Palmetto 89 Incident in Chester, Pa. (4/3/16)

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Thanks Bill, lucky you, truely a game for the ages and a heartbreaker for the Tarheels but America loves Underdogs!

It was exciting on TV,( I didn't have a dog in the hunt but my Longhorns did beat UNC on a Buzzer Beater Last Second Shot in Austin this year!),I can imagine that it was crazy in the Dome!
Yes, Lucky you Bill!!! I NEVER got to personally witness my UT Longhorns win any Championships !!!

I was attending school there from the Fall of 1973, so those four years SUCKED for Championships. There were SWC Titles, but --NO-- Cotton Bowl victories in my tenure. And NO wins over OU --- just one stinkin' tie, which as Darryl Royal so aptly said, "is like kissing your sister!" :( But... Texas does hold the record, twice, for longest consecutive wins over OU, "8". :)
 
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Today's trainorders has a post with Boardman's official statement on the 89 Incident.

It's basically boilerplate and lawyer tuned corporate speak, but does contain one misstatement about Amtrak's "stellar" Safety Record during his watch.

Not able to link but you can read it for free on trainorders.
 
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Wow is right! If this is correct this will be another hit to Boardman's Safety Legacy with Amtrak!

As you said, Unbelievable!
Unfortunately these practices apparently date all the way back to the 1990's when the SSD rules were put in place and apparently soon thereafter for various reasons a significant proportion of the people that the rules were supposed to apply to started ignoring the rules and Amtrak management did not seem to feel that it was worth enforcing the safety rules. So it is not just a Boardman problem. it appears to be a deeper systemic problem that has been festering now for over 20 years.

Rules are not worth the paper that they are written on if there is no governance mechanism in place to verify that the rules are actually being followed. Providing such governance is the job of the management. Apparently they have not been very successful in carrying out their job.

BTW, the specific rule in question is apparently this one:

140-S2. USE OF SUPPLEMENTAL SHUNTING DEVICE

This instruction requires the employee in charge of “covered fouling activities” to apply an approved Supplemental Shunting Device (SSD) to the track(s) to be fouled, after receiving foul time from the Dispatcher or Operator. The purpose of the SSD is to supplement, not replace, blocking device protection provided by the Dispatcher or Operator.

A. Covered Fouling Activities: Except as noted below, this instruction applies when equipment will be used to foul a track in signaled territory or within interlocking limits for more than 5 minutes.

This instruction does not apply when the fouling activity:

1. Requires Form D line 4 or line 5 authority,
Of course there still remains some confusion about whether the Dispatcher was actually aware of the foul time on track 3, and even if s/he was, then why such was not entered in the control system. So there is more to come I am sure.

I cannot imagine how bad the Amtrak safety culture is that SSG's would not be placed every single time a track is fouled, even if the foul is only going to last a moment. This is the classic, "we do this all the time and never have a problem" trap. The fact that it is reported that Amtrak has now purchased additional SSG's, if true, suggests that the higher-ups were well aware of the practice and at least tacitly condoned it. Disgraceful.

.
I usually stay out of these types of discussions for obvious reasons, but it is quite clear. We're assuming that the crew in question knew they were fouling. The rule states the use of a SSD is not required if the track was under FORM D Line 4 or 5 Authority.

Do either of you gentlemen know for certain that

a) the track was not under form d line 4 or 5

or

b) for one reason or another, the crew had reason to believe the track was under Form D Line 4 or 5.

I'm going to state that it is unlikely that a Line 5 was in play, but SSDs are not for all circumstances as listed above, particularly if a line 4 is used and the equipment fits the exceptions for that applicable rule. I may need to go out on a track and although I can't legally "foul," I can "hold." When I'm holding, I'm not going to have access to nor am I required to use the SSD.

There is a lot more to this than 15 or so lines that was presented out of a page and a half of rules. As Jis intimated, more details need to come out.

I thought this on Sunday, and still think it today. Joe Boardman should be escorted out of the building by security right now. Not when he "retires." Now. Eight passengers and three employees dead, and dozens of passengers hurt due to Amtrak operating violations (and, yes, I'm assuming the NTSB will blame Amtrak for #188 - as far as I'm concerned, that is all but a given). It's time for Mr. Boardman to be held accountable.

