcing Amtrak onto an uncooperative freight railroad.

Under 49 USC 24308(A)(2)©, the STB is to determine "the extent to which, the compensation shall be greater than the incremental costs of utilizing the facilities and providing the services." Apparently this standard governing off-NEC access was not altered by the recent legislation [Pub. L.110-432, Sec. 212, 122 Stat. 4848, 4925-27 (Oct. 16, 2008)], but it did set up a new regime of STB-adjudicated damages (not fines, as misstated in the press) for "substandard" freight performance of obligations, pursuant to new 49 U.S.C. 24308(f).

On the NEC, where Amtrak is the landlord vice tenant, the recent changes are very significant.

For freight carrier users of Amtrak’s NEC infrastructure, the pre-October 2008 standard of compensation to Amtrak was that the STB "shall assign to a freight carrier … the costs Amtrak incurs only for the benefit of the carrier, plus a proportionate share of all other costs of providing transportation … incurred for the common benefit of Amtrak and the carrier. The proportionate share shall be based on relative measures of volume of car operations, tonnage or other factors that reasonably reflect the relative use of rail property covered by this subsection." [49 U.S.C. 24904©(2)] Note the absence of comparable statutory specificity for the payments to be made by commuter operators. No accident.

However, a potentially monumental change has been made — very inconspicuously – with respect to the NEC. See Pub. L. 110-432, Sec. 212(B)(2), 122 Stat. 4848, 4926. The limiting word "freight" has been deleted. Thus the statutory standard for STB cost allocation now applies to commuters as well.

There was also an existing directive [subsection ©(1)] that NEC access agreements with freight and commuter carriers "shall provide for reimbursement of reasonable costs, but may not cross-subsidize intercity rail passenger, commuter rail passenger, and rail freight transportation."

But, the pre-October 2008 statute contained no parallel coverage of commuter rail in its prohibition [subsection ©(2)] in STB adjudications of access charges; only cross-subsidization between intercity passenger service and freight was prohibited there. No coverage of commuter service. No accident, again. That deficiency, too, has now been cured by Section 212(B)(2) of Public Law 110-432: "commuter rail passenger" service has now been made part of the cross-subsidization provision governing the STB’s adjudications.

These fundamental changes, based on the plain statutory language, would seem to require immediate – well, by government standards anyway – adjustment of the STB’s now superseded administrative standards for assigning costs in NEC access disputes.

There is no delayed effective date for these changes (as with the Amtrak board structure, for example), nor is there any statement that the advisory committee regime I am about to describe displaces any STB obligation to revamp its NEC cost standards right away.

Thus, any affected party could — and probably should — immediately file with the STB seeking the immediate opening of a new proceeding to replace the old standards.

However, there is to be a new NEC access formula developed by the new Northeast Corridor Infrastructure and Operations Commission (NCIOC), established under Sec. 212(a) of Pub. L. 110-432, new 49 USC 24905.

The Commission is to consist of members representing Amtrak, DOT/FRA, each state on the NEC (even the one that runs no commuter service whatever), plus DC, and the freight users of the NEC, but the freight representatives must be "selected by the Secretary." Interestingly, only the freight representatives are also prohibited from voting. See new 49 USC 24905(a)(1)(D). Again, presumably no accident.

Among its other duties, the NCIOC is to develop by Oct. 16, 2010, "a standardized formula for determining costs, revenues, and compensation for Northeast Corridor commuter rail passenger transportation," to be applied to the NEC as well as the Harrisburg Line. [new 24905©(1)]

The three elements mandated to be in the new formula are (1) the amended prohibition against cross-subsidization among all three types of services; (2) "each service is assigned the costs incurred only for the benefit of that service, and a proportionate share, based upon factors that reasonably reflect relative use, of costs incurred for the common benefit of more than 1 service": and (3) "all financial contributions made by an operator of a service that benefit an infrastructure owner other than the operator are considered, including but not limited to, any capital infrastructure investments and in-kind services." [new 49 USC 24905(©(1)(A)(i)-(iii)]

This new, late 2010 formula is to be accompanied by a "proposed timetable for implementing" the formula by October 16, 2014.

Whatever the practicality of the mandated formula and any accompanying complexities, it’s only the beginning of a wild and tortuous ride. Remember NCIOC is an advisory committee. But, the newly amended statute requires that "Amtrak and public authorities providing commuter rail passenger transportation over the Northeast Corridor shall implement new agreements for usage of facilities or services based on the formula proposed [by NCIOC] in accordance with the timetable established therein." Note again, no mention of the freights.

If Amtrak and the commuters fail to implement new access agreements based on the NCIOC formula and timetable, NCIOC "shall petition" the STB to "determine the appropriate compensation amounts for such services in accordance with section 24904©," i.e., the newly amended NEC formula statute discussed above. (This would seem to enhance the urgency of a new STB proceeding to replace the now obsolete cost-allocation standards posthaste, in case the NCIOC’s supposed consensus approach "fails.")

I do not pretend to expertise regarding the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), but making the recommendations of an "advisory" committee legally binding without any further intervening action by the Congress or the President seems dicey. Moreover, making the amended cost-allocation statute the default standard if the NCIOC process falters necessarily implies that whatever NCIOC does is expected to be somewhat at odds with or at least different from that statute, so it virtually has to constitute the improper delegation of authority to NCIOC to supersede a federal statute.

A second legal time bomb: as far as I know, there are existing access agreements covering all the current NEC tenants, presumably with specified prices and durations. I think to the Constitution, these are known as "contracts." Impairing same by the feds is a big no-no.

But, this new statute (if the new NCIOC cost-allocation standards actually are implemented) arguably would overturn those agreements by 2014, regardless of their remaining terms, because new NCIOC agreements have not only to be signed by then, but "implemented." (Note also that this same issue of overturning existing agreements prior to their expiration may well apply to new STB-developed allocation standards reflecting the now already fully effective changes to the statute.)

And, then there’s the across the board stiffing of the freights — no vote inside NCIOC, and no assured coverage by the new NCIOC formula. Nothing resembling due process. Deliberately perverse incentives to assure that no consensus NCIOC formula is ever implemented? A clever strategy by the freights to plant some constitutional land mines with which to overturn the statute? In the absence of additional information, I will adhere to the hallowed proverb of Rep. Al Swift (former D-WA): "Never assume conspiracy when mere incompetence will suffice."

As Contributor Six correctly points out, actions and words (even statutory words) are often at considerable variance, and the standards (present or future) I have described apply in practice only when an access dispute finds its way to the STB.

In any other situation, what Amtrak, the commuters, and the freights do in actual negotiations and the setting of unlitigated access pricing and related cost-sharing charges is quite another matter. Whatever the state of play there, it is a virtual certainty that Amtrak’s demonstrably unreliable accounting and lack of transparency is an additional unhelpful factor. Now, at least on the NEC, a further degree of turmoil is virtually assured by the recent statutory changes, even the positive and the non-opaque ones.

CONTRIBUTOR TEN: Contributor Six and Contributor Nine, well put; both of you.

The real problems, as both have stated, is that (1) Congress loves to mix apples and oranges to its own political ends, (2) there is no traceability and/or common methodology to the calculation of incremental costs by the various parties in individual agreements (i.e., what is incremental to one is not to another) including Amtrak, and (3) the remnants of the arcane railroad accounting systems are still also muddying up the waters.

It will be interesting to see if the EU can force consistency on their systems.

It's the 21st century version of the application of the old Interstate Commerce Commission formula: Santa Fe consistently reported an above the rail profit for its passenger services because they viewed them as solely incremental and only charged what they believed they actually added in real costs, while Southern Pacific took all the allowables ever given them and would, for example, charge half the total cost of the Sunset Route infrastructure to the Sunset Limited passenger train when it was tri-weekly in order to show a whopping loss.

The railroads did not magically and immediately roll in dough on May 1, 1971 when Amtrak came into being. And, that's why.

Just remember, in the early 1950s, SP President Russell succeeded in convincing the ICC that SP should be able to drop all interstate routes less than 300 miles because "short hauls don't and can't make money, but, long hauls do." Within 10 years, he and successor Biaggini were back before the ICC axing long distance trains because "long hauls lose money and only short haul corridors less than 300 miles can make money."

That, folks, is the epitome of creative accounting.

I am drawn back to what URPA showed 25-30 years ago, that Amtrak has taken full advantage of the old approach (remember what [former Amtrak Board of Directors member ]Joe McDonald discovered on the Montrealer [passenger train route between Washington, D.C. and Montreal, Quebec]) it inherited from PennCentral (mostly) to say what it wants to say when it wants to say it. This, of course, still extends to gouging states when it wants to (which is generally constantly).

And, the most obvious result is that when national system (read "long distance") routes come off, the deficit goes up.

When McDonald reported to the Amtrak board that they were obtaining a black hole when they got the NEC from PennCentral, he knew exactly what was going to happen, and he was completely right.

For you who are too young to remember, Joe was a Vice President of Continental Can, with an extensive background in corporate operations and accounting who was appointed to the Board as a consumer rep all the way back in the 1970s. He discovered, among other things, that PC, and then Amtrak, were charging the Montrealer crew costs on one division in Connecticut that would account for a total of 26 enginemen and trainmen (not onboard services) on board a single Montrealer trainset at any given time, and after extensive investigation, determined that such "accounting" was occurring all over the NEC in order to prop up [former Pennsylvania Railroad President] Stuart Saunders' old myth that led to President Lyndon Johnson subsidizing Pennsylvania's first Metroliner program. Unfortunately, he succumbed to cancer before he got all the way to the bottom of it.

As we have said for decades, they've been cooking the books since the beginning.

As long as all of the involved parties are going to play this game, don't expect any real progress, either here or (equivalently) overseas.

[End quote]

2) That may have been just a tiny bit on the – shall we say – "dry and technical" side of things, but, the point is, anyone willing to do some honest research can discover throughout the world passenger systems do make money. Some of the systems are playing with similar rules to what Amtrak plays, some systems have a slightly easier time of it, and some have a more difficult time.

The bottom line is, there is nothing that keeps Amtrak from being fiscally responsible and fiscally self-sufficient except that Amtrak chooses not to take that path. We have demonstrated in TWA before that when Amtrak reaches enough critical mass of a combination of rational frequencies, services desired by passengers, and long enough trains, it can be a government-owned, self-sufficient enterprise, without the annual worry of begging federal and state governments for money for everything from operations to new equipment.

It’s true "profitability" is done elsewhere, and it’s true it can be done here. Until now, we have just chosen not to do it, and, in the process of enabling Amtrak’s constantly bad fiscal behavior, have continued to rationalize the constant lies told to us by far too many organizations, people, publications, and members of government.

3) Okay, you say, how do I change this?

Well, first, do your own research. Everything stated above is available on the Internet. Visit the sites above, visit the sites of the passenger railroads from around the world, visit the World Bank’s web site, visit sites where Amtrak statutes can be found, and confirm for yourself what the law says. Question everything and everyone. Don’t take anything at face value unless it’s backed up by facts.

Second, take your research and forget everything you have learned about passenger rail in the United States. The sad reality is, the U.S. is horribly behind the rest of the world in every facet of passenger rail, even to the point there is not a single home-grown major passenger car builder in the country, and we were the home of Pullman-Standard, which, along with Budd, were the two most prominent passenger car designers and builders in the world. Now, both are gone.

As you take your newfound research and study it with an open mind (Not tainted by what you know about Amtrak and it’s ongoing follies.), start applying it to a new generation of Americans who are willing to try different modes of transportation. This does NOT mean different types of automobiles, it means different types of transportation, such as air, surface, and water.

Ask yourself, if someone is willing to leave home and travel, what are their requirements? How important is time spent traveling, availability of schedules, and amenities while traveling? Is speed always the overriding factor? Where do comfort and convenience fit in? If you have ten different people, are there ten different preferences for mode of travel? Since people come in all shapes and sizes, should everyone be required to fit into a 19" wide seat, elbow to elbow and be allegedly happy about it?

Once you have reached your conclusions, start looking around and seeing why some modes of transportation are more popular than others. Is popularity based solely on convenience and cost, or do other factors come into play? Are the two most popular forms of transportation – air and private vehicle – the most popular by choice, or by consensus that these two forms will be the only two forms supported by private enterprise and government?

Then, start wondering how change can come about. We discovered in a previous issue of TWA earlier this year passenger rail is just a tiny fraction of less than one percent of the travel market, and Amtrak is statistically irrelevant. However, at times, it’s the number two recipient of federal dollars for annual infusions of free federal monies in the form of subsidies.

So, we know Amtrak has constant, bi-partisan political support. But, why does it have support? Is it because it’s just another government program which can’t be killed with an atom bomb?

What would happen if individual constituents across the country – especially outside of the Northeast Corridor – did their research and, in turn, attempted to educate their Senators and Congressmen? What would happen if Congress – Amtrak’s most important banker – suddenly said this country should have a viable surface transportation policy beyond building highways, and rational passenger rail is the answer? What would happen if every Congressman who has no Amtrak service or only midnight and wee hours of the morning Amtrak service demanded better schedules and connections for their districts, just like the East and West Coasts have?

The end result would be a viable, robust passenger rail system that is not only sustainable, but desirable.

That’s not going to happen as long as the grossly misinformed (often for their own benefit or political agenda) keep everyone believing nowhere in the world is passenger rail service profitable.

When you say passenger rail service is profitable, it means two things: It’s sustainable, and it’s popular.

When it comes to politicians, like congressmen and senators, "popular" is a critically important phrase, and it often translates into support.

Amtrak isn’t popular. Amtrak continues to be America’s Best Kept Secret.

4) To fix the problem of Amtrak being America’s Best Kept Secret, several things have to happen. First, Amtrak has got to stop being a railroad principally focused on the NEC, and become what it is supposed to be, a national carrier.

Second, it has to embrace the national, long distance system, where financial success is found, and political support can be successfully mined.

Third, it has to have a viable business plan that doesn’t focus entirely on the development of ruinously expensive short corridors, but instead focuses on growth throughout the country.

And, fourth, Amtrak has to have in place a new equipment plan that demonstrates a commitment to long distance trains and all levels of passengers, from short distance coach passengers to high-dollar sleeping car passengers, and everyone in between.

5) Go, do your own homework. Find out for yourself the truth about passenger rail and profitability in the developed world. Find out what everyone outside of the USA and Canada already know: Passenger rail is good, and passenger rail is viable and popular. Then, take your new knowledge and educate others. But, most importantly, stomp hard on those who want you to believe their convenient and/or ignorant lies. Demand the heretics tell the truth.

Because, a lie is a terrible thing, and in the real world, there is nothing bad about passenger rail that anyone should have to lie about.

Passenger rail is a good thing, and we should be telling people the good things about it, not the lies about it.

6) Everyone knows the two best national magazines in the United States about railroading are Progressive Railroading and Passenger Train Journal. Progressive Railroading produces excellent reporting for those in the railroad industry, and Passenger Train Journal provides a satisfying mix of history and perspective about passenger trains in North America and the world.

In the current issue of Passenger Train Journal (2009:1, Issues 238), available on news stands now, PTJ Assistant Editor and Art Director Kevin Holland wrote a piercing essay, "VIA’s New Canadian Schedule: Too Much of a Good Thing?" in which he studies the lengthening of the Canadian’s transcontinental schedule by almost 13 hours westbound, and adds an entire extra evening onboard for passengers traveling from launching terminal to end terminal.

Mr. Holland presents a sound analysis of whether or not the Canadian is actually providing transportation or just another tour train, and a number of associated issues. He writes with brevity and clarity.

This article is required reading for anyone studying the various facets and merits of passenger rail travel.

If you are reading someone else’s copy of This Week at Amtrak, you can receive your own free copy each week by sending your e-mail address to

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This Week at Amtrak; March 9, 2009




A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from




United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.




America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute




1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA




Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail [email protected]

http://www.unitedrail.org



Volume 6, Number 7



Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute that focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, and New York. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) This word arrived last week from Gil Carmichael, via the University of Denver Graduate Studies Intermodal Transportation Institute. Mr. Carmichael is one of the two greatest visionaries in America (the other being Andrew Selden) for the future of passenger rail.

[begin quote]

PRESIDENT OBAMA'S ECONOMIC STIMULUS PACKAGE PROMOTES 21ST CENTURY TRANSPORTATION VISION OF "INTERSTATE II," SAYS ITI'S GIL CARMICHAEL

– $8 Billion Targeted for High-speed, Intercity Rail Equivalent to Phase One of "Interstate II" –

DENVER, CO, February 26, 2009 – In a speech entitled "Railroad-based ‘Interstate II,’" delivered to the Fourth Annual Railroad Night at Michigan Technological University in Houghton, Michigan, Gil Carmichael, Founding Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Intermodal Transportation Institute at the University of Denver and a former Federal Railroad Administrator, said the $787 billion economic stimulus package, recently signed by President Barack Obama, is the most ambitious transportation infrastructure program put forth in the U.S. since the 1950s, when President Eisenhower initiated the development of the Interstate Highway System.

"Wrapped inside the $111 billion devoted to much-needed infrastructure spending in his American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Obama's stimulus plan very significantly allocates $8 billion for intercity high-speed rail transportation and another $1.3 billion for Amtrak," said Carmichael. "This is the first phase of what should be a three-part, high-speed, intercity transportation blueprint that will connect all our major cities, ports and airports via rail," Carmichael told the audience of students, faculty, and representatives from major railroads. "This is the first time an intermodal strategy, with a strong emphasis on rail, has been proposed by government to meet the North American transportation system's requirements for both freight and passenger transport."

Carmichael told the audience this new approach represents the most economical, fuel-efficient, and environmentally sustainable vision for improving our transportation network in this country, and it will help us achieve energy independence. Carmichael calls this new vision of transportation Interstate II, as opposed to the 43,000-mile, four-lane "Interstate I" Highway System that was begun 50 years ago; and said "President Obama clearly understands this necessary, new approach to meeting 21st century transportation needs."

"The nation has enough highways, albeit, most of them are badly in need of repair and suffering from massive gridlock due to a doubling of our population since they were built. What the U.S. does not have is a rail-based, intercity, rail transportation network like that in Europe and Asia. In those parts of the world, where fuel was priced higher, electric high-speed trains carry hundreds of passengers safely and efficiently between cities and connect to and from major airports. North America has a huge rail system already in place, serving 60 states and provinces with 240,000 miles of route. The rights-of-way are already paid for, and the private sector has done much to upgrade them; but they have been vastly under-utilized for years. Our rail system right now carries only 25 percent of capacity since most of it is single-tracked. By adding 30,000 miles of double- and triple-tracked rail, with grade separations, to our existing system, we can create three times more capacity, connecting millions of people to not only ports, but to airports and center cities, greatly relieving the stress on our overburdened highway system."

Carmichael pointed out that Obama's new infrastructure plan would expand the originally recommended six, intercity, high-speed rail corridors to 13 intercity corridors in phase I and would create developmental partnerships between the private sector and state DOTs. Furthermore, it would be administered by the Federal Railroad Administration, as it should be, and would be fully paid for under the recovery act – not by matching funds.

He also pointed out that the railroad is the only mode of transportation that easily converts to electricity should the world's fossil fuel supply continue to decline, as many predict. It would also offer a vastly more environmentally friendly and ethical form of transportation, providing nine times the fuel efficiency as highway transportation, while operating at speeds of up to 90 miles-per-hour for freight and up to 125 miles-per-hour for passenger transit. "In the foreseeable future, the railroad mode is the only candidate for large-scale benefits from the electrification of a new energy grid, such as President Obama is talking about," said Carmichael. "Electrifying the U.S. rail system would make sense in a future of oil scarcity and would provide us with a 'greener' carbon footprint as we move toward cleaning up the global environment."

"Our nation is experiencing a wrenching reshaping during this time of economic volatility, and by mid-century our lifestyle will be very different from today. Our nation urgently needs a new vision for its outmoded transportation system, and the President's new policy is a step in the right direction," summarized Carmichael. "Phase I of Interstate II represents an important policy shift toward developing and maintaining a 21st century, intermodal transportation network, based on greater cooperation between the freight and passenger rail segments. It will greatly enhance our intercity transit needs. In the future, to build new, national transportation programs, such as Interstate II, partnerships between the government agencies and the private-sector railroads must be promoted. Investing $100-200 billion over the next 15-20 years will create huge numbers of needed jobs, stimulate economic growth, and provide us with a beautiful, 21st century, high-speed, intermodal freight and passenger system."

About ITI

The Intermodal Transportation Institute at the University of Denver offers an Executive Masters Program that awards a Master of Science in Intermodal Transportation Management from the University of Denver. This graduate degree program prepares transportation industry managers for the increasingly complex, global business environment where knowledge of finance, quantitative processes, supply chain, law, and public policy issues as well as freight, passenger, and intermodal transportation operational strategies are critical management tools for success. For more information on the ITI Executive Masters Program call: 303-871-4702 or visit: www.du.edu/transportation.

[End quote]

2) Okay, now we have the big picture in a nutshell. So, where do we go from here? Let’s review.

We have Amtrak – which, depending on your point of view and your basis in reality – is a help or hindrance.

We have a number of other companies vying for a spot at the high speed rail table, some well known, and some not known.

We have 10 discreet high speed corridors already identified, and one extra corridor favored by the senate majority leader. We also have an additional high speed corridor which everyone thinks will be looked favorably upon because it’s in the backyard of the President of the United States.

First, back to Amtrak.

Amtrak is fortunate at the moment to have an interim president and chief executive officer who seems to be doing yeoman’s work cleaning out some of the deadwood found in Amtrak’s cadre of managers at all levels. This exercise could prove to be most interesting, because the outcome will demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of Amtrak’s entrenched Good Old Boy system and various duchies which have grown over the past three decades. On the upside, some very good managers could finally be released from their restraining bonds and be allowed to fully accomplish their goals in an honorable manner.

On the down side, many of Amtrak’s ongoing habits are some which are best not spoken about in polite company, but desperately need to change. Included in these are Amtrak’s (And, it’s wholly owned lapdog organizations and sycophant enablers.) continually bad habit of underestimating itself by unilaterally and continuously spreading the lie that no passenger rail systems in the world make money when we know empirically systems in The Netherlands, Germany, and Japan do make money, along with others.

3) Here’s a burning question of the moment (Be assured the old, false canard about under funding has nothing to do with this question.): If, after nearly 38 years of existence, Amtrak has no viable business plan for the future other than to drain state treasuries for the cost of expensive to operate and low-return short corridor trains, has no equipment plan in place to replace its fleet of aging equipment, and has never achieved a greater position than one tenth of one percent of the overall domestic intercity domestic transportation marketplace, why does any reasonable person expect that merely handing Amtrak billions of dollars of Other People’s Money will change its corporate course and suddenly make Amtrak a leading contender to operate new and shiny high speed trains?

If Amtrak can’t make proven technology work in the United States that used to be the greatest transportation system in the world, how can it plan for and operate new technology that will require innovative thinking grounded in reality and financial expertise?

What reasonable person is willing to risk billions of dollars – at a time when the moment is ripe in the public’s mind for rapid expansion of passenger rail transportation – on a company which, at the end of its fiscal year, usually can’t even afford to restock it’s office supply shelf?

As one former Amtrak manager sagely says, "The money will start moving toward rail. Next, a fundamental change in the culture of passenger rail ... currently, entrenched bureaucrats impede potential new and next generation talent from entering. The merits of passenger rail are moot with these conditions, and a skeletal network will continue while bureaucrats play."

But, back to the good news mentioned above, Amtrak Interim President and CEO Joe Boardman openly told a reporter he is cleaning house at Amtrak, getting rid of the deadwood and hopefully empowering those who can make a difference. Since Mr. Boardman enjoys the full confidence of the Amtrak Board of Directors, this has to be a breath of fresh air both for those inside of Amtrak who have been suffering under the heavy hand of immovable bureaucracy, and those Amtrak watchers on the outside who have constantly been asking why so many Amtrak managers who bring nothing positive to their positions remain on the company payroll.

As noted in this space earlier this year, Amtrak’s Chicago General Superintendent Daryl K. Pesce seems to be one of the managers earnestly making a difference and demanding better and improved performance from his staff.

4) Now, on to the question of the division of the new $8 billion dollars provided by the Obama administration for high speed rail. To no one’s surprise, there is a great deal of competition for this relatively small pool of money (Remember, Mr. Carmichael accurately predicts the final need for funding to get infrastructure in place is $100 to $200 billion over the next 15 to 20 years.).

Today, New York State’s governor announced his state’s new high speed rail plan, and he’s counting on some of that $8 billion to put his plan into action.

California is further along than anyone on its $45 billion high speed rail line, and it’s hoping for a piece of the $8 billion in federal monies.

Minnesota says since it’s high speed rail line originates in President Obama’s backyard it should get a piece of the pie, even though the corridor is not currently recognized by the Department of Transportation.

The Midwest High Speed Rail Association, which has been working long and hard to make high speed rail a reality even before anyone had ever heard of Barack Obama, says it has plans in place, drawings on the table, and shovels just waiting to be used, because its plan is the most comprehensive and it feeds in and out of Chicago, and in the process, will alleviate a number of rail congestion points in and out of Chicago.

Nevada, which usually doesn’t have much to say about high speed corridors, suddenly finds itself at the center of attention because Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada says he wants a high speed train running between Anaheim, California (home of Disneyland) and Las Vegas. This announcement came at the same time the $8 billion in funding appeared in the 2009 stimulus bill which passed the house and senate in February.

North Carolina dreams of a high speed corridor, running between Charlotte and Raleigh, and then extending northward over the old Seaboard Air Line Railroad roadbed into Virginia and into Washington, D.C. Add to that the thought of a full Southeast high speed rail route that extends southward to Columbia, South Carolina; into Savannah, Georgia and onto Jacksonville, Florida.

Here in Florida, there are plans for a high speed corridor from Tampa northeast to Orlando, and then taking a sharp right turn southward to the Florida Gold Coast and West Palm Beach, Fort Lauderdale, and Miami, with an extension northward to Jacksonville from Orlando at some point in the future.

And, lastly, Amtrak says it would be pleased to create an entire new Northeast Corridor for true high speed rail to replace the current NEC. No one is quite sure how much that would cost, but it would be one of the most expensive projects in the country because Amtrak envisions an entire new infrastructure over an entire new route.

Who gets funding first? That’s an easy question. Who’s in control of the political process? That’s who gets funding first. Informed opinions say the majority of the $8 billion will stay within 300 miles of Washington, D.C., with some small amounts going to other projects like the Midwest project, California’s two projects, and perhaps some small amount of the money coming to Florida.

Taking the long view, if the new administration’s interest in high speed rail continues, and the federal printing press churning out money doesn’t break down, it’s likely we will see more money for these projects over the next four years.

5) Here is what is going to be critical to the success of high speed rail: whatever projects come on line first have to be measurably successful, both from a social standpoint and a financial standpoint. The old axiom of "build it and they will come" has to hold true, because the full development of high speed rail is a decades-long process, that will take place over a number of presidential administrations of both parties and a number of different ideologies.

Therefore, these first projects MUST stand the test of time and pioneer leading the way for following projects in order to fulfill Mr. Carmichael’s vision.

Since these first projects are likely to be chosen on political rather than financial merits, we can only hope the results will be satisfactory enough to inspire further spending and investment. Which is why the chosen operator of these trains has to be the best available, not the most conveniently available.

6) Joe Boardman is coming up on the four month anniversary of his planned one year stewardship of Amtrak. The handwriting on the wall tells us he walked into a job (like so many of his predecessors) that he had no idea required so much fixing. Basic things like replacement rolling stock for Amtrak’s fleet were not even being whispered among Amtrak’s core executives. Instead, a hodgepodge of disjointed plans were lying around, not making much sense one way or the other. We can hope the Amtrak Planning Department – previously known as the most socialist place in Washington – has a new direction and a new mandate to help create a functioning passenger railroad, not just maintain the status quo by sucking as much money as possible out of government treasuries.

Here is his message to Amtrak employees in the February 29, 2009 issue of Amtrak This Week.

[begin quote]

Message from the President and CEO

Dear Co-workers,

As I travel across the country, I often meet people who tell me about how much potential Amtrak has. The truth is, Amtrak has seen a promising future since 1971. I know you think you’ve heard it before, but I’d like to tell you why it’s true in 2009.

Three major reasons: For the first time in a long while, we have some clear direction from Congress on the future of Amtrak and passenger rail. The Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act is our blueprint and aims to make enduring improvements in passenger rail.

As part of the stimulus bill signed by the president last week, we will receive $1.3 billion to make significant strides on capital programs. Among other things, we’ll return to service 100 cars that are currently sidelined, completely replace the Niantic River Bridge in Connecticut, install more Positive Train Control systems and make major Americans with Disabilities Act modifications to our stations. The law also provides money for states to make rail investments of their own, and they’re coming to us for our expertise.

And we have an administration that seems to be building a legacy defined in part by the development of high-speed rail. I believe that this administration is more likely than any other in recent history to be open to making additional investments in passenger rail.

All of these elements combine to help us realize great potential. But that’s just it — it’s only potential if we don’t believe in the direction we’re taking and make it happen. Sometimes I wonder if we’ve become conditioned to low expectations over the years, surviving from year to year, and thinking that no one expects big things from Amtrak. Well, I expect big things from us. We need to open our collective hearts and minds to the Amtrak we know we can be. That is the safer, greener and healthier Amtrak I envision.

That’s where vision and leading by example come in. I’m not just talking about forward movement, I’m taking the steps. Just last week, I met with vendors about how quickly they can deliver the Viewliners we need for our long-distance fleet. I intend to replace the electric locomotive fleet and am seeking the funding to do that. I want to electrify the railroad to Richmond and I’ll be studying the cost estimates on that next week. And I listen — we have a great deal of talent and dedication; our employees have good ideas and they need to be heard.

