Amtrak Derailment Philadelphia (5/12/2015)
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jis
Permanent Way Inspector
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Bringing this thread back to its original subject matter.....
NTSB has set up a web page dedicated to this accident. All NTSB materials related to this accident will be accessible from this page. The page is:
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/2015_philadelphia_pa.aspx
The latest is that the investigation of the state of the signal system has been completed and it was found to be operating without any flaw. They are in the process of constructing a consolidated timeline. They are trying to verify that the Engineer did not use his phone while operating the train.
NTSB has set up a web page dedicated to this accident. All NTSB materials related to this accident will be accessible from this page. The page is:
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/2015_philadelphia_pa.aspx
The latest is that the investigation of the state of the signal system has been completed and it was found to be operating without any flaw. They are in the process of constructing a consolidated timeline. They are trying to verify that the Engineer did not use his phone while operating the train.
FormerOBS
Conductor
We're getting off topic here. "Torpedo" used to be a more or less generic term for explosives in the common vernacular. Remember David Farragut's command at the Battle of Mobile Bay, "Damn the torpedoes; Full speed ahead!" He was talking about mines, not those long, skinny self-propelled things that were invented later. The term continued in use in the railroad industry, for a small explosive charge that could be clamped to a rail as a warning. It was loud enough to warn the train that hit it, but not powerful enough to damage the track structure. The noise was probably a bit louder than a shotgun, although I've never heard one myself. If a train was unexpectedly stopped (for an equipment failure, for example) the flagman would walk back a designated distance and place the torpedo as a warning to approaching trains. When it was removed, the flagman would drop a fusee (i.e., flare) before he returned to the caboose, so that a "timed" warning would remain in place long enough to let his train get clear.
Back to the accident:
The Amtrak representatives who contacted the victims might have done better, but I think their hesitation has to be kept in context. It seems that everybody loves Joe Boardman. As I've said before, I never got a strong enough impression of him to judge for certain, one way or another. I've heard some very good things about him. But I'm concerned about the fact that he is the man in charge, and Amtrak personnel don't feel comfortable taking risks in the current climate. Does this climate originate with him, or does it originate with Management personnel at a lower level? I don't know. But it does not surprise me at all that Amtrak representatives were very cautious about making promises about what Amtrak would do for the victims of this tragedy. Would they be held accountable, and possibly fired, if some manager decided they had exceeded their poorly defined authority? If the company is likely to punish initiative, why would you want to show initiative? Maybe some kind of more comprehensive disaster plan could address this. My point above is that no disaster plan can address everything.
Tom
P.S. Hooray! It looks like it accepted my edits this time!
Back to the accident:
The Amtrak representatives who contacted the victims might have done better, but I think their hesitation has to be kept in context. It seems that everybody loves Joe Boardman. As I've said before, I never got a strong enough impression of him to judge for certain, one way or another. I've heard some very good things about him. But I'm concerned about the fact that he is the man in charge, and Amtrak personnel don't feel comfortable taking risks in the current climate. Does this climate originate with him, or does it originate with Management personnel at a lower level? I don't know. But it does not surprise me at all that Amtrak representatives were very cautious about making promises about what Amtrak would do for the victims of this tragedy. Would they be held accountable, and possibly fired, if some manager decided they had exceeded their poorly defined authority? If the company is likely to punish initiative, why would you want to show initiative? Maybe some kind of more comprehensive disaster plan could address this. My point above is that no disaster plan can address everything.
Tom
P.S. Hooray! It looks like it accepted my edits this time!
Last edited by a moderator:
OlympianHiawatha
Engineer
Ryan
Court Jester
Yes there is, each engineer carries a company issued phone to be used in case of emergency, to be stored in their bags, shut off unless needed.
I'm not sure we need to be delving in the hypothetical charges and sentences at this point.
I'm not sure we need to be delving in the hypothetical charges and sentences at this point.
jis
Permanent Way Inspector
Staff member
Administator
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It is completely normal for the investigators to record what use was made of cell phones and verify that none of the use was an inappropriate one while operating a train. That is all that NTSB is doing. There is absolutely no implication that the Engineer used the cell phone improperly. According to his own testimony after the crash when he came around he pulled the phone out of his bag, turned it on and called 911.
So please let us not go off the deep end on what should be done if some hypothetical happened. That is some what inappropriate at this point IMHO.
As Ryan said, it is an operational requirement to have the company issued cell phone in the cab, but turned off and stored away, for use only in emergencies, so to state that "there is no reason a cell phone should even be in the cab...." is just based on a lack of understanding of normal operating protocols.