It should involve not only Boardman but the retinue of bureaucrats that he has brought in from the FRA in various key positions of relevance in this incident, who have all been remarkably silent while the fire burns their tent down.

Obviously, I can't comment on these statements but I also wonder what is happening with the Board of Directors. The silence is indeed deafening.
 
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It's basically boilerplate and lawyer tuned corporate speak, but does contain one misstatement about Amtrak's "stellar" Safety Record during his watch.

.
It could be argued that, technically speaking, a black hole is a star. Just saying. ;)
 
The OIG Report on safety record at Amtrak starts off with this remarkable piece of bureaucratese!:

The company has demonstrated a strong commitment to Safe-2-Safer, investing about $70.1million in the program since 2009.
However program results have been mixed and opportunities for improvement exist. Specifically (the bold highlights applied by me)

  • The company’s safety culture and working conditions have improved, as demonstrated by a net positive change in the safety culture since 2009 and the elimination of more than 2,700 reported unsafe working conditions.
  • The number of injuries reported by employees increased each year: with 695 employee injuries reported in 2009 and 1,301 injuries in 2013. This trend continued in 2014.
  • Employee injury claims increased by about 80 percent from 2009 through 2013 and the payments on these claims have cost the company about $79.6 million, which could increase by an additional $48.8 million.
Wait what? Things have improved and we have more injuries and higher claims payments? That is around $125 million in what a $3 to $3.5 billion (give or take) company. I wonder what the corresponding ratios are for other passenger carriers. Maybe that is close to the norm. I don't know. But off hand seems kinda high. Also has the trend line improved since the time of this report? I don't know, but certainly hope so.

Anyway, it is an interesting read. You can find it at: https://www.amtrakoig.gov/sites/default/files/reports/oig-a-2015-007.pdf

Specially Figure 7 on page 13 is impossible to spin in a positive way I am afraid.

BTW, Thirdrail. I absolutely agree that there are many other factors, and indeed it is possible and possibly even quite likely that due to miscommunication everyone was not on the same page in this particular case. One possible consequence is that the folks on the track were themselves not at fault for not applying SSD. But the fact still remains that a piece of equipment and a fast train traveling at over 100mph happened to be trying to occupy the same physical location at the same time, and that is demonstrably a breakdown of safety in some extremely serious way, with extremely serious consequences.

It is inevitable that such an incident will increase scrutiny and various facts that were not known to outsiders like me would become known and on occasions we might draw the wrong conclusions. However, though possibly a bit unrelated (different sort of safety issues being addressed), still, I find the OIG report on trends since 2009 quite alarming. One of the things that is of equivalent importance in the IT industry is information security and availability (which is where my expertise lies), where typically people don't get killed as often (though it could happen) but billions and trillions can be lost and reputations destroyed, with break in security of information, And lord knows we have our bad days too. But if a single company had a trend line like the one in Figure 7 quoted above, there would be many heads that would roll quite immediately. The fact that nothing happens at Amtrak concerns me and I am sure others.

Board of Directors of large corporations is a mystery to me. They seem to be quite oblivious of many things that they ought to know about in their decision making process, which is alarming too. Then again there are persistent rumors that many Board members are just rubber stamps and hold the positions due not necessarily to any specific expertise that they have in the area of managing the specific activity of the company. Who knows?
 
Seconded Bill! And what's the New Avatar? Thought you were a PRR guy for Life?
That is the Villanova Block "V." My beloved Wildcats are National Champions - and my wife and I were in Houston to see it happen in person. I'm still trying to catch my breath after that incredible final game against North Carolina.
Back in 2009 when Villanova won the 1-AA Football National Championship I was in the Met. lounge in CHI and saw a gentleman in a Nova sweatsuit. I congratulated him on the championship. He looked at me funny and said basketball season isn't even over yet.
 
Here is a closeup of the front end damage to ACS 627, then parked in Race St. Yard in Philly, wit the entire consist of 89.

http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=4434018

The damage now appears to be relatively superficial. but of course only an expert taking a closer look can tell for sure.

Since then it has been moved out of there, possibly to Wilmington, per report around 4:50pm on Wednesday April 6.