The time to harness our future is now and we’re moving ahead with renewed energy. I care very much about our future and I know you do, too. Together, we must embrace the opportunities that are before us and run with them — for us, for our customers and for our country.

Sincerely,

Joe Boardman

President and CEO

P.S. By the way, I know everyone wants to know the details of our proposed "stimulus" capital programs, I’ll share the list with you as soon as we’ve finalized it with the FRA — I wouldn’t want to mislead you.

[End quote]

Lots of red meat there for the True Believers, and lots of good stuff about the future, including the information about the new Viewliner series of long distance cars (Which, by the way, the order as it stands today is less than a third of what it should be to meet all current demand potential.)

The truly scary part if his statement he wants to electrify the CSX (former RF&P) main line south from Washington, D.C. to Richmond, Virginia.

Why?

Why is the interim president and CEO of Amtrak worrying about spending money to electrify someone else’s railroad? Especially when Amtrak can’t reasonably maintain the infrastructure it owns and operates north of Washington? What is there to gain? Why would CSX want to run its diesel freight locomotives under electric catenary for passenger trains?

Since the former RF&P route is the ONLY north-south direct route through the heart of Virginia leading to the Carolinas, Georgia, and Florida, while it is a very attractive passenger route, would CSX ever dream of turning over ownership of this critical route to another company which can’t maintain what it already owns? Not likely.

So, why is Mr. Boardman, who is the fullest of all of the full plates in Washington, spending time dreaming of this and even taking the time to get actual quotes? Shouldn’t this be an issue for the DOT and FRA, and not Amtrak? Mr. Boardman, please, stick to fixing your horribly broken railroad which requires so much attention, and leave issues like this to others. Amtrak as it is requires not only your full attention, but every skill you have to just get it back to a point of being moderately dysfunctional beyond completely dysfunctional.

7) And, finally, the last issue of TWA drew a lot of amusing comments from Amtrak cultists and sycophants who find it inconceivable any passenger railroad in the world makes money, since for decades they have been told the Holy Word is that Amtrak – and, conversely – no passenger rail in the world, makes money.

Just the mere heresy of presenting factual information about this lie sent many into involuntary fits of cultist rage and disbelief, and inspired rambling responses.

Other comments from more rational people contained praise for lifting the veil of lies that have been surrounding passenger rail for lo, these many decades in America.

It’s going to take years to undo the harm done in this country about the true facts of the business of passenger rail. It’s hard to imagine how anyone would actually prefer a system which does not make a profit versus a system which has the potential to break even or make a profit.

Most likely the ghosts of the Vanderbilts and Goulds and Pullmans and Harrimans are heartily laughing at us all day, every day.

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This Week at Amtrak; March 11, 2009




A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from



United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.




America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute



1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA




Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail

[email protected]http://www.unitedrail.org


 

Volume 6, Number 8



Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute that focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, and New York. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) The combined arrogance and hubris of these people is incredible; maybe some enterprising staffer on Capitol Hill will start looking into this and have someone in the House or Senate start demanding some answers. It’s a good thing former Amtrak President and CEO Alex Kummant is gone, but that doesn’t take the Amtrak Board of Directors off the hook for not doing their lawful duty and asking more questions and demanding better of Amtrak.

Brandweek.com has reported Amtrak spent $15.3 million on U.S. media in 2008, not including online expenditures, up from $14.8 million in 2007, according to Nielsen Monitor-Plus.

If you think that’s a lot of money in today’s world of paid media, you’re very wrong. It’s more like a half a drop in the bucket.

Last year, Amtrak spent $98.1 million on what it categorizes as advertising and sales according to its year end figures. That $98.1 million generated ticket revenue of $1,699,300,000. Most successful companies the size of Amtrak spend about 10% of revenues on advertising and marketing costs; Amtrak spent just slightly less than six percent. Even worse, on actual media the public sees, Amtrak spent only .009 – less than a single percent – on advertising.

No wonder Amtrak perpetually remains America’s Best Kept Secret.

To no one’s surprise, the biggest slice of the advertising and sales money was spent on the Northeast Corridor, instead of the long distance national network where the most good for total transportation output could be achieved.

At this point you may be wondering, what’s all the fuss about?

All the fuss is about how Amtrak positions itself with its customers, which, obviously is not its passengers in the minds of Amtrak executives. Amtrak’s true customers, where all of its efforts are spent, are the various public treasuries of the federal and state governments which constantly have to feed the voracious Amtrak bottomless financial pit.

Amtrak’s decision to spend so very little money on national or local media clearly demonstrates how little it cares about being a successful company.

Is Amtrak afraid of success?

Good heavens, what would Amtrak actually do if a lot of people showed up and wanted to ride its trains?

As always, this isn’t an argument about how much free federal monies Amtrak receives as a result of its annual begfest on Capitol Hill, it’s an argument over unsound management decisions and mis-allocation of resources and poor priorities.

During the same year Amtrak spent less than one percent of its ticket revenues on paid advertising, it received about $1.2 billion in free federal monies, of which less than $500 million was for nationwide/systemwide operating assistance.

Let’s be radical and say Amtrak suddenly saw the light and reoriented its priorities and (Gasp!) tripled its annual expenditures on advertising to less than three percent (Still woefully below any national averages for companies in the real world.) What would happen? Amtrak’s load factors would soar, wiping out at least half, if not more, of the annual operating subsidy requirement.

This also directly goes to the debunked lie no passenger railroad system in the world makes money, when we know factually systems in Japan, Germany, The Netherlands and elsewhere do, in fact, make money.

If, like Amtrak, you run a passenger railroad and don’t bother to tell anyone you’re running trains, well, yes, it’s not going to make money, or even come close to breaking even because no one knows there are trains to ride.

2) Let’s revisit some familiar territory, Amtrak’s load factors. We know a load factor of 65% technically makes a long distance train sold out, because allowances have to be made for entraining/detraining passengers at intermediate station stops. When a passenger on the Silver Meteor boards in Miami at the train’s originating terminal, and detrains in Palatka, leaving a vacant seat, that seat may not be filled again until Savannah, 206 route miles to the north. However, that Savannah passenger stays in that seat all the way to Philadelphia, just 101 miles short of the Meteor’s final terminal in New York City. So, that coach seat on the Meteor (which probably needed new upholstery) was occupied for 1,082 miles out of the total route length of 1,389 miles. The magic of trains is when one passenger detrains, most of the time another passenger entrains.

Those with endpoint mentalities or airline mentalities where there are no intermediate stops on a route, often have difficulty grasping this concept. It’s true, once an airplane pushes out from the gate at its originating terminal, any vacant seat on the plane has no other opportunity to be sold/filled. However, once the Silver Meteor departs Miami on its northward journey, that are still 25 more opportunities for passengers to board the train before it reaches the silly "discharge only" territory of the Northeast Corridor, where long distance trains are banned from picking up passengers between Alexandria, Virginia and New York City so Amtrak can falsely prop up NEC numbers without interference from those pesky, money-making long distance trains.

Look at Amtrak’s load factors for last year:

Long Distance Routes

Silver Star – 58.9%

Cardinal – 55.5%

Silver Meteor – 62.5%

Empire Builder – 63.4%

Capitol Limited – 66.9%

California Zephyr – 52.3%

Southwest Chief – 63.8%

City of New Orleans – 63.8%

Texas Eagle – 53.4%

Sunset Limited – 56.7%

Coast Starlight – 62.4%

Lake Shore Limited – 64.1%

Palmetto – 51.3%

Crescent – 51.6%

Auto Train – 63.6%

Average Long Distance Routes Load Factor – 59.7%

State Corridors and Short Distance Routes

Ethan Allen – 40.8%

Vermonter – 45.8%

Maple Leaf – 54.0%

Downeaster – 31.8%

New Haven-Springfield – 47.1%

Keystone – 35.5%

Empire Service – 35.0%

Chicago-St. Louis – 46.6%

Hiawathas – 40.4%

Wolverines – 54.9%

Illini – 50.0%

Illinois Zephyr – 43.1%

Heartland Flyer – 43.0%

Surfliners – 36.5%

Cascades – 56.6%

Capitols – 29.1%

San Joaquins – 39.1%

Adirondack – 69.4%

Blue Water – 78.7%

Washington, D.C.-Newport News – 60.2%

Hoosier State – 35.4%

Kansas City-St. Louis – 37.4%

Pennsylvanian – 74.3%

Pere Marquette – 67.3%

Carolinian – 77.9%

Piedmont – 44.6%

Average State Corridors and Short Distance Routes Load Factor – 43.5%

Northeast Corridor Routes

Acela – 62.6%

Northeast Regional – 48.1%

Average Northeast Corridor Routes Load Factor – 52.9%

These figures show Amtrak has plenty of room for more passengers without adding a single piece of equipment to its far-too-short existing consists.

Look at the numbers above, realizing the sad state of Amtrak’s skeletal national system, lack of operable locomotives and passenger cars, and lack of rational business plan, and think what a combination of advertising, getting bad-ordered and wrecked cars back on trains, and lengthening consists could accomplish. Close your eyes and start thinking about second and third frequencies, and, suddenly you have the beginnings of a robust, healthy system. Go one step further and start implementing Gil Carmichael’s Interstate II vision, and, astonishingly, you have a real railroad, not a shadow of a ghost of railroads past.

2) We’re talking chump change here in the overall Amtrak universe to begin to get Amtrak up to acceptable levels of advertising expenditures. One cannot help but question Emmet Fremaux, Amtrak’s Vice President who handles marketing, as to why he has allowed these advertising numbers to be so low. Has this been intentional, or a result of more senior managers only allocating so little for his total budget?

Where was the board of directors on this? Oh, wait, they were here, but, consider that of the five board members who constituted the Amtrak board last year, not a single one has corporate background experience; each and every one is either a creature of government service, or a Washington lobbyist or Washington attorney. After David Laney, Enrique Sosa, and Floyd Hall all left the board, not a single member replacing them or remaining has any real world, corporate experience, and would automatically know Amtrak’s abysmally low advertising expenditures amount to corporate malfeasance, and, at best, poor stewardship of public funds when the company willingly asks for billions in government subsidies, and then does nothing to promote the company and try and actually attract paying passengers who would replace the need for government subsidies.

3) Well-respected Washington Post Writers Group syndicated columnist Neal Peirce has been writing about Washington for decades, and often strays to the subject of Amtrak. Mr. Peirce again recently wrote about Amtrak and our new President Obama’s spending on passenger rail. One quote from Mr. Peirce’s column bears repeating, for it demonstrates how Amtrak has gotten away for so long with being America’s Best Kept Secret and nobody seems to care.

[begin quote]

Asserts James RePass, founder-leader of the 20-year-old National Corridors Initiative; "Suddenly, by the grace of God, we have a president who absolutely, positively gets it." This signifies, he adds, an end of the reign of "the ideological libertarians out to destroy the transportation system by saying ‘the market’ will take care of it, that Amtrak should make a profit – which is nuts!"

[End quote]

It’s this type of clearly wrong thinking that has been pervasive throughout America, bolstered by Amtrak’s bad behavior and not spending near enough on advertising to the public that makes Amtrak such a mess today.

Only when this type of wrong opinion is no longer considered gospel will Amtrak stop being enabled and start working towards being more self-sufficient. There’s nothing in our national government constitution that says every government entity has to lose money. There is nothing unpatriotic about Amtrak being self-sufficient. This is something grossly unpatriotic about Amtrak being such a poor steward of the public’s money and doing such disagreeable and arrogant things like taking public money and then not spending it wisely or in such a way which creates more business, more revenue, and more self-sufficiency.

Joe Boardman, as Amtrak’s Interim President and CEO, what steps are you taking to solve this problem and stop keeping Amtrak as America’s Best Kept Secret?

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This Week at Amtrak; April 6, 2009






A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from



United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.




America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute



1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA




Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail

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Volume 6, Number 9





 

 

 

Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute that focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, and New York. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) Interesting words from Matt Rose, Chairman, President, and CEO of Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway. His thoughts and comments mesh well with former FRA Administrator Gil Carmichael’s Interstate II vision.

[begin quote]

Written Testimony of Matthew K. Rose




Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer




BNSF Railway Company




Before the House Committee on Appropriations




Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development




For a Hearing on "The Future of High Speed Rail, Intercity Passenger Rail, and Amtrak"




Wednesday, April 1, 2009





Good afternoon Chairman Olver, Ranking Member Latham and members of the Subcommittee. I am Matt Rose, the CEO of the BNSF Railway, and I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee today on the issue of high speed rail. As a freight railroad CEO, a member of the National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission, and an early supporter of the One Rail coalition, I’ve had a lot of opportunity to think about what our country’s vision for passenger rail ought to be.

I, too, have traveled to Europe and Asia and appreciate the perspective of those in the United States who ask why Americans can’t have what they have – 200 mph corridor service connecting dense population centers which, themselves, have efficient regional transit distribution. However, as I discovered in my work on the Commission, while many passenger rail advocates and policy makers at all levels of government are intercity passenger rail advocates, they are somewhat skeptical of this vision. Their appetite is for a more incremental approach of improving existing intercity passenger rail service. Perhaps conditioned by years of scant Amtrak budgets and Congress’s disinterest in a formal federal intercity passenger rail program, many also are concerned that some large metropolitan areas might not be included in a "bullet train" network, either due to unavailability of right of way or other market-based demand reasons. In the Commission deliberations, we had a very robust discussion about these issues.

The Commission clearly called for the kind of investment needed to support passenger trains operating at the highest speeds in sealed, passenger-only, separated right of way. It called upon Congress to see the future, as Europe and Asia have, and begin the process of developing a corridor system of truly high speed rail. Make no mistake about it – this is a trillion-dollar funding proposition. Such a system may be beyond our current means; but one certainly can envision the development of five to ten truly high speed passenger regional rail corridors that make economic and operational sense. California – where you would expect some of these corridors should be – has taken the difficult yet necessary steps toward a vision of 200-plus mph passenger trains, despite a challenging budgetary environment.

Importantly, the Commission report also specifically recognizes the contribution that less-than-highest speed passenger trains in corridors of fewer than 500 miles can make to the Nation’s transportation system. Existing Amtrak service outside the Northeast Corridor generally achieves 79 mph on freight rail tracks. Public investments made to enhance reliability of this service can yield tremendous on-time performance reliability benefits, which is often all that is needed to successfully satisfy demand for passenger service in certain markets. There are many examples of this, but most recently, BNSF completed several double track construction projects on behalf of the State of California, which are intended to further improve already good on-time performance levels for 79 mph service.

Speaking as a freight railroad CEO, it is possible to increase speeds from 79 mph to 90 mph on tracks that both freight and passenger trains use. Upgrades would include the implementation of Positive Train Control (PTC), which I’ll touch on again shortly. Track would need to be upgraded from Class IV to Class V track, which would lead to a step level increase in track maintenance and track component replacement. For example, a larger number of ties per mile would have to be replaced each year. Rail joints would have to be eliminated. Extensive and regular undercutting would have to be undertaken to eliminate sub-grade defects. Rail would have to be re-surfaced much more often. All of this, in turn, would lead to more frequent outages for needed work, which will make joint freight/passenger operations more challenging and expensive.

At sustained speeds in excess of 90 mph, passenger train operations will need to be segregated from freight operations on separate track. The level of maintenance work required, the very different impacts passenger and freight rolling stock have on the surface of the rail and managing the flow of train traffic with such differences in speeds would make the joint use of track uneconomic and impracticable. Furthermore, it is my belief that at these speeds all interface between passenger trains and road crossings will need to be eliminated by grade separations or crossing closures. While it may be possible in some instances to co-locate higher speed passenger tracks with freight tracks in a freight railroad’s existing right of way, that won’t always be the case, and other right of way should be obtained. Where it is possible for the public to purchase freight railroad right of way, we must ensure sufficient capacity remains to operate safely and protect the ability to serve freight rail shippers, present and future, on a corridor.

In sum, the Commission’s model for intercity passenger rail in this country is to develop the highest speed rail where feasible and economically viable, coupled with more reliability for 79-90 mph passenger service in other key corridors where it will continue to make sense from a density, utilization and cost perspective. We believe that this vision could finally generate the public support and political will necessary for a successful passenger rail system in this country.

During the Commission’s deliberations, Wisconsin DOT Secretary and Chairman of States for Passenger Rail Frank Busalacchi and the late, great Paul Weyrich and I spent a lot of time debating the provisions of the report that dealt with the passenger and freight rail interface. It was a worthy exercise because from it came a clear understanding of the importance of how freight and passenger rail are interdependent in today’s policy, political and economic environment. This is the origin of the OneRail coalition, which consists of passenger, freight and environmental interests and advocates for the benefits of both freight and passenger operations.

There were some basic principles around this interface upon which the Commission agreed. These are basic rules of fairness, which make public-private cooperation possible and fruitful. In my own experience, they have helped BNSF and many communities on the BNSF network – including Seattle, Chicago, Albuquerque, St. Paul/Minneapolis, and Los Angeles – realize a partnership that achieves outstanding commuter rail service without degrading present or future freight service. These communities recognize their stake in both passenger and freight rail service.

The first key principle is that access by passenger providers to freight rail networks, where reasonable, must be negotiated at an arm’s length with freight railroads. This includes joint use tracks and rights of way, as well as opportunities for shared corridors with separate track structure for freight and passenger service. The second is that the impact on present and future corridor capacity must be mitigated to ensure that rail freight capacity is not reduced, but enhanced. This recognizes that speed differences between passenger and freight trains and certain well-defined passenger service requirements must be taken into account. There must be a fair assignment of costs based on the ongoing cost of passenger services, including the cost of upgrading and maintaining track, signals and structures to support joint freight and passenger operations and the cost of maintaining and improving the safety and reliability of highway/railroad intersections in joint use corridors. Finally, all host railroads must be adequately and comprehensively protected through indemnification and insurance for all risks associated with passenger rail service on their lines and in their rights of way.

I’d now like to turn your attention to an issue that has become very important in the discussion about the passenger-freight interface: positive train control (PTC). Congress has placed a non-risk based, multi-billion-dollar mandate to install PTC on what effectively could be 90% of the freight rail network. This is driven by the requirement to implement this technology where passenger rail or shipments of certain hazardous materials utilize the network.

BNSF began developing this train control technology in 1984, which led us to the development of what we now call Electronic Train Management System (ETMS). However, it was never intended to be implemented on the scale envisioned by the mandate included in the rail safety bill enacted last year by Congress. The unprecedented cost – which we estimate could be in excess of $1 billion when fully implemented on BNSF in 2015 – is driven by factors mostly outside of our control, such as the presence of passenger trains and our statutory common carriage obligation to haul toxic chemicals. The cost will have to be fairly allocated between BNSF, its shippers and the public.

This mandate represents a tremendous financial burden not just on the freight railroads, but also on Amtrak and the commuter lines. If you have not yet heard about this issue from these constituencies, you soon will. They are partners in the cost of implementing this technology across jointly used lines. While the rail safety bill did authorize a relatively small technology grant program ($50 million per year for Fiscal Years 2009-13), no funding has yet been appropriated. I urge you to fully fund this program.

However, you should also ensure that other funding sources are available to the public passenger and private freight railroads to help defray the tremendous financial impact the mandate will have. For example, the intercity passenger and high speed rail programs at the Federal Railroad Administration received significant funding in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The intercity passenger program has previously been tapped for safety technology investments like centralized traffic control and cab signal systems and makes sense as a funding source going forward, given the PTC mandate’s intense focus on passenger train operations.

In addition, the Department of Homeland Security’s rail security grant program was created by Congress with specific statutory language making train control, tracking and communications systems eligible for funding. The Transportation Security Administration’s long time focus on reducing security risks surrounding shipments of Toxic Inhalation Hazards fits squarely with the mandate’s inclusion of rail lines carrying these highly hazardous materials.

Finally, the freight railroads continue to support a rail infrastructure tax credit bill, sponsored by Congressman Kendrick Meek (D-FL) and Congressman Eric Cantor (R-VA) in the House. This bill provides a 25% tax credit and expensing for rail infrastructure expansion activities, of which PTC implementation is eligible. I believe this is a significant way that Congress can soften the impact this mandate will have on the railroads, in what is one of the most economically challenging times we’ve seen in decades.

In closing, my recommendations to you are two-fold:

1) Observe the principles for passenger/freight joint use of rail right of way that the Commission recognized, and be realistic about the kind of passenger service that can be achieved, given the limitations of joint use. Generally, those limitations are based on nothing less than the laws of physics and the consequences that flow from them.

2) Develop a realistic vision for passenger service that works for all stakeholders – including freight railroads and the nation’s shippers – and fully fund it.

It took $4 a gallon gas to show us that passenger train options are important to providing a fuel efficient alternative to the highway for millions of Americans. In addition, though, a comprehensive passenger rail program may shift a portion of the congested short-medium haul air traffic to rail, expand employment in the passenger rail industry and engender vibrant economic development around these networks. The choice to fund passenger rail over the next 20 years can have as significant an impact on this country as funding Air Traffic Control and runways have had in the last 20 years.

I appreciate the opportunity to present these views and I would be happy to answer any questions you have about passenger rail or freight rail policy.

[End quote]

2) An inconvenient fact: When writing about high speed rail coming to the United States, many writers refer to high speed rail in Europe where "everyone rides the train, and high speed rail is very successful." Well, compared to Amtrak’s share of the domestic transportation market in the United States, which stands at less than one percent, yes, high speed rail in Europe does have a much larger market share. However, look at the real numbers. High speed rail in Europe does not have an overwhelming market share.

According to the Rio Grande Foundation, high speed rail works well for tourists traveling in Europe without the expense of renting an automobile, but it hasn’t done much to change European travel habits.

In 1980, intercity rail accounted for 8.2 percent of passenger travel in the 15 countries which made up the European Union as of 2000. But, by 2000, intercity rail declined to 6.3% of market share. Automobile driving gained almost exactly the same market share that rail lost in this time period, growing from 76.4% to 78.3%. Low cost European airlines have made the greatest challenge to high speed rail, thanks to Europe’s "open skies" policies, domestic air travel increased from 2.5% of travel in 1980 to 5.8% in 2000. Both intercity busses and urban transit both lost shares.

3) Thoughts from Ken Orski, Innovation NewsBriefs, Volume 20, Number 5.

[begin quote]

April 1, 2009

The Promise of High-Speed Rail

Is it wise to spend $13 billion of the taxpayers' dollars in the next five years ($8 billion in the recovery package and $5 billion in the next five annual appropriations) as a down payment on a high-speed rail network? Or are there better ways to spend this money on transportation? That was the subject of a recent weekly debate on the National Journal's Transportation Blog. The Blog's contributors include some 80 invited "Beltway Insiders," including members of Congress, governors, state and local transportation officials, senior executives of trade associations, environmentalists and respected transportation professionals. The debate revealed a spectrum of opinion among the contributors, with proponents of high-speed rail outnumbering the doubters by a wide margin.

SUPPORT FROM THE POLITICAL LEADERS

To launch the conversation, National Journal’s Lisa Caruso, who hosts the blog, asked Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood what he thinks of President Obama’s decision to make high-speed passenger rail service a centerpiece of his transportation agenda.

"Do I believe in President Obama’s high-speed rail initiative? The short answer is ‘Yes, I do. Profoundly,’ the Secretary answered. It is a "transformational initiative," the Secretary went on, and the $13 billion in federal money is "a down payment that will jump-start what will be a world-class passenger rail system." The Federal Railroad Administration is finalizing a plan and related guidance for intercity passenger rail grants from the initial $8 billion in the economic recovery package, the Secretary announced.

Belief in the promise and potential of high-speed rail was also expressed by two congressional lawmakers who will be at the center of the legislative debate about the future of the nation's transportation program. "President Obama is on the right track, if I may use the term," wrote Rep. James Oberstar (D-MN), Chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. High-speed rail can provide "an efficient, convenient, comfortable alternative to driving or flying short or medium distances," he observed. Referring to the European and Japanese experience with high-speed rail (HSR), Oberstar noted "that success did not occur overnight." It took many years for the high-speed networks to mature and European countries continue to invest substantial amounts each year. There is no reason why we cannot do the same here in the United States, Oberstar contended. Rep. John Mica (R-FL), Ranking Member of the House T&I Committee echoed Mr. Oberstar’s sentiments, noting that he has been a long-time supporter of high-speed rail. A solicitation in the Amtrak reauthorization law, he wrote, produced over 110 expressions of interest, "an encouraging sign that there is tremendous interest in bringing high-speed rail to the United States." It won’t be right for every region of the country, and it will require a significant investment, Mica wrote, but it has to be part of our national transportation strategy. Gov. Tim Kaine of Virginia, was of the same opinion. Many communities have lost commercial air service over the last two decades, he observed, and high-speed rail can be an effective and affordable alternative for shorter commute routes. It already is in the Washington DC-to-New York corridor, he noted, and we need to create additional high-speed passenger rail corridors to support other major urban centers.

STATES’ SHOULD BE AN IMPORTANT PARTNER

Several contributors drew attention to the need to involve the states and to use the leverage of federal money to obtain funding commitments from state, local and private sources. Steve Heminger, Executive Director of (Bay Area) Metropolitan Transportation Commission cited the California HSR Authority’s plan as the kind of business model that needs to be replicated around the country if we are to be successful in building high-speed rail networks. The $35 billion Los Angeles-to-San Francisco project, he wrote, hopes to secure at least $15 billion in federal funds, $3 billion from local agencies and about $7 billion from the private sector in addition to a $10 billion state bond measure. In other words, the federal investment would leverage another 130 percent of funding from other, non-federal sources. "When it comes to high-speed rail, the federal response should focus on helping those states and regions that are willing to help themselves," Heminger concluded. Frank Busalacchi, Secretary of Wisconsin DOT was of the same opinion. California, the Cascades corridor, the Midwest corridor and North Carolina are some of the states already offering corridor services at their own expense, he noted. "Allocating the $8 billion to the state corridors will help expand passenger rail services where services are most needed," he wrote. "High-speed projects that require new rights-of-way would require a longer time frame."

Mortimer Downey, Senior Advisor at Parsons Brinckerhoff and head of the Obama transition team at U.S. DOT observed that what the Administration proposal has done is to bring the rail options to the intercity transportation table. But, he said, "the real proof of the merits of rail investment will come when hard decisions have to be made concerning specific corridor investment. It is those corridor decisions that will prove or disprove the merit of the high-speed rail case. And it will be up to the proponents of specific projects to show how effective high-speed rail is in bringing about desired results in terms of energy conservation, decrease in greenhouse-gas emissions, congestion reduction and other potential benefits.

NOTES OF CAUTION

Several contributors cautioned about raising unreasonably high expectations as to what the $13 billion in federal money can accomplish. There needs to be a reality check on what is practical, since there is no way an entirely new rail line can be built in the near future given the complex and lengthy environmental review and approval process, Rich Sarles, Executive Director, NJ Transit wrote. A similar opinion was expressed by Bob Poole, Director of Transportation Studies at the Reason Foundation. "The $8 billion in the stimulus bill has created expectations for Japanese-style bullet trains on 11 long-planned corridors, but those hopes are likely to go unrealized," he wrote. "True high speed rail (HSR) that goes 150-200 mph requires entirely separate rights of way with no grade crossings, shallow grades, very broad curves, and no 60 mph freight traffic. That’s what Japan, France, Spain, Germany, and Italy are doing, and the taxpayer cost is many billions per line...What the new federal funding will mostly be used for is upgrades to the existing shared passenger/freight tracks, aiming to get Amtrak trains up to speeds of 90 to 100 mph rather than today’s 60 or 70 mph."

Ken Orski, Editor/Publisher of Innovation NewsBriefs, also thought that much of the $13 billion in federal money is likely to end up supporting incremental improvements in existing rail infrastructure rather than building true high-speed lines in new alignments. But incremental improvements, he suggested, could involve not just upgrading existing signalization and roadbed but also adding extra track capacity in existing rail corridors, a move that would reduce interference between passenger and freight trains and benefit both freight and passenger rail service. In the same vein, Ed Hamberger, President of the Association of American Railroads, noted that passenger and freight improvements are not mutually exclusive goals. "America has the best freight railroad system in the world," he wrote, and " there is no reason why we can’t have the best passenger system as well."

Jack Schenendorf, former vice chairman of the congressionally-chartered National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Commission, urged to consider the high-speed rail initiative in the wider context of a national surface transportation strategy. "I applaud the fact that the President is making a down payment on high-speed rail but I am dismayed by the fact that he continues a pattern of underinvestment in the rest of our national surface transportation network," he wrote. We need to do much more than just increase investment in high-speed passenger rail, he continued. We also need to increase investment substantially in other modes of transportation. We need to adequately maintain our existing roads and bridges, upgrade our freight rail network, expand our transit systems and significantly increase highway capacity. "I respectfully urge the President to revise his budget to do for all the modes of transportation that he did for high-speed rail" Schenendorf concluded. Bill Graves, President of American Trucking Association also cautioned that we must not lose sight of the nation’s need to expand and repair the national highway system. Expanding passenger rail will not end traffic congestion, he wrote.

Greg Cohen, President of the American Highway Users Alliance, injected a note of skepticism. It is important that the Administration, rail advocates and critics answer some critical questions about the ultimate high-speed rail plan before investing hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars, he wrote. "Where is the money coming from to fund the ultimate HSR plan?" he asked. Are there no good alternatives to HSR? He suggested that "intercity motor coach" transportation may offer a meaningful alternative and ought to be considered more closely.

Is the $13 billion high-speed rail program a game changing event that, in the words of Peter Gertler, Director of High-Speed Rail at HNTB Corporation, "will lay the foundation for the most significant national investment in public infrastructure since President Eisenhower’s vision to build a national interstate highway system"? Or will the money be frittered away on studies and modest improvements in existing rail service — improvements that may achieve marginal reductions in travel time but do not move us any closer to achieving a true national high-speed rail vision? Will the Administration resist the political temptation to spread the $13 billion among the six high-speed rail initiatives that are in various stages of planning in California, Texas, the Midwest, Florida, Nevada and North Carolina? Or should the Administration take the long view and focus its efforts and resources on one or two corridors that most clearly justify high-speed service (the Northeast Corridor comes to mind), knowing that such a strategy, like the interstate highway system, may take decades to realize over a number of presidential administrations. We should soon find out which road the Administration has chosen to follow.