So please let us not go off the deep end on what should be done if some hypothetical happened. That is some what inappropriate at this point IMHO.
As Ryan said, it is an operational requirement to have the company issued cell phone in the cab, but turned off and stored away, for use only in emergencies, so to state that "there is no reason a cell phone should even be in the cab...." is just based on a lack of understanding of normal operating protocols.
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Ryan and jis nailed it re the cell phone question.
Since the Conductor mentioned that they heard the comments over the radio from engineers about their train being struck by projectiles, I wonder if this was considered an emergency so the Company Cell phones could be used to call this in to 911 or would the Dispatcher(s) or Conductors do this?
Also, are there tapes of such radio transmissions, along with cell phone records, that are available for the investigations??
Since the Conductor mentioned that they heard the comments over the radio from engineers about their train being struck by projectiles, I wonder if this was considered an emergency so the Company Cell phones could be used to call this in to 911 or would the Dispatcher(s) or Conductors do this?
Also, are there tapes of such radio transmissions, along with cell phone records, that are available for the investigations??
jis
Permanent Way Inspector
Staff member
Administator
Moderator
AU Supporting Member
Gathering Team Member
My understanding is that the telephone is never to be used while a train is in motion. In motion one is only allowed to use the radio. However, I have not seen the actual rule and its fine prints, so I could be wrong.
Radio transmission should be available in recorded form (if they are treated at the same level of importance as Air Traffic Control Comms) but probably not all telephone conversations, except perhaps via NSA
OTOH, conversation with dispatcher may be available even via telephone. Not sure.
Thirdrail7
Engineer
- Joined
- Jul 9, 2014
- Messages
- 4,542
Actually, you saying and I quote "These conductors, IMO are just as at fault as the engineer." is a statement. It is not a question. You placed blame.
As for me calling you a foamer, jerk or anything, those were the words are not mine. A guest lobbed those words at you and Ryan mentioned that (paraphrasing here) that it something to attack someones work ethic on the internet. In my opinion, this is exactly what you've done. Most people with inside already knew where crumbled conductor was found but won't say or address anything that has already been stated publicly, So, it is cringe worthy to watch you make a statement assessing blame without even knowing the location of the crew or their level of qualification.
As for my alleged tendency to attack on other internet forums, I merely ask people to substantiate their posts. It is a way of learning and a way of educating. People that tend to be able to validate their positions or are open to different viewpoints usually are appreciate it. I've notice that people that can not, often say they are being "attacked."
That being said, I won't address it again, particularly since a bunch of other members pointed out the flaws in your position including one who summarily dismissed by saying you're above your depth. My intent was not to get you "bothered'" because if there is one thing I've learned from these forums it is you can't shame the shameless.
caravanman
Engineer
Just to reply to the question asked about distances, (and this is my final off topic post today!)...
A detonator is a small flat cylinder, placed onto the rail and clipped into place. When a train runs over it, the force of the wheel causes the detonator to explode, creating a very loud and distinctive sound which the Driver of the train should immediately identify as being a detonator, stop his train and investigate the situation. The purpose of this is to warn of danger; detonators form part of what is known as 'Emergency Protection' which on the railway refers to the method of trying to prevent any approaching trains from colliding with or becoming involved in an emergency situation which has already taken place, primarily but not exclusively a train accident.
I have been in the cab of a loco when running over a detonator, and it was just like a giant had thumped a warning on the underside of the loco.
After first laying track circuit operating clips where applicable, a member of staff 'protecting the line' will place detonators at a set distance (1 1/4 miles from the obstruction, placing three detonators 20 yards apart on each obstructed line) as a warning to any train which may already be approaching before a Signalman can stop all traffic. Detonators are carried on all trains, in cabs and other crew areas such as the Guards' office on an HST, in packs of 10. They are dated and must be checked and replaced every so often.
Detonators were also used by fogsignalmen, rail workers who would stand at the foot of specific signals in foggy weather and place a detonator when the signal was showing caution/danger. Some signals had special small huts and even detonator placers. Fog signalling is now also extinct - a colour light signal is bright enough to be seen and if the signal has AWS that gives another warning. Also with less use of coal fires we don't have the sort of "pea souper" fogs that affected the London area in particular fifty or more years back. There are several accident reports that describe conditions where someone standing at the foot of the signal literally could not see the signal arm.
Ed.