Here is a general view before the engine was moved:

http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=4434017
 
Here is a closeup of the front end damage to ACS 627, then parked in Race St. Yard in Philly, wit the entire consist of 89. The damage now appears to be relatively superficial. but of course only an expert taking a closer look can tell for sure. Since then it has been moved out of there, possibly to Wilmington, per report around 4:50pm on Wednesday April 6.
A random hobo told me the lomotive has severe frame damage and that it's scheduled to be scrapped next week.
 
Here is a closeup of the front end damage to ACS 627, then parked in Race St. Yard in Philly, wit the entire consist of 89.

http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=4434018

The damage now appears to be relatively superficial. but of course only an expert taking a closer look can tell for sure.

Since then it has been moved out of there, possibly to Wilmington, per report around 4:50pm on Wednesday April 6.

Here is a general view before the engine was moved:

http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=4434017
And if you look closely at that last photo, you'll catch a view of the three new VLII cars; bagg-dorm, diner and sleeper looking ready to head south.
 
Wall Street Journal has a new article on the riot act that has been read to Amtrak, and which Boardman has described as a good thing(!) because it will finally convince everyone that safety is really important!!!

Leaving that aside for the moment, the WSJ article is at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-railroad-administration-calls-for-immediate-amtrak-safety-reviews-1460000996

As usual, if you are not a WSJ subscriber you will have difficulty getting to see the whole article. you can try the google trick mentioned in the previous pointer to a WSJ article. but meanwhile here is a critical quote from the article which has a bearing on what Thirdrail mentioned in his post yesterday:

Though officials haven’t yet completed their investigations into what went wrong, they already have uncovered violations of safety protocols that are “sufficiently troubling” that the agency decided to step in, an FRA official said.

Investigators have learned that the foreman of one of the work crews contacted a dispatcher using a cellphone, not an Amtrak-issued radio, a person familiar with the matter said. That is a frequent practice, some in the industry said, and it is permitted in some cases by Amtrak rules, where dead spots don’t allow radio communications to work.

But others warned that the use of cellphones poses greater danger, because unlike a radio, cellphones don’t allow other workers to overhear interactions with rail controllers, or to correct misunderstandings about who may be using different sections of a track.

“Many catastrophes have been avoided by people catching things other people said and straightening it out before it happened,” one of the people said.

A stand-down exercise effectively requires workers involved in safety-critical tasks to drill on the basics. The goal is to ensure that communication and safety protocols are in place to avoid the cardinal sin of railroad operation: incidents, like Sunday’s, in which a train, moving at more than 100 miles an hour, suddenly encounters workers or vehicles blocking its path.
So it would appear that the two poor souls as far as they knew were working on a protected piece of track. What is more galling is the person that used the cell phone was nowhere near the work site when he released the foul by cell phone, and the dispatcher accepted it, because apparently Amtrak safety culture allows such to take place often as a matter of routine. This fellow just apparently packed off and left without even bothering to talk to the incoming foreman!

Meanwhile on the matter of shunting, apparently back in '98, both Amtrak and FRA thought it was a bad idea to use shunts of any sort, and everything should depend just on the sanity and correctness of the dispatcher's actions with no fall back stop for the safety of the poor souls on the track. There is an interesting article quoting an article from back then from Philly.com on the controversy regarding shunting that brewed back than:

http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/in-transit/Amtrak-train-crash-mirrors.html
 
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Here is a closeup of the front end damage to ACS 627, then parked in Race St. Yard in Philly, wit the entire consist of 89.

http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=4434018

The damage now appears to be relatively superficial. but of course only an expert taking a closer look can tell for sure.

Since then it has been moved out of there, possibly to Wilmington, per report around 4:50pm on Wednesday April 6.

Here is a general view before the engine was moved:

http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=4434017

That entire consist (including the 627) is still in Race Street. It won't be for too much longer, but it is still there now.
 
Here is a closeup of the front end damage to ACS 627, then parked in Race St. Yard in Philly, wit the entire consist of 89. The damage now appears to be relatively superficial. but of course only an expert taking a closer look can tell for sure. Since then it has been moved out of there, possibly to Wilmington, per report around 4:50pm on Wednesday April 6.
A random hobo told me the lomotive has severe frame damage and that it's scheduled to be scrapped next week.
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Here is a closeup of the front end damage to ACS 627, then parked in Race St. Yard in Philly, wit the entire consist of 89.

http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=4434018

The damage now appears to be relatively superficial. but of course only an expert taking a closer look can tell for sure.