For a full text of the discussion go to http://transportation.nationaljournal.com

[End quote]

For a full view of all of Mr. Orski’s work, visit www.innobriefs.com

4) Amtrak, finally, after three and a half decades seems to be getting serious about the Sunset Limited. Word is coming the Sunset will become a daily train between Los Angeles and New Orleans. Still no word, however, about much needed service east of New Orleans. Amtrak still has not made a decision about this service; a congressionally mandated study is underway concerning restoring the Sunset Limited or a replacement service for it. We expect to hear about a completed study sometime soon. In the mean time, Amtrak is still sticking to its story that no one is interested in riding this train east of New Orleans even though a full 46% of the Sunset’s revenue used to originate east of New Orleans. Or, to put it another way, Amtrak still claims the dog ate its homework, as usual.

5) There is some good news. Amtrak has restored sleeping car service on the Lake Shore Limited between Boston and Albany, New York. This puts a missing sleeping car service back which has been gone for several years. Miraculously, Amtrak says it can make money from this on-again sleeping car. Wow; Amtrak has figured that out. Does that mean Amtrak also acknowledges what the rest of us have known for decades, that most sleeping car service on Amtrak everywhere else in the country makes money, too?

6) Just a quick note about Amtrak’s $1.3 billion in stimulus money. Amtrak has a plethora of documents on www.amtrak.com detailing how this money is being spent all over the country (That translates to how the money left over from not being spent on the Northeast Corridor is being divided up by the rest of the country.). Lots of good projects included in here, mostly for ADA compliance, and lots of new signage around the country which will help solidify Amtrak’s image. A lot of projects which have desperately needed to be done, such as the restoration and painting of the canopies over the train platforms at Tampa Union Station are included here. Most of this stuff would have never come out of Amtrak’s normal operating or free federal monies capital budgets, so it’s good to have the stimulus money to get these things done.

However, probably the most important expenditure of the money is for the restoration and rehabilitation of out-of-service passenger cars.

On Amtrak’s web site, we are told there are 1,519 passenger cars owned by Amtrak, plus 469 locomotives, 80 Auto Train vehicle carriers and 101 baggage cars. Amtrak operated state-owned equipment includes 136 railroad passenger cars and 20 locomotives.

So, if Amtrak says it owns 1,519 passenger cars, less the 1,346 cars it says it has on its active daily roster, then there are 173 pieces of equipment sitting around in the weeds somewhere on a wreck line. In the stimulus package, Amtrak says it will return 21 long distance cars from wreck status to operating status, and a mixture of 60 Amfleet low-level cars (a very few long distance cars, but the vast majority are NEC cars) back to service. This totals 81 cars, which still leaves 92 cars sitting in the weeds. Yes, some of those cars are most likely beyond repair, but not all 92 of them.

When will we see these other cars returned to service? How much of a priority will this be for Amtrak?

Of the current 1,346 active cars on the daily roster, there is a daily requirement of 1,072 cars for use (Yes, trainlines and consists have been cut that much.). In late February, there were 1,120 cars ready for service, which is a good improvement for Amtrak. That leaves 274 cars (a high percentage) either as spares, or in the shops being worked on.

So, let us say Amtrak is improving its shop performance, and will have a lower amount of cars in the back shop at any one time, and more cars available for service, plus the new Viewliner series sleepers, diners, and baggage cars it is ordering.

What could be done with all of this equipment, right now?

Well, the Sunset could easily go daily between Los Angeles and New Orleans, as could the Cardinal between New York and Chicago.

Either the Pioneer, Desert Wind, or North Coast Limited between Chicago and the West Coast could be restored (Only one, not all three.).

Some type of short daily train between New Orleans and Florida could be added to replace the east end of the Sunset Limited, and this train could include a full consist of cars, including sleepers. Other consists could be beefed back up.

All it takes is for Amtrak management to have the will to do this.

Remember, with the current inventory of cars (prior to lots of wrecks, thus the requirement for some of this equipment to be rebuilt), all of the existing Amtrak network was operated, plus the Desert Wind, Pioneer, and Sunset Limited east of New Orleans, and most trains had longer consists.

It’s not about the money. It’s about Amtrak management wanting to be clever enough and work hard enough to make this happen, and the Amtrak Board of Directors to be asking questions as to why this isn’t happening.

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This Week at Amtrak; 2009-04-13 Volume 6, Number 10

Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute that focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, and New York. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) A strong case can be made that often there is not a lot of intellectual honesty when it comes to discussing passenger rail in the United States.

Different groups have staked out different positions, and they are sticking to those positions, no matter what happens to prove those positions are incorrect. Often, the positions make no sense either ideologically or realistically, but are good for membership drives, which accomplishes very little other than to fatten organization coffers.

Such examples are "there are no passenger rail systems in the world which make money," and "all Amtrak needs is more money and everything will be fine." Both statements, of course, are completely wrong.

The real head-scratcher is how the concept/ideology/operation of passenger rail passed from being the province of the very conservative world of the railroad industry to the socialist and liberal world of no one other than a government has the ability to operate passenger rail. Therefore, this unsavory theory goes, passenger rail should be treated exactly as roads and highways are treated, and funded accordingly, without an honest attempt for passenger rail to be as self-sustaining as possible, with government contributions only after other resources are exhausted, not the other way around.

2) Respected passenger railroad historian David Carleton has provided this very brief outline of recent passenger rail history [Note: a TWA guest columnist is working on a longer and more intricately detailed history of Amtrak, which we hope to bring to you sometime soon.]

[begin quote]

By David Carleton

In 1956 the Republican Eisenhower administration approved the Interstate Highway program. It was going to have serious implications for the passenger train, but Congress and the administration did nothing to alleviate it.

In 1967 the Democratic Johnson administration directed the Postal Service to remove all remaining Railway Post Office cars from passenger trains. Since this was the one remaining piece of passenger train business which was consistently profitable, the implications for passenger train service were dire. Still, the administration and the Congress did nothing to relieve it.

Then, in 1970 the Congress passed - and Republican President Nixon signed - the bill creating the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (NRPC), commonly known as Amtrak. In light of the previous inaction this would appear to be a dramatic turnabout. What events facilitated it? Here are three:

A) At the end of 1969 the venerable Pullman Company ceased operations and in 1970 was liquidated. Evidence of the impending demise of the Pullman Company became apparent in official Washington when it was necessary to assemble a funeral train to transport the remains of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. The large fleets of stand-by Pullman cars which had once been called upon to assemble campaign trains for candidates such as Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower were no longer available and the railroads had to scramble to assemble a suitable train.

B. In 1970 the Western Pacific Railroad succeeded in winning a train-off case to stop running its segment of the California Zephyr, effectively killing the train. This was America's train, the train of the movies, the quintessential post-war streamliner. Its discontinuance had symbolic meaning larger than the train itself.

C) The bankruptcy of the Penn Central Railroad threatened the stability of the entire railroad industry. The Penn Central was the largest passenger carrier, and that became an issue - not because of all the passenger train mileage that was being imperiled, but rather because of the size of the passenger train losses which showed up in the railroad's reports to the Interstate Commerce Commission. If these reports were accurate, then these losses accounted for about ten percent of the railroad's loss, but they were the most obvious item. Then, too, the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project (NECIP) was just then beginning to bear some results with new Metroliner trains moving swiftly over recently resurfaced Penn Central tracks.

It is important to understand what happened to crystallize the thinking of both Congress and the Nixon administration when the decision was made to form the NRPC, because their reaction to those events continue to shape the national passenger train enterprise till this day.

First of all - The NRPC was to stand in the place of the Pullman Company and manage a fleet of cars that could be deployed as needed.

Second - The ICC and the railroads would be relieved of the complications of train-off litigation. That's not to say that no more trains would be cut, in fact on Day One of Amtrak, half of all remaining private passenger rail service (Except for the services which opted not to join Amtrak, including the Southern Railroad and the Denver and Rio Grande Western.) was eliminated by the creation of Amtrak under rules governing what were - and were not - viable routes. But, the railroads and the ICC were no longer part of the process, from then on if the public was dissatisfied with changes to their service they would have to take their complaints elsewhere.

And, third - The NRPC (Amtrak) was to save the NECIP and the Metroliners from the bankruptcy of Penn Central. It is interesting to note Amtrak service has typically been meager throughout most of its system, even on the former Penn Central, with the exception of the Northeast Corridor.

In carrying out the above, the NRPC was formed and contracts were made with the various railroads. The contracts called for these railroads to operate certain designated trains "for" the NRPC, and also allowed the railroads to eliminate most of the rest. All the personnel, stations, etc. were to be provided by the railroads per the contract. The better railroads even continued to print timetables for "their" trains and distribute these to "their" stations. After a year even this began to fade away. What happened?

The NRPC acquired an upper management which proceeded to form it into a strong bureaucracy. They replaced the designation NRPC, which stood for something, with Amtrak, a word they made up. And, then they went to work building and reinforcing the Amtrak we know today - perfectly equipped to stand against the travails of 1969/70!

[End quote]

3) Next, we visit a most interesting and thought-provoking white paper by J. William Vigrass. Through the years This Week at Amtrak has been published, we have been honored to publish the writing and speeches of former FRA Administrator Gil Carmichael, who, along with Andrew Selden, are the two greatest passenger rail visionaries in the United States today. Long-time railroad and transportation specialist William Vigrass has shared his thoughts of a vision similar to that of Mr. Carmichael and his Interstate II concept for the future of American railroading.

Mr. Vigrass completed 56 years on the transportation industry, including service with Rutgers - The State University of New Jersey, Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy; Hill International, Inc.; Port Authority Transit Corporation, Lindenwold, New Jersey; Battelle Memorial Institute, the Union Pacific Railroad Company, and the Erie Railroad Company. Mr. Vigrass is the past chairman of the Committee on Rail Transit A1E04 of the Transportation Research Board.

Mr. Vigrass has an extensive background in both passenger and freight railroad operations and planning. The following paper was first presented in 2007 at the height of freight congestion in our country. While today many of the problems cited have abated simply because of a slackened economy, as the national and world economy start to improve, these problems will once again be all too prevalent.

[begin quote]

A proposed National System of Interstate and Defense RAILROADS, as an infrastructure project for the next fifty years

By J. William Vigrass, Member, Blue Ribbon Panel of Experts

Project Manager (retired) Hill International, Inc., Marlton, NJ 08053.

To the National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission, USDOT Bldg., L'Enfant Plaza, 400 7th St. N.W. Conference Room 4200, Washington, DC, 20590, Tuesday, 10:00am February 6th, 2007.

Background: The scope of the Commission's mandate is to provide policy direction for infrastructure for the next fifty years. This paper will expand upon the thoughts set forth in my December 7th, 2006 paper and will be confined to the railroad mode because all other modes have numerous advocates for government investment in highways, waterways and airways, all of which are owned by the public sector. All are used by private sector operators which have not invested any of their own capital in the infrastructure provided by government. They pay fuel and other taxes as operating expenses, and said taxes cover but a portion of the government's investment and maintenance costs. Only the railroad infrastructure is privately owned, maintained and financed. Even though railroad property is devoted entirely to the public interest, the owning companies nonetheless pay real estate taxes on their properties. In urban areas these taxes can be substantial. Railroad freight rates must cover all operating, maintenance and ownership costs, something that competing modes have never had to do.

When railroad companies invest in improvements to their physical plant with internally generated funds, they must be assured of an internal rate of return equal to or better than the cost of borrowing money in the private market. In contrast, when the Corps of Engineers makes improvements to the inland waterways system, the barge operators do not put up any investment dollars. When the FHWA and state DOT's improve highways, the trucking industry does not have to directly contribute to the investment. This unbalanced situation has led to under-investment in railroad plant with consequent congestion is many locations. Railroads presently have great difficulty adding new train services and have made it clear they are unable or unwilling to add timetable slots for additional passenger train services unless the public sector makes capacity available.

At the same time, an expanding economy has put pressure on freight railroads to add more service and some new services such as long distance run-through trains. The nation's highways are congested in many places, and the expanding economy has added to the pressure for widening existing Interstates and building new Interstates where they do not now exist. Tests done under the auspices of the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) have proven highway damage is geometrically related to heavy loads. There is good reason to divert heavy loads off highways onto railroads since the latter are engineered to handle heavy loads. With several good reasons to add more railroad service, why has not more been done? The answer is, very simply, the railroads cannot afford to make the necessary investments. Their margin of profit is held down by truck competition for the most part. Common carrier truck rates are held down by the ubiquitous owner-driver who often works for bare wages, fuel, a contribution to maintenance and little or nothing for depreciation.

The trucking industry is using an Interstate and Defense Highway System designed and built since 1956, and incorporating improvements in design from time to time. It is largely an up-to-date highway system. The enormous capital invested in the Interstate and federal aid highway systems has been generated by motor fuel and other motor vehicle related taxes borne by the entire motoring public. Past studies have found trucking does not cover about 30% of costs related to truck operation. This allows the trucking industry to offer rates less than their true economic costs. Every time taxes on trucks or trucking have been increased, the industry has lobbied intensely and successfully for increased length and weight limits which in turn allowed freight rates to remain lower than they otherwise would have been. This has attracted more freight to highways, which in turn caused more wear and tear and congestion.

It is recommended the Congress not approve any more increases in the size or gross weight of motor trucks in interstate commerce.

Trucking uses up to date highways.

Railroads use Nineteenth Century Alignments. In contrast, nearly all the US railroad network was designed and built in the 19th Century. Grading was done by manpower, horses and scrapers. Heavy excavation was done by manual drilling (sledgehammers on the drill someone was holding) and black powder. Such engineering achievements as the Horseshoe Curve, Tehachapi Loop, the Central Pacific (UP) over Donner Pass were all great achievements of that era, but they are circuitous compared to competing Interstate highways. No matter how fast railroad freight trains may run, they must go further than a truck in most cases. Curvature imposes permanent speed restrictions. Histories of those early projects often include drawings of proposed realignments that could not be carried out by the privately owned railroads. Major tunnels had been proposed, but not built. Many sharp curves remain although realignments had been planned.

Meanwhile in Europe, at this time, many kilometers of new high speed railways have been - and are being - built. Several Base Tunnels are being built for railway use under the Alps and other mountainous barriers. These are:

- Lötschberg base tunnel - portals at Frutigen (Canton of Bern) and Raron (Canton of Valais) in Switzerland. 34.6 km (21.6 miles) in length. Scheduled to open this year (portions will be single track).

- Gotthard base tunnel - portals at Erstfeld (Canton of Uri) and Biasca (Canton of Ticino) 57 km (35.6 miles) in length. Scheduled to open 2015-2017. They are running into geological problems. (This project has been covered on cable television's The Discovery Channel.)

- Combination bridge/tunnels connecting Sweden to Denmark provide an all rail connection between Scandinavia and Europe.

- In project planning (length not yet established) - Mt. Cenis (France-Italy and Brenner (Innsbruck), Austria and maybe Bolzano/Bozen, Italy

- Proposed tunnel connecting Spain and Morocco under the Straits of Gibraltar has been planned and is going into the engineering phase. This will connect the railway system of North Africa with that of Europe.

- The Channel Tunnel (50 km, 31 miles long) is well known in the US. Less known in the US is the Japanese Seikan tunnel between the main island of Honshu and the north island of Hokkaido. It is longer and deeper than the Channel Tunnel, and passes through far more difficult geology. It has the following statistics:

Seikan Tunnel

Location: Honshu and Hokkaido, Japan

Completion Date: 1988

Cost: $7 billion

Length: 174,240 feet (33 miles)

Setting: Underwater

Materials: Steel, concrete

Engineer(s): Japan Railway Construction Corporation

The US has no railroad tunnels that compare.

In all such cases, the railroads are owned by the public sector and such projects have national and/or European Union support. (Switzerland is not in the EU.) While European railroads offer much more frequent passenger train service than is found in the US, they carry a tiny percentage of freight ton-miles and are far less efficient than American freight railroads. Yet, with the superiority of American freight railroading, the companies cannot justify or afford the huge investment that would be needed to provide a 21st Century alignment. They need help!

The present US railroad system is the most efficient hauler of overland freight in the world in terms of ton-mile costs. It is also the result of drastic downsizing that followed deregulation. The present system is carrying double or triple the number of ton miles that had been carried on a much larger network prior to deregulation. About one third the track miles are carrying two to three times the traffic. While efficient, this leaves little room for growth. It is also difficult for freight railroads to maintain their track when there is only one track on a given alignment. Trains must be delayed or rerouted over circuitous routes to allow track to be taken out of service for maintenance or replacement. This is not desirable, but it is necessary.

One may conclude that the present railroad system consists largely of 19th Century engineering, has greatly reduced track miles and route miles than existed in the 1950's, yet is carrying twice the traffic. Expanding capacity to be able to handle increased freight traffic as well as increased passenger train traffic appear to be highly desirable national objectives. Excess capacity is desirable to handle an expanding economy as well as peak loads. Private companies cannot invest in excess capacity (unless they have large profit margins, which the railroads do not.) Redundancy is highly desirable to handle dislocations caused by natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina or terrorist attacks that have not yet been experienced.

It is a point of historic fact the Prussian State Railways in what is now Germany were built in the 19th Century such that the network consisted of a series of triangles. Two routes were provided between strategic points so that the military would always have an alternative route in case of invasion. The US railroad system was not designed with such strategic objectives in mind. The mainland US was never threatened, but now this is a distinct possibility. The loss of a key bridge or tunnel here or there could cause great havoc to the US economy, as there are now fewer alternative routes than there were in the 1950's. Some of the alternatives might be restored, or new ones created.

One may conclude the basic US railroad network is a product of 19th Century engineering with no thought to redundancy which may be needed to cope with natural or terrorist activity, or even routine maintenance or reconstruction. It is also circuitous compared to the Interstate Highway System, and thereby not as competitive as it might be. This all indicates it probably is an impediment to economic growth of the US rather than a lubricant for economic growth.

What, then, should be done?

It is proposed to create a National System of Interstate and Defense Railroads which would be multi-tracked, grade separated and suitable for competitive speeds. This would mean 75 mph for freight trains and 110 or 125 mph for passenger trains. A combination of tax credits and direct grants would be needed, since some strategic investments desired for passenger train use might not be needed or wanted by freight railroads. Those improvements would be provided by grants, and such grants would consist of federal and non-federal shares. Multi-track means at least double tracked, and where combined passenger/freight traffic requires, three or even four tracks.

Heavy Haul Routes Needed. This is not to ignore the need for separate heavy haul routes that would be (and are) designed for 25 - 40 mph. It is recognized such routes being capable of handling 15,000 to 25,000 ton coal or other heavy trains are needed. Energy needed increases with the square of the speed, such that it requires four times the energy to move a train at 80 mph as at 40 mph. The railroad companies have been relatively successful in generating internal capital for such investments in heavy haul routes. It is desired to keep such traffic off high speed freight/passenger routes to avoid delays to fast trains. It may be desirable to have separate heavy haul tracks alongside fast freight/passenger tracks where both share the same corridor as exist on portions of the Union Pacific Railroad and Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway. For purposes of this paper, it will be assumed the railroad companies can continue to fund improvements for heavy haul traffic from their own resources. Exceptional needs might be handled on a case by case application for government aid.

A Program to Create a National System of Interstate and Defense RAILROADS.

A number of steps would be needed to approach, identify and quantify needs. This is not something which can be done by a few papers such as this, in which small numbers of man hours have been committed. A major research and planning effort will be needed. This might be done under the auspices of the Transportation Research Board with funding from USDOT.

Assumptions: Some key assumptions must be made upon which planning would be based. Among them would be the following:

- Population of the US would continue to increase as forecast by the Bureau of the Census. Legal immigration would continue at the same rate.

- The US economy would continue to expand at the same overall rate. Shifts within the economy would be recognized to the extent data become available.

- Petroleum would continue to become scarcer with consequent increases in price. Unusual or anticipated changes in the supply/price would be included to the extent data permit.

- Efforts to control degradation of the environment will increase.

- Population distribution will continue to flow to metropolitan areas.

- Others, as may be developed during initial research.

A Proposed Research Program to Develop a National System of Interstate and Defense Railroads.

Some factors which have come to mind and/or have been suggested by some of my many email friends and correspondents follow. They are in a more or less sequential (chronological) order.

- Identify corridors, and quantify traffic to the extent data permits as to what growth would be expected over the 50 year period under study for the Commission.

- Identify where rights of way for double or multiple track remain. Determine when - and if - restoration would be desirable.

- Identify abandoned rights of way that exist (more or less intact). Determine which ones could be rebuilt for modern use. Rank them in order of probable need. Establish a list of rights of way to be purchased and preserved for future rail use. This use might be freight railroad, intercity and/or commuter passenger railroad or rail transit in urban-suburban areas. Funding for purchase and preservation of such rights of way should be the first item to be implemented under the proposed program. Existing rights of way must be preserved especially in urban areas before they are disposed of to developers or other non-rail use.

- Identify where railroads are essential for defense. It is established that railroads are the most efficient way to move an armored division. There are other areas where railroads have been used effectively.

- Identify new areas where railroads might be useful or critical in combating domestic terrorism.

- Identify areas/places where railroads should be protected from terrorism access. Devise means for such protection.

- Identify corridors suitable for electrification in chronological sequence. Given that petroleum will become more expensive and scarcer, it follows that electrification of major corridors will be in the national interest and will contribute to the railroad system's efficiency. This may well be a major contribution to reducing our nation's dependency on petroleum and allow petroleum's use where there is no alternative, such as for aviation. A major shift of freight and passengers from highway to railroad should be an objective to reduce domestic use of petroleum based fuels. No technological development would be needed. Electric locomotives would be similar to diesel-electric locomotives "under the floor" with similar traction motors. "Above the floor" devices such as transformers, rectifiers and inverters are all within the state of the art. Transmission and distribution systems have been developed in Europe and Japan and could be adapted to American conditions.

- Identify where increased electrical generating capacity would be needed. Whether electrification would be nuclear or coal powered would be decided by research in that area and local policy. It may vary from one place to another in the US. Where convenient to waterpower or coal, those sources would be used. Nuclear power might be used widely provided that certain objections to it can be overcome.

- Determine where by-pass freight routes are desired around urban areas. These are desired for carriage of hazardous materials and as ways around urban railroad congestion. In recent months, carriage of hazardous material through Washington, DC has stirred up opposition by local residents and their political representatives. There are few options other than very circuitous routes that would bring the shipments through other communities which would object.

Input from local planning agencies will be desired, but oversight by a steering committee appears to be desirable and necessary because many planners have not had academic training or experience in evaluating what railroad rights of way might be used for. They might want a hiking trail on what might be a strategic interstate freight corridor.

- A nationwide survey is needed to determine where such by-passes are desired. The survey would include identification of existing abandoned or underused alignments that could be incorporated.

- Costs and benefits from such by-passes should be identified and quantified. They could be strategic redundant routes.

- Create a "Greater Amtrak" route structure and overlay it on a proposed fast freight network. Determine where multiple track would be needed, multiple meaning three or more tracks. It used to exist, and roadbeds remain in most places, primarily New York - Cleveland on the ex-New York Central and New York - Philadelphia - Pittsburgh on the ex-Pennsylvania Railroad. Short segments did exist in other places such as on the Pittsburgh & Lake Erie between Pittsburgh and Youngstown where the heavy industry that was served has disappeared. Some multi-track routes may not be needed to be replaced, but new multi-track may be needed where none existed, such as has occurred for the Powder River Coal Field in Wyoming. Other new needs will occur for multiple track.

The sum of all the above efforts will be a very large research effort. It might be separated by task into contracts, or it might be awarded to an agency that could manage and coordinate the entire effort, subcontracting out tasks. The latter appears desirable because of the huge depth and breadth of scope and need to coordinate tasks.

- Financing of such a National System of Railroads will be a major and continuous undertaking. In the recent past, TRB and USDOT/FHWA have sponsored meetings/seminars/symposia on the subject of innovative financing of transportation projects. There is no need for duplication. Rather, research toward financing the National System of Interstate and Defense Railroads should build upon work already done. This new research effort will be separate from but in parallel with research to define and quantify the proposed system.

Win/Win: A key point to be kept in mind is that financing must be acceptable to all parties to any agreement to improve the national railroad system. With win/win in mind, it is suggested that improvements funded by the public sector be owned by a public entity and leased to the railroads so that the improvements should not be subject real estate taxes.

Some assumptions here may be in order, but they should be confirmed before work begins.

- Whatever is proposed must be acceptable to the freight railroads which own nearly all the national railroad system. It must be a win/win combination that benefits the owning railroads, as well as public sector needs.

- Tax credits as proposed by the Association of American Railroads may well be a primary source of capital funds from the private sector. It is suggested a basic percentage be established for all railroad infrastructure, primarily heavy haul routes, and a somewhat higher percentage be allowed for multi-tracked lines handling passenger trains operated by public entities or on behalf of public entities.

- For very large projects (which would be common) having very long pay off periods, precedent of the Alameda Corridor might be followed. A public entity would be owner, and would issue long term bonds to fund the project. Using railroad(s) would pay a fee (a toll) per car, per ton, per ton-mile or whatever logically fits the project for the use of it. If such fees would not cover interest and amortization, public financing of the balance might be used, covered by a port authority or whatever the owning agency might be assuming it has cash flow from other sources.

- Multi-purpose corridors might be established, especially in urban areas, in which a corridor might include separate freight and passenger railroad tracks along with fiber optic cable, electric power lines (especially if the railroad is or is to be electrified), water or other pipe lines, and perhaps truck-only roads. Fees from all users would be applied to bond issues. If forecast revenues were found insufficient, direct grants from relevant public agencies might be sought. The nature of each project would guide choices of funding. It is likely funding will be project specific, although similar projects might well employ similar funding methods. Innovative, new, financing methods should be an objective of research.

- Legislation at the federal and state levels will be needed to implement the proposed National System of Interstate and Defense Railroads. It would be the objective of a final research task to draft such proposed legislation for review by representative staff of relevant legislative bodies.

The above program is ambitious and will require much investment over a period of years. It need not be done all at once. Much of it is already in place, and needs only improvement. Restoration of double track where rights of way exist could be an early development. Some bottlenecks are already apparent, and are the topic of another panel discussion. Elimination of such bottlenecks would be a natural inclusion in the proposed National System. Identification of defense needs is the subject of still another panel that will be fit into the National System.

Task 0: A preliminary first task will be to estimate the funds and time needed to undertake the research outlined above. A source of such funds must then be identified and found. Some money or services in kind might come from the railroad industry itself, as a key beneficiary and would also give them seats on any steering committee. Much must come from the public sector, most likely USDOT through its FRA, FHWA or other appropriate agency. An independent research organization would manage the effort, and this would logically be the Transportation Research Board which already has much experience in some of the proposed tasks. Tasks would be advertised and awarded to research foundations or consultants in the usual manner. This effort might take up to three years and might cost on the order of $3 to $5 million. Output would be a conceptual engineering type of result defining a National System of Interstate and Defense Railroads and putting tasks in prioritized order for implementation.

A sense of urgency is needed to create a National System that will reduce the nation's dependence upon imported petroleum for its basic interstate transportation needs. The world's petroleum supply is being used up at an ever increasing rate, and many of its sources are in insecure areas. President Bush's state of the union message January 23, 2007 included an objective of greatly reducing the US's consumption of petroleum for surface transportation purposes. The proposed electrified railroad system would contribute to this objective in a big way. Freight railroads are one of the larger users of diesel fuel, much of which must be consumed on main lines which are most conducive to electrification. It has been estimated that railroads consume about six percent of the nation's consumption of petroleum. Railroads are the only interstate mode that is suitable for electrification using existing technology. We should save petroleum for uses in which there is no readily apparent alternative such as aviation.

If we don't get started promptly, we will regret it in the not too distant future. The future is approaching rapidly. It is recommended the research proposed above be authorized and funded at the earliest opportunity. It took fifty years to build the Interstate and Defense Highway System as defined in 1956 legislation and amended from time to time. The railroad system envisaged would take approximately the same length of time.

An improved railroad system will benefit the economy.

An electrified railroad system would reduce petroleum use and will also contribute to faster and more efficient operation.

An unimproved railroad system will be a hindrance to economic growth.

If the United States is to continue its role as the world's leading economy, it must have a 21st Century System of Interstate and Defense Railroads.

The time to begin is now!

[End quote]

4) One highway interchange to be rebuilt in New Jersey using stimulus funds appropriated earlier this year connects an Interstate Highway with a US Highway and a New Jersey state road. The cost of rebuilding this single interchange is $900 million. Amtrak's average annual free federal monies appropriation is $1.3 billion, just $400 million more than the single interchange in New Jersey.

This does not speak of the unattractive bugaboo of modal envy, but makes business sense for the spending of government resources for the highest and best use of funds and return on investment. While the highway interchange will serve perhaps less than two million citizens in New Jersey, that same $900 million, applied to Amtrak's national system, would easily serve over 20 million Americans and international tourists, based on Amtrak's unacceptably skeletal system.

Which is the best return on investment?

Where is the vision in federal, state, and local governments to start seriously including passenger rail in government planning?

Where is the vision in Amtrak to start realigning corporate resources to reach out to the various government agencies to create awareness and programs which benefit everyone involved in domestic network transportation planning?
 