A detonator is a small flat cylinder, placed onto the rail and clipped into place. When a train runs over it, the force of the wheel causes the detonator to explode, creating a very loud and distinctive sound which the Driver of the train should immediately identify as being a detonator, stop his train and investigate the situation. The purpose of this is to warn of danger; detonators form part of what is known as 'Emergency Protection' which on the railway refers to the method of trying to prevent any approaching trains from colliding with or becoming involved in an emergency situation which has already taken place, primarily but not exclusively a train accident.
I have been in the cab of a loco when running over a detonator, and it was just like a giant had thumped a warning on the underside of the loco.
After first laying track circuit operating clips where applicable, a member of staff 'protecting the line' will place detonators at a set distance (1 1/4 miles from the obstruction, placing three detonators 20 yards apart on each obstructed line) as a warning to any train which may already be approaching before a Signalman can stop all traffic. Detonators are carried on all trains, in cabs and other crew areas such as the Guards' office on an HST, in packs of 10. They are dated and must be checked and replaced every so often.
Detonators were also used by fogsignalmen, rail workers who would stand at the foot of specific signals in foggy weather and place a detonator when the signal was showing caution/danger. Some signals had special small huts and even detonator placers. Fog signalling is now also extinct - a colour light signal is bright enough to be seen and if the signal has AWS that gives another warning. Also with less use of coal fires we don't have the sort of "pea souper" fogs that affected the London area in particular fifty or more years back. There are several accident reports that describe conditions where someone standing at the foot of the signal literally could not see the signal arm.
Ed.
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neroden
Engineer
I think that's just railroading. The climate of railroading is an extreme anti-risk-taking climate, has been for over 100 years. It's to the point where what would be considered ordinary customer service in most industries is considered risky departure from protocol in railroading. But it's not new -- it's been true since at least the 1900s.
Thirdrail7
Engineer
- Joined
- Jul 9, 2014
- Messages
- 4,542
to make sure everyone is warm and fuzzy, I will note that this is not an attack.
Amtrak's rule on electronic devices is more restrictive than the federal requirements. In general, engineers are not issued company cell phones. Assistant conductors are not issued company cells. In general, road conductors on regular assignments are issued company cell phones. Now, some of those scanners double as cell phones, but there are strict limits on when, where and how they are operated. In an emergency (which has an established criteria), you may use your personal cell phone.
For your entertainment, Jis:
b. Railroad-Supplied Electronic Devices
An employee may use a railroad-supplied electronic device only for an authorized
business purpose as prescribed below.
1. Authorized Business Purposes: Subject to the Restrictions below, the following
are authorized business purposes for railroad-supplied electronic devices by
an employee who is not controlling a moving train or track car:
(a) Emergencies: Use is authorized for voice communication to respond to or
coordinate an emergency situation involving the operation of the railroad or to
respond to an emergency encountered while on-duty.
(b) Assigned Tasks Directly Related to Duties: Use is authorized for revenue
related functions, delay reporting, mechanical defect troubleshooting and
reporting, roadway maintenance work, passenger service requests, and numerical
calculations.
© Radio Communication Failure: Use is authorized for voice communication:
(1) To perform duties directly related to the operation of the train or track car
when radio communication has failed; or
(2) To perform duties directly related to the operation of the railroad when the
railroad is not required by Federal regulation to provide a working radio.
When the railroad is not required by Federal regulation to provide a working
radio, an employee may use a railroad-supplied electronic device for assigned
duties after a safety briefing, provided all employees responsible for the
movement of the train or track car agree that it is safe to do so.
(d) Supplemental Reference Materials: The use of digital and display functions
of an electronic device is authorized as a supplemental means to refer to a
railroad rule, special instruction, timetable, or other directive.
(e) Documentation of a Safety Hazard: Use is authorized for still photograph
documentation of a safety hazard or a violation of a rail safety law, regulation,
order, or standard provided the device is turned off immediately after the
documentation has been made, unless its use is otherwise permitted.
2. Restrictions
(a) Use in Locomotive Cab or Control Compartment
(1) Use of a railroad-supplied electronic device for an authorized business
purpose by an employee controlling the movement of a train or track car
is prohibited:
i. When the train or track car is moving,
ii. When any employee is assisting in the preparation of the equipment for
movement, or
iii. When any train crew member is on the ground, or riding rolling equipment
during a switching operation.