Since then it has been moved out of there, possibly to Wilmington, per report around 4:50pm on Wednesday April 6.

Here is a general view before the engine was moved:

http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=4434017

That entire consist (including the 627) is still in Race Street. It won't be for too much longer, but it is still there now.
Is the locomotive in bad shape? Do we know if it's going to Bear, Delaware? How will they repair it?

What about the cars on the train? I heard there was damage to the first car, will it need to be scrapped? Was there anymore damage to the other cars?
 
I've been reading thru here, and the articles in the news, and I don't see what Amtrak itself did wrong. It seems to me, that Amtrak has all the right rules and procedures already in place, to prevent this from happening. Its just, for some reason not clearly known yet, they weren't followed.
 
I've been reading thru here, and the articles in the news, and I don't see what Amtrak itself did wrong. It seems to me, that Amtrak has all the right rules and procedures already in place, to prevent this from happening. Its just, for some reason not clearly known yet, they weren't followed.
It's a corporate culture issue when it comes to safely fowling a track. Ever since the rules were put in place, from what I've heard, the rules have been enforced only once in awhile.
 
The problem appears to be that tracks are being released from the foreman to the dispatcher when they shouldn't be. The foreman did not perform his job correctly and got people killed as a result.

The foreman is supposed to confirm that:

(a) all equipment or debris which might prevent safe movement of trains is off the track,

(b) individually confirm that each member of his crew is safely off the tracks,

(c ) individually confirm that each member of his crew knows that he is planning to release the track back to the dispatcher,

before actually releasing the track back to the dispatcher.

This is just general principles of safeworking, not even any specific rulebook.

It's obvious this didn't happen.

If the foreman was supposed to be handing the track off to a different work crew, the procedure might be different but the principles are the same....

CSX has an extremely talkative method of handling work zones. Amtrak doesn't, and probably should.

I never found out what the rules violation was on the Empire Service train I was on which killed a trackworker in fall of 2014. I've been waiting for the NTSB investigation report but I haven't seen one.
 
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Is the locomotive in bad shape? Do we know if it's going to Bear, Delaware? How will they repair it?

What about the cars on the train? I heard there was damage to the first car, will it need to be scrapped? Was there anymore damage to the other cars?
Unfortunately warrenwarner, unlike some other members of this board, I can't look at a picture (or actually look at one in person) and tell if it is "in bad shape." To me, if it doesn't appear as it did when it was delivered, it is in bad shape! So, I can't tell you how they will repair it, if it is indeed repairable. I DO know upon release (any day now), it is not going to Bear.

Same goes for the cars. I have seen things that looked worse but who knows what happened underneath. It is premature to speculate until they are over a pit and fully inspected. I do know that some cars are likely a little worse wear than others which is why certain cars are going to different facilities.

Use your imagination.
 
Let me ask here for some clarification. From the little bits that I've parsed, the backhoe was operating on an adjacent track - not the one that the Palmetto was actually on.

Obviously, if the train hit the backhoe and spun the bucket into the first car, there was a conflict (duh).

My question is, if there are four tracks, and say 89 was on track 2, and the backhoe was on track 3, could track 3 still be considered "protected" even though there is a chance that it could foul track 2?

I guess my question is, what constitutes a "protected track"? Obviously, it has to be more than just the track being worked on.

The way some articles read, sound like the backhoe was on the same track as 89, which I don't think was the case. Please enlighten me.
 
Let me ask here for some clarification. From the little bits that I've parsed, the backhoe was operating on an adjacent track - not the one that the Palmetto was actually on.

Obviously, if the train hit the backhoe and spun the bucket into the first car, there was a conflict (duh).

My question is, if there are four tracks, and say 89 was on track 2, and the backhoe was on track 3, could track 3 still be considered "protected" even though there is a chance that it could foul track 2?

I guess my question is, what constitutes a "protected track"? Obviously, it has to be more than just the track being worked on.

The way some articles read, sound like the backhoe was on the same track as 89, which I don't think was the case. Please enlighten me.
My understanding is that 89 was on track 3, LORAM was on track 2, and the backhoe was supposed to have a foul on track 3. The accident happened just after shift change, and the previous supervisor had released the track back to the dispatcher, with the new supervisor not yet in possession of track 3.
 
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