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This Week at Amtrak; April 21, 2009

A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

America's foremost passenger rail policy institute

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail [email protected]http://www.unitedrail.org

Volume 6, Number 11

Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute that focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, and New York. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) America finally has a surface transportation plan – sort of. The Obama Administration has, to great fanfare, placed a renewed emphasis on high speed rail as our next capital system of transportation. No one seems to have an exact definition of high speed rail for this plan, but it's useful to say all of the proposed routes reach a traveling speed of at least 110 miles per hour over some portion of the route.

The foamers are foaming at the mouth over this, and they are so collectively excited, they can't stand to wait for all of this to happen. Towns and cities large and small are trying to get into the high speed rail business, with great speculation as to what high speed rail can do for the future of their denizens. One can imagine that if newspapers of the day were archived when the first transcontinental lines were built just after the Late War of Northern Aggression in the 19th Century, the same type of speculation was made then as today about what the railroad would do for local commerce and local development. Hopefully, the railroad rascals and robber barons of that day haven't become the railroad CEOs of today.

We've read what visionaries like Gil Carmichael and Andrew Selden have to say about the future of passenger rail in this country. And, we're seeing what other voices have to say, too. The informed voices are making interesting projections and floating viable ideas; the uninformed, as usual, are using up valuable oxygen and wasting our time with hyperbole.

2) It is time to step back half a step and look at the big picture. We've seen the designation of 10 allegedly viable high speed corridors in the United States, some just a couple of hundred miles long, others multiple hundreds of miles long.

As we proceed to designate spending this year for the first corridors, what are we doing to design a full system? When the Eisenhower Interstate Highway System was designed and building began, it was pretty much a complete map; certainly much more than today's few high speed rail corridors.

We know connectivity is critical for the success of any rail corridor, and, at the moment, there doesn't seem to be much connectivity in the initial design. "Disjointed" perhaps is the best description of the first parts of the system.

And, we know these new high speed lines are going to be considered almost exclusively for passenger trains, so they will cause a financial double whammy. First, the higher the track speed, the more expensive it is to maintain that track. Speed can kill, and it really can kill when you combine high speed trains on low speed track. Second, today's tracks outside of Amtrak's expensive to maintain Northeast Corridor share the right of way with pesky, money-making, keep-America-moving freight trains. In most instances, the argument is made the tracks are maintained for the heavy pounding of freight trains, and only maintained at incrementally higher costs for passenger train speeds. Thus, outside of the NEC, no passenger train is burdened with the full cost of track maintenance, since tracks are shared with freight trains.

The new, nearly-exclusive high speed train tracks will have ALL of the maintenance costs charged to the high speed trains, which will make the high speed trains less financially viable.

3) Amtrak for years has falsely claimed Acela service on the NEC makes a profit. Amtrak accomplishes this through financial hocus-pocus (which sounds so much better than to simply say they are lying) and the payment of routine maintenance costs from capital budgets instead of operating budgets, or, simply just ignoring maintenance and chalking it all up to deferred maintenance, and claiming Acela service is profitable. The reality is, of course, Acela is never charged with all of the costs of operating the service because of the financial hocus-pocus.

So, who is going to operate these nifty new high speed trains? The French, since they are not busy surrendering at the moment to anyone, have generously offered to come run the trains, but it's unlikely Amtrak is going to take kindly to that suggestion.

If Amtrak is the operator of the high speed trains, will it continue its current shabby and probably illicit accounting practices and use the same methods to keep track of high speed profits and losses it does on the NEC? Or, will somebody – anybody – seize the initiative and declare high speed rail to be free of funny accounting and demand everything be done right from the first moment?

4) And, let's talk more in-depth about the issues of connectivity and feeder systems to the proposed new high speed rail trains.

Everyone wants to point to Europe as the example to follow. (Which, by the way, should you, too, choose to point to Europe, please take note of the Dutch, German, and other passenger rail systems in Europe which do make money, commonly called "profit." Amtrak and its sycophant organizations such as the National Association of Railroad Passengers seem to love to tell the lie that no passenger systems in the world make money, which we know not to be true. Even the Japanese passenger rail systems turn a profit.)

One of the reasons European trains make money is connectivity; you CAN get there from here. Unlike Amtrak's skeletal system, with current glaring holes like the missing Sunset Limited east of New Orleans to Florida, and the fact in Florida you can't get to Atlanta, the commercial capital of the Southeast by passenger train, in Europe everywhere is connected to everywhere else by either conventional passenger rail, fast passenger rail, or high speed passenger rail. Frequencies are frequent (hence, the term), levels of service are designed to match market demand, and competition abounds, providing incentive to do well and provide good passenger service.

In Europe, you can go almost anywhere on a train. In America, there are many more small, medium, and large cities and towns that Amtrak doesn't serve than it serves. Amtrak brags it serves just over 500 destinations in 46 states, with 21,000 route miles of service. Hmmm ... let's see, 46 states, round up to 510 destinations, that averages 11.08 station stops per state. But, wait! In Florida alone, Amtrak serves 23 stations (including Amtrak Thruway bus service), so that means some states have less than the average of 11.08 stations. The Commonwealth of Virginia has 40 cities and towns, but Amtrak only serves 14 of those, including Amtrak Thruway bus service.

Should we return do the days of the 1956 Official Railway Guide where every small town and hamlet had passenger train service? Certainly, not. But, for Amtrak to be successful, and the next generation of high speed trains to be successful, then more than a mere 500 cities and towns must have passenger train service.

5) Where does/where should Amtrak figure into the development of high speed rail? The automatic answer is it should figure prominently. The realistic answer is, Amtrak, after being the monopoly passenger rail carrier in the United States since 1971, for nearly 40 years, still has not proven it is worthy of the tax dollars which are poured into it year after year.

This brings us to "the vision thing" as the first President George H.W. Bush used to say at the end of the 1980s.

As it stands today, Amtrak and its management lack vision. Amtrak may corporately lust after the pot of money which is being thrown at the development of high speed rail, but it really has not proven itself worthy of the privilege of directing the spending of that money.

Here is what Andrew Selden has to say as a vision for the immediate and long-term future of Amtrak.

[begin quote]

A. Amtrak must become relevant.

Its contribution to national mobility today does not justify its cost. The national network is too small – it goes to too few places and interconnects too few city pairs (e.g., it doesn't go to Las Vegas, Nevada or Columbus, Ohio, and one cannot get from Dallas to Denver or Dallas to Orlando). Even in what its own supporters characterize as its strongest market, the Northeast Corridor, its market share of intercity trips is less than 1%, at a public cost of about three-quarters of a billion dollars a year. Even in the NEC, a complete shut-down would be all but imperceptible as all of its customers (except in the New York-Philadelphia sub-market) could be easily absorbed into existing road and airway capacity.

B. Amtrak must grow.

No business, or social service, succeeds by stagnating. Amtrak's share of the national intercity travel business has shrunk steadily for three decades. Its carrying capacity has shrunk steadily for two decades. The newest Superliner rail car is more than 10 years old and the average age of the intercity fleet is far older than the cars Amtrak inherited from the private railroads in 1971. At the same time, Boeing builds a new 737 airliner every day, and Airbus builds a new A320 every day. Southwest Airlines adds a dozen or more new aircraft to its fleet every year. Amtrak could not absorb real growth if it were to occur, except in regional corridor markets where even a doubling of transactions would not raise it to a 2% market share.

C. Amtrak must change its vision.

Amtrak views itself as a social service, like a transit agency or a sewer authority, and thus as a ward of government. It measures its performance by the metrics of a public agency, in simple transaction volume. The only function at which it truly excels is extracting money from public sector sponsors. This vision condemns Amtrak to always being irrelevant to the needs of the traveling public. Amtrak must adopt a vision of sustained growth, relevance and minimized dependence upon public agency financing in favor of dependency upon customer selection, of mode and route. Amtrak must position its services and its operational network such that it can become the mode of consumer preference for most intercity travel.

D. Amtrak needs a new business model.

Amtrak has pursued the same business model for its entire history, one based upon the supply-driven model of point-to-point short corridors between urban city-pairs, based on the High Speed Ground Transportation Act of 1966. That model has produced the current state of Amtrak: irrelevancy to the traveling public and financial catastrophe. The model causes the results, the results do not occur despite the model. The new business model must be based on consumer demand, in applications that can be financially remunerative. The new model must focus on the metrics of output, not merely transaction volume, and growth, market share, and maximal return (in output and revenue) on invested capital. The model must create volume and efficiencies of scale on a national basis, by developing a true national network of regional and interregional routes that allow use of rail for most intercity travel demand, and inherently grow with demand and population growth. Capacity must be re-allocated to match consumer demand, and must grow to anticipate and accommodate growth in demand.

[End quote]

6) It's going to take a while before the first shovel of dirt is turned to build any new high speed rail systems, even those systems with studies completed and the permitting process underway. What do we do in the interim?

We must unleash the pent-up power of Amtrak and let it take its natural course to prosperity through expansion and growth. Stop all of this silliness of whether or not Gulf Coast cities and towns east of New Orleans deserve or can support the reinstatement of the Sunset Limited from New Orleans to Florida. Yes, those cities can. Nashville, too, can support passenger rail, as could Louisville, Kentucky if it was properly configured and based on passenger needs, not commodity needs. Amtrak's present skeletal system has done yeoman's work as a placeholder, but those days need to be over. Amtrak and its host railroads must devise a plan – right now – that will provide for growth and connectivity and a financial infrastructure through connectivity and a proper domestic transportation matrix to support coming high speed rail and make it viable from the first day.

To allow Amtrak to remain as it is, without first improving it, and jump directly to high speed rail is like putting a race car on a bicycle path.

High speed rail may be visionary, it may be exciting and glamorous, and it may be the wave of the future. But, if the proper connectivity infrastructure is not in place when high speed rail becomes a reality, then it will fail, and be even a worse stepchild of government than Amtrak is today.

Andrew Selden has dubbed a new concept in America – advanced passenger rail. APR will ensure the success of high speed rail, and can be accomplished in less than three years.

This first step towards high speed rail can be done cheaply (as opposed to what is being spent on high speed rail) and efficiently. Things like ordering new passenger cars for existing trains, making station and parking improvements to make Amtrak more user friendly, and making relatively inexpensive upgrades to today's railroad infrastructure to allow initial 90 miles per hour running where feasible, along with eliminating railroad choke points like junctions and bridges, and adding double track where viable.

An important aspect is these are all things which can be done with existing technology and plans, without requiring any costly and time consuming environmental politics, and mostly without land acquisitions (with a few exceptions at a few stations). These are things which can be begun TODAY with almost immediate MEASURABLE results and gauged RETURN ON INVESTMENT. These are the steps which pave the way for successful high speed rail. These are the steps that cost relatively little to do, thus building a new popularity for passenger rail which will result in less spending by the federal treasury later to build a popularity for high speed passenger rail.

7) Now is not the time for the faint of heart. Now is the time for the bold and resourceful to stand up and demand things be done right, in the proper order, and by those who have a vision to understand the process. Now is not the time to waste valuable federal dollars in the beginning on a project that may flounder. Embrace advanced passenger rail as the first logical step towards high speed rail. Finish the job with Amtrak and create a viable, functioning organization which can meet the demands of the future without relying on political patronage and money from others that only comes after months of haggling and begging.

This time, do it right.

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J. Bruce Richardson

President

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

[email protected]

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This Week at Amtrak; April 27, 2009







A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from









United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.




America's foremost passenger rail policy institute








1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA




Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail

[email protected]http://www.unitedrail.org










Volume 6, Number 12









Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute that focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, and New York. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) We're hearing many things about the Sunset Limited route; not many of them are what we want to hear.

Working from west to east, and working from confirmation from good, multiple sources, it appears Amtrak's plans to make the Sunset Limited a daily train mostly consist of extending the Texas Eagle from its artificial endpoint of San Antonio, Texas all the way west to Los Angeles.

This is the good part, having the Texas Eagle now providing a second daily service between Los Angeles and Chicago over a variety of other intermediate stops and opportunities for hubbing and allowing the natural affects of the matrix theory to come into play. The bad part appears to be this will replace the Sunset Limited, America's oldest named passenger train, with a train once mistaken by Al Gore's office for a noble species of bird.

If the Texas Eagles does extend all the way to Los Angeles on a daily basis, that will be a boon to the fortunes and finances of that train, and – if Amtrak uses enough foresight – a boon to the fortunes and finances of the beleaguered Sunset Limited.

In every way the Sunset has been mismanaged by Amtrak through the years, and even with some of its best frontline managers running the train and making the most of a bad situation, the Sunset has always suffered from being an exceptionally long route with a multitude of stations and infrastructure, but only tri-weekly operation. Where all other Amtrak trains have 730 departures a year (once a day in each direction), the Sunset only has 312 departures a year, yet carries all of the station and corporate overhead of a daily train. Basically, by design, the Sunset has never been given a chance to show its financial chops.

If you take today's Sunset Limited numbers and extrapolate them over a year for a daily train, they are dramatically different, and move the Sunset into a much different financial category of long distance train.

Using Fiscal Year 2008 annual performance numbers, the Sunset (Based on its truncated route of Los Angeles to New Orleans; not its full pre-Hurricane Katrina route of Los Angeles to Orlando, Florida.):

Total Revenue, tri-weekly – $8,046,900

Total Revenue, projected if daily – $18,827,682

This moves the Sunset from next to last place (The Cardinal, Amtrak's only other long distance tri-weekly train.) in revenue for all long distance trains to in front of the Palmetto, City of New Orleans, and Capitol Limited.

Revenue Passenger Miles, tri-weekly – 66,149,000

Revenue Passenger Miles, projected if daily – 154,771,698

This moves the Sunset from next to last place (The Cardinal, again.) in revenue passenger miles for all long distance trains to in front of the Palmetto, City of New Orleans, Capitol Limited, Crescent, Lake Shore Limited, and Texas Eagle.

Ridership, tri-weekly – 71,700

Ridership, projected if daily – 167,759

This moves the Sunset from dead last (including the Cardinal) in Ridership for all long distance trains up one place to in front of the Cardinal.

Seat Miles, tri-weekly – 116,569,226

Seat Miles, projected if daily – 272,742,099

This moves the Sunset from next to last place (Back to the Cardinal, again.) in Seat Miles for all long distance train to in front of the City of New Orleans, Palmetto, Texas Eagle, Capitol Limited, and Lake Shore Limited.

This brief display of numbers shows two points: First, if allowed, the Sunset Limited can be a reasonable performer, and not the financial punching bag of every blow-hard politician who doesn't understand passenger rail economics. And, second, ridership numbers alone, the way Amtrak loves to present them as an absolute of performance measurement, mean nothing. While the Sunset's spot for ridership moves up only one position, it moves up dramatically in all other categories which really matter.

But, you wisely say, "what about expenses; won't they go up, too?" Yes, they will, but will only go up incrementally for some, but not all categories.

As an example, station costs will go up, but, since some stations, depending on the train's schedule, are open most of the week, or all of the week anyway (Such as New Orleans, San Antonio, and Los Angeles.), the only difference will be what it takes to open the remaining stations every day instead of most days.

Train miles, of course, will increase. But, so will the corresponding number of opportunities for revenue to be produced, too, and on Amtrak long distance trains, revenue exceeds actual operating costs. Onboard services employees and train and engine crews costs will increase, but only incrementally. Train and engine crews will take the smallest hit, because they work only an average of eight hour shifts now, and with tri-weekly service, these crews are often paid to sit around waiting for the next train instead of staying in continuous service such as on daily trains.

Where incorrectly Amtrak piles on the excess costs to the long distance system (Often, so the Northeast Corridor trains look better financially.) usually occurs in areas of corporate overhead, the reservations system, and related areas. If the Sunset is a daily train, there will be near-zero additional costs associated with all of these functions (Okay, there probably will be a slight increase in the cost of copy machine paper and toner.). A daily Sunset will require no additional costs for reservations, the number of corporate managers in Chicago and Washington, or the number of people in Human Resources.

Put all of this together and tie a nice bow on the package and – suddenly – if the Texas Eagle goes daily and starts fully sharing expenses with the Sunset between San Antonio and Los Angeles, and the Sunset goes daily and provides actual travel choices instead of the one-service-in-each-direction-take-it-or-leave-it for all of the 13 stations between San Antonio and Los Angeles, there is a financial and transportation output boon for both trains.

But, from what is coming out of Amtrak right now, this scenario is unlikely, and a butchered Sunset Limited route seems to be in the making.

If a daily Texas Eagle assumes the Sunset Route on the west end, then most likely a daily, daylight train will run between San Antonio and New Orleans, consisting of coaches and reduced food service from a full dining car to a lounge car selling potentially stale sandwiches. The home terminal for this train would be New Orleans, which has an excellent crew base, and used to have a good maintenance base before most activities were moved elsewhere.

While two connecting trains meeting in San Antonio would preserve the length of the original, pre-1993 Sunset route, it doesn't do much for passengers; but, it does keep intact Amtrak's penchant for operating trains for the convenience of its operating and maintenance departments.

From 1993 to the dark days when Hurricane Katrina hit in 2005 (We're fast approaching the 4th anniversary of that tragedy, and Amtrak for that long has been telling everyone the dog ate its homework and refusing to reinstate the train and make any move to reconsider running it, even though it officially never cancelled the train or abandoned the route. CSX released the track to Amtrak for use again three years ago, on April 1, 2006.), the Sunset was the only fully transcontinental train in North America, virtually running from the Left Coast in Los Angeles to the Right Coast in Jacksonville, Florida, and down to first Miami and then more sensibly truncated to Orlando.

Passengers luxuriated in single-car, single-train service to any station, without bother of changing trains. And, the service was popular, despite the many digestive ills of Union Pacific Railroad as it gobbled up the Southern Pacific Railroad, owner of the Sunset Route between Los Angeles and New Orleans. Despite the Sunset being tri-weekly, and constantly running late, passengers still rode the train. It wasn't until the final year and a half before Hurricane Katrina when CSX was performing many maintenance and infrastructure upgrade chores on the Sunset route east of New Orleans, that ridership fell for the simple reasons Amtrak management at the time was CONSTANTLY cancelling the train for the entire run east of New Orleans, and the unofficial slogan of Amtrak was "no alternative transportation provided." This was occurring every season of the year; it was nearly impossible to book a trip on the Sunset much in advance of departure because of all of the cancellations.

The arrival of Hurricane Katrina provided the biggest reason of all for cancellation of the Sunset, and Amtrak, in one of its darkest and foulest corporate moments, took advantage of the cancellation to drive a stake through the heart of the Sunset and keep it off the rails east of New Orleans, even though CSX gallantly made a Herculean effort to restore that track and get the route open again in record time.

After all, Amtrak managers and planners could point to the declining ridership east of New Orleans and with something of a con man's straight face, declare to Amtrak's Board of Directors the route was more of a loser than most. The dishonest part of that on the part of Amtrak's management cadre and what it was presenting to the Amtrak Board of Directors was the numbers were falling by Amtrak's own design, as it constantly, in the months preceding the windy arrival of Hurricane Katrina, kept cancelling trains because of CSX planned maintenance and did nothing to assist passengers other than directing them to the bus station and telling passengers they were on their own.

In effect, Amtrak's dishonest managers at the time grabbed onto knowingly false and manipulated information, and killed a train that was a vital link in its system, all the while claiming there was no financial benefit in restarting the train, using every excuse in the book, from storm-damaged stations to bad track, to the dog ate their homework.

Now, after Florida Congresswoman Corrine Brown has given Amtrak $1 million in free federal money to "study" the reinstatement of the route, Amtrak has come up with a scenario which breaks a once promising transcontinental route into three different trains, all at the inconvenience of Amtrak's passengers.

2) All of this brings us to Amtrak's April 23rd initial presentation to the Southern High-Speed Rail Commission meeting in Birmingham, Alabama. This coalition of the three states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama has a long history of promoting efficient and effective rail services along the Gulf Coast.

The bottom line on Amtrak's presentation for restoration of service to the Sunset Limited route east of New Orleans was one of three proposals would likely be chosen.

The first proposal is a complete restoration of Sunset Limited service as it was previously, with an endpoint of Orlando, as before Hurricane Katrina. It should be noted – again – that 46% of the Sunset's total route revenues originated on the route east of New Orleans, a concept which seems to constantly escape the numbers crunchers at Amtrak.

The second proposal is one long advocated by United Rail Passenger Alliance of the route of the daily City of New Orleans being extended eastward to Orlando over the previous Sunset route.

The third proposal, which is probably the most likely, is a new daily train on an overnight schedule, based either in New Orleans or Sanford (Orlando) running the Sunset's east-end route, with connections to the new train to the west of New Orleans, replacing the Sunset to San Antonio.

In its presentation, Amtrak did its usual huffing and puffing about a shortage of equipment (Self-inflicted, by choice, if they were honest with themselves.), and, oddly, about a lack of funding to run this train. Since funding wasn't a problem prior to Hurricane Katrina, one can't help but wonder why funding is a problem now, since this is a national system train, and not a state-sponsored corridor train.

Let's veer to the left here for a moment. If Amtrak is allowed to get away with taking a long distance route and chop it into pieces, and then tell certain states that restoration of service will only come with the proffering of state or regional monies, then no route – NOT A SINGLE ONE – in the Amtrak system is safe from this type of blackmail shenanigans. Amtrak could just as easily take the California Zephyr, and declare the route between Chicago and Denver to be a new corridor, and the company not be willing to operate the Zephyr unless Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, and Illinois pony up big bucks. Since Missouri and Illinois are already paying twice for Amtrak service (Once through the federal dollars which flow to Amtrak, and the second time for trains within Illinois and Missouri Amtrak says it won't run without state funds.), what's to keep ambitious managers at Amtrak seeking more from these current donors?

But, back to the Sunset route east of New Orleans. Any of the three solutions outlined above are acceptable, as long as the actual restoration of the Sunset be done on a daily basis, and not return as tri-weekly service.

In its presentation, Amtrak said a dependable train between New Orleans and Orlando would generate somewhere between 50,000 to 100,000 passengers a year, an increase over the final year numbers from Amtrak of 16,000 to 17,000 passengers a year based on the many months of train annulments and outright cancellations Amtrak did to the Sunset due to an isolated period of CSX track work and upgrades before Katrina.

Taking Amtrak at its word, at 17,000 passengers a year, and 312 departures a year (If none of the annulments had taken place.), that means an average of only 54 riders per departure were on the train.

That number can't be correct. Year round, Orlando always had heavy boardings, as did Jacksonville. Tallahassee and Pensacola usually had pretty good business, too, and more than a smattering of passengers called Mobile their station stop. What happened here? Most likely, whoever crunched the numbers at Amtrak didn't pull the counts correctly. It's impossible to think that train ran empty through all of the major metropolitan areas it served, especially Orlando, one of the world's busiest vacation destinations. However, Amtrak may have been using one of its old hocus-pocus tricks when pulling this number, by just using local boardings for points between New Orleans and Orlando.

Years ago in the 1980s when URPA fought and won the war to extend the Palmetto from Savannah, Georgia to Jacksonville, Florida, when Amtrak managers presented data to the Board of Directors, they presented data which showed local business only between Savannah and Jacksonville, a short distance of only 148 miles. The Amtrak planning department never took into account how many passengers in Jacksonville (Which turned out to be a substantial amount.) would board a northbound Palmetto and travel beyond Savannah to all of the other cities along the route, including those cities in South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York. The only figures the Amtrak planning department pulled were for Savannah-Jacksonville business.

It's likely this same scenario has happened with the Sunset numbers east of New Orleans, where we know 46% of the pre-Katrina Sunset's revenues originated east of New Orleans. Passengers boarding in Orlando, Palatka, Jacksonville, Lake City, Tallahassee and elsewhere to the west are just as likely to travel to Houston, San Antonio, El Paso, Tucson, Maricopa, Yuma and Los Angeles as they are to Pascagoula, Biloxi, Bay St. Louis, and New Orleans.

Again, we drift into the discussion of intellectual honesty when discussing Amtrak, even when discussing internal numbers crunching and internal communications, and who has what agenda.

The new 50,000 to 100,000 projected figures are probably a bit low, as any figures in a service estimate should be. Based on 100,000 passengers per year, and 730 departures, that puts an average of only 137 passengers per train, on a route which is just over 600 miles in length, which includes Orlando, Jacksonville, Florida's capital of Tallahassee, Pensacola, Mobile, and all of the other Gulf Coast cities between Mobile and New Orleans. It isn't unreasonable to say Amtrak's passenger count estimate is low by as much as 50%, but, again, for estimating purposes, it's good to have a low count of revenues.

Much of the Sunset's transcontinental on-time performance factors in the past were due to the Union Pacific Railroad's problems integrating the Southern Pacific into its larger UP system. It was not unusual for the Sunset to register the lowest on-time performance measurements in the Amtrak system. Today, that has much improved, with the Sunset's on-time factor somewhat equivalent with most other long distance trains.

Running a single train across an entire continent does present its own special set of problems and challenges. Enormous and expensive pad time in the Sunset's schedule partially solves that problem, including, when it ran all the way to Orlando, at least three to four hours layover time in New Orleans, which often wasn't enough.

In an ideal world, the City of New Orleans would be extended to Orlando as the overnight train, offering connections from an eastbound train from San Antonio, but a separate, daylight train would also run between New Orleans and Jacksonville. The increased travel choices through two frequencies generally push ridership numbers through the roof, even with just a second frequency.

So, it's possible the Sunset will be butchered into three separate trains. It would be nice to know Sunset cars would be carried on the Texas Eagle (including sleepers) and transferred in San Antonio to the New Orleans bound train. At least that would provide through-passengers with the convenience and courtesy of same-car service, and would also preserve the Sunset Limited name. A single change in New Orleans is not the end of the world, as long as legal connections can be made and enforced. Even in the early days of the Sunset's coast to coast service, splitting the train in New Orleans, offering a "fresh and clean" on-time train between New Orleans and Orlando was discussed and considered an option. It's tough to explain to someone in Atmore, Alabama their train was delayed by multiple hours because of a grade crossing accident in Yuma, Arizona, about 2,000 miles away.

3) Let's take a moment and study what could happen east of New Orleans if the present City of New Orleans was extended to Orlando (Or, even better, to Tampa, which sits in the middle of a four million resident metropolitan area on Florida's West Coast, just 99 route miles beyond the Orlando Amtrak station, and has a complete, but unloved and unused maintenance base.).

Today's City of New Orleans operates between New Orleans and Chicago via Jackson, Mississippi; Memphis, Tennessee; Carbondale, Illinois and various other cities and towns.

Southbound, the City leaves Chicago at 8:00 P.M., arrives in Memphis at 6:27 A.M., and pulls into New Orleans Union Passenger Terminal on Loyola Avenue at 3:32 P.M.

Northbound, the City leaves New Orleans at 1:45 P.M., arrives in Memphis at 10:00 P.M., and arrives at Chicago Union Station at 9:00 A.M., at the end of rush hour.

The City trainset lays over in New Orleans for over 21 hours each day and night before it heads north, again. There is an 11 hour turn time in Chicago.

Okay, let's be creative and get away from Amtrak's habit of only running routes in a straight line, and loathing to split trains into sections (Even as it successfully does each day in Spokane, Washington for the two sections of the Empire Builder.).

Remember, the matrix theory, where more trains to more places with more city pairs dramatically improves travel choices and ridership and revenue passenger miles.

During the 1979 murder of much of Amtrak's long distance system by Democrat Jimmy Carter's administration, Amtrak lost its only Chicago to Florida service, the Floridian. Now, there is an opportunity to not only restore a much-agitated-for Chicago to Florida same train service, but improve on the concept, too.

Understand the Auto Train maintenance facility in the Orlando suburb of Sanford is one of Amtrak's best maintenance facilities. The work done there is consistently superb. When the Sunset had its maintenance performed there instead of Los Angeles, equipment reliability jumped substantially, as well as passenger satisfaction because the train was cleaner and everything worked.

So, move the maintenance of the City of New Orleans to Sanford/Orlando. Since you won't need to rely on maintenance in Chicago, do something dramatic on that end of the route, and extend the City's route to either Minneapolis/St. Paul to the west, or Detroit to the east. Either of these logical extensions make sense because a second, full service train is being added to the busy Minneapolis/St. Paul to Chicago market, or Detroit for the first time in years will have a full service train (And, there is already a maintenance base in Detroit, too.) with direct connections to the lower Midwest and Florida. It's an eight hour run from Chicago to Minneapolis, and about an eight hour run between Chicago and the Detroit maintenance base, too. In other words, the existing Chicago-New Orleans schedule of the City could easily be maintained with either of these extensions.

But, you wail, Amtrak would need more sets of equipment to make either of these changes. Yes, it would. And, there is adequate equipment available, sitting around in the wreck line weeds which could be restored and put back into high revenue service instead of deteriorating on some unloved siding. At some point someone has to make a visionary choice and say either the highly valuable equipment sitting on the wreck line is worth something, or Amtrak is not interested in running long distance trains, and the equipment should be sold to some Third World country which has better service than the United States has today.

Okay, so we've extended the north end of the City to other logical endpoints. What else can we accomplish getting this train to Florida?

Easy. We can restore the River Cities between Kansas City, St. Louis, Centralia, Memphis, and New Orleans. When Amtrak went through its second massacre of routes under Democrat President Bill Clinton, this piggyback train which operated as part of the City of New Orleans from New Orleans to Centralia, Illinois and then split into a separate section, provided the two major metropolitan areas of Kansas City and St. Louis with a direct connection to New Orleans.

If this service is restored, then a passenger in Kansas City or St. Louis will be able to board a train and stay in the same seat or accommodation all the way to Orlando, Florida via Memphis and New Orleans. Again, the power of the matrix theory with enhanced city pairs and many more travel opportunities comes into play, creating a powerhouse of a train.