Since an engineer typically wouldn't have a company cell phone, the rules allowing personal cell phone use apply but are subject to this special instruction on the NEC:
716-S1. USE OF PERSONAL ELECTRONIC DEVICES: RESTRICTIONS
In the application of Rule 716, a personal electronic device must not be used when
a railroad radio or a railroad-supplied electronic device is available.
It your radio works, that is supposed to be the primary method of communication.
Amtrak's rule on electronic devices is more restrictive than the federal requirements. In general, engineers are not issued company cell phones. Assistant conductors are not issued company cells. In general, road conductors on regular assignments are issued company cell phones. Now, some of those scanners double as cell phones, but there are strict limits on when, where and how they are operated. In an emergency (which has an established criteria), you may use your personal cell phone.
My understanding is that the telephone is never to be used while a train is in motion. In motion one is only allowed to use the radio. However, I have not seen the actual rule and its fine prints, so I could be wrong.[/i
Radio transmission should be available in recorded form (if they are treated at the same level of importance as Air Traffic Control Comms) but probably not all telephone conversations, except perhaps via NSA
For your entertainment, Jis:
b. Railroad-Supplied Electronic Devices
An employee may use a railroad-supplied electronic device only for an authorized
business purpose as prescribed below.
1. Authorized Business Purposes: Subject to the Restrictions below, the following
are authorized business purposes for railroad-supplied electronic devices by
an employee who is not controlling a moving train or track car:
(a) Emergencies: Use is authorized for voice communication to respond to or
coordinate an emergency situation involving the operation of the railroad or to
respond to an emergency encountered while on-duty.
(b) Assigned Tasks Directly Related to Duties: Use is authorized for revenue
related functions, delay reporting, mechanical defect troubleshooting and
reporting, roadway maintenance work, passenger service requests, and numerical
calculations.
© Radio Communication Failure: Use is authorized for voice communication:
(1) To perform duties directly related to the operation of the train or track car
when radio communication has failed; or
(2) To perform duties directly related to the operation of the railroad when the
railroad is not required by Federal regulation to provide a working radio.
When the railroad is not required by Federal regulation to provide a working
radio, an employee may use a railroad-supplied electronic device for assigned
duties after a safety briefing, provided all employees responsible for the
movement of the train or track car agree that it is safe to do so.
(d) Supplemental Reference Materials: The use of digital and display functions
of an electronic device is authorized as a supplemental means to refer to a
railroad rule, special instruction, timetable, or other directive.
(e) Documentation of a Safety Hazard: Use is authorized for still photograph
documentation of a safety hazard or a violation of a rail safety law, regulation,
order, or standard provided the device is turned off immediately after the
documentation has been made, unless its use is otherwise permitted.
2. Restrictions
(a) Use in Locomotive Cab or Control Compartment
(1) Use of a railroad-supplied electronic device for an authorized business
purpose by an employee controlling the movement of a train or track car
is prohibited:
i. When the train or track car is moving,
ii. When any employee is assisting in the preparation of the equipment for
movement, or
iii. When any train crew member is on the ground, or riding rolling equipment
during a switching operation.
Since an engineer typically wouldn't have a company cell phone, the rules allowing personal cell phone use apply but are subject to this special instruction on the NEC:
716-S1. USE OF PERSONAL ELECTRONIC DEVICES: RESTRICTIONS
In the application of Rule 716, a personal electronic device must not be used when
a railroad radio or a railroad-supplied electronic device is available.
It your radio works, that is supposed to be the primary method of communication.
jis
Permanent Way Inspector
Staff member
Administator
Moderator
AU Supporting Member
Gathering Team Member
Thank you. I think we were all more or less on the right track (except of course where we were not ).
).
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Ryan
Court Jester
Ditto!
KmH
Engineer
Are the news media, this far from the derailment, still so uniformed that they show a photo of a train Conductor while doing a story about the Engineer's cell phone usage the day of the derailment?
Or did they use a photo of an Amtrak Conductor because his hat has the Amtrak logo on it?
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/amtrak-derailment-was-the-train-engineer-texting/vi-BBk4jeG
Or did they use a photo of an Amtrak Conductor because his hat has the Amtrak logo on it?
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/amtrak-derailment-was-the-train-engineer-texting/vi-BBk4jeG
fairviewroad
Engineer
- Joined
- Jan 13, 2011
- Messages
- 3,389
They didn't use a photo "of an Amtrak conductor." They used a photo of the specific individual who was the Engineer of the train. That photo is one of the few publicly circulating photos of him. That is what he happened to be wearing on the day the photo was taken. I don't see the problem, honestly.