Think of this, all on the same train:

From the Minneapolis/St. Paul side of the equation (substitute Detroit if you like),

Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota

Red Wing, Minnesota

Winona, Minnesota

La Crosse, Wisconsin

Tomah, Wisconsin

Wisconsin Dells, Wisconsin

Portage, Wisconsin

Columbus, Wisconsin

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Glenview, Illinois

Chicago, Illinois

Homewood, Illinois

Kankakee, Illinois

Gilman, Illinois

Rantoul, Illinois

Champaign-Urbana, Illinois

Mattoon, Illinois

Effingham, Illinois

Centralia, Illinois

Kansas City, Kansas

Independence, Missouri

Lee's Summit, Missouri

Warrensburg, Missouri

Sedalia, Missouri

Jefferson City, Missouri

Hermann, Missouri

Washington, Missouri

Kirkwood, Missouri

St. Louis, Missouri

Belleville, Illinois

Du Quoin, Illinois

Carbondale, Illinois

Fulton, Kentucky

Newbern-Dyersburg, Tennessee

Memphis, Tennessee

Greenwood, Mississippi

Yazoo City, Mississippi

Jackson, Mississippi

Hazelhurst, Mississippi

Brookhaven, Mississippi

McComb, Mississippi

Hammond, Louisiana

New Orleans, Louisiana

Bay St. Louis, Mississippi

Gulfport, Mississippi

Biloxi, Mississippi

Pascagoula, Mississippi

Mobile, Alabama

Atmore, Alabama

Pensacola, Florida

Crestview, Florida

Chipley, Florida

Tallahassee, Florida

Madison, Florida

Lake City, Florida

Jacksonville, Florida

Palatka, Florida

DeLand, Florida

Winter Park, Florida

Orlando, Florida

What a powerhouse. Here's a single train departing Florida, with a section to Kansas City and a section to Chicago and Minneapolis/St. Paul (Or, Detroit.), providing 60 terminals and intermediate stations, with a total city pair possibility of 1,770 city pair combinations JUST FOR ONE SINGLE TRAIN ROUTE. When you add the additional hubbing/matrix opportunities for this proposed route in Orlando, Jacksonville, New Orleans, St. Louis, Kansas City, Chicago, and Minneapolis/St. Paul, that number explodes into more thousands of combinations because over a dozen other major Amtrak routes suddenly become connected to this one impressive train. If you calculated every city pair in Amtrak's entire system (Even those which are impractical, such as Dallas-New Orleans.), you have 129,795 city pairs. That is the power of the matrix theory, and that is what can help make Amtrak much more of a player in Advanced Passenger Rail, as a springboard to a high speed passenger rail system all over the country.

Here's hoping Amtrak looks at ALL of the options, and first makes decisions that are best for its passengers and customers (The people who pay the bills and make the company possible.) before it makes decisions based on the comfort and convenience of the operating and maintenance departments.

And, keep in mind when Amtrak WANTS to do something, it can always miraculously find the equipment to do so. Those stimulus dollars which have floated into Amtrak are not the last dollars it's going to receive from the federal treasury. If Amtrak is serious about restoration of service, it will somehow find the money to put a couple of trainsets back together, and get operating funding again for a train which has never been officially discontinued.

This is one of those moments when the Amtrak Board of Directors needs to step up and closely examine all possibilities, not just blindly accept what is presented to them by staff which may have an agenda that is separate from that of the board.

4) On the subject of Advanced Passenger Rail, William Lindley of Scottsdale, Arizona has some thoughts on the subject.

[begin quote]

By William Lindley

Amtrak is the glue that is to bind the growing local rail networks, and it can have a definite role in what Andrew Selden has named Advanced Passenger Rail. Here's how ...

A prerequisite to APR is a national commitment to opening at least one new passenger railcar factory in the United States. Today, all railcars including commuter, light rail and subway cars, are imported from already overburdened foreign plants. Part of rebuilding America will be reigniting our dormant skills in manufacturing, and if passenger trains are part of our future we will be needing many more of them. There must be significant sources of new equipment, and even if an American plant says "Bombardier," "Siemens," or "Kawasaki" it's a step in the right

direction.

As the single physical roadblock to new trains – namely, manufacturing – is removed, Amtrak can go to the states and make offers. In its history, Amtrak has rarely sought expansion; it has nearly always been the states asking for new trains, or Amtrak making demands and threatening to cut service. Instead, let Amtrak now devise a plan to fulfill its charter of tying together America's existing and emerging regional systems, connecting Los Angeles Metrolink to proposed commuter lines in Phoenix and Houston; connecting Dallas's Trinity commuter trains to Chicago's; and likewise across the country.

Specifically, Amtrak's charter is:

"Amtrak shall operate a national rail passenger transportation system which ties together existing and emergent regional rail passenger service and other intermodal passenger service."

– Title 49, Chapter 247 Section 24701 (http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/49C247.txt )

There has been no better time, with new light rail systems in places like Phoenix and Houston bursting with new riders, many of whom never set foot on a bus but have now discovered that, to quote Amtrak's old slogan, "There's something about a train that's magic."

Cities are looking to expand their rail systems but budgets are short. Commuter rail and regional rail deliver more "bang for the buck" than light rail projects do; in Phoenix, a few hundred millions are slated for several five-mile extensions, but similar money could run trains sixty miles northwest to Wickenburg, thirty miles west to Buckeye, maybe even a hundred miles southeast to Tucson. In Arizona, both BNSF and Union Pacific railroads are at the table with the state, counties and cities on passenger rail projects. Arizona DOT and the associations of governments are careful to point out that the railroads are private businesses, and that any agreement must make business sense to them. But experience from Los Angeles to Denver and beyond proves fair agreements can be reached ... agreements that expand freight capacity and bolster safety while providing space for passenger trains. The recent Arizona pattern is being repeated in nearly every major American city.

With new equipment, and with new determination to forge relationships with the railroads, and with regional rail projects looking like better bargains than subways and new highways, there is little in the way of nationwide passenger rail expansion.

Amtrak's challenge is to develop an Advanced Passenger Rail-style proposal to connect these existing and new commuter and transit lines together – first regionally and then nationally. This lays the base for high speed rail in five to ten years, but more importantly it's how in two or three years we can get our people, and our economy, moving sooner rather than later.

[End quote]

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J. Bruce Richardson

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1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

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http://www.unitedrail.org
 
This Week at Amtrak; 2009-05-04

Volume 6, Number 13



Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) It looks like the Sunset Limited, as we know it today - and, since 1993 - is about to be dead and gone, hacked into at least two, probably three pieces as reported in the last issue of This Week at Amtrak. The full story is below, after an account of Florida's SunRail debacle in the Florida Senate. See item number 3, below.

2) SunRail, apparently for all practical purposes is yesterday's news, leaving behind a bewildered constituency trying to pick up the pieces. The demise of SunRail late last week in the Florida Senate came after a long and torturous journey, and the end was due to a lethal combination of revenge, ignorance, and plain stupidity. The last cause - stupidity - shouldn't be too shocking, as it was the stupidity of elected officials who didn't bother to do their homework, and the current state of Florida's Republican Party which has become populated with elected officials who are less than stellar and have only been elected because they pledge allegiance to the Republican label.

Yes, it happened here in Florida, and it could happen to you, too.

First, some background. Florida is a huge state, from the extreme northeast corner just north of here in Jacksonville at the Georgia line, it's over 300 miles due south to the bottom of the peninsula, south of Miami. Going due west from the Atlantic Ocean here at Jacksonville, it's over 300 miles to just west of Pensacola to the Alabama state line. Florida has three distinct coasts, the east coast, west coast, and gulf coast. Our current population estimate is over 18 million souls. Politically, we are divided into seven distinct parts: South Florida, which encompasses Miami, Ft. Lauderdale, and Palm Beach; Southwest Florida which encompasses Naples, Fort Myers, and Sarasota; Tampa Bay, which includes Tampa, St. Petersburg, and Clearwater; the Interstate 4 Corridor of Central Florida which includes Lakeland, Orlando, and Daytona Beach; Northeast Florida which includes St. Augustine and Jacksonville; North Central Florida which encompasses Ocala, Gainesville, and Lake City; and West Florida/the Panhandle, which includes all of the gulf coast areas including Tallahassee, Panama City, and Pensacola.

Republicans for the past 20 years have controlled Florida; we have our second Republican governor in a row (first, Jeb Bush, now, Charlie Crist), and both houses of the Florida legislature have been controlled by Republicans since the 1980s.

South Florida and Gainesville in North Central Florida are the liberal hot spots in the state; most other areas have a mix of Republicans and moderate Democrats running the big cities.

SunRail was a plan to bring commuter rail to Central Florida, starting about 20 miles inland from the east coast in DeLand, on the extreme western edge of Volusia County (Daytona Beach is the most famous city in Volusia County), and traveling southwest to Sanford, Winter Park, Orlando, and Kissimmee, and ending eventually in Poinciana, on the outskirts of what is today the Central Florida theme park area, consisting of Walt Disney World, Universal Studios, and SeaWorld, and everything that goes with those three giants of entertainment and vacation nirvana.

Florida, like so many other states, was a creature of railroad development in the 19th Century, but, railroad development, via the Florida Land Boom in the 1920s, kept going until after 1925.

Eventually, through the usual mergers, Florida ended up with three major railroads, with CSX having the most trackage and claim to the majority of Florida. CSX has two Florida main lines, the old Seaboard Air Line main line via Ocala in the center of the state, and the old Atlantic Coast Line, via Orlando, which runs to the east of the Seaboard main line.

It was the old ACL main line CSX was willing to sell to the State of Florida to commence SunRail.

The deal was a commuter railroad developer's dream. A well maintained, vital piece of track starting on the far outskirts of Florida's major metropolitan area in the middle of the peninsular, and hitting every bedroom community along the way, while paralleling Interstate 4. DeLand, Sanford, Longwood, Castleberry, Winter Park, downtown Orlando, Kissimmee, and Poinciana were all planned SunRail stops, with another dozen thrown in for good measure. Some of the track was already double tracked, and several stations were already in place and currently used by Amtrak. Putting SunRail into operation would be relatively easy as opposed to so many other new commuter rail projects which require huge infrastructure upgrades and major building projects. SunRail could be up and running on its first segment in a measurement in months, not years.

Florida already has Tri-Rail in South Florida, which runs from north of Palm Beach to Miami, hugging Interstate 95, and using the old Seaboard main line which was completed during the Florida land boom in the 1920s. Tri-Rail has been in operation for 20 years, and by all transit measurements is a success on a daily basis. It was robust service every day of the week, and is popular in all segments of South Florida society.

Two other areas of Florida are actively looking at creating commuter rail; Jacksonville and Tampa Bay both are putting together long range plans which include major commuter rail components. The Tampa area system will run over existing CSX tracks; the Jacksonville system will use a combination of CSX, Norfolk Southern, and Florida East Coast tracks, all of which radiate like spokes on a wheel from downtown Jacksonville.

CSX, like all railroads, was made the whipping boy of this project because it sought to maintain its risk position, by asking the State of Florida to limit how it can be sued by commuter rail passengers, and be held harmless under any circumstances, no matter who was a fault (including CSX) for the accident.

This is an interesting place to stop, because it involves so much of the convoluted thinking of today's society, where private property rights seem to be disappearing in favor of what some think are overpowering rights for the greater good of society. Of course, we fought a war against the Mother Country of England to get away from such tyranny, but, in light of the shabby job done today by alleged educators in America, no one seems to remember this morsel of history.

CSX, like all railroads, is as private company, owner by stockholders and investors. People buy and maintain shares of CSX stock because they believe it is a well-run company and a good investment, on which there will be a return in the form of dividends. In addition to the widows and orphans which own this stock, there are retirement systems, individual retirees, mutual funds, hedge funds, and a wide variety of other types of stockholders, all who depend on CSX to provide income based on their investment. For those in the back of the class sleeping, this is called capitalism, and it is what makes our country go forward.

CSX has what is called a fiduciary responsibility to its owners/shareholders to run the company as well as possible, and provide a return on investment. If the CSX managers do not do this, they can be held liable in a number of ways, under a variety of laws and regulations. When this does not happen, we have situations like Enron, where everyone is a loser.

So, CSX wants to protect its interests and the interests of its investors/shareholders by asking to be protected against lawsuits in case of accident. Railroading, as everyone knows, is one of the most dangerous activities on Earth, and accidents, under the very best of circumstances, are prone to happen.

We have seen in recent years insane decisions by judges and juries against railroads because it is presumed all railroads have deep pockets, and any time someone gets a hangnail when near a train, it is cause for the railroads to pay big bucks for any pain and suffering as a result of said hangnail. Amtrak in the past couple of years has had more than one lawsuit where scrapings from the bottom of the human gene pool have trespassed on Amtrak property (which was plainly marked as no trespassing areas or fenced in areas to keep the public out), but, judges have said Amtrak didn't to enough to stop dumb people from harming themselves.

CSX, rightly so, wants to avoid this situation in Florida, and, in Massachusetts, too, where it is negotiating to turn over some trackage for commuter use around Boston.

The public and public officials somehow seem to continually think railroad property is public property, and should be available to everyone for any use. It's only when an accident occurs (that hangnail, again), that suddenly the mean, rich, railroad should have been more careful to protect those who use private railroad property for public purposes.

The revenge piece of this saga goes back almost a full decade. Back in 2000, the general electorate of Florida, not realizing what a silly mistake they were making, actually added an amendment to the Florida constitution requiring a high speed rail system be built in Florida. No funding mechanism was added at the time, and the amendment was worded and promoted without benefit of an actual cost to taxpayers. The "gee whiz" factor of the thing, along with total ambivalence by many facets in the state (including this writer), allowed the amendment to be passed and ratified in Florida's general election in 2000. The morning after election day, many rational people woke up and were stunned to learn we actually had a mandate to build a high speed rail system in Florida, even though there was no way to pay for it, nor a rational plan for it.

The amendment was the work of a Florida millionaire, C.C. "Doc" Dockery, who had nothing better to do than push for his dream and spend his money on the constitutional amendment.

Jeb Bush, Florida's Republican governor, two years into his first term, was appalled. Governor Bush, a fiscal conservative grappling with a number of issues and trying to get a handle on a bloated state budget and tax system he inherited from his predecessor, knew a bad amendment when he saw one. Additionally, one of his first acts when he took office in 1999 was to kill another Florida high speed rail project, the Florida Overland Xpress, which was the product of a reputable firm in California. The concept of the FOX project was good, but many felt it had the inherent problems many of today's proposed high speed corridor have; it was a stand-alone system, had inadequate feeder systems, and was too expensive for what Florida needed to spend at the time.

Even though Governor Bush's Florida Department of Transportation had a solid policy to develop rail before developing major new highways in a booming state where 800+ people a day were moving to, Mr. Bush knew both FOX and Mr. Dockery's plans were flawed and had the potential to cost Florida taxpayers a ton of money without much return on investment/sustainable ridership.

Subsequently, in 2004, Florida voters, under the leadership of Governor Bush, wisely got rid of the amendment to Florida's constitution and high speed rail went away.

This annoyed Doc Dockery, a millionaire who was accustomed to getting his way. As a result, Mrs. Millionaire, Paula Dockery, got herself elected to the Florida Senate from the Dockery's hometown of Lakeland, one county over to the east from Tampa on Florida's west coast.

Senator Dockery started ingratiating herself in the Florida Senate, collecting chits and swapping votes she would hoard and use later against SunRail.

Towards the end of his second and final term in office (We have term limits on practically everyone in state office here in Florida.), Governor Bush made a surprise announcement and said a much needed commuter rail system would be created in Central Florida, using the existing CSX/old ACL tracks to the northeast and southwest of Orlando.

It was a great bargain in many respects. In exchange for CSX selling the 61 miles of track for the future SunRail to the State of Florida, the state would provide hundreds of millions of dollars for CSX to upgrade the old SAL main line in Central Florida which runs through Ocala, allowing CSX to move all but local freight service from the ACL line to the SAL line. Additionally, local communities along the SAL line would receive huge amounts of dollars to upgrade and bridge over grade crossings, eliminating traffic congestion and making sure the doubling of freight trains would not be an inconvenience to local residents.

CSX would also move the primary operations from its Taft yards in Southwest Orlando to further south in Winter Haven, and build an entirely new yard and intermodal facility which would be closer to the old SAL main line and still maintain a presence near all of Florida's major Interstate highways.

Senator Dockery found her chance for revenge against Jeb Bush. She flung herself into action, convincing the downtown merchants of Lakeland all of the new trains coming down the SAL line would ruin business in Historic Downtown Lakeland (One man's definition of historic, of course, is another man's definition of blighted and/or old.). She also started a campaign against CSX, and gathered up lots of allies along the way like the trial lawyers, calling the deal a "giveaway" for corporate monolith CSX, unfair because of the limited liability portion of the deal, and pretty much also managed to blame tooth decay in every citizen of Florida because of the overall meanness of CSX.

As a result, the Florida Senate defeated the plan in 2008. But, wait! supporters said, we have a two year deal with CSX, not scheduled to expire before June 30, 2009, so we can win this thing again when the legislature goes into its 2009 session.

And, Senator Dockery did it again, finishing off SunRail last Friday, the final scheduled day of the legislative year. Even though the legislature automatically went into a week's overtime to finish the budget, only budgetary matters are being considered, not new programs.

Republican Senator Dockery used every trick in the book. She scared the unions into going along with her by exclaiming union jobs would be lost if SunRail became reality. The truth is, eight - yes, 8 - CSX union jobs for signalmen would be abolished along the 61 mile SunRail route, but all eight of the workers would be offered their same job on another part of the CSX division which encompasses SunRail.

She also convinced many of Florida's minorities to back her, falsely claiming that money for SunRail would take away money from education and community program accounts. Never mind the majority of the money was coming from the federal government in special earmarked accounts which could only be used for transportation, and never mind what little state money being used was also barred from being used for projects other than transportation.

The trial lawyers the second go-round gave up the fight and endorsed SunRail, as did the downtown merchants of Lakeland. Dockery still fought on, because her goal was revenge on Jeb Bush's system, not what was best for Florida.

Tri-Rail, in South Florida, while a continual success, has been hampered by money for its entire 20 year history. It is currently supported by farebox revenue and the three county government of Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade counties. The county governments, while simultaneously pushing for expansion of Tri-Rail by encompassing the parallel Florida East Coast Railway main line to create a giant "U" shaped system (An excellent idea; the possibilities are endless if this goes through.), constantly threaten to cripple Tri-Rail by slowing down basic funding for the system.

Legislators from the other six parts of Florida are generally non-plussed by the hard-and-fast pleas of South Florida politicians to allow them to levy a $2 per day sales tax on rental cars in Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade counties only, claiming it would hurt tourism. They would not even allow a proposed bill this session in the legislature for two things to happen: first, by a super majority, county commissioners would have to approve the $2 rental car tax, and, second, the tax would have to have voter approval in a general election. Despite constant pleas from Tri-Rail supporters, house and senate members from other parts of the state are tone-deaf, and refused to even consider such a measure. And, since many of the South Florida senators refused to back SunRail because of misinformation and threats from Senator Dockery, Central Florida senators essentially said, "too bad, so sad," and turned their backs on Tri-Rail, leaving the three counties to fend for themselves for funding.

Obviously, the politicians from the other six political divisions in Florida want the fruits of expansion and commerce in South Florida, so they will have the sales taxes and property taxes generated in South Florida to spend all over the state, but they refuse to understand how much an efficient commuter rail system contributes to the economic well-being of an area, which ultimately increases tax revenues. They want their cake, and want to eat it, too, but still cling to a silly "no new taxes under any circumstances" mantra in a state which has grown so rapidly it's impossible to keep up with infrastructure needs and expansion solely based on current income.

This story could go on for another 2,000 words to get in all of the details, but, at this point you get the drift. SunRail was killed not for the public good, but for political revenge and intrigue, swapped votes and payback, misinformation, and outright lies.

Congressman John Mica, who represents much of the SunRail area in Congress, was a strong supporter of SunRail, and tried to convince his colleagues on the state level $100 million has already been spent on SunRail, and a quarter of a billion dollars allocated for SunRail on the federal level would forever disappear if the Senate failed to act. Likewise, Congresswoman Corrine Brown of Jacksonville, whose district also includes some of the SunRail territory, and is the most powerful Democrat in Congress controlling railroad money to be spent, couldn't convince her colleagues on the state level, either. It was if all of this federal money didn't matter; political intrigue and revenge mattered more.

Today, as this is being written, defeated SunRail proponents - Republicans and Democrats alike - are meeting in Orlando and trying to figure out what to do. The State of Florida will most likely move ahead with its plans to expand Interstate 4 to its maximum width, and, without the benefit of SunRail to help local commuters, it's going to be very messy driving through Central Florida for the next few years.

The Florida Republican Party has demonstrated what happens when one party stays in power too long. All of the initial visionary stars which got things going and brought the party to power have been replaced by political hacks who win elections only because of their party affiliation. Leadership has been replaced by rote process.

The fun part of this concerns CSX. While CSX will continue to pay property taxes and run trains on the old ACL main line through Orlando and Central Florida, it will proceed to build its new yard and intermodal facility in Winter Haven, and most likely reroute more trains down the old SAL mail line. All of those cities and town along the way which would have received state help for traffic mitigation due to increased train traffic are now on their own. Likewise, the City of Lakeland will see increased train traffic, but now that SunRail is gone, so is the part of the package which would have paid to move the CSX line out of downtown Lakeland. The worst fears of the merchants will come true, but no one will be there to help them solve the problem.

Senator Paula Dockery and her husband, C.C. "Doc" Dockery have their revenge against Jeb Bush, three years after he left office and is a private citizen living in Miami. Just as talk has started again about high speed rail in Florida from the federal level, Doc Dockery resigned his position on Florida's High Speed Rail Commission a few weeks ago. That probably doesn't matter much. Some of the federal criteria for high speed rail, such as having a feeder system like SunRail, won't be met, and most likely federal money will go anywhere but Florida.

The new efforts of TBART, the Tampa Bay area's metropolitan planning organization, to get a commuter rail system organized on CSX tracks just took a major hit. If you were a CSX executive, would you put much time and effort into a project like that so your company can become a whipping boy for a vengeful woman? All of this was not just a slap in the face to CSX, it was a slap in the face in the company's home state.

And, don't forget about us here in Jacksonville. We've been slowly but surely putting together a pretty good commuter rail plan, which not only will help Jacksonville, but provide benefits for Amtrak, too. Don't get too excited about that; Senator Paula Dockery started driving a pretty heavy stake through the heart of our plan, too, for all of the same reasons as with Tampa's system.

Could this happen to you in your state? You betcha. This is why many of us for years have been saying any rail plan must be the best plan, not just any plan. Any time politicians are involved with commuter rail - or, any type of passenger rail - there is a potential for trouble. We've just proved that here in Florida; we have a dead system, $100 million spent on something that doesn't look like it's having any immediate prospects, and one of our best corporate citizens has a black eye through no fault of its own.

One telling result of all of this is the public's (and politicians') love for the automobile. Because this is such a deep and abiding love, no one is willing to look at reasonable alternatives. It's one thing to talk about banning automobiles and forcing everyone onto public transit or commuter rail. It's quite another thing to provide reasonable choices as long as the public budget stays balanced and there is a large enough segment of the population which wishes to use those choices. Those who dearly love automobiles need to understand not everyone have the same deep feelings about spending hours each day in a car, along with hundreds of thousands of your new best friends, all creeping along at minimum speeds, just hoping you can move over four lanes to the right before you reach your exit.

3) William Lindley of Scottsdale, Arizona attended the joint RailPAC/NARP meeting in Los Angeles and files this report and personal observations.

[begin quote]

By William Lindley

Saturday, May 2, 2009 in Los Angles, Amtrak Interim President and CEO Joseph Boardman and longtime and well-respected Vice President Brian Rosenwald laid out the company's new direction. The scene was an auditorium in the office tower adjoining Los Angeles Union Station, at the well-attended joint membership meeting of the Rail Passenger Association of California and Nevada (RailPAC) and the National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP).

Amtrak has had some good leaders before; and on occasion there has even been money enough to work with; but like the Chicago Cubs where everything so promising in Spring seems to not quite come together by the end of the baseball season, there has always been a missing link. On Saturday, though, one received the impression that - with folks like the determined and visionary, yet, realistic Mr. Boardman, and the experienced and capable Mr. Rosenwald - there might, this year, be a World Series to be had for Amtrak.

In a letter to Amtrak employees shortly after he arrived in his new position, Mr. Boardman wrote, "In my view, a national intercity, interconnected passenger rail service is critically important for the mobility and energy independence of the United States." Saturday's presentation was consistent with realistically expanding passenger trains' role across the country.

Mr. Boardman spoke of Amtrak as momentarily feeling like "the dog that caught the car" with the recent stimulus funds - "What do you do now?" Yet, plans are moving quickly, with the $1.3 billion already 70% obligated. He said "a healthier Amtrak includes a better relationship with employees" and the May 1st employee appreciation day included due back pay.

Touching on the Obama Administration's high speed rail plans, he explained systems like the French TGV only occurred after the existing networks were at capacity. America does not yet have a "high speed rail culture … we are not ready for orphan systems" that do not have appropriate feeder networks including bus, streetcar, subway, and commuter trains. Boardman described a high speed network emerging through incremental improvements, using improved track such as "Class 6 at 110 MPH," and even using (relatively common) Class 5 mainline freight tracks at 90 MPH. And, "I don't buy the argument you can't mix passenger trains and freight at 110 MPH." This from the man whose immediate previous job as Amtrak's interim president and CEO was the administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration, whose primary role is that of the safety of America's railroads.

Concluding his remarks, Boardman characterized the discussion of revising the existing Sunset route as representing a "new way of thinking, not an announcement" and continued, "We recognize the need to reconnect Florida (to the West)."

Replying to questions from the audience, Mr. Boardman indicated there would be a Viewliner (single-level, as used on eastern trains) equipment order, of all types (Coach, Sleeper, and Diner); that "Diner Lite" never worked, and it would be eliminated this year; and that "we will have a long distance fleet plan." He said Amtrak had begun to study new options for serving Phoenix, but that Las Vegas service would be further in the future.

Later, VP Brian Rosenwald spoke of several issues; of particular interest was the Sunset Route realignment proposal which is "within range of demonstrating that added revenue from daily service will offset the additional costs. Our only bias in developing this proposal is that there be daily service" with a primary factor being the highest projected revenue segment via Dallas to Chicago. He was clear this is all still a proposal, subject to further input, not an announcement.

As the proposal stands now, there would be a daily train operating from Los Angeles via San Antonio and Dallas to Chicago, with a cross-platform transfer to a daily train operating from San Antonio via Houston to New Orleans. Running time between Los Angeles and Chicago may be up to eight hours less than today's Sunset Limited/Texas Eagle schedule. There would be daily through-car service with sleepers and full diner between Los Angeles and Chicago by extending the daily service between Chicago and San Antonio and tri-weekly service west of San Antonio of the Texas Eagle on the Sunset Limited route to a single train on the full Los Angeles-Chicago route, and dropping the two existing names of the Texas Eagle and Sunset Limited.

Departure from Los Angeles under this scenario would be closer to the Sunset Limited's traditional one, perhaps 10:30 P.M., in order to offer better times at Maricopa (for Phoenix) and San Antonio. The desert Maricopa station "will do for the moment" until a better plan for serving Phoenix can be devised. Estimate a 9:30 P.M. arrival at New Orleans from the west. Also, by moving to the traditional departure time of the Sunset Limited in Los Angeles eastbound, this re-establishes the connection with the Coast Starlight with its "strong revenue potential" because of the matrix effect. Further, a single onboard services crew could operate between LA and Chicago, thus simplifying operations.

To describe this new service, the "Sunset Limited" name might be shelved in favor of, potentially, the "Golden State." When equipment permits, Mr. Rosenwald was hopeful through cars between New Orleans and Los Angeles could be added.

In my opinion, the Sunset restructuring could bring a far stronger, functional passenger train presence to America's entire south and west. Coupled with new and developing commuter-rail and light-rail projects widely perceived as successes in Sunbelt cities like Phoenix, Dallas, and Houston, the seeds of a "rail culture" could well germinate.

My impression was that Joseph Boardman knows when to be specific, when to be delicate, and when to be bold. Mr. Rosenwald has demonstrated ability to manage a train and work with the parties involved. Together, Mr. Rosenwald and Mr. Boardman represent an Amtrak that may at last find its balance.

[End quote]

4) Other interesting facts reported by Mr. Lindley from the meeting include a continuing emphasis by Amtrak on the Route Performance Improvement program, which moves each route more towards product-line management "ownership." Hmmmm … Amtrak had this as a well-working program in the 1990s, and it was thrown out by former Amtrak President and CEO David Gunn in favor of traditional freight railroad management style. Now, the future is the past; at least it's back to a program which proved to be one of Amtrak's best management innovations.

There is also work afoot for restoring higher level of coach attendant staffing, dining car staffing, and restoration of regional dishes in dining cars. Gee, all of those Amtrak employees who were let go or otherwise forced out when onboard staff downsizing took place must be thrilled to know losing their jobs could have/should have been avoided.

Other than Auto Train, the Palmetto leads all trains in cost recovery, with a 96% ratio. This ratio correctly excludes allocated system costs (such as corporate overhead) and depreciation. Auto Train has a 121% ratio (that translates to profit), followed by the Empire Builder at 76%, and the Southwest Chief at 74%. the lowest long distance train ratios are the Cardinal at 52%, and the Sunset Limited at 33%. The common factor of the two lowest ratios is both trains are tri-weekly trains. The Empire Builder contributes over $5,000 per coach per day of revenue, and the Sunset Limited coach daily revenue is $1,990; again a victim of tri-weekly service.

5) Mr. Lindley's report offers a mixture of hope and anticipation.

While the elimination of the Sunset Limited as a separate train - and, America's oldest, continuously operating named passenger train - at least some attempt seems to be made to improve the financial performance of the route, even with a less than perfect replacement. If, as indicated, as soon as possible some necessary equipment comes out of the shops to provide through-car service from Los Angeles to New Orleans (An adequate supply of Superliner transition cars seems to be the hold-up.), then a reasonable substitute for the Sunset will have been accomplished. Later, hopefully, a second frequency on this route will be provided, and the honorable Sunset Limited name can be used, again.

For a number of years, the Sunset Limited has been made a mockery by uninformed politicians and uncaring Amtrak senior management. The move from tri-weekly to daily could have been accomplished long before this, and, even with all of the on time performance problems of the Southern Pacific and later Union Pacific railroads, the train would have had better numbers if it was daily and not tri-weekly. Finally, an answer seems at hand, even if the "chicken" way is being taken, and the equally honorable name of the Golden State for a time rides on the Sunset Limited's rails. No more will ignorant politicians be able to point to the hapless Sunset as the route/root of all evil of Amtrak. So, what will be the solution for the tri-weekly Cardinal between Chicago and Washington/New York?

Mr. Lindley aptly points out what Amtrak Vice President, the father of the Pacific Parlour Car for sleeping car passengers on the modern day Coast Starlight, can accomplish when he's allowed to flourish. Here's hoping now that he's firmly embedded in Washington and apparently has been given room to dream, he can push through more changes for Amtrak passengers and crews and help push the company to viability.

As for Interim President and CEO Joseph Boardman, while he received high marks from Mr. Lindley, others were not as fascinated with her performance in Los Angeles. While he receives credit for allowing Mr. Rosenwald to "do his thing," and starting to make other inroads in the Amtrak bureaucracy, it's still questionable if he is the man who ultimately has the type of vision luminaries such as Gil Carmichael and Andrew Selden have for the future of passenger rail. Mr. Boardman has shown us results, and has shown us good starting plans for the future, but, close to six months into his stewardship of Amtrak, we still have not seem a long term plan for Amtrak, nor have we seen any type of meaningful housecleaning in Amtrak's management cadre. We will wait and see what Mr. Boardman next has to say and what he will do about a serious equipment order for the bi-level car long distance route system, which should be one of the highest priorities on anyone's list for the stabilization and future growth of Amtrak.
 
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Other than Auto Train, the Palmetto leads all trains in cost recovery, with a 96% ratio. This ratio correctly excludes allocated system costs (such as corporate overhead) and depreciation. Auto Train has a 121% ratio (that translates to profit), followed by the Empire Builder at 76%, and the Southwest Chief at 74%. the lowest long distance train ratios are the Cardinal at 52%, and the Sunset Limited at 33%. The common factor of the two lowest ratios is both trains are tri-weekly trains. The Empire Builder contributes over $5,000 per coach per day of revenue, and the Sunset Limited coach daily revenue is $1,990; again a victim of tri-weekly service.
Those are very interesting figures. I had suspected, but not fully realized how good at cost recovery the Plametto is. I suspect the Carolinian would be right up there too, though unlike the Palmetto it is not counted as a LD train.

I wonder if AlanB or MrFSS or someone in the know can figure out how to get the full list from URPA or wherever it is available and post it for us. Thanks.
 
Other than Auto Train, the Palmetto leads all trains in cost recovery, with a 96% ratio. This ratio correctly excludes allocated system costs (such as corporate overhead) and depreciation. Auto Train has a 121% ratio (that translates to profit), followed by the Empire Builder at 76%, and the Southwest Chief at 74%. the lowest long distance train ratios are the Cardinal at 52%, and the Sunset Limited at 33%. The common factor of the two lowest ratios is both trains are tri-weekly trains. The Empire Builder contributes over $5,000 per coach per day of revenue, and the Sunset Limited coach daily revenue is $1,990; again a victim of tri-weekly service.
Those are very interesting figures. I had suspected, but not fully realized how good at cost recovery the Plametto is. I suspect the Carolinian would be right up there too, though unlike the Palmetto it is not counted as a LD train.

I wonder if AlanB or MrFSS or someone in the know can figure out how to get the full list from URPA or wherever it is available and post it for us. Thanks.
I don't know if URPA has a list available with the percentages, but you can calculate the numbers yourself from the Amtrak monthly financial statements posted on Amtrak's site. About 3/4ths of the way through the report is Section C where you can find pages showing revenue vs. costs for each train. In the case of the September 2008 report, which was the year end report for Amtrak, the year-to-date numbers are on page #65. URPA is taking the "Total avoidable costs" and comparing that to the revenue earned by the train to come up with the percentage.
 
I don't know if URPA has a list available with the percentages, but you can calculate the numbers yourself from the Amtrak monthly financial statements posted on Amtrak's site. About 3/4ths of the way through the report is Section C where you can find pages showing revenue vs. costs for each train. In the case of the September 2008 report, which was the year end report for Amtrak, the year-to-date numbers are on page #65. URPA is taking the "Total avoidable costs" and comparing that to the revenue earned by the train to come up with the percentage.
Thanks.

As Whooz mentioned in one of his posts the info was there for all trains on a slide presented at LA. So I will wait a few days for those slides to be posted by NARP before I crank up my own spreadsheet. :)
 
This Week at Amtrak; May 22, 2009

A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail [email protected]http://www.unitedrail.org

Volume 6, Number 14

Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) It’s the “little things” that often start the biggest stories. Progressive Railroading Online featured a story on May 19th about Amtrak launching construction on the much-needed new Auto Train station in Sanford, Florida. The story went on for four paragraphs talking about this new $10 million facility being paid for with federal stimulus fund monies.

It was the last line in the last paragraph which really matters the most. “Amtrak plans to seek other places throughout the country where it can launch other Auto Train services.”

Wow.

Auto Train, in concept and operation, has consistently been a winner, and has huge potential. Apparently, now that Amtrak is out of full-retreat mode, it thinks so, too.

Today’s Auto Train, with daily service between the Washington, D.C. suburb of Lorton, Virginia, and the Orlando suburb of Sanford, has a “cost recovery” ratio at the farebox of 121%, in Amspeak. In the real world, it makes a profit. The current load factor for the Auto Train is 63.6%, up from 50% where it was for years. Considering this train has no intermediate stops, 63.6% makes this train – even though it is (gasp!) profitable – underperforming. Mostly this is due to seasonal migration of cold-weather states denizens and Canadians coming to the warmth of Florida, or those same people escaping our intolerable heat and humidity of the summer for the cooling breezes of northern climates.

Yes, we need more of this, and good for Amtrak to be looking for other route opportunities.

2) The saga of SunRail in Central Florida continues, with its supporters racing to a deadline of June 30, 2009 with CSX to close the deal, even though the Florida Senate would not vote to approve the deal week in early May. SunRail supporters are looking for a way around the Florida Senate to get the project going. This should be an interesting exercise in government creativity. Despite the fact every leftie in and out of Florida wanted to paint CSX – the current owner of the tracks SunRail will hopefully travel upon after the tracks are sold to SunRail – as evil, money-grubbing, anti-American, anti-human, anti-everything, no rational person can blame CSX for looking for an outcome that will best benefit the company and its shareholders. Everyone seems to forget railroads are not public utilities, but private businesses which have a primary responsibility to create benefits and profits for owners. Anyone who believes CSX should not live up to that responsibility in the best way it can is living in a dreamland.

But, now, some thoughts on Amtrak and some opportunities to prove it’s really an organization dedicated to the proliferation of passenger rail and being an honest provider of transportation, not just dedicated to extracting maximum rents from gullible public agencies.

3) For an exercise, suppose you are a planner in Amtrak’s planning department. Suppose your goal was to harvest the low hanging fruit of opportunities, where passenger train service could be expanded with minimum impact on the need for additional equipment, the establishment of new stations, or blazing new trails, but “closing gaps” in the national system and expansion based on sound matrix theories. What are your obvious choices?

That question has a number of good answers, but we’re going to focus on several easy choices, including extending the Palmetto south from Savannah, Georgia to Jacksonville, Florida; pushing the former Kansas City Mule/current Missouri River Runner services to Omaha, Nebraska; extending the California Zephyr from Emeryville, California to Los Angeles, taking the Silver Meteor, Silver Star, and Crescent to Boston; extending the Capitol Limited to Florida; and turning the pretty-much wasted Heartland Flyer into a real route, extending it on both ends to form a Chicago-Oklahoma City-Fort Worth-San Antonio route.

4) In the 1980s, at the instigation of United Rail Passenger Alliance, the Amtrak Board of Directors granted an experimental program extending the New York-Savannah Palmetto route to Jacksonville, Florida, an additional 148 miles that includes the route of the Silver Meteor and Silver Star. Ostensibly, the Palmetto hauled some U.S. Mail, but the extension mostly benefitted passengers.

Originally, the Amtrak planning department opposed the move, saying the only traffic which would be picked up by an extended Palmetto was local traffic between Jacksonville and Savannah, never taking into account the realities of extra frequencies and how much of a traffic generator going from two trains a day to three trains a day produces. The extension started off with a bang, and much to the dismay of Amtrak planners, Jacksonville passengers wanted to go other places than just Jesup, Georgia or Savannah, they wanted to travel to every station along the route, even all the way to New York City! The extension did well for a period of time, and then came the realignment of Florida service, and the Palmetto was extended to Tampa, and given a new name, the Silver Palm. Despite a number of changes, the train continued to do well for over a decade, until yet another realignment and cuts, including the end of Amtrak Express and mail haulage, which was big business for the Silver Palm (Remember, Amtrak managers are judged on how much money they save in a budget, not how much revenue they produce.), and the Silver Palm went away, and the Palmetto returned, this time only to Savannah. The reason, as quoted by an Amtrak spokesman, was Savannah produced better crew turns than Jacksonville, so the train ended there instead of Jacksonville.

Essentially, Amtrak said the needs of passengers were not important, but the needs of the operating department were paramount.

Moving the southern terminus of the Palmetto would cost relatively little; there is already the required crew base in Jacksonville for the train and engine crew and the onboard services crew, no extra equipment would be required, and the only inconvenience would be abolishing the car cleaner jobs in Savannah and moving those jobs to Jacksonville. Also, the hours the Jacksonville station is open would need to be extended. So, the 296 extra train miles a day, and a few extra hours for the Jacksonville station to be opened are the only large considerations. The route matrix of stations increases from 20 stations (including terminals) to 22 stations, adding Jesup, Georgia and Jacksonville. The possible city pair combinations leap from 190 city pairs with 20 stations to 231 city pairs with 22 stations, nicely increasing the travel possibilities. In the final days before the Palmetto was extended to Tampa and renamed the Silver Palm, it was not unusual for the Palmetto to board up to 40 or more northbound passengers in Jacksonville on a daily basis.

As reported in the last edition of TWA, Amtrak says the Palmetto has a cost recovery ratio of 96%; no doubt, with the additional addition of the two new stops that ratio would easily go into the black, which would make the Palmetto profitable, even under Amtrak’s arcane accounting system. The Palmetto has a 51.3% load factor, using only two train sets of one club-dinette, four coaches, and one baggage car.

To recap:

– No extra equipment

– Only 148 additional route miles in each direction

– No extra train and engine crews or onboard services staff (T&E crews on the Silver Meteor already run between Jacksonville and Florence, South Carolina, where the Palmetto’s southernmost crews board on their way to Savannah.)

– Minimal costs to keep the Jacksonville station open longer hours

– Southbound and northbound schedule can remain as is with additional time added in the evening and the morning to accommodate run to Jacksonville

– City pair combination possibilities jump from 190 to 231 city pairs

– Increased frequency makes train travel more attractive for every city along the route because two more stations have been added, including the Jacksonville metropolitan area market of over 1 million souls

What’s not to like about this proposal?

5) Amtrak’s Missouri River Runner, the service with the snappy new name instead of the older Kansas City Mule, operating between St. Louis and Kansas City, Missouri via Sedalia is an opportunity to turn a local, state supported service (Illinois, are you listening?) into a regional service connecting three of Amtrak’s long distance routes with a simple extension. Take the River Runners to Omaha, Nebraska, thereby creating a route from St. Louis to Kansas City to Omaha. The extension would be less than 200 miles, and, with some clever scheduling, would tie together for hubbing the routes of the California Zephyr, Southwest Chief, and Texas Eagle. But, really, if you’re going to be aggressive about this, run the trains all the way from St. Louis to Chicago on the Texas Eagle route (Or, for extra credit, be really creative and go beyond the Texas Eagle route and bring the trains into Chicago on the City of New Orleans route, therefore connecting four, instead of three, long distance routes.).

Too many of Amtrak’s current routes begin and end a hubs like Chicago or Los Angeles, but you “can’t get there from here” from anywhere but endpoint hubs, making Amtrak virtually useless for anyone who dares to want to travel in anything but a straight line.

The current fad (as in, hopefully, will go away, like all fads) for Amtrak is to milk money from state governments to run trains which come to a screeching halt at state borders. There is no thought of federalism, or (horrors!) of reducing costs to states (after all, it’s only taxpayer money) by extending state routes and turning them into regional routes. Taking the Missouri River Runners and letting them sprint all of the way from Omaha to Kansas City to St. Louis (and, even into Chicago) creates viable regional connections which provide feeder service from one long distance route to other long distance routes.

Today’s Kansas City-St. Louis service, despite having two daily frequencies, boasts of a depressing 37.4% load factor, carrying 151,700 passengers a year, or just 104 passengers on average per departure. That 37.4% load factor, believe it or not, is based on a train consist of two Horizon coaches and one club-dinette car for one train consist, and three Horizon coaches for the other train consist. Train consists this small are designed for failure and constant government dependance.

If you’re comfortable spending other peoples’ money, and not really caring about financial accountability, it doesn’t matter to you what kind of load factor trains have, just as long as trains run on a route. The three routes involved with hubbing in this concept, the California Zephyr, Southwest Chief, and Texas Eagle, all have better than average load factors, but all have room for improvement. The Zephyr’s is the lowest, at 52.3%, followed by the Chief and Eagle, both at 63.8%. While technically a long distance route is sold out at 65%, both of these trains today are suffering from short equipment consists, so adding a single car to each consist could produce a great amount of revenue for new travelers with better hubbing opportunity and a greater number of city pair combinations.

To recap:

– Create a regional route connecting three (or four) major long distance routes for greater hubbing and matrix benefits; a poor performing, state sponsored route expands into a greater money maker and provides more transportation output

– Route extension is less than 200 miles

6) The extension of the California Zephyr from Emeryville, California southward to Los Angeles was a favorite of the late Adrian Herzog, Ph.D., one of URPA’s early luminaries. Dr. Herzog, who was considered one of the country’s best computer modelers for passenger train routes (He was an astrophysicist/rocket scientist by trade.), considered the addition of an overnight run down the Coast Starlight route on the very western edge of California to have huge money-making potential.

Today’s California Zephyr westbound arrives in Emeryville, California from Chicago everyday at 5:10 P.M., and departs eastbound the next morning at 9:10 A.M.

The Coast Starlight makes the run between Emeryville and Los Angeles in just a tad over 12 hours. Adding that travel time onto the schedule of the Zephyr, plus allowing from some station dwell time, would permit the westbound Zephyr to depart Emeryville at 6 P.M., and arrive in Los Angeles before the morning rush hour, anywhere from 6:30 to 7:30 A.M. Departing eastbound, the Zephyr could depart Los Angeles in the middle of the evening sometime beyond 7:30 P.M., and be in Emeryville for the scheduled departure back to Chicago at 9:10 A.M., allowing a full 12 hours in Los Angeles for the train to be cleaned and maintained, all during daylight hours.

One extra train set would be required for this extension. The major benefit from this extension would be a full second frequency, offering overnight service, between Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay Area, two giant California markets. Not only would this relieve some pressure from the Coast Starlight, but it would also increase travel possibilities, opening up a huge vista of passenger opportunities.

The city pair combinations for single train travel skyrocket from 561 city pairs on the current California Zephyr route to 946 city pair possibilities when you add the 10 stations in California south of Emeryville and down to Los Angeles. The California Zephyr has a load factor of 52.3%, with plenty of room to grow. It runs with one baggage car, one transition dorm/sleeper, two sleepers, one lounge car, a diner, and three coaches.

To recap:

– One extra trainset

– Second frequency, providing desirable overnight service on a highly popular route with high revenue potential on a full service train

– No new stations, but many stations will have to extend hours for an overnight stop

– Two additional train and engine crews, one additional onboard services crew

– Allows California Zephyr to have turn maintenance and restocking at full Los Angeles maintenance base instead of smaller maintenance base in Emeryville

– Existing California Zephyr schedule remains as is, with additional running added before and after present schedule times

7) Moving the northern terminus of the Silver Meteor, Silver Star, and Crescent from New York City to Boston isn’t really much of a stretch. Today’s Meteor arrives from Miami in New York City at 11:38 A.M., and returns to Miami at 3:15 P.M. The Silver Star arrives from Miami in New York City at 7:16 P.M. and returns the next morning, departing Penn Station southbound at 10:52 A.M. The northbound Crescent arrives in New York at 2:06 P.M., and departs southbound the next day at 2:15 P.M. It’s obvious too many trains are sitting for too long in Sunnyside Yard in New York; the Meteor, Star, and Crescent each use four full consists under today’s scheduling.

Take the whole bunch, and push them each to Boston, including the Lake Shore Limited, while keeping the separate Boston section, but setting it up as it’s own Boston-Chicago train as a second frequency between Boston, Albany/Rensselaer, and Chicago. All cities along the Northeast Corridor are horribly under served by Amtrak trains going east-west. It would require no extra equipment for any of these trains.

Boston is already servicing the Boston section sleepers of the Lake Shore, and has a full turn maintenance base today, so moving each of these trains to Boston from New York will only impact the onboard services crews of the Lake Shore and Crescent, as the Meteor and Star are staffed by the Miami Crew Base.

Since all of the track on the NEC between New York and Boston is either owned by Amtrak or Metro North, pushing these trains north is not a major consideration, and each train can keep its current schedule, just adding time before and after the current schedule for running between Boston and New York.

Amtrak for decades has had an unsavory habit, except during the Christmas season, of running long distance trains on the NEC as “receive” or “discharge” only, preventing local business between New York and Washington. No matter what excuse may be given about time keeping, quick movement on the corridor, or, Amtrak’s favorite – the dog ate its homework – the only reason this is done is to funnel local revenue to Acela and Northeast regional trains instead of the long distance trains. With proper yield management in place, this receive/discharge system could be abolished, and passengers wishing to travel on a full service train with a complete dining car and private sleeping car accommodations could be filling empty spaces (particularly northbound) on these trains and adding to both food and beverage revenues and accommodations up charge revenues.

As with other routes, the city pair combinations for same train service, by adding either the Shore Route or the Inland Route between Hartford, Connecticut and Boston go up dramatically.

On the matter of sending the Lake Shore from Penn Station in New York directly to Boston, this merely creates a desirable “L” shaped route, which suddenly provides the passengers along the New York-Boston section of the NEC with more travel choices without having to change trains.

On the other side of the coin, by creating a new train between Boston and Chicago via Albany/Rensselaer (such as the old New York Central train, the New England States), this ploy requires only additional dining cars, and, most likely, more coaches to keep up with the increased demand in business because of a second frequency along the current Lake Shore Limited route. The current consist of the Boston section of the Lake Shore is one baggage car, one sleeper, one Horizon food service car, and two coaches.

Today’s Lake Shore Limited sits for 12 hours in Chicago before it heads back east, and the Boston section lays over for 14 hours on the east end. By keeping the current Lake Shore schedule (or, perhaps, departing Chicago 60 or 90 minutes earlier, the new Boston train could depart Chicago an hour later, providing the major metropolitan city of Cleveland, Ohio with a more marketable eastbound train time, from the current 5:05 A.M. to a slightly more civilized 6:00 A.M. and still arrive in Boston before late night because of eliminating the extra time in Albany for switching from one train to two trains. The same theory holds true westbound; by leaving Boston a bit earlier than its current noon departure, and eliminating the switching time of combining two trains into one, the new train from New England could be in Cleveland closer to midnight than 3:27 A.M., and still be in Chicago after 7:00 A.M.

Let’s stop for a moment, and veer to the right. If you’re a resident of Cleveland, and want to ride the train, you better be a night owl. Cleveland’s Terminal Tower downtown station at one time was one of the busiest stations in the country, with dozens of trains serving this major northern city. Today, Cleveland is only served by the Lake Shore Limited and the Capitol Limited. The Capitol’s Cleveland times aren’t much better than the Lake Shore’s, arriving westbound at 1:55 A.M., and eastbound at 2:48 A.M., all at a relatively small Lakefront station. Even though the Ohio legislature and governor’s office are working on creating a new Three C Corridor of Cleveland-Columbia-Cincinnati, that will only provide daylight service, and the southern terminus of that route will be in Cincinnati, which at the moment is only served (you guessed it) in the middle of the night by the tri-weekly Cardinal running between New York, Washington, and Chicago. Cleveland and Ohio all deserve better than what Amtrak has provided lo these many years.

As said before in this space, the most efficient answer to the problem of providing any type of adequate service to Cincinnati is to do what the Commonwealth of Virginia has done with its two new trains – extend an existing NEC train over the route of the Cardinal between Washington and Cincinnati. Amtrak has two daily trains which originate in New York before 6 A.M.; either of these trains extended to Cincinnati would arrive well before the Cardinal does at 1:03 A.M., not only providing a second frequency along this very scenic route, but bolstering the fortunes of the Cardinal, which Amtrak has indicated next year it will look at making a daily train. A return eastbound train from Cincinnati could launch from its terminal anytime after 7:00 A.M. and provide good daylight service until close to arriving in Washington, D.C.

On the west end of the route in and out of Chicago, the Hoosier State operates on days the Cardinal does not, on the same schedule. Once the Cardinal goes daily, again, an opportunity opens for the Hoosier State to operate from Chicago earlier in the afternoon than it does now (about mid afternoon) and still arrive in Cincinnati before midnight, with the return westbound train leaving Cincinnati early in the morning during daylight hours and arriving in Chicago mid afternoon. This also provides the major city of Indianapolis with much improved passenger train service.

But, back to the issue at hand, moving the northern terminus of all east coast long distance trains from New York City to Boston.

To recap:

– No additional equipment needed, except for fleshing out a new Boston-Chicago train by adding a diner and a couple of coaches because of added passenger demand

– Minimal changes in crew bases; moving the Crescent food service crew base from New York to Boston, and moving the Lake Shore Limited crew base from New York to Boston. Boston already has a major crew base. No additional onboard services crews on existing trains, and only minimal additions for new Boston-Chicago train

– Additional train and engine crews needed between New York and Boston, and 231 route miles added to each train between New York and Boston

– Better equipment utilization instead of train consists having long layovers in New York’s Sunnyside Yard. No schedule changes south of New York City

– Passengers better served by single train service for entire east coast to Boston; elimination of receive/discharge restrictions north of Washington allows for these trains to be better financial performers, and provide a new array of choices for local passengers on NEC

– No additional stations costs

8) It’s time to revive an old idea at Amtrak that never made it to reality: taking the Capitol Limited south from Washington to Orlando, Florida. The way the current schedule for the Capitol runs, the train arrives in Washington early afternoon just after lunch, and stays in Washington until the next afternoon at 4 P.M. These trainsets spend more time sitting around than they do on the road; it’s less than an 18 hour run between Washington and Chicago. It takes three train sets today to run the schedule with one baggage car, 2 coaches, one diner-lounge, one lounge car, two sleepers, and one transition dorm/sleeper. The Capitol has a load factor of 66.9%, but with only two coaches, there is ample room for growth, even with an additional coach already added during high revenue periods.

Extend the train down the former Atlantic Coast Line route of CSX via Rocky Mount, North Carolina and Charleston, South Carolina, and terminate the train at Orlando (Tampa would be better), making use of the excellent Auto Train maintenance facility in adjacent Sanford, just as the Sunset Limited in brighter days used the Auto Train maintenance facility.

Keeping close to the current Capitol Limited schedule would provide a civilized 9 A.M. or so arrival in Orlando, perfect for starting the day in America’s family vacation capital. The return train would leave Orlando after 9 P.M., and resume the northbound Capitol schedule in Washington. Since the current misuse of equipment for the Capitol Limited takes three trainsets, this change would only require one extra trainset, and would most importantly resume through train service between Chicago, the Midwest, and Florida without blazing any new trails (or having an expensive reopening of any old trails). Since the route between Washington and Orlando is already served by both the Silver Meteor and Silver Star as well as the Palmetto (see above), the addition of a Florida-bound Capitol Limited would provide and additional popular frequency feeding passengers into Orlando from the Midwest with through-train service.

An extended Capitol Limited would provide good marketing hours for major stops south of Washington, such as Richmond, Virginia; Fayetteville, North Carolina; and Florence, South Carolina.

To recap:

– Requires one additional set of equipment, and makes more efficient use of current three sets of equipment which now have long, unprofitable layovers; also more efficient use of onboard services crews

– No new stations or new routes

– Provides single-train service from Chicago and the Midwest to Orlando, Florida

– Makes more efficient use of Auto Train maintenance facility

– Adds to frequencies on popular east coast routes to Florida

– Combined with previously mentioned concepts such as extending the City of New Orleans east and south to Orlando, extending the Capitol Limited, too, would create a pair of strong services between the Midwest and Florida, with each train complementing the other, and creating huge matrix theory opportunities

9) Bless its steel soul, the Heartland Flyer is probably Amtrak’s most lovable, yet terrible route. Just 206 route miles long, this bump which sits atop the Texas Eagle schedule runs from Fort Worth, Texas almost due north to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with five intermediate station stops. Departing Fort Worth northbound at 5:25 P.M. after the Texas Eagle has called at Fort Worth in both directions, the Heartland Flyer arrives in Oklahoma City at 9:39 P.M., sits overnight, and leaves the next morning at 8:25 A.M., trundling back to Fort Worth and arriving at 12:39 P.M. in time for the southbound Texas Eagle.

It takes one trainset of two Superliner coaches and one Superliner snack coach for this toy route, and the State of Oklahoma pays Amtrak millions of dollars to operate this train on its behalf. The Heartland Flyer generates $1,680,500 in revenue, with ridership of 80,900 passengers per year, or an average of 111 passengers per departure. The load factor, typical of a short run such as this, is 43%, even with a very short consist of equipment.

There has been a good movement afoot, including the state governments of Oklahoma and Kansas, to expand this microcosm of passenger railroading to something useful that has half a chance of being financially successful in the process.

The Heartland Flyer needs major surgery, in two easy steps. Get rid of its base in Fort Worth, and extend the southern terminus of the train either southwest to San Antonio (providing a much-needed second frequency between Fort Worth and San Antonio), or southeast to Houston via Dallas, restoring a long-lost Amtrak route which would reconnect by rail the two largest metropolitan areas in Texas.

The second easy step is to extend the Heartland Flyer northward to Newton, Kansas (on the route of the Southwest Chief, and, coincidentally the near exact middle of the continental United States) and take the train to Kansas City or, even better, to Chicago or St. Louis.

These two easy steps turn the Heartland Flyer from a nearly-useless and tragically expensive stub route into a powerhouse route serving major metropolitan markets and important intermediate stops, and, just as importantly, connects discreet existing routes with new travel opportunities so “you can get there from here” without having to go around the Horn of Africa.

Concepts such as this take money-losing routes like the Heartland Flyer and turn them into real transportation providers, ignoring invisible boundaries falsely built by near-sighted executives who only seek to raid government treasuries instead of completing Amtrak’s real mission of being a truly national passenger railroad company.

To recap:

– Expands a poor-performing local route into a strong regional route

– Connects two other long distance routes and major metropolitan areas through hubbing which has not previously been possible

– Provides real transportation alternatives in lieu of what is essentially a high cost local train which provides no real transportation output

– As a stand-alone route, the Heartland Flyer has 21 possible city pair combination. Combining the Heartland Flyer and its present connection to the Texas Eagle brings the city par combinations up to 1,128; extending this train and connecting it to the Southwest Chief route in Kansas explodes the number of city pair combinations to 3,160, a huge jump from the 21 combinations on the present route.

10) The battle for the hearts and minds and souls of Sunset Limited fans and admirers has gained momentum with lots of discussion going on over Amtrak’s proposed changes to the route of the Sunset, replacing America’s oldest continuously operating named train with three distinct new trains, and one of them being a renamed and extended Texas Eagle operating daily from Chicago to Los Angeles via San Antonio, Texas and then west on the Sunset route to Los Angeles.

Here are a couple of ways to look at this.

First, Amtrak has taken a proactive approach to ending the days of the Sunset being an unacceptable tri-weekly train, stuck with most of the overhead of a daily train but not with the earning potential. The extension of the Texas Eagle to Los Angeles and making it daily all the way with a new name such as resurrection of the respected “Golden State” name (formerly of the Rock Island Railroad) makes senses, because, as Amtrak has said, that has the greatest potential for earning revenue.

While the creation of a second daily train on a daylight schedule to replace the Sunset between San Antonio and New Orleans is offensive to some because it will require a cross-platform change for those traveling all the way from Los Angeles to New Orleans, at least this – again – gets rid of unacceptable tri-weekly service and puts daily service on the line to important cities like Houston, Texas, and the many smaller cities between Houston and New Orleans. Amtrak has also speculated it will provide through-car service all the way from Los Angeles to New Orleans when more equipment is available through being rescued from the wreck line and re-manufactured at Beech Grove in Indiana. Since Amtrak has already restored the Boston sleeping car to the Lake Shore Limited, this bolsters confidence Amtrak is looking at concepts that work, and understands the strength of through-car business.

And, Amtrak openly saying it will take some of the surplus sleepers from today’s Sunset after it is reconfigured and put them elsewhere where strong demand exists so it can capture the revenue from these cars is not only revolutionary coming from Amtrak, but highly welcome.

The second way to look at this is Amtrak has cut and run from the constant bickering over the Sunset Limited name being used as a poster boy for bad management by both politicians and the news media, and is looking to replace what was once America’s only true transcontinental route with three trains (including whatever happens east of New Orleans) that has more consideration for Amtrak’s operating and maintenance departments than the comfort and convenience of its passengers.