G
Gene Poon
Guest
This concerns the emergency order in which the FRA required
Amtrak to impose a 50mph speed limit on the curve in
Philadelphia where the deadly wreck of Amtrak
Train 188(12) occurred, to implement Automatic Train
Control at that location, to survey its entire Northeast
Corridor for more such locations where additional speed
limitations and enforcement will be required, and to
install speed warning and advisory signage on the Northeast
Corridor.
==============================================
FRA Emergency Order No. 31
WASHINGTON – The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) today issued
an Emergency Order that will assist in controlling passenger train
speeds at certain locations on the Northeast Corridor (NEC). Today’s
order is the latest in a series of actions the FRA has taken in the
wake of last week’s derailment of Amtrak Train #188.
FRA also announced today its intention to take additional actions in
the coming days to address potential speed issues on all other
passenger corridors.
Last Saturday, FRA instructed Amtrak to immediately take several
actions to improve safety along the NEC. As stated in that weekend
announcement, today’s Emergency Order formalizes those instructions.
“Although we do not yet know what caused the derailment of Amtrak
Train #188, the information we do have underscores the need to
continue to do all we can to further promote safety along the
Northeast Corridor,” said U.S. Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx.
“Today’s action will help prevent similar incidents from occurring on
the NEC until Amtrak completes its installation of Positive Train
Control later this year.”
The Emergency Order requires Amtrak to take a series of steps to
improve safety along the Northeast Corridor, including implementing
Automatic Train Control (ATC) code changes and modifications,
adopting other safety procedures at several curve locations with
significant speed reductions, and submitting an action plan to FRA
outlining additional steps.
FRA will take additional steps in the coming days and weeks to ensure
other corridors are addressing potential over-speed issues as well.
“The Northeast Corridor is the busiest rail corridor in the country,
and the steps we have ordered Amtrak to take will immediately improve
safety on this busy corridor,” said Acting Federal Railroad
Administrator Sarah Feinberg. “But in the days and weeks to come, we
will also do more – while FRA will continue to push Amtrak and other
commuter lines to achieve full implementation of Positive Train
Control, we will also work with them in the short term to immediately
address potential over-speed issues.”
The Emergency Order requires Amtrak to immediately implement a code
change to its ATC system near the Frankford Junction curve in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The change must enforce the passenger
train speed limit of 50 mph, or lower, for northbound trains
approaching the curve. Amtrak implemented this change prior to the
restart of service on Monday.
In addition, Amtrak must survey the NEC to identify each main track
curve where there is a reduction of more than 20 mph from the maximum
authorized approach speed to that curve for passenger trains, and
provide a list of each location to the FRA.
Following Amtrak’s identification of the curves referenced above,
Amtrak must develop and submit an action plan to FRA that
accomplishes each of the following:
Identify appropriate modifications to Amtrak’s existing ATC system or
other signal systems (or alternative operational changes) to enable
warning and enforcement of applicable passenger train speeds at
identified curves.
Target dates for implementing each identified modification to
Amtrak’s existing ATC system or other signal systems (or alternative
operational changes) to enable warning and enforcement of passenger
train speeds at the identified curves.
Amtrak must submit the action plan to the FRA within 20 days of the
date of the Emergency Order.
In addition, Amtrak must begin to install additional wayside signage
alerting engineers and conductors of the maximum authorized passenger
train speed throughout its Northeast Corridor system no later than 30
days after the date of the order.
Amtrak to impose a 50mph speed limit on the curve in
Philadelphia where the deadly wreck of Amtrak
Train 188(12) occurred, to implement Automatic Train
Control at that location, to survey its entire Northeast
Corridor for more such locations where additional speed
limitations and enforcement will be required, and to
install speed warning and advisory signage on the Northeast
Corridor.
==============================================
FRA Emergency Order No. 31
WASHINGTON – The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) today issued
an Emergency Order that will assist in controlling passenger train
speeds at certain locations on the Northeast Corridor (NEC). Today’s
order is the latest in a series of actions the FRA has taken in the
wake of last week’s derailment of Amtrak Train #188.
FRA also announced today its intention to take additional actions in
the coming days to address potential speed issues on all other
passenger corridors.
Last Saturday, FRA instructed Amtrak to immediately take several
actions to improve safety along the NEC. As stated in that weekend
announcement, today’s Emergency Order formalizes those instructions.