A third alternative was offered this week by the prestigious and highly respected Passenger Train Journal magazine, with a full article on how to “fix” the Sunset Limited, complete with reroutings and restructuring so the train has more major metropolitan areas to serve, and better connections with other trains.

Since Passenger Train Journal, along with Progressive Railroading, are the two most important and credible national magazines regarding railroading, it’s tough to ignore what PTJ has to say without some serious discussions.

No matter how you choose to look at the fate of the Sunset, there have been howls of protest from some who simply want what is there now with some improvements, and nothing more. But, these howls overlook the fact Amtrak is taking a critical look at much of its long distance system and attempting to fix some problems which have long needed fixing. While almost any changes to the Sunset as we know it today other than taking it daily are sure to be painful, it’s important to look at the big picture regarding the Sunset and seeking what is the best solution from a combination of interests, including financial, passenger services, and the ability of Amtrak to offer a worthwhile service. The way the Sunset is today accomplishes none of those goals. A changed and/or reborn Sunset under a new name has a chance to accomplish those goals, even if it takes some getting used to by those of us on the ground.

11) This resolution was passed by the attendees of the Rail Passenger Association of California and Nevada and National Association of Railroad Passengers joint meeting in Los Angeles on May 2, 2009.

[begin quote]

Whereas the Rail Passenger Association of California is deeply concerned that there has been no new investment in rolling stock for the Coast Starlight, Sunset Limited, California Zephyr and Southwest Chief (the western overnight trains) since 1991, and

Whereas currently up to 95% of Amtrak’s capital investments go to the North East Corridor trains and infrastructure, and

Whereas there is a growing demand for rail passenger travel and these western trains are often sold out, and

Whereas old equipment is expensive to maintain, is subject to mechanical failure, and is unattractive to passengers, and

Whereas without new investment these trains and other routes will eventually be withdrawn for want of serviceable equipment,

Therefore the Rail Passenger Association of California calls upon the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”) to meet its obligation to provide a national network by allocating a reasonable proportion of its capital investment budget to purchase new coaches, sleeping cars and dining cars for the western overnight trains, to a common design that can also be used for corridor services.

[End quote]

Amen.

Before you start any conversation about the above suggestions, keep in mind, even after Amtrak funds the repairs to wrecked equipment through stimulus funds, there will still be another 200 or so pieces of equipment which can be repaired and put into revenue service. It’s all just a matter of priorities and how much desire Amtrak has to fulfill its mandate to provide a true national system of passenger trains, or its present plan to suck as much money as possible out of government treasuries while providing the least amount of service.

If you are reading someone else’s copy of This Week at Amtrak, you can receive your own free copy each edition by sending your e-mail address to

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United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

[email protected]

http://www.unitedrail.org

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I couldn't agree more with your suggestions for the most part. I reported when you mentioned the River City Stub from the City be put back that it might extend to Omaha for greatly improved midwest service. One of the glaring missing links would be the service on to New York or Washington from St. Louis which could also extend to Omaha. It could open service in many cities to people who now as you say can't get anywhere from anywhere. I read with some hope that the new President also from Illinois may be in favor of more established feeder routes before a great deal of new High Speed rail going where trains already travel. It needs to be a complete nationwide system before spending billions on the same old routes to the same old places.
 
This Week at Amtrak; June 4, 2009

A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

America's foremost passenger rail policy institute

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail [email protected]http://www.unitedrail.org

Volume 6, Number 15

Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) The indefatigable Paul Dyson, President of RailPAC – properly known as Rail Passenger Association of California – and long time associate of United Rail Passenger Alliance, has had a few busy days this week.

Below is a press release from RailPAC, along with correspondence between Mr. Dyson and Joseph Boardman, Interim President and CEO of Amtrak.

2) [begin quote]

RAIL PASSENGER ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA

1017 L Street PMB 217, Sacramento, CA 95814

www.railpac.org

3rd June, 2009

AMTRAK TO REDUCE OR END SERVICE TO MORE THAN 20 STATES?

Railroad experts conclude that Amtrak proposes to cease operations in most of the southern and western states within the next five to ten years. That is based on Amtrak's failure to order replacement rolling stock for worn out trains. For the last 20 years almost 95% of the purchases of locomotives and passenger cars were for trains that run exclusively in the Northeast Corridor between Boston and Washington DC. Current plans call for refurbishing a handful of out of service cars but otherwise make no mention of the need to replace the aging cars that provide service to most of the states west of Chicago. These trains are already running with a reduced number of seats and sleeping berths in spite of record high demand, resulting in major loss of revenue.

RailPAC's President, Paul Dyson, wrote to recently appointed Amtrak President Joe Boardman in January asking for an immediate review of this policy. He pointed out that a long term program to replace the old fleet and augment the available accommodation on the western trains would provide jobs and helps meet the new administration's target of reducing dependence on imported fuels. "Without new cars there will soon be no trains on most routes west of the Mississippi" says Dyson. The expected service cuts will not happen overnight, nor will they receive much fanfare. Instead the economics of running these trains will gradually worsen as old cars are withdrawn from service, and eventually the trains will be discontinued.

Dyson wrote again to Mr. Boardman today asking for a response to the question, "Will there be a car order for the western interstate trains?"

RailPAC is an all volunteer non-profit group that has campaigned for 30 years for enhanced passenger rail service in California and the western states.

Contact: Paul Dyson

[email protected]

818 845 9599

[End quote]

Interesting, don't you think? Farfetched, you ask? Not very; even though a small, mostly inadequate car order has been placed for single-level eastern long distance trains, nothing has been mentioned about the transcontinental or Midwest long distance trains.

3) Here is the reply letter from Amtrak Interim President and CEO Joseph Boardman to Mr. Dyson's original letter, as mentioned above.

[begin quote]

March 24, 2009

Mr. Paul J. Dyson

President

Rail Passenger Association of California

1017 L Street PMB 217

Sacramento, CA 95814

Dear Mr. Dyson:

This is in reply to your letter of January 16, 2009, regarding the need for investment in equipment to support the development of passenger rail service across the whole of the United States. Since taking up the position of President and CEO of Amtrak, I have been working closely with my team to understand just how we will address exactly the sort of issues you refer to in your letter.

The recent enactment of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA) has provided a solid basis to deal with the sort of issues to which you refer. Three key elements in PRIIA have specific relevance in this case.

First, PRIIA changes the emphasis on funding for capital investment. Whereas Amtrak has traditionally borne the responsibility to secure funding for new equipment, the funding for service expansion is now with the state partners via the new Intercity Rail Grant matching fund program. For the first time, there will be a level playing field with other modes of transportation. Matching funds for capital investments – including equipment – will now be provided on the same basis for passenger rail as has been the case for highway projects. State partners will define their own requirements through their state rail plans as these are required as the basis for funding applications to the federal government.

Second, PRIIA requires Amtrak to constitute a committee to plan for the specification, procurement, support and funding of next generation common corridor passenger equipment. This will cover different types of passengers car as well as locomotives and, potentially DMUs. This committee will be led by Amtrak but will have involvement from state partners, the FRA as well as other interested parties from the industry.

Last, PRIIA includes an authorization of funding to Amtrak for its own capital requirements. This funding will be required to support the development of the Amtrak services outside those developed in partnership with the states.

With these three elements, it is possible to see a route to the creation of the next generation of service across the United States ensuring that the equipment provided is properly aligned with the requirements of the individual states. Amtrak continues to strive to be the preferred partner for working with states on the development of their services. Based on the core capabilities Amtrak has for all aspects of developing, equipping and operating passenger rail services, we are well positioned to continue to support route development across the country.

You raised some additional points about the Northeast Corridor that I wish to address. While other railroads operate more trains and carry more passengers than we do on parts of the Corridor, none run the entire length of the corridor at the speeds at which we operate, or operate anywhere near the train miles that we do, or own as much of it as we do. It is a matter of asset utilization on the most complex piece of railroad in the Western Hemisphere, and recognition that our own needs make it more complex than it would be if it were simply a string of unrelated commuter railroads. Northeastern states do contribute capital support to the Corridor, and PRIIA ensure that, in the future, all commuter railroads on the Northeast Corridor will bear a proportionate share of its operating and capital costs. Also, the recently approved economic stimulus package stipulates that approximately 56% of the capital funding Amtrak will get will go to places away from the Corridor. We learned long ago that regional differences, however heartfelt, among supporters of passenger rail does much more to harm the goal of better train service nationwide than it does to help it.

Thank you for the invitation to your upcoming meeting on May 2. I look forward to speaking with the group.

Sincerely,

Joseph H. Boardman

President and Chief Executive Officer

cc: Joe McHugh

[End quote]

4) Here is RailPAC President Dyson's response to Amtrak Interim President and CEO Boardman, president to president.

[begin quote]

2nd June, 2009

Mr. Joseph H. Boardman

President and Chief Executive Officer

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION

60 Massachusetts Avenue NE

Washington DC 20002

Via Fax to 202 906 2850 (3 pages total)

THE FUTURE OF THE INTERSTATE NATIONAL SYSTEM TRAINS IN THE WESTERN STATES

Dear Mr. Boardman:

I am reviewing your letter of March 24, 2009, your public comments since then and the remarks you made at our meeting this past May 2 in Los Angeles. In rereading your March letter I see many references to "state partners" and "requirements of the individual states". I see nothing that directly answers my question about rolling stock for the interstate trains that I referred to in my January letter. And while there is reference to commuter railroads on the NEC paying a proportional share of operating and capital costs, I don't see any requirement that the NEC states pay a proportion of the expenses of the Acela or Regional trains. You do mention PRIIA funds for Amtrak's "own capital requirements" but you make no suggestion as to how these funds might be invested. Your public statements since, and your comments at our meeting and answers to questions there have thrown no more light on the question that I asked then and repeat now: "When will you order cars for the western interstate trains?"

I have attached for your information a resolution passed unanimously by about 235 NARP and RailPAC members at the end of the May 2 meeting. After 41 years in transportation I have seen plenty of companies come and go. The ones that are on their way to exiting the business are those that do not invest in their rolling stock. I would be delighted if you can convince me that I am wrong, and that you have every intention of replacing the worn out cars and locomotives of the western interstate trains and of growing the business. What are your intentions?

I don't know who wrote the sentence in your March 24 letter "We learned long ago that regional differences, however heartfelt, among supporters of passenger rail does much more to harm the goal of better train service than it does to help it"? Long ago we had a lot more service in the west, including to major cities such as Phoenix and Las Vegas. The trains that still run have much shorter consists even though trains are frequently sold out. What we now have are very real "regional differences", except that they are "heartfelt" by Amtrak management, not by passenger rail advocates. It is Amtrak management that has consistently undervalued the western trains and invested most of the capital dollars in the NEC. At the same time they have downgraded the western trains and in the accounts have heaped average system costs on them that they really don't generate to set them up for failure and the opprobrium of Amtrak's critics.

Mr. Boardman, you've had a few months to digest a lot of information and advice from many quarters. You've taken the helm at Amtrak at a time when it is about to receive an unprecedented amount of funding, and when it has more political support then ever in its existence. It may well be that your Board, Executive Committee and many of your managers view the NEC as the real railroad and the western overnight trains as anachronisms. Yet it is these same trains that are maintaining consistent revenue during the recession while the Acela has lost significant ridership. If you have decided that the western overnight trains should be allowed to fade away as equipment becomes unserviceable then the communities served by them are entitled to know your policy and to react as they see fit. Doing nothing, with no new rolling stock order, is tantamount to abandonment by Amtrak of interstate service to 23 states.

We look forward to an early, and I hope positive response, to these issues.

Yours faithfully,

Paul J. Dyson

President

[email protected]

818 845 9599

[End quote]

5) This is the resolution, passed in Los Angeles on May 2, 2009 referred to by Mr. Dyson. It is repeated here from the last issue of This Week at Amtrak.

[begin quote]

Whereas the Rail Passenger Association of California is deeply concerned that there has been no new investment in rolling stock for the Coast Starlight, Sunset Limited, California Zephyr and Southwest Chief (the western overnight trains) since 1991, and

Whereas currently up to 95% of Amtrak's capital investments go to the North East Corridor trains and infrastructure, and

Whereas there is a growing demand for rail passenger travel and these western trains are often sold out, and

Whereas old equipment is expensive to maintain, is subject to mechanical failure, and is unattractive to passengers, and

Whereas without new investment these trains and other routes will eventually be withdrawn for want of serviceable equipment,

Therefore the Rail Passenger Association of California calls upon the National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak") to meet its obligation to provide a national network by allocating a reasonable proportion of its capital investment budget to purchase new coaches, sleeping cars and dining cars for the western overnight trains, to a common design that can also be used for corridor services.

[End quote]

There is little need for a lot of compelling commentary at this point. As Mr. Dyson has figured out, many of the facts and action – or, inaction – all speak for themselves. Now, Mr. Boardman and Amtrak, what's next?

If you are reading someone else's copy of This Week at Amtrak, you can receive your own free copy each edition by sending your e-mail address to

[email protected]

You MUST include your name, preferred e-mail address, and city and state where you live. If you have filters or firewalls placed on your Internet connection, set your e-mail to receive incoming mail from [email protected]; we are unable to go through any approvals processes for individuals. This mailing list is kept strictly confidential and is not shared or used for any purposes other than distribution of This Week at Amtrak or related URPA materials.

All other correspondence, including requests to unsubscribe should be addressed to

[email protected]

Copies of This Week at Amtrak are archived on URPA's web site, www.unitedrail.org and also on www.todaywithjb.blogspot.com where other rail-related writings of Bruce Richardson may also be found.

URPA leadership members are available for speaking engagements.

J. Bruce Richardson

President

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

[email protected]

http://www.unitedrail.org
 
The lack of clarity in Boardmans comments is very disturbing. He seems to have said at times that he thinks we need a good system of feeder routes to make High Speed work. But I agree that actions speak louder than words, especially in politics unfortunately now days. I can't see how they could justify letting the long distance network fall totally apart, although recent years have shown that not much respect is shown for any sense of providing the cars and service necessary for building business.
 
I agree that Mr. Boardman could have been clearer in his remarks, and I agree with Mr. Dyson that the west does seem to be getting neglected to some extent. However, I disagree with the conclusion that the LD's are being abandoned.

After all, Amtrak isn't buying 75 new baggage cars for the NEC. They will see service throughout the entire Amtrak system via the long distance trains. And while this part is eastern in orientation, Amtrak isn't buying new single level dining cars and sleepers because they are planning on getting out of the long haul business or because they plan to use them on the NEC. Yes, some of these cars will run on the NEC for part of their journey, but they won't be providing local NEC service, they will only be taking people off the NEC for a long journey or returning them to the NEC from a long journey.

I see these as positive signs that Mr. Boardman does intend to remain in the long distance business. Additionally I expect that assuming that Congress continues to live up to the plan approved last year, that we will see new car orders placed for expansion and replacement of the Superliner fleet within the next few years.

Now perhaps it could be argued that some of the bi-level short haul cars that Amtrak is about to order, if they haven't already done so, could and should have been postponed in favor of new Superliner cars. But there are also good arguments for buying those cars. First of course, it curries political favor with many states. Second, it put Amtrak into people's minds, and perhaps one day encourages them to try a long distance train.
 
This Week at Amtrak; June 8, 2009







A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from








United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.




America's foremost passenger rail policy institute








1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA




Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail

[email protected]http://www.unitedrail.org











Volume 6, Number 16





Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) For those of us who keep track of segments of the news using key words for Internet searches, the term "Amtrak" has been popping up on a frequent basis in stories referring to the bankruptcy and government restructuring of General Motors. Most of the time, Amtrak is being cited as an example of what happens when formerly private industry suddenly comes under public ownership, with all of the resulting ills and pains in that process. Most writers and thinkers are bemoaning the fate of GM, and hoping against hope GM will not one day be a close cousin to Amtrak as we know it today with all of the associated problems.

Optimists, however, don't point to Amtrak as a comparison for GM and Chrysler, but rather point to Conrail, the product of a similar crisis takeover that was allowed to work under market forces and eventually go back into the private sector and eventually become so attractive, it was fought over by two titans of modern railroading, CSX and Norfolk Southern.

One can only wish GM and Chrysler the fate of Conrail, and not that of Amtrak.

2) Another fun exercise with the news has been the tracking of Vice President Joe Biden's and United Stated Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood's ongoing dog and pony shows around the country exploring the future of high speed rail.

There have been nearly identical headlines in almost every newspaper and media outlet around the country, wherever the Veep and Secretary have gone: "(Insert city name here) is likely on the fast track to high speed rail."

Since there is only $8 billion to go around to get things started, it looks like there are going to be a lot of disappointed folks who were hoping and dreaming to be in the first wave of high speed rail free federal monies. After all, $8 billion isn't that much money when you're looking at an entire continent, but it's a start.

3) Speaking of high speed rail, this word has come from Gil Carmichael. As always, whatever Mr. Carmichael has to say is important.

[begin quote]

PRESS RELEASE

For Immediate Release

ITI's Gil Carmichael says "ethical" 21st century High-speed rail transportation system 2.0 is needed now

- Ambitious High-speed Freight and Passenger Rail-based Transportation Infrastructure Program Required -

DENVER, CO, June 3, 2009 – Gil Carmichael, Founding Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Intermodal Transportation Institute (ITI) at the University of Denver, told a group of transportation industry, academics, and government leaders at the National Transportation Infrastructure & Regulatory Policy Forum, held at the University of Denver, in Denver, Colorado, that an "ethical" high-speed rail-based intermodal transportation system must be implemented – and soon.

"Like President Obama, a growing number of American people have a vision of a high-speed rail, intercity passenger transportation infrastructure system in the U.S.," said Carmichael. "It is a logical and necessary next step forward from President Eisenhower's Interstate Highway System of the 1950s; but proponents have long had a hard time being heard until recently."

To illustrate where we have been coming from as a nation, Carmichael pointed to several critical events that occurred during the past four decades. "Many of us remember October 1973, when the Arab oil embargo took place and created our fist energy crisis," he said. "Long waiting lines at service stations formed and many stations turned off their lights on the Interstate. They were out of gas! Americans woke up and realized that we had built a mobility system on a finite fossil fuel. By 1974, I remember people abandoning their 4,000-pound, eight-cylinder, six-MPG Buicks and lining up to buy a VW Rabbit diesel. We started to 'think small' and solar and wind energies were being discussed. But by the late 1970s we were seemingly discovering oil under every polar bear in the Arctic. The price of a barrel of oil then went from $35 back down to $9-$12 a gallon, and by the middle 1980s we were once again well on our way to preferring gas-guzzling muscle cars, SUV's, 400HP V8's, and $70,000 trucks! Fat City was the way to go until last year. Furthermore, research shows the U.S. had an unwritten transportation policy that declared we wanted 'cheap fossil fuel.' Virtually any political figure who even talked about raising the gas tax was doomed to failure."

So, Carmichael posited, where are we today with our 21st century global economy? The truly big energy crisis has occurred. Oil rose to $140.00 plus per barrel. Gasoline/diesel went to $5.00 per gallon. Oil is down now to about $60.00 per barrel, as are gas-per-gallon prices; but our airlines are clobbered by high fuel prices; our Big Three car manufactures are shattered; and our economy is on some sort of life support. It is quite possible that gas, diesel, and jet fuel prices will go back up in the near future as long as we are held hostage by our dependence on foreign oil and unpredictable supplies, consumer demand, and fluctuating prices. Congress cannot keep prices reduced by legislation. Global economic chaos would result if just one major oil producing nation has some sort of calamity.

"We can no longer afford the lavishness of the past. As soon as possible, this nation has got to radically change the way people and freight move in order to avoid long-term economic decline," said Carmichael. "One need only look at our demographics and our growing population density. When I was 30, there were 130 million people in the U.S. By 2040, there will be 400 million. North America will have a population of well over a one-half billion people! We are finishing the first decade of this new century and the old order of 'doing business as usual' is not working. It will not be able to correct itself. Like China, we must think more wisely."

Carmichael looked at where we are headed with our transportation infrastructure. "What is the biggest public-works project this century that can ensure U.S. prosperity?" he asked. "Last century it was building Interstate I – 43,000 miles of grade-separated, four-lane highways. It served millions of cars and trucks and thousands of busy, small airports and commuter airplanes, feeding into huge hub airports with large passenger planes going long distances to big cities. The airlines in the 1970s and 1980s expanded, in part, with jet fuel prices at about 40-60 cents per gallon, with no tax. Western man built a huge transportation system on this cheap oil; it employed millions of people and we all prospered. But that is all over in 2009!"

"So what do we do now?" asked Carmichael. "What major public-works project can we implement this century that will help keep our 400 million people working, will produce a prosperous economy, and will build a long-lasting, sustainable transportation system? My answer is we build 'Interstate 2.0'. I initially said it should be 20,000 miles of high-speed rail. It really should be 30,000 miles and use the huge, wide, existing – and paid for – rail Rights of Way in partnership with the private freight railroads and the states. We should give the private railroads their 25% investment tax credit to encourage them to upgrade and double- and triple-track their main lines to increase speeds and double freight capacity. States should build or lease high-speed track on their ROWs to run new, modern, intermodal freight and passenger trains. These high-speed tracks should be grade separated just as were the Interstate Highways. Our objective is to enable Amtrak and its partners to run frequent and safe 110-125 MPH passenger trains. We have the technology with GPS/PTC to do this with a high degree of safety. It will cut highway fatalities at least 50% and drastically reduce the wear and tear and cost of maintaining the highways."

"So intermodal and high-speed passenger rail visionaries have finally been heard by a young, new President who produced $14.3 billion to be spent on high-speed rail corridors in the next five years to begin Phase I of this century's most important infrastructure program. This huge work program puts America on the way to creating an 'ethical' intermodal freight and passenger transportation network. We can electrify it by mid-century. It will then truly be an 'ethical, sustainable' system. President Obama will be the 21st century's 'Eisenhower' because he will have created 'Interstate 2.0,' a high-speed rail network reconnecting our center cities, major airports, and ports – recapturing the vital role of the intercity bus and transit industries."

In explanation, Carmichael defined an ethical transportation system as one that 1) does not injure or kill 2) does not pollute and is environmentally benign 3) does not waste fuel and 4) does not cost too much. It uses the strengths of each mode. "We must build a 21st century intermodal transportation system using the 'steel wheel and steel rail' as the fundamental element of this system. Early in this century we can electrify all of North American rail, providing a new source of energy for our transportation system," he said.

"We have started," summarized Carmichael. "This is Phase I – $14.3 billion of funding and 13 federally designated, high-speed rail corridors. Amtrak has crossed the Rubicon. It now needs to put out an RFP for 150 new trains sets. It will show the American people that a truly interconnected intermodal transportation system is coming. By using our existing freight rail ROWs and not destroying more green fields, we can actually have a much better transportation system than Europe. It is an exciting new era that we are entering."

About ITI

The Intermodal Transportation Institute at the University of Denver offers an Executive Masters Program that awards a Master of Science in Intermodal Transportation Management from the University of Denver. This graduate degree program prepares transportation industry managers for the increasingly complex, global business environment where knowledge of finance, quantitative processes, supply chain, law, and public policy issues as well as freight, passenger, and intermodal transportation operational strategies are critical management tools for success. For more information on the ITI Executive Masters Program call: 303-871-4702 or visit: www.du.edu/transportation.

[End quote]

Two things Mr. Carmichael said are of profound importance. The first is naming an "ethical transportation system," a phrase that is seldom used when referring to major industry. His definition is superb.

The second is his call for Amtrak to immediately order 150 new trainsets. While that is just a round number, the meaning is all too important. Amtrak can either get with the new program in this country, or it can be left behind.

As demonstrated in the last issue of This Week at Amtrak, it's tough to imagine Amtrak having any type of current, relevant plan for expanding the all-too-important national long distance system instead of just raiding state treasuries for the operation of often statistically irrelevant short corridor routes. We need some sort of statement right now from Amtrak about a new equipment plan, even if it's to say a plan is in the works with perhaps a broad, general outline.

We hope GM one day will have the success of Conrail; is it impossible to hope that one day (hopefully, soon) Amtrak, too, will have the success of Conrail?

4) The following commentary appears in the Spring issue of the Minnesota Association of Railroad Passengers newsletter.

[begin quote]

By Andrew C. Selden

Is Amtrak secretly planning to exit the long distance business?

It may be. Despite billions of new federal grants this year, signs are building that Amtrak may be on its way to dropping the commercially strongest part of its business, or alternatively, perhaps, setting up another "hostage" situation, where Amtrak pulls its old stunt of threatening to shut down this service or that, or everything, if Congress doesn't give it billions of new dollars (almost all of which are always lavished on the NEC).

By any objective analysis of Amtrak's actions, one is forced to conclude that Amtrak wants out of the LD train business. They are not repairing locomotives in Chicago, they are not fixing wreck damaged Superliners at Beech Grove, they have no plans to order more equipment for LD trains. Cliff Black, Amtrak's P.R. chief, referring to the LD trains, said "The moment of truth is coming." Before Alex Kummant was run out of town, he said, "The future is in the corridors." The last Amtrak CEO who cared about the LD trains was Graham Claytor, who said at a NARP Board meeting in Washington that "the LD trains are operating in the black." Eyewitnesses sitting right in front of Claytor confirm that this is exactly what he said.

Profit-making businesses have customers, and those customers are vital to the success of the business; not enough customers and the business dies. Businesses do everything they can to get more customers, and the value their most important customers by "courting" them constantly. All this is blindingly obvious.

So, who are Amtrak's valued customers? Passengers? Not really, at least not directly. Amtrak's most important customers are Congress and the States that hand Amtrak all that free cash to pay for service. Thanks to years of myth-making by Amtrak, Congress believes that the LD trains are huge money losers, that nobody rides them, and they go places nobody wants to visit. This is all nonsense, but it is what Congress (and the media) believe, so it might as well be fact.

Since Congress is Amtrak's most important "customer," and since Congress believes that the LD trains are the cause of Amtrak's financial mess, what is Amtrak to do? Admit that they have been cooking the books and lying to Congress for years? Admit that Warrington's promise that Acela would make a PROFIT (and bring in enough cash to support the rest of the system) was a big fat lie? Admit that they have been making spending decisions to garner political support (which translates into free money), rather than to develop a better, bigger national railroad which carries more passengers, more miles? No way, no chance. Amtrak is a company that focuses its attention on doing things that get more of that free money – rather than getting it the old fashioned way, by earning it.

It seems increasingly likely that Amtrak is going to let the LD trains die by simply not ever ordering more LD equipment, and/or not repairing anything at Beech Grove. As equipment wears out or is damaged, trains will come off, and because Congress believes the LD train myth, this action will be viewed by many as an example of Amtrak actually being fiscally responsible.

Once the LD trains are gone, it will be interesting to see how Amtrak and the politicians along the NEC explain the continued need for that huge subsidy.

Consider, too, that Amtrak's new interim CEO, New Yorker Joe Boardman, has been mouthing support for the (skeletal) national network as it exists now, but doing almost nothing to invest in it. Certainly, no new cars are being ordered, and no new route connections implemented (although, plans are well along to run a daily train Chicago – Dallas – San Antonio – Los Angeles over the Texas Eagle/Sunset route). In the six months or so that Mr. Boardman has led Amtrak, there has been much talk about another wave of improvements, including new Viewliner and Acela cars, for east coast services, including the NEC, of course, but nothing at all about new Superliners or western routes."

A business that doesn't believe in itself, that doesn't reinvest in itself, that is consumed with political game-playing rather than a relentless entrepreneurial drive to play to win in the marketplace, is a business that really is in a slow liquidation. This isn't about "fairness," or "regional balance," or "social service to fly-over states." It's about smart business and winning strategies. And based on all the evidence, Amtrak is failing at that.

[End quote]

5) Here in Florida, a game of "Chicken" is being played by the State of Florida and Tri-Rail in Southeast Florida.

Readers of this space know the just completed legislative session in Florida earlier this month was not kind to commuter rail; completely killing (they think) SunRail in Central Florida, and leaving Tri-Rail in Southeast Florida somewhat hobbled without a permanent funding source.

Part of the failed SunRail deal was for Tri-Rail to receive permission for the three counties it serves – Palm Beach, Broward (Ft. Lauderdale), and Miami-Dade – to levy a $2 per day surcharge tax on rental cars in those three counties, only. It was estimated this surcharge would provide adequate funding, in addition to farebox revenues and some monies kicked in from the three counties, for Tri-Rail to be a fully functioning system.

Whoops! SunRail went down in flames (for the moment), and the Tri-Rail's permanent funding along with it.

Now, Tri-Rail says its host counties are not going to fund it fully, and it will have to cut back on service, slashing its daily service and completely eliminating all weekend and holiday service.

Whoops! again. The feds, who provided a lot of the funding for the recent upgrades to Tri-Rail infrastructure, say they have a written agreement with Tri-Rail which states Tri-Rail will at least run all of the trains it does today (less two frequencies), or Tri-Rail will have to pay hundreds of millions back to the feds because the federal money was intended to help Tri-Rail provide a full schedule of trains.

But, wails Tri-Rail, it has no money, and it's going to receive even less money next year from the three counties it serves. So, supplication to the State of Florida has occurred, but the state says it has no money, either, in this tight budget year. (When it comes to government, somehow isn't EVERY year a tight budget year?)

Which leaves Tri-Rail in a pickle.

What about raising fares? That is going on right now, with a 25% increase, but it won't be enough.

More riders? Already happening, courtesy of last year's high gas prices, and the riders decided to stay, even with today's lower gas prices.

Tri-Rail is a relatively new system, just 20 years old. It has never had an opportunity to create any type of financial cushion, and has always been dependent on the financial kindness of others to survive. It kept fares artificially low for decades, declaring it was all riders could afford to pay. No one even took inflation into account; just unrealistically low fares hoping today's day of reckoning would never occur.

Tri-Rail is not alone. News accounts from across the country tell sob story after sob story about insolvent transit systems. What started as sleek steel wheels on shiny steel rails have become lumpy, worn wheels on two streaks of parallel rust.

Who is to blame? Everyone. Commuter rail managements who thought they were in the welfare business instead of the transportation business made unsustainable business plans that never tested to find the high end of commuter fares.

Local governments which saw the benefits of commuter rail systems, but couldn't bring themselves to understand the fiscal needs of commuter rail as much as the fiscal needs of concrete and highways.

State governments which for the most part have ignored commuter rail, never bothering to look at its benefits or flaws, especially the benefits of higher tax bases and greater job creators.

And, the federal government, which has never really had a defined surface transportation policy which blended all types of surface transportation into a cohesive system.

The one group NOT to blame is the public. When given the chance, the public has embraced commuter and light rail time and time again when it was built intelligently and to meet public demand. Skyrocketing ridership in places like Dallas-Fort Worth, Phoenix, Minneapolis, various places in California, and elsewhere prove the point.

When the public is presented with intelligent commuter rail, the public will sample it, and a certain portion of the public will choose commuter rail for a variety of personal reasons.

So much public policy today is made for annoying "green" reasons, or reasons various nanny state government busybodies think we should do for our own good (After all, we know best, they say, no matter what.), often public planners forget that if a good plan is put into place, the public will willingly flock to it, without having to inflict pangs of environmental guilt. Good commuter rail systems – especially ones like found in the Dallas-Fort Worth system – are able to stand on their own as attractive alternatives without overt government coercion.

Where should these commuter rail systems be going? Straight into the future, but with better planning, better financing, and better management.

At the moment there seems to be two types of politicians controlling the fate of commuter rail. Here in Florida, we have the type which are uninformed, and ideologically opposed to any new taxes on anyone for any reason. These same folks, while having an admirable goal, seem to think somehow infrastructure and public utilities spring from the ground after a good soaking rain. It never occurs to them the prudent investment in commuter rail brings huge results from higher tax revenues because commuter rail helps make cities livable, desirable for new businesses to relocate to the area, and commuter rail is an economic generator in its own right.

The other type of politician looking at commuter rail seems to think money grows on trees or is easily produced by printing presses, any type of commuter rail is good (No matter how ill-conceived.) because it creates jobs (Even though they are not quite sure how jobs are created.) to build, and then voters can ride for nearly free because Big Brother will be happy to foot the bill for perpetual commuter rail by raising taxes on all of those mean, evil rich people.

Neither type of politician is very good for commuter rail.

All types of politicians need to be educated about commuter rail and learn the discrete benefits of commuter rail as applied to any local system.

Why do we care about commuter rail? Because it is an infrastructure incubator for Amtrak and intercity passenger rail.

6) As long as everyone understands the huge worlds of difference between commuter rail and intercity passenger rail (And, the individual management philosophies which apply to each distinct, separate type of rail.) then an understanding can be reached how one is good for the other.

Commuter and regional rail done correctly provides a superb feeder system for Amtrak's (or, anyone else's) long distance trains. Commuter and regional rail stations and infrastructure also serve nicely as stations and infrastructure for long distance trains, without long distance trains being burdened solely with all of the costs of those stations and infrastructure.

Long distance trains, when part of a robust system (a far cry from today's skeletal Amtrak system), reverse feed commuter and regional trains, disgorging passengers from long distance trains to complete their journey by local rail.

One hand washes the other, neatly and cleanly.

What we now need is a comprehensive government surface transportation policy which understands the interconnectivity of all of these systems, and the strengths and weaknesses of each.

Some will say we used to have that, in the heyday of railroads. But, really, we didn't. Because, while we had a fully mature passenger railroad system, it was a highly regulated system constantly fighting with government interference and resulting high costs to operate often unnecessary trains and services. Also, at the time, there was no mature highway system, but, rather, a skeletal system of two lane roads around the nation which ironically resembled today's Amtrak national system.

And, too, there wasn't a mature air travel system, but, rather, a system of DC-3 Gooney Birds and later ill-starred Constellations with plenty of holes in the route system, and no effective transcontinental service as we know it today.

The bottom line is, we never have had as a nation a real passenger transportation policy which addresses surface, air, and water transportation. We have either had predominantly water transportation (Erie Canal), predominantly passenger rail transportation, or predominantly highway and air transportation. Never have we had a policy which takes into account the full benefits of all of these modes of transportation.

The wise gray heads like Gil Carmichael are making a clarion call for a workable transportation policy. Amtrak can be an important part of that policy, but only after it has had a major restructuring from what it is today.

7) The Wall Street Journal last week reported United Airlines has requested dueling bids from Boeing and Airbus for 150 new aircraft – all paid for with private capital, and all for passenger service. Someone obviously thinks the passenger business is on the upswing.

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United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

[email protected]

http://www.unitedrail.org
 
4) The following commentary appears in the Spring issue of the Minnesota Association of Railroad Passengers newsletter.
[begin quote]

By Andrew C. Selden

By any objective analysis of Amtrak's actions, one is forced to conclude that Amtrak wants out of the LD train business. They are not repairing locomotives in Chicago, they are not fixing wreck damaged Superliners at Beech Grove, they have no plans to order more equipment for LD trains. Cliff Black, Amtrak's P.R. chief, referring to the LD trains, said "The moment of truth is coming." Before Alex Kummant was run out of town, he said, "The future is in the corridors." The last Amtrak CEO who cared about the LD trains was Graham Claytor, who said at a NARP Board meeting in Washington that "the LD trains are operating in the black." Eyewitnesses sitting right in front of Claytor confirm that this is exactly what he said.
I would love to know what this guy is smoking. Beech Grove has hired dozens of new workers, reports from railfans indicate that cars have already moved that were sitting for years. Amtrak just sent the prototype Viewliner Diner to Beech Grove, along with a bunch of P40's.

Additionally there are reports of new workers being hired in Bear, Delaware to start work on the Amfleets there.

Granted no cars have yet been reported released yet, but it does take a while to ramp up production and start turning out these cars, while still maintaining the normal work programs that must run.
 
This Week at Amtrak; June 15, 2009








A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from








United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.




America's foremost passenger rail policy institute








1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA




Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail

[email protected]http://www.unitedrail.org











Volume 6, Number 17







Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) Are you a fan of failure? You may be, if you believe the following things to be true:

• The reasons freight railroads exited the passenger business in 1971 are the same reasons anyone but Amtrak should not be in the passenger rail business today.

• Railroads in 2009 are just like the railroads of the middle of the 20th Century and later until deregulation in 1980.

• There is no hope rail passenger service in North America can every make money under any circumstances.

• You believe everything you see and hear from many of your state or national rail fan organizations concerning Amtrak, and you refuse to do any independent thinking on your own.

2) Look at each of the four issues above, and think clearly about things in the first decade of the 21st Century.

Joe Boardman, Interim President and CEO of Amtrak is telegraphing to the world he doesn't want to be the head of a company which embraces failure. While there are still miles and miles to go, and there still is an overall lack of vision, there are some isolated signs Amtrak is slowly shaking off its constant culture of failure and has stopped saying no to anything because it's more convenient to do nothing versus working to make money for the company.

And, some state membership organizations, like RailPAC in California, are not happy to be part of a culture of failure, and are demanding in no uncertain terms things be improved at Amtrak.

As said in this space countless times before, when railroads cheerfully exited the passenger business and left it all to Amtrak, things in the world of railroading were far different from today. Railroading on every level was still highly regulated by the government, and railroads were fighting for their corporate lives. State and local governments were taxing railroads practically out of existence, with every two streaks of rust being treated as mainline track and therefore being levied in the highest categories.

When the idea of Amtrak was first floated during the early days of the Nixon Administration, it was embraced as a way of helping the railroads – many of which had already slipped into bankruptcy or were on the very brink of bankruptcy – be relieved of a part of their business which was either running in the red or was not making back the cost of capital required to keep the passenger rail system operating with modern equipment and suitable station infrastructure. At the time of Amtrak's beginning, there was no clue the relief of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 would ever be considered by Congress.

In the late 1960s, the vast majority of locomotive and rolling stock was nearing the end of its supposed useful life, and would cost hundreds of millions of dollars to replace.

Much of the station and terminal infrastructure in place all over the country consisted of huge buildings built as monuments to the gilded age of railroading and corporate egos. The smaller, more practical stations were okay, but most were built prior to either of the world wars, and needed help to be made modern.

The best and the brightest of the Nixon Administration thought by combining most passenger service into one, non-competing company with a single management structure and all of the alleged savings of said structure would turn around the onslaught of the Boeing 707 jetliners and the Eisenhower Interstate Highway system populated by the latest offerings of Detroit zipping along in air conditioned comfort with power steering and power brakes and enjoying the hospitality of that new, upstart chain of moderately priced roadside hotels, Holiday Inn.

Passenger trains, after all, had no glamour, had no glory, were often old and creaky, and were considered passe, if you were being kind about the whole thing.

Actually, what hurt the passenger business the most was the strangulation of oppressive government regulation, where a struggling railroad couldn't even get rid of a now-useless branch line milk train without spending thousands of dollars bucking the Interstate Commerce Commission and begging and pleading to be relieved of the burden of an expensive, non-necessary, non-revenue generating train.

The sad part is, many good railroaders intentionally sabotaged their once-glorious passenger trains to run off passengers so they could cook the financial books and be rid of what they thought of as the nuisance and vast expense of passengers.

By the Kennedy Administration in 1961, America had already become a too litigious society, with the beginnings of exorbitant jury awards to plaintiffs for the least problem or inconvenience, and railroads – particularly passenger railroads – were in the gun sights of prowling, money-grubbing plaintiff attorneys.

If you were a president of a near-bankrupt, struggling railroad, trying to do everything you could in the face of stiff competition from trucks which were practically unregulated compared to your operation, and trying to keep Wall Street happy so your stock price didn't go through the floor and your ability to sell bonds didn't evaporate, wouldn't you look at your passenger operations and say to yourself, "why not give this business to anyone else to wants it, as long as I don't have to fund it, anymore?"

And, so, they did.

And, the railroad industry struggle for survival continued for a couple of more decades.

In the process, far too much of what was then considered surplus and duplicate main line track was ripped up to keep the tax man poor. Business was at best staying steady, if not shrinking in alarming amounts, so why pay to maintain too much track?

That, of course, is the biggest regret of the era of creating mega-railroads and merger mania. Infrastructure we need today is gone, and if the environmental left has its way, will probably never come back, no matter how much our economy will suffer because of lack of adequate trackage. Just because some infrastructure was "rail banked," that doesn't mean it's now available for reuse by the railroads. Incredibly, even where there was once a railroad, to put a railroad back you have to go through the lunacy and outrageous costs in time and money of worthless environmental impact statements so the latest poster animal or plant or creature for the tree huggers can be "saved" in place of necessity for mankind.

The Staggers Rail Act of 1980, signed into law by Jimmy Carter before he left office the next year, got rid of the worst of government regulation of the railroads. It allowed the railroads to act more like businesses than regulated public utilities, and most will agree it's what saved the freight railroad industry from following Amtrak into the horrors and nightmares of public ownership (See: General Motors and Chrysler for modern applications of this type of fiasco.).

By the time Congressman Harley O. Staggers, Democrat of West Virginia, could get this extraordinary piece of legislation signed into law, there were also other changes in the transportation industry under the Carter Administration, including the deregulation of the airline industry in 1978, and the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. Both the abolishment of the Civil Aeronautics Board and the freeing of the trucking industry, along with the Staggers railroad legislation helped move the country into an era of prosperity under the Reagan Administration, and a welcome realignment of the transportation industry.

Perhaps during all of this the most comical instance was when the Nixon Administration – with a completely straight face – told the world the American passenger train would again reach prosperity within three years of the creation of Amtrak and an initial free federal monies infusion of $140 million from the public treasury. Little did the Nixonites know of the power of the road to ruin by an industry feeding from the federal trough and not having the responsibility of proving to a professional board of directors or shareholders the company is either solvent or on the road to being solvent.

All of this brings us to today, where the sons and daughters of the railroaders of the 1960s and 70s are now, complete with their MBAs, running the few remaining mega-railroads and short lines. Gone are the railroaders who made the tough decisions to rip up track and shrink available mileage. Gone are the railroaders who initially looked at trucks hurtling down new, four lane Interstate highways and sniffed and said, "nothing can replace the power of the train."

Today's railroaders are no longer in the ultimate struggle for survival, but are captains of a mature industry which is both discovering its roots, and overall rediscovering itself and its many capabilities as an essential – and permanent part – of American surface transportation.

Here's a laugh every railroader can have: There is no other type of commercial transportation that has vehicles made – be it ships, space ships, jet and rotary engine aircraft, pipelines, and even trucks – which do not have much of the components for those vehicles shipped to the final assembly point by rail. Rail is the only carrier capable of routinely hauling just about anything, from booster rockets to ship propellers to airplane fuselages to truck transmission parts.

The difficult, messy decisions of 20th Century history for railroads went away thanks to Congressman Staggers and President Carter. Today's railroads, while still subject to the same rules of economic cycles as every other industry, are overall in a healthy position, and all of the support industry, such as car and locomotive builders are overall healthy, too.

Which means, the first thought in the morning for railroad presidents, CEOs, CFOs, and chairmen is not whether or not something is going to happen today to put the company into bankruptcy, but, how to swipe a nice chunk of business from a competing railroad or a trucking company, along with how to make the company more efficient.

Which also means, railroaders today, while having some limits to their patience, are more than willing to sit down and discuss passenger rail with serious people.

It has often been Amtrak through the years, not the host freight railroads, which has been hesitant to talk about system expansion. While many railroaders have moaned and groaned about their systems bursting at the seams for capacity prior to the recent recession, somehow, when someone really wanted to do something and the price was right, one more train could always be squeezed into the system.

Amtrak, using any excuse from the dog ate its homework to "no operating money" to "no equipment," has historically embraced a culture of failure. For years, independent studies conducted by United Rail Passenger Alliance and others have shown Amtrak's long distance trains to be profitable "above the rail." What this means is the actual operating cost of the train, to get it from terminal to terminal, including all costs of running the train, have been cash-positive, or, to use that supposedly nasty "P" word amongst Amtrak's alleged friends – profitable.

Today, Amtrak itself says the Auto Train makes 121% of the its operating costs, but it doesn't use the "profit" word, probably because it was intentionally struck from the Amtrak corporate lexicon decades ago.

The Palmetto, according to Amtrak's byzantine accounting system, makes nearly 100% of its operating costs through the sale of tickets and onboard services.

Most of the other daily long distance trains do as well, but to slightly different degrees. So, what is holding these trains back, through Amtrak's accounting system, from bursting through the ceiling to complete profitability?

The burden on of excessive corporate overhead, a bloated reservations system which runs up costs quicker than a drunken sailor, and the intentional throwing off of costs directly and solely associated with the Northeast Corridor onto the national system of long distance trains so the NEC can claim to be operating in the black. (Keep in mind Amtrak's other favorite accounting hocus pocus, the incorrect charging of NEC operations costs to capital costs, to disguise the real costs of owning and operating the NEC.)

If Amtrak keeps on its current path of promoting irresponsible short distance and corridor trains over cash cow long distance trains, it will forever be a ward of the government treasury and a failure.

Look at New York's Empire Corridor, formerly the domain of current Amtrak Interim President and CEO Joe Boardman when he headed the New York State DOT before taking on the Amtrak assignment.

Mr. Boardman's trains, totaling 18 departures a day (nine roundtrips), solely serve residents of New York State. These trains offer coach and business class service, and some trains have cafe/food service, too. Most of the departures are clustered around morning and evening rush hour in and out of New York City, and cover much of the same stations as Metro North commuter trains. For FY 2008, Empire Service trains had an average failing load factor of 35%, carried just 105 passengers per mile, and had an average length of trip of 124 miles per passenger. Empire Service trains carried 994,300 passengers, each paying an average of 33 cents per revenue passenger mile for total revenue of $41,058,400.

This is relatively wonderful if you are a resident of New York State and want to commute to work everyday in style. However, if you live anywhere else in the country, you have to be wondering why you have one train (or less) a day, while the New Yorkers along the Hudson River have nine roundtrips a day, plus many also have Metro North passenger train commuter service, and New York contributes zero dollars to this operation.

Yes, Mr. Boardman's former home and employer get a free ride, 365 days a year, while just to the south the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania pays heavily for its Keystone Service (New York does help pay for the Adirondack route of one train a day), and Vermont, Virginia (starting this year), North Carolina, Michigan, Illinois, Missouri, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington State, and California all pay for their short distance regional and corridor trains.

Mr. Boardman, are you going to correct this grievous and unfair situation? Why should New York get a free ride while all other states have to pay?

This is the type of failure mode Amtrak has been in for too long. It's irresponsible on one hand, and wants public treasuries in several states to make up for that by paying for what others are getting for free. If the Empire Service trains had a better load factor, then there would be room for debate about the credibility of keeping these trains running. But, since we're looking at a whopping 35% load factor, one can't help but wonder how much longer this is going to continue?

The saviors of Amtrak are the long distance trains. Amtrak in the past few years did a bang-up job, along with the unhelpful assistance of its various Amen Corner organizations, of selling a bill of goods to the government and public that long distance trains are evil, and short distance and regional trains are good.

The people doing this – from Amtrak managers to state and national rail fan organizations – did nothing short of defrauding the public with such nonsense and junk science.

Since there has been no legitimate scrutiny of Amtrak by outside sources beyond URPA, and the respected Amtrak Reform Council, Amtrak has been allowed to remain in a state of failure with no accountability and scrutiny. When some members of Congress or White House Office of Management and Budget officials have demanded Amtrak be held accountable, they have been either roundly shouted down, ridiculed, or ignored in favor of continued bad behavior by Amtrak for all of the wrong reasons.

So, what are you going to do about it?

The railroads of today are not the failed or near-failed railroads of 40 years ago. There is enough empirical evidence to show long distance trains are not only the wave of the future, but have the financial clout to liberate Amtrak from constant government interference and financial guardianship.

There are legitimate reports and corporate information available to anyone who can read from the Internet there are profitable passenger train services in Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, and elsewhere. If passenger trains can be profitable there, why not here?

The only people thinking and saying Amtrak must remain a failure are those who either don't want to work cleverly or hard enough to make it a success, or those who have a vested interest in keeping things the way they are so they can retain what power they have (at other people's expense).

So, what are you going to do about it?

Are you going to continue to accept whatever drivel Amtrak hands out to the public and politicians for unquestioned consumption, or are you going to ask questions? Are you going to demand your congressional representative and senators stop blindly accepting whatever Amtrak says, and ask Amtrak to do more?

Are you going to demand the White House, so enamored with passenger trains, makes sure whatever money is spent is done so in the most judicious manner?

Are you going to join the several activist state organizations around the country no longer accepting Amtrak's the dog ate its homework excuses and say "do better!"?

Are you going to stop apologizing for Amtrak, claiming it just can't do better because of the very lame excuse of "no money" and realize whatever Amtrak has done with the $30 billion it has received in free federal monies during its corporate life, have not been the right choices that have benefitted the greatest number of Americans?

Are you going to realize you, as an American citizen, have the same right to ask your government to provide you with passenger rail (as the only current provider of passenger rail in the country) as do people living in the Northeast Corridor who presume the blessings of passenger rail are a "given" and their passenger rail needs are more important than your passenger rail needs?

It's really up to you to choose what to believe, and choose how to believe. You can believe passenger rail will always be a failing proposition, or you can choose to believe passenger rail can stand on its own and be part of a growing proposition that is market driven and a positive part of our capitalist system.

3) A number of times in the past this space has featured the writing of Ken Orski of Innovation News Briefs writing about transportation and infrastructure issues. Here is Mr. Orski's latest issue of his publication, Volume 20, Number 8, dated June 11, 2009. For more information visit the web site www.innobriefs.com .

This issue contains a good roundup of developments in surface transportation policy, among other issues.

[begin quote]

June 11, 2009

The Surface Transportation Bill — Closing the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality

As the debate over the surface transportation program revs up and as Chairman James Oberstar prepares to release his thoughts on the "principles" of the proposed authorization bill, efforts to influence the legislative process are multiplying. The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials led with its new, well-documented "Bottom Line Report" that estimates future needs for highway improvements at $132-166 billion annually. The American Road and Transportation Builders Association, one of the most seasoned and influential advocates for transportation on Capitol Hill, has chosen to focus its efforts on promoting a proposal to establish "Critical Commerce Corridors" and to increase capital investment in transportation infrastructure through public-private partnerships.

Ad hoc coalitions also are weighing in. The "Building America's Future" coalition led by Governors Ed Rendel and Arnold Schwarzenegger and Mayor Michael Bloomberg has issued a new appeal to Congress and the Obama Administration to make "transformative changes" and chart a new transportation vision for the 21st century. The liberal-leaning "Transportation for America" (T4 America) coalition has published a report, The Route to Reform, calling for "a bold new vision" for a 21st century transportation system and a restructured federal surface transportation program with specific goals. The Freight Stakeholders Coalition, a 17-member organization that includes public and private freight carriers, has released a 10-point platform calling for development of a comprehensive national freight program and a "National Multimodal Freight Strategic Plan." A cryptically named "Combined Infrastructure Working Group" has drafted a set of policy recommendations focused on expanding the opportunities for private investment in U.S. infrastructure (the Group has not revealed the identity of its sponsors).

The latest to be heard from is the Bipartisan Policy Center's National Transportation Policy Project (NTPP). Before a large gathering of Beltway insiders on June 9, the Project sponsors unveiled their report entitled Performance Driven: A New Vision for U.S. Transportation Policy. (The Project co-chairs include former Detroit Mayor Dennis Archer (D), former Senator Slade Gordon (R-WA) and former Congressmen Martin Sabo (D-MN) and Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY)) The report recommends "bold and comprehensive reform founded on a relatively simple proposition: U.S. transportation policy needs to be more performance-driven, more directly linked to a set of clearly articulated goals, and more accountable for results." The sweeping proposal also recommends consolidation of all current transportation programs into two categories: formula-based system preservation programs (75% of all funds) and discretionary capacity expansion programs (25% of all funds). The latter would award grants for new infrastructure on a competitive basis. (the full report and executive summary are available at http://www.bpcntpp.org )

In the meantime, a group of private sponsors, including former Vermont Governor Howard Dean, former Indianapolis Mayor Stephen Goldsmith, and the law firm McKenna Long & Aldridge, have joined forces to launch a Council of Project Finance Advisors (CPFA). The aim of this initiative is "to provide recommendations and advocate for a center of excellence on public-private partnerships" modeled after similar organizations in Canada's British Columbia and the United Kingdom. The CPFA, in the words of its prospectus, will assist the public and private sectors by providing greater transparency and credibility for public-private partnerships, serving as a repository of best practices on financing options, improving public trust in the P3 process and addressing public sector concerns.

A New Policy Consensus

Despite their diverse backgrounds, the various stakeholder groups have reached a remarkable measure of agreement—at least at the rhetorical level — about the future nature and direction of the federal transportation program. Every constituency agrees that the existing program has lost direction and lacks a clear sense of purpose. A composite version of the stakeholders' conclusions and recommendations would read something like this (phrases in quotation marks are verbatim quotes from their reports):

Simply reauthorizing the existing program is not a solution. Rather, there is a need to "bring new approaches and fresh thinking." The new bill must articulate "a compelling new vision" and the nation's transportation policy and program must be fundamentally "reformed," "restructured," "reinvented" or "transformed." (Indeed, calling for "transformative change" has become the mantra of many of the policy statements). Individual program categories must be reduced in number, consolidated and refocused to reflect more closely the national objectives. The future program must be "performance-driven," and "outcome-oriented." State and local transportation agencies must be held accountable for demonstrable progress toward achieving clearly defined goals. Tolling, private capital and public-private partnerships should be among the potential sources of revenue "but are not a silver bullet." The project review and approval process must be streamlined with a goal of getting projects completed in far less time than is the case today. Congress must elevate freight transportation as a new national priority and establish a national freight program, perhaps with its own dedicated source of funding.

On funding, the concensus conclusions would read as follows: The fuel tax will remain the principal source of revenue for the federal surface transportation program for many years to come but the tax revenue currently collected is not sufficient to maintain existing infrastructure, let alone provide the funds needed to expand and modernize the transportation system. Increased vehicle fuel economy standards and a possible leveling of future travel demand is likely to lead to steadily declining receipts from fuel taxes. Moreover, the gas tax provides weak and somewhat inaccurate price signals and needs to be supplemented, and eventually replaced, with a more "sustainable" revenue mechanism that relies on direct user charges. In other words, the days of the fuel tax are numbered — but not just yet.

Closing the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality

Assuming, as we do, that these statements reflect accurately the collective mindset of the transportation community, the challenge for the congressional leadership and the Administration will be to translate the lofty rhetoric and generalities into an implementable program. However, not all the rhetoric lends itself to implementation. For example, the NTTP report speaks of a "performance-driven" program and recommends eight "performance metrics" by which to evaluate the progress towards achieving the national goals (these goals include economic growth, national connectivity, metropolitan accessibility, safety, energy security and environmental protection). At a panel discussion celebrating the release of the NTPP report, skepticism about the feasibility of implementing such a complex performance-based system was much in evidence. "I am a seasoned enough observer to know that such an approach will not be adopted," remarked one panelist. "Measuring performance and assessing outcomes requires a robust national data base and data collection capability that we simply do not possess," another participant who follows the federal highway program closely told us.

The recommendations of the Transportation for America (T4 America) coalition suffer from a similar excess of rhetoric. Its Blueprint: The Route to Reform report recommends a series of performance targets that include reducing per capita vehicle-miles traveled by 16 percent, and tripling walking, biking and public transportation usage by 2030. However, the report is silent on how these targets are to be achieved— if, indeed, they are achievable. Similarly, the T4 America report talks about the need to create a mode-neutral "unified transportation trust fund" that would allow for greater integration of surface transportation systems and for cross-subsidization between the modes. However, the authors fail to consider the realities of congressional committee jurisdictions and modal self-interests, both of which have proved to be serious obstacles to integrating the surface transportation program along mode-neutral lines. What is more, as the Reason Foundation's Bob Poole points out in his latest newsletter (June 2009), opening the fuel tax-funded pot of money to all forms of transportation would be the coup de grace for the user-pays/user-benefits principle advocated by the National Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission and endorsed by scores of transportation professionals in and out of government.

Funding Remains the Big Unresolved Issue

Nowhere is the gap between rhetoric and reality wider than on the question of future funding. The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) estimates that $2.2 trillion is needed over a five-year period to repair the nation's aging infrastructure. AASHTO recommends an annual investment of $166 billion for highways and bridges and $46 billion for public transportation to improve system conditions and performance. Rep. James Oberstar speaks bravely about the need to double the current federal transportation program to $450 billion over the next six years. But the reality is less obliging.

The Obama Administration in its Fiscal Year 2010 budget has proposed to continue most transportation programs at a one percent baseline increase. It has noted that this proposal is subject to an upward revision as provided for in the upcoming surface transportation authorization. However, Congress has given no indication where any such additional money might come from. What we do know is that the Administration is categorically opposed to any immediate gas tax increase ("we are not going to propose any kind of an increase in the gas tax while our economy is in a state of recession and so many people are at work," Secretary LaHood testified). Secretary LaHood also would "absolutely not" consider a transfer of general fund money into the Highway Trust Fund — thus closing the door on two of the most obvious and straightforward solutions to the funding shortfall. Instead, the Secretary has vaguely suggested that extra funds could be raised through a National Infrastructure Bank and private investors. However, so far the Administration has not spelled out its ideas on how to attract private capital and implement a meaningful program of public-private partnerships.

In the meantime, concern about the near-term solvency of the Highway Trust Fund tends to overshadow the issue of long-term infrastructure funding. The Highway Trust Fund will need $5 to $7 billion just to maintain current spending rates through the end of FY 2009 according to U.S. DOT and OMB officials. An additional $8 to $10 billion would be necessary to ensure the solvency of the Highway Trust Fund through the end of FY 2010 in the event the reauthorization schedule slips and Congress is obliged to pass an extension of the current law. (passing the bill by September 30 of this year would be truly "a triumph of hope over experience," former Sen. Slade Gorton observed at the June 9 NTPP press conference).

A House Ways and Means subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures is expected to hold a hearing in late June or early July on alternative approaches to fund the multi-year surface transportation program. Until Congress has settled on a specific long-term funding strategy, until Rep. James Oberstar has unveiled his legislative proposal, and until the interface between the transportation bill and the energy and climate bill (H.R. 2454) has been clarified, the shape of the future federal transportation program will remain shrouded in uncertainty.

[End quote]

4) Keeping up with things on the South Florida Tri-Rail front as it battles for its existence in a political world that doesn't know the difference between a subway and a commuter train: The South Florida Business Journal, a weekly business newspaper with a daily Internet news service which conducts unofficial polls came up with a fascinating tidbit of information.

The Business Journal asked its online readers – mostly executives and wannabe executives – the question, "How important is continued funding for Tri-Rail?"

The poll response was illuminating. Among all of the responses – again, mostly from people who probably don't use the service, but know their employees do – 72% said Tri-Rail needs full funding, 8% said service cutbacks are acceptable, and 21% said they didn't care about Tri-Rail or disapprove of it altogether.

That 72% is a pretty big, whopping number in favor of spending tax dollars on an alternate form of transportation. What do the taxpayers and voters of Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade counties in South Florida know that their elected representatives of both major parties don't know?

If you are reading someone else's copy of This Week at Amtrak, you can receive your own free copy each edition by sending your e-mail address to

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URPA leadership members are available for speaking engagements.

J. Bruce Richardson

President

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

[email protected]

http://www.unitedrail.org
 
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