“Although we do not yet know what caused the derailment of Amtrak
Train #188, the information we do have underscores the need to
continue to do all we can to further promote safety along the
Northeast Corridor,” said U.S. Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx.
“Today’s action will help prevent similar incidents from occurring on
the NEC until Amtrak completes its installation of Positive Train
Control later this year.”
The Emergency Order requires Amtrak to take a series of steps to
improve safety along the Northeast Corridor, including implementing
Automatic Train Control (ATC) code changes and modifications,
adopting other safety procedures at several curve locations with
significant speed reductions, and submitting an action plan to FRA
outlining additional steps.
FRA will take additional steps in the coming days and weeks to ensure
other corridors are addressing potential over-speed issues as well.
“The Northeast Corridor is the busiest rail corridor in the country,
and the steps we have ordered Amtrak to take will immediately improve
safety on this busy corridor,” said Acting Federal Railroad
Administrator Sarah Feinberg. “But in the days and weeks to come, we
will also do more – while FRA will continue to push Amtrak and other
commuter lines to achieve full implementation of Positive Train
Control, we will also work with them in the short term to immediately
address potential over-speed issues.”
The Emergency Order requires Amtrak to immediately implement a code
change to its ATC system near the Frankford Junction curve in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The change must enforce the passenger
train speed limit of 50 mph, or lower, for northbound trains
approaching the curve. Amtrak implemented this change prior to the
restart of service on Monday.
In addition, Amtrak must survey the NEC to identify each main track
curve where there is a reduction of more than 20 mph from the maximum
authorized approach speed to that curve for passenger trains, and
provide a list of each location to the FRA.
Following Amtrak’s identification of the curves referenced above,
Amtrak must develop and submit an action plan to FRA that
accomplishes each of the following:
Identify appropriate modifications to Amtrak’s existing ATC system or
other signal systems (or alternative operational changes) to enable
warning and enforcement of applicable passenger train speeds at
identified curves.
Target dates for implementing each identified modification to
Amtrak’s existing ATC system or other signal systems (or alternative
operational changes) to enable warning and enforcement of passenger
train speeds at the identified curves.
Amtrak must submit the action plan to the FRA within 20 days of the
date of the Emergency Order.
In addition, Amtrak must begin to install additional wayside signage
alerting engineers and conductors of the maximum authorized passenger
train speed throughout its Northeast Corridor system no later than 30
days after the date of the order.
Ryan
Court Jester
engineers not at fault ican feel it.
yarrow
Engineer
what a snide and totally characteristic comment from you, ryan. gene poon has, imho, the most accurate info on amtrak around. i suppose the idea of showing a little respect is lost on you
On the other hand, if they know each other and are friends, then I would characterize the remark as terse and informative, instead of snide.
We can't tell the tone of the comment just by reading it.
jb
jis
Permanent Way Inspector
Staff member
Administator
Moderator
AU Supporting Member
Gathering Team Member
Just out of curiosity I have been reading a few freight accident reports, specifically collisions caused by overspeeding with two crew members in the cab. Unfortunately these are not very uncommon. This one caught my attention:
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAR1402.pdf
In summary, Engineer blanked out, yet continued to call out signals following the Conductor's call. In dark night the Conductor could not judge speed past an Approach signal. The Engineer told him it was 30 something and he believed it sitting in the cab while they were actually doing 50 something. There is no reason at all to believe that the Conductor was not a conscientious person doing his job the best he could. I mention this example apropos the spat that we had about "every Conductor knowing their precise location and speed at all times". Such may be the ideal, but it is not achievable in reality for various reasons, even when the Conductor is at no fault while sitting in the cab. Also a case where the Conductor finally realized there was something amiss and hit the emergency, but it was too late and made little difference to the outcome. This is a poster child for why PTC is necessary even after you put two or even 16 people in the cab.
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAR1402.pdf
In summary, Engineer blanked out, yet continued to call out signals following the Conductor's call. In dark night the Conductor could not judge speed past an Approach signal. The Engineer told him it was 30 something and he believed it sitting in the cab while they were actually doing 50 something. There is no reason at all to believe that the Conductor was not a conscientious person doing his job the best he could. I mention this example apropos the spat that we had about "every Conductor knowing their precise location and speed at all times". Such may be the ideal, but it is not achievable in reality for various reasons, even when the Conductor is at no fault while sitting in the cab. Also a case where the Conductor finally realized there was something amiss and hit the emergency, but it was too late and made little difference to the outcome. This is a poster child for why PTC is necessary even after you put two or even 16 people in the cab